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Abstract 
 
Emotions  differ  between  cultures,  especially  in  their  eliciting  conditions,  social 
acceptability, forms of expression, and co extent of terminology.  This thesis examines the 
psychological sensation and social expression of envy and jealousy in Classical Athens.  
Previous scholarship on envy and jealousy (Walcot 1978, Konstan and Rutter 2003) has 
primarily taken a lexical approach, focusing on usage of the Greek words phthonos (envy, 
begrudging spite, possessive jealousy) and zêlos (emulative rivalry). 
 
This lexical approach has value, especially in dealing with texts and civilizations from the 
past, but also limitations.  These are particularly apparent with envy and jealousy in ancient 
Greece as: a) overt expression of phthonos is taboo; b) there is no Classical Greek label for 
sexual jealousy.  Accordingly a different, complementary approach is required, which reads 
the expressed values and actions of entire situations. 
 
Building on recent developments in the reading of emotion episodes in classical texts, this 
thesis applies to Athenian culture and literature insights on the contexts, conscious and 
subconscious motivations, subjective manifestations, and indicative behaviours of envy and 
jealousy, derived from modern (post 1950) philosophical, psychological, psychoanalytical, 
sociological  and  anthropological  scholarship.    This  enables  the  exploration  of  both  the 
explicit theorisation and evaluation of envy and jealousy, and also more oblique ways in 
which they find expression across different genres. 
 
Topics  examined  include:  1. Aristotle’s  analysis  of  the  nature  of  phthonos  and  its 
relationship  to  other  emotions;  2. the  persuasion  or  manipulation  of  audiences  using 
phthonos,  both  overt  and  masked,  in  Attic  oratory;  3. the  arousal  of  envy  and  moral 
indignation (as a ‘safe’ form of transmuted envy) by ‘Old’ Comedy; 4. phthonos scenarios 
and their destructive outcome in tragedy; 5. the nature of Greek sexual jealousy, especially 
as  a  gendered  emotion  in  tragedy,  and  the  use  of  tragic  themes  in  other  genres  to 
manipulate audiences’ expectations. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 
This  thesis  examines  the  psychological  sensation,  social  expression  and  literary 
representation of envy and jealousy in Athens during the Classical period (479 322).  It is 
primarily a contribution to the increasing body of research into the emotions of the ancient 
Greeks and Romans that has been published in the last two decades.
1  It also develops a 
methodological approach which contributes to the ongoing debate as to how research on 
ancient emotions should be conducted.  Finally, since (for reasons given below) my main 
source is literary texts, I also aim to shed light on a number of literary issues relating 
especially to the genres of tragedy, comedy and oratory, including thematic and rhetorical 
issues, and the dynamics of the text ‘reader’ (or more properly text audience) relationship. 
 
1.1  Methodological approach 
 
Emotion studies is a highly multidisciplinary  field.  There has been a  large  amount of 
research  into  the  nature  of  emotions  (both  specific  emotions  and  emotions  in  general) 
across a variety of disciplines,
2 especially since the cognitivist ‘revolution’ of the 1970s.
3  
Within this body of research, many psychologists have noted that it often makes more sense 
                                                 
1 Major works include: Cairns (1993); Williams (1993); Nussbaum (1994); Braund and Gill (1997); Konstan 
(1997);  Sihvola  and  Engberg Pedersen  (1998);  Konstan  (2001);  W.V.  Harris  (2001);  Nussbaum  (2001); 
Braund and Most (2003); Kaster (2005); Sternberg (2005); Konstan (2006); Graver (2007); J.T. Fitzgerald 
(2007). 
2 E.g. cognitive and evolutionary psychology, neurobiology, physiology, sociology, anthropology, philosophy 
and history.  For a useful summary by a Classicist of the major approaches, see Konstan (2006) 7 27; see also 
Cairns (2003a) 11 20, Cairns (2008).  Among non Classical scholarship, Rorty (1980a), Lewis and Haviland 
Jones (2000) and Solomon (2004) are excellent edited volumes that demonstrate a variety of disciplinary 
approaches to the emotions.  Griffiths (1997) provides an useful critique of what the major schools have to 
offer before (less persuasively) attempting a synthesis. 
3 Cognitivists argue that an emotion arises from a sensory perception that is evaluated by our brains (this is a 
cognition), automatically arousing certain physiological and psychological responses.  Strict cognitivists – 
e.g. Solomon (1993), Lazarus (1991), Nussbaum (2001) – believe cognition is the only important element in 
emotion,  and  most  emotionologists  currently  ascribe  it  a  major,  if  not  primary,  role.    Set  against  the 
cognitivists  are  ‘neo Darwinists’  such  as  Paul  Ekman,  who  are  most  interested  in  the  physiological  and 
neurobiological  effects  of  an  emotion  (in  Ekman’s  case,  facial  changes  –  e.g.  Ekman  (1980a)).    Their 
approach dates back to Darwin (1872) and James (1884), who argue that physiological changes are the initial 
emotional response, and thinking comes later.  The cognitivist approach has similarities to Aristotle’s view of 
the emotions (see ch.4), though Aristotle was more concerned with the sociological aspect of cognition than 
some of his latter day successors.  Chapter 1: Introduction 
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to  speak  of  an  emotional  episode  (or  scenario),  than  an  emotion  per  se.
4    Emotional 
episodes begin with cognitions – perceptions of (or thoughts about) a situation – and our 
interpretations  of  them,  frequently  called  the  ‘antecedent  conditions’.
5    These  arouse 
psychological and physiological feelings, the ‘emotion’ itself.  Attempts to regulate or cope 
with the emotion may follow;
6 then verbal expressions and/or physical actions resulting 
from the emotion; and eventually resolution.  Griffiths refers to the antecedent conditions 
(or ‘stimuli’) as the ‘input’ part of an emotion, and the rest as the ‘output’.
7 
 
Elements  of  some  emotions,  especially  on  the  output  side,  are  often  considered  to  be 
‘universal’ or ‘pan cultural’: for example, the set of so called ‘basic’ or ‘primary’ emotions 
(anger, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust) which have been identified in very young 
children,  and  which  have  associated  facial  expressions  that  appear  to  be  present  in  all 
cultures (albeit occasionally repressed).
8  However, even for these emotions, many aspects 
will vary between cultures.  Cairns notes these include their eliciting conditions, social 
acceptability of the emotion, socially accepted forms of expression (which may vary not 
just between societies, but also within them, e.g. between classes and genders), and the co 
extent of their terminology.
9  Other emotions (including envy and jealousy), frequently 
called ‘non basic’ or ‘secondary’, are thought to be more socially complex and therefore 
develop later as the child learns the social rules of his culture.  They may involve blends of 
                                                 
4 Parrott (1991) 4: “… an emotional episode is the story of an emotional event, and it seems a natural unit of 
analysis for understanding human emotions.” 
5 E.g. Sharpsteen (1991) 37 defines ‘antecedent conditions’ as “the elements physically or objectively present 
in a situation, along with the perceptions, interpretations, and appraisals of them”.  See Elster (1999) 249 71, 
Ben Ze’ev (2000) 52 9. 
6 Psychoanalysts term these ‘defences’. 
7 Griffiths (1997) 55. 
8 Lewis (2000) 275 8 argues that neonates can show general distress and pleasure; by the age of three months 
joy, sadness, surprise and disgust can be identified, and anger and fear shortly after – cf. Bates (2000) 384 5, 
Wierzbicka  (1999)  24 5.    Griffiths  (1997)  44 99  describes  Darwin’s  work  on  these  emotions  and  more 
modern research on the so called ‘affect programs’ based on them.  Ekman (1980b) believes there are up to 
nine universal emotions observable even in babies: six certainly (anger, fear, sadness, happiness, surprise, and 
disgust) and perhaps three others (interest, shame, and contempt).  Envy and jealousy are not found on any list 
of  primary  or  basic  emotions,  with  the  exception  of  Klein  (1957/1975),  who  associates  envy  with  the 
frustration a baby directs at his mother’s breast when it withholds the milk (s)he wants.  Joffe (1969) 539 42 
takes issue with Kleinian primary envy from a variety of perspectives; see Roth and Lemma (2008) and H.F. 
Smith (2008) for recent research dealing with Klein (1957/1975).  Lewis (2000) 277 argues that envy emerges 
in the latter half of the second year of life, along with embarrassment and empathy.  Frankel and Sherick 
(1977) report that while a very young child will desire and take a toy, (s)he will have no awareness that it 
belongs to another child; only later will (s)he develop that awareness and an attendant hostility characteristic 
of envy – see ch.2.2.2; cf. Rosenblatt (1988) 57 8. 
9 Cairns (2003a) 12 13.  There are also personal differences between individuals who are homologous within 
their society. Chapter 1: Introduction 
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more basic elements (e.g. guilt may include fear and sadness, jealousy may include fear and 
anger).
10  Non basic emotions can vary even more widely between cultures than basic ones.  
Constructionists argue that the elements of emotions that differ between cultures are so vast 
that each emotion should be considered as entirely unique to that culture, and cite culture 
specific  emotions  such  as  Japanese  amae  in  support.
11    However,  such  emotions  are 
exceptions.    While  there  may  be  major  differences  in  many  aspects  (such  as  those 
mentioned above), other cultures’ emotions are usually identifiable, and relatable to our 
own emotions.
12 
 
Research into classical emotions has so far largely focused on emotions that are freely and 
frequently expressed in ancient literature – anger, shame, pity, grief etc.  It has primarily 
taken a lexical approach, focusing on Greek emotion words and the contexts in which they 
are used (by a particular author or more generally), and comparing them with the nearest 
equivalents  in  our  own  lexicon.    Previous  scholarship  on  envy  and  jealousy  has,  for 
instance, mostly concentrated on usage of the Greek words phthonos (envy, begrudging 
spite,  possessive  jealousy  –  see  ch.3)  and  zêlos  (emulative  rivalry).
13    Such  a  lexical 
approach has value, particularly in dealing with texts and civilisations from the past, and 
this  thesis  will  not  neglect  lexical  issues.    However  a  purely  lexical  approach  has 
limitations.  First, it encourages too great a dependence on the labels our own language 
                                                 
10 Damasio (1994) 131 9; Elster (1999) 242; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 104 14; Johnson Laird and Oatley (2000) 
466 7. 
11 A kind of “pleasure at being dependent” – see Morsbach and Tyler (1986).  Griffiths (1997) 141 gives the 
south east Asian amok, or “being a wild pig”, as another example – see Newman (1964) for more details.  For 
constructionist approaches to emotions see Harré (1986), Harré and Parrott (1996). 
12 For instance, ancient Greek orgê is clearly related to English “anger”, and aidôs to English “shame”, even if 
the boundaries of these ancient Greek terms are not co terminous with their English equivalents. 
13 I refer principally to Walcot (1978) and Konstan and Rutter (2003).  Walcot (1978) provides an overview of 
Greek  envy  over  the  thirteen  centuries  from  Homer  to  Boethius,  from  a  comparative anthropological 
perspective.    He  makes  some  false  generalisations  (e.g.  that  zêlos  should  be  translated  “jealousy”,  and 
phthonos “envy”, their use being in “much the same way as their English equivalents” (2); or dividing envy 
into “‘professional envy’, ‘sibling envy’ and ‘sexual envy’” (3), passing over the many instances of class or 
wealth envy in fourth century oratory, and the phthonos of the gods – though he later devotes two chapters to 
this, undermining his own tripartite division); however the book is still highly relevant and contains many 
useful insights.  Very little else was published on Greek envy (with the exception of Pindar’s poetics – see 
Bulman (1992); Kurke (1991) 195 224) until Konstan and Rutter (2003).  This collection of essays has begun 
the modern psychological investigation into the ‘rivalrous’ emotions in ancient Greece.  However, most of the 
chapters limit themselves to an examination of phthonos (and zêlos) in one author or genre, and many appear 
to  do  so  without  any  wider  insight  into  investigations  into  these  emotions  in  fields  other  than  Classics.  
Despite the many strides made by Konstan and Rutter (2003), no comprehensive socio psychological analysis 
of ancient Greek envy and jealousy exists prior to this thesis. Chapter 1: Introduction 
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uses, in trying to understand those of another language/culture.
14  Second, our own emotion 
labels can hide from our conscious minds the emotional scenarios they imply – which may 
not, in part or in total, be applicable to those of another culture.
15  A further problem with a 
lexical approach to envy and jealousy in ancient Greece, is that (unlike anger, shame etc.) 
these emotions are not freely and frequently expressed in Greek.  This is for two reasons: 
first,  because  overt,  first person  expression  of  phthonos  (i.e.  “I  feel  envy”)  is  taboo;
16 
second, because there is no Classical Greek word for sexual jealousy.
17  Such problems are 
not limited to these two emotions.
18 
 
While a lexical approach is useful, therefore, it cannot be the sole – or even the primary – 
methodology for a detailed investigation of the emotion concepts of another culture, and 
particularly  cannot  be  the  sole  approach  of  this  thesis.    A  complementary  approach  is 
required, which reads the expressed values and actions of entire situations.  Accordingly I 
adopt the approach of emotion ‘scripts’ advocated and used to great effect by Kaster.
19  
‘Scripts’ are essentially similar to the emotion scenarios discussed above, and allow us to 
get behind the terms “envy” and “jealousy” to achieve a greater understanding of what 
actually happens in prototypical envy  and jealousy scenarios.
20   In this way  I apply to 
Athenian  culture  and  literature  insights  on  the  contexts,  conscious  and  subconscious 
motivations,  subjective  manifestations,  and  indicative  behaviours  of  what  we  truly 
understand by the terms “envy” and “jealousy”, derived from modern research into these 
                                                 
14 Konstan (2006) shows too great a tendency to look for one to one equivalents.  For instance, he runs into 
difficulties trying to argue (77 90), somewhat unpersuasively, that Aristotle’s praotês (Rh. 2.3) should be 
translated into English as “satisfaction” rather than “calming down”.  This misses the point that praotês is 
neither equivalent to “satisfaction” nor to “calming down”: praotês is praotês, an ancient Greek phenomenon, 
and translation of any particular instance of the word is secondary to understanding that phenomenon.  Kaster 
(2005) 7 makes a similar point about translating Latin fastidium. 
15 Cairns (2008) 46 makes similar points. 
16 While Greeks frequently admit anger, shame, pity, grief etc., they almost never admit envy – see pp.57 8. 
17 Zêlotypia is normally translated “jealousy”, but this is controversial, at least in the Classical period (see 
ch.8, esp. p.201 3).  Further, the first surviving instance of the term dates from the 380s, more than halfway 
through the period covered by this thesis. 
18 Other emotions (e.g. arrogance) are morally problematic and unsuited to first person expression; other 
emotions (e.g. ‘positive’ pride) lack an ancient Greek label. 
19 Kaster (2005) 8 9, 85 describes these as “narrative processes” or “dramatic scripts”.  Cairns (2008) 46 also 
argues for the use of scripts – see also his references to further scholarship (59 n.17).  Wierzbicka (1999) 
makes the case for meta language (instead of English language) scripts, though this has attracted criticism – 
see e.g. Cairns (2008) 49 50. 
20 We can note that psychology can be obscured not just by the lexicon, but by the fact that people can react to 
situations with a mixture of emotions, only some of which they may be conscious of, or choose to express. Chapter 1: Introduction 
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emotions  in  a  variety  of  fields.
21    An  approach  derived  from  modern  social  scientific 
research does potentially have limitations, for instance the extent to which the phenomena 
are real within Athenian society, or how to avoid the circularity inherent in comparative 
studies where evidence is limited.  In this thesis I get around these limitations by using 
Aristotle’s examination of the socio psychology of phthonos as a control.  This enables me 
to  explore  not  merely  the  explicit  theorisation  and  evaluation  of  envy  and  jealousy  in 
ancient Greece, but also the more oblique ways in which they find expression across a 
variety of genres – including texts where the role of these emotions is currently under 
appreciated. 
 
1.2  The scope of the thesis 
 
Envy and jealousy are major topics (especially the former), and one could spend ten years 
investigating all their  aspects in Greek culture.   Of necessity, this thesis must limit its 
investigations.  In choosing to concentrate on Classical Athens, I am mindful of the concept 
of  an  ‘emotional  community’,  posited  by  Rosenwein.
22    Emotional  communities  are 
generally the same as social communities, in which members “have a common stake [and] 
interests” and are “tied together by fundamental assumptions, values, goals, feeling rules, 
and accepted modes of expression”.
23  At the highest level this could be a nation, a tribe or 
a  polis.    Within  this  overarching  community,  though,  will  be  subordinate  emotional 
communities, such as the family, Assembly members, tavern goers, celebrants at a sacrifice 
etc.; and as people move from one community to another they will adjust their cognitive 
judgments and emotional displays accordingly.
24 
 
A large majority of surviving (BCE) Greek texts come from Athens during the Classical 
period (479 322) and, while our evidence is still unsatisfactorily low, we have a relatively 
                                                 
21  The  fields  I  draw  on  most  particularly  are  philosophy,  psychology,  psychoanalysis,  sociology  and 
anthropology – see ch.2.  Despite the multidisciplinary nature of emotion studies, it is surprising how little 
interdisciplinary work there is in the field. 
22 Rosenwein (2002) 842 3; Rosenwein (2006) 24 6. 
23 Rosenwein (2006) 24, who gives a crowded street as an example of a group that is not an emotional 
community; emotional communities are also not generally co terminous with a genre.  However, they may be 
textual  communities,  e.g.  those  throughout  the  Roman  Empire  who  try  to  live  by  the  writings  of  Stoic 
philosophers. 
24 Rosenwein (2002) 842.  E.g. contemplative awe would be unusual in a pub, as raucous hilarity would in a 
church, while sexual desire might be best expressed in the privacy of the home – the same person might feel 
all three, but social rules govern what can be expressed where. Chapter 1: Introduction 
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greater volume and range of evidence (both in kind and chronologically) about democratic 
Athenian society and values.  For this reason I have chosen to concentrate on this society.  
That is not to say that Classical Athenian values would necessarily have differed in every 
respect from those of other poleis at the time, or of Athens at different times, but there is no 
guarantee of a total commonality of outlook.  Even leaving aside such a literary construct as 
Homeric society, arousal and appropriate expression of envy might well differ between 
democratic Athens and oligarchies of the fifth and fourth centuries, or between the oratory 
of  fourth century  Athens  and  that  of  the  first /second century  CE  Dio  of  Prusa;  again, 
sexual  jealousy  might  be  constructed  differently  in  the  literary  genres  of  fifth century 
tragedy  and  the  second /third century  CE  Greek  novel.    It  makes  sense  therefore  to 
concentrate on one society, after which one can branch out to see how envy and jealousy 
compare in other periods and places of ancient Greece. 
 
In this thesis, then, I have concentrated on the literature of Classical Athens, by which I 
mean literature written either for performance in Athens (e.g. tragedy, comedy, oratory), or 
written in the Athenian intellectual milieu.  I therefore include Aristotle, who lived and 
worked  in  Athens,  and  e.g.  whose  Rhetoric  must  clearly  have  taken  account  of  the 
development of oratory there.
25  However, I avoid Xenophon, who spent most of his adult 
life abroad, and mostly did not write for an Athenian audience;
26 likewise authors who are 
not Athenian (e.g. Herodotus), Classical (e.g. Solon), or either (e.g. Pindar).  This is not to 
say  that  these  authors  have  nothing  to  contribute  on  the  subject  of  envy  –  it  will  be 
immediately apparent that all three do, and I do not ignore them entirely; however, I treat 
them delicately (some more so than others), and avoid building any assumptions based on 
them into my analysis of Classical Athenian texts.
27 
 
Because the socio psychological approach is particularly well suited to cultural history, to 
ideas expressed in literature or philosophy, it is this that I focus on.  I therefore ignore 
                                                 
25 Similarly Plato in his analysis of comedy in the Philebus. 
26 In general, I avoid envy in inter polis or international relations.  While this would make a fascinating topic 
for an article, the extra community nature of such texts means that rules of arousal and expression are likely 
to differ from more Athenocentric texts. 
27 I take a little more licence with Menander in my chapter on sexual jealousy, (chronologically) as he came to 
maturity in the Classical period and his intellectual background is Aristotelian, (geographically) as his plays 
were written for performance at Athens even if set elsewhere, and (generally) because the construction of 
jealousy in his comedies appears to conform to that in Classical Athenian texts. Chapter 1: Introduction 
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material evidence such as decrees, epitaphs and curses:
28 the body of inscriptional evidence 
is vast and disparate, it is not immediately obvious that such texts will give insight into an 
emotional episode as such (antecedent conditions, psychological feelings etc.), and it may 
be  hard  to  control  the  results  since  (at  least  in  some  of  the  material)  imputation  of 
motivation will often be conjectural; there are also questions of methodology, as inclusion 
of material evidence would require a significant adjustment of the hermeneutic approach.
29  
Finally, it is socio psychological aspects that I focus on in literary and philosophical texts, 
rather than political or economic issues: leaving aside the question of how much institutions 
such as ostracism really owe to envy,
30 economic political envy has in any case already 
been well treated by Ober, as a by product of his investigation of mass (i.e. non elite) and 
elite relations.
31 
 
1.3  Outline of the thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into four parts, between which the argument develops linearly.  Some 
parts have more than one chapter, which can be considered side by side.  Part I (chapter 2) 
surveys  and  analyses  the  insights  of  modern  (post 1950)  philosophical,  psychological, 
psychoanalytical, sociological and anthropological research into envy and jealousy.  The 
two emotions are examined separately, and then compared for their differences and what 
they have in common.  I show that, while many cognitive psychologists prefer to separate 
envy (felt when I lack something I want) from jealousy (felt when I want to retain or regain 
something I have developed an exclusive bond with), others prefer to concentrate on the 
situational aspects of rivalry between two people for a mutually desired object or person.  
Both approaches have analytical value, but also limitations: the former position tends to 
draw a dividing line between envy and all types of jealousy (including sexual), ignoring the 
                                                 
28 Eidinow (2007) briefly refers to envy and jealousy in relation to curses in general (230 1), as well as envy 
tied specifically to curses relating to commercial competition (204 5) and the institution of the khorêgia (160, 
296 n.17).  Also on material evidence, see Dunbabin and Dickie (1983) on Greco Roman iconography of 
phthonos. 
29 Such evidence may be the subject of future studies, by myself or another. 
30 Some, e.g. Ranulf (1933) I.134 5 and ff., Walcot (1978) 53 61, have seen the institution of ostracism as a 
licensed outlet for envy against a prominent individual (perhaps instituted to dissuade the poor from attacking 
the  rich  as  a  class).    However  most  of  the  evidence  for  this  is  provided  by  Plutarch,  who  is  hardly 
contemporary.  Cairns (2003b) 243 4 summarises the evidence, and is rightly sceptical of this “reductive 
explanation”; see also Elster (1999) 187 9, Fisher (2003) 188.  See Brenne (1994) for examples of what 
ostraka actually say. 
31 Ober (1989); see also Cairns (2003b). Chapter 1: Introduction 
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fact that laypersons frequently conflate “envy” and “jealousy” in speech, and that envy is 
inextricably part of the jealousy scenario; the latter position draws a helpful distinction 
between  social  comparison  and  sexual  scenarios,  but  occasionally  downplays  genuine 
differences between prototypical envy and (possessive) jealousy scripts.  Following this 
examination of envy and jealousy, I compare these emotions with a number of others that 
overlap with them, such as emulation, greed and covetousness, spite and Schadenfreude.  
Finally, I consider a number of emotions that envy and jealousy tend to be (consciously) 
misrepresented as or (unconsciously) transmuted into, including anger, indignation, and a 
desire for justice.  These insights arm us well for an in depth exploration of envy  and 
jealousy in other cultures, here Classical Athens. 
 
Part II (chapters 3 4) takes two complementary approaches to the Greek vocabulary of envy 
and jealousy, in order to map the phenomena we are dealing with in Greek culture.  Chapter 
3 involves a thorough lexical examination of phthonos and zêlos (and their cognates) in the 
literature of the Archaic and Classical periods.  I show that (outside Hesiod) zêlos is sharply 
distinguished from both envy and jealousy (though the circumstances which call it into play 
may  overlap  in  some  particulars),
32  and  is  instead  more  closely  related  to  English 
“emulative rivalry”; its main correlation with English envy is in such phrases as “I envy 
you”,  which  generally  express  an  attitude  of  emulation  or  admiration,  rather  than 
(invidious) envy.  Phthonos, however, covers similar ground to both English “envy” and 
(possessive, though not sexual) “jealousy” – correlating with the views of those modern 
psychologists who take a situational approach to these emotions.  Unlike English envy, 
however, phthonos can also imply a sense of moral censure, particularly when someone is 
transgressing socially acceptable boundaries relating to the (ab)use of money or political 
power. 
 
In chapter 4 I turn to the first detailed, socio psychological examination of phthonos, that of 
Aristotle in his Rhetoric and (both) Ethics treatises, both to make use of his insights in their 
own  right,  and  to  compare  his  phenomenology  with  that  of  modern  social  scientific 
research, allowing us to utilise the latter with confidence.  I first consider how Aristotle 
sites phthonos within a group of emotions concerned with response to someone else’s good 
                                                 
32 Contra Walcot – see n.13 above. Chapter 1: Introduction 
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or bad fortune.  I discuss how envy (phthonos) is related to spite (epikhairekakia) in his 
thought,  and  how  as  ‘bad’  emotions  these  are  opposed  to  such  ‘good’  emotions  as 
indignation (to nemesan), justified pleasure in another’s misfortune (unnamed in Greek), 
emulation  (zêlos)  and  disdain  (kataphronêsis).    I  go  on  to  show  how  this  distinction 
survives, with minor alterations, the intellectual shift to the ‘doctrine of the mean’ in the 
Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics.  Next I turn to Aristotle’s views on phthonos itself, as 
described in the Rhetoric, where he discusses the socio psychological situations in which 
phthonos  arises,  before  showing  how  Aristotle’s  ethical  training  (as  outlined  in  the 
Nicomachean Ethics) can remove vices such as phthonos from one’s character.  Finally, I 
compare Aristotle’s thought on envy (and related emotions) with the findings of modern 
scholarship. 
 
Part III (chapters 5 7) extends the focus on phthonos, as I examine the use of this emotion 
in  three  genres  of  literature  written  for  performance  in  front  of  mass  (i.e. non elite) 
audiences.  Chapter 5 focuses on oratory, a genre which makes frequent use of phthonos 
words.  I begin not with oratory, however, but with Aristotle.  Picking up on chapter 4, I 
demonstrate how phthonos’ badness prevents the use to which Aristotle would like to put 
emotions in rhetoric – namely, persuading an audience.  I explore alternative reasons why 
Aristotle should still have discussed this emotion in his Rhetoric, and argue that its only 
acceptable  use  consistent  with  his  philosophy  is  to  accuse  one’s  opponent  of  being 
motivated by it.  Turning to oratory proper, I show that this is largely the case, first through 
a survey of all instances of phthonos words in the genre, and secondly by in depth analyses 
of several speeches in which accusations of phthonos form a crucial part of the speaker’s 
strategy (Isae. 2; Lys. 24; Aeschin. 2; Dem. 18 and Epist. 3).  In fact, phthonos words are 
not once used in the genre to arouse an audience’s envy.  We do find several calls for an 
audience’s phthonos, but (evidenced by a detailed discussion of Dem. 20 and 21) this is 
crucially a call for moral censure.  This undermines the strict division Aristotle makes 
between phthonos (by which he clearly means envy) and to nemesan (indignation), and in 
fact  nemesis  roots  barely  survive  in  the  Classical  period,  their  function  in  the  Archaic 
period being mostly subsumed in the Classical by phthonos – which I recognise by using 
the hypothetical analytical constructs of envy phthonos and indignation phthonos where Chapter 1: Introduction 
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necessary for clarity.
33  I end the chapter by considering how an orator might attempt to 
arouse an audience’s envy phthonos. Because of the negative associations of the term and 
the  concept,  an  orator  must  do  so  without  using  the  word  itself,  and  I  examine  three 
speeches (Lys. 28 and 29; Dem. 3) which attempt to do just this. 
 
In chapter 6 I continue to focus on arousal of phthonos in an audience, but this time in Old 
Comedy.  In the Philebus, Plato argues that one goes to a comedy in order to laugh at the 
misfortunes  of  one’s  friends,  and  he  calls  this  phthonos.    This  emotion  bears  a  close 
similarity  to  Aristotle’s  epikhairekakia  and  to  modern  Schadenfreude.      For  all  the 
difference in emphasis, this reading has certain affinities in common with the ‘carnival’ 
approach  to  understanding  Old  Comedy,  and  particularly  its  predilection  for  onomasti 
kômôidein  (abuse  of  named  individuals),  as  I  explain  there.    I  focus  in  particular  on 
phthonos against politicians, both named and as a class, in Aristophanes’ political plays of 
the 420s, as providing the clearest and most coherent body of evidence for phthonos arousal 
in  the  genre.    I  first  consider  arguments  against  the  behaviour  of  ambassadors  in 
Acharnians, and then against that of demagogues and generals in Wasps.  The arguments 
advanced ostensibly play to the audience’s moral censure (i.e. indignation) at the excesses 
of these groups, but in fact appeal as much if not more to their (transmuted) envy.  These, 
however,  are  English  emotions  and,  as  I  demonstrate  in  chapter  5,  both  fall  under  the 
purview of phthonos in Greek.  I conclude the chapter with an examination of the case 
against Paphlagon (i.e. Kleon) in Knights. 
 
In chapter 7 I turn away from the audience, to look at phthonos scripts onstage in tragedy.  
While  this  emotion  is  not  one  of  those  regularly  seen  motivating  characters,  it  is  not 
completely absent.  I examine primarily two scenarios: Ajax’s response to the Arms of 
Achilles being awarded to Odysseus (Soph. Aj.); and Phaidra’s response to her rejection by 
Hippolytos  (Eur.  Hipp.).    Both  characters  exhibit  psychological,  verbal,  and  physical 
reactions  highly  typical  of  English  envy/jealousy  scenarios,  and  clearly  describable  as 
phthonos by what has been revealed of the nature of that emotion in part II.  Notable, 
however, is that the word itself is not prominent in these plays, and this is true of the genre 
as a whole.  An unusual type of phthonos is that felt by the gods (phthonos theôn), and this 
                                                 
33 Constructs which would not, of course, have been recognised by Greeks – see Kaster (2005) 7 on fastidium. Chapter 1: Introduction 
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is prominent in tragedy.  While my focus on human psychology places divine phthonos 
generally beyond the scope of this thesis, Aphrodite’s (Eur. Hipp.) phthonos for Hippolytos 
is accompanied by sibling rivalry for her half sister Artemis, and in the final section of this 
chapter, I show that the psychology of this phthonos between two gods is a reflection of 
phthonos between mortals. 
 
In  Part  IV  (chapter  8)  I  turn  away  from  phthonos  and  consider  sexual  jealousy.    The 
existence of this emotion in ancient Greece has been questioned,
34 and a minor concern of 
this chapter is to prove that an emotion related to our sexual jealousy does indeed exist in 
Greek literature.  The major focus, however, is on how this emotion is constructed, and its 
vocabulary.  I begin with Medea (Eur. Med.), who is normally portrayed as suffering from 
heroic pride or rage.  While accepting the presence of these emotions as motivators, I argue 
that it is overly reductive to interpret Medea’s psychology solely in these terms, and that 
sexual jealousy should be rehabilitated as one of her motivations.  Erôs and sex play a 
major role in Medea’s marriage, and her entire self conception is bound up with being a 
wife, a mother, and a (sexual) woman.  Jason’s abandonment of her wrongs her in all three 
roles.  I show how Medea’s subsequent emotions (rage, hatred, grief, pride and begrudging 
envy) are all traceable directly back to this wrong, and how her desire for “justice” (which 
typically masks envy) and the form of the revenge itself, fit in well with both the English 
sexual jealousy prototype and Aristotle’s ideas on phthonos, orgê (anger) and to misein 
(hatred).  The main elements of this Greek jealousy script appear in two other tragedies 
(Soph. Trach. and Eur. Andr.), which I explore in similar level of detail.  I conclude that 
Greek sexual jealousy requires three components: erôs, an exclusive relationship, and a 
desire to protect the integrity of that exclusivity by beating, damaging or destroying the 
rival  or  partner.    This  destructive  element  shows  that  phthonos,  like  erôs,  is  perhaps 
inextricably part of the Greek sexual jealousy prototype.  Finally, I turn to philosophy, 
oratory  and  comedy,  and  briefly  examine  a  number  of  texts  in  which  elements  of  the 
jealousy prototype recur (Plat. Symp.; Lys. 3 and 4; Aeschin. 1; [Dem.] 59; Men. Epit. and 
Pk.).
35  By considering this wide variety of texts, I show how the jealousy script changes 
when the patient is a man, how male male relationships differ from male female, and the 
effect of genre on the use of the jealousy script to manipulate an audience. 
                                                 
34 Konstan (2003b); Konstan (2006) 219 43. 
35 Including the meaning of zêlotypia in the Classical period – see n.17 above.  
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Chapter 2:  The Phenomenology of Envy, Jealousy and Related Emotions 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
To understand fully the workings of envy and jealousy scripts in Greek literature, in this 
chapter I explore how envy and jealousy scenarios unfold in our own society.
1  The major 
academic fields which have contributed to modern discussions of envy and jealousy are 
philosophy,  psychology,  psychoanalysis,  sociology  and  anthropology.    This  chapter 
provides  a  survey,  and  partial  synthesis,
2  of  modern  research  in  these  fields  on  the 
phenomenology  of  envy,  jealousy  and  related  emotions,  and  provides  the  theoretical 
underpinning of my reading of Greek texts in subsequent chapters. 
 
2.2  Envy 
 
2.2.1  Etymology 
 
 “Envy” is derived from the Latin noun invidia, which corresponds with English “envy; 
jealousy; grudge; ill will; hatred; odium; unpopularity”; that in turn is derived from the 
verb invidere, which means “to look askance at; to look maliciously or spitefully at; to cast 
an evil eye on; to be prejudiced against; to envy, grudge; to be unwilling; to aspire to rival; 
to  prevent,  refuse  or  deny”.
3    Dictionary  definitions  for  envy  include:
4  (noun)  ill will, 
malice, enmity, harm; emulation, desire; a longing for another’s advantages; mortification 
and ill will occasioned by the contemplation of another’s superior advantages; (verb) to feel 
envy at the superior advantages of; to regard with discontent another’s possession of (some 
superior advantage); to wish oneself on a level with (another) in some respect, or possessed 
of (something which another has); to feel a grudge against, to begrudge, to treat grudgingly; 
                                                 
1 The large majority of the research discussed in this chapter is Anglo American, and/or published in English. 
2 The approaches of these various disciplines are heterogeneous (both between and within disciplines), and 
my aim is not primarily to weld them into a homogeneous whole.  My primary concern is to explore the range 
of research on the phenomena of envy and jealousy and their relationship with other emotions, so as to give 
the broadest possible understanding.  It is worth noting that no academic study considering the full variety of 
disciplinary approaches to envy has appeared since Schoeck (1966/1969). 
3 Lewis & Short; cf. Spielman (1971) 61.  Klein (1957/1975) 181 n.2 notes this accords with her view that 
envy is projective; see Cairns (forthcoming) on the envious gaze in Greek literature. 
4 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the remainder of the paragraph, which is abridged direct quotation. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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to have envious, grudging or malevolent feelings; to vie with, seek to challenge.  There are 
three related adjectives: enviable, envious and invidious.  “Enviable” means: to be envied.  
“Envious” means: full of envy, affected or actuated by envy, vexed at the good fortune or 
qualities  of  another;  full  of  ill will;  malicious; full  of  emulation;  grudging,  excessively 
careful; enviable; invidious; odious.  “Invidious” means: tending to excite ill will or envy; 
looking with an evil eye; envious, grudging, jealous. 
 
2.2.2  Envy scenarios 
 
Envy  is  a  complex  (or  ‘blended’)  emotion,  and  occurs  in  complex  situations  of  social 
comparison.
5  Its antecedent conditions involve three perceptions: (1) that someone else 
(the object/agent) has some object or quality; (2) that I (the subject/patient) do not have it;
6 
(3) that this situation is wrong.
7  A number of factors influence this third perception.  One is 
self esteem:  the  higher  one’s  self esteem,  the  more  likely  one  is  to  feel  a  sense  of 
entitlement;
8 contrarily though, the higher one’s sense of self worth, the less likely one is to 
care that one is lacking something.
9  Secondly, we are more likely to feel envy of our peers 
                                                 
5 Foster (1972) 168 70; Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; R.H. Smith et al. (1996) 158 9; Ben 
Ze’ev (2000) 284 5; R.H. Smith (2004) 43.  Social comparison theory is a very important area of psychology, 
concerned in (surprisingly small) part with envy (or indeed with any other emotion until recently – Salovey 
(1991b) 261).  Festinger (1954) is seminal for social comparison theory.  Salovey has been greatly interested 
in social comparison theory in relation to envy and jealousy: see pp.32 3 for a fuller discussion.  It should be 
noted  that  within  this  literature  envy  is  often  (confusingly)  termed  ‘social  comparison  jealousy’.    Early 
psychoanalysts  did  not  believe  envy  to  be  a  social  phenomenon,  but  rather  that  it  is  rooted  in  infant 
psychosexual development (whose phases are labelled ‘oral’, ‘anal’, ‘phallic’, ‘Oedipus complex’), a theory 
first laid out in Freud (1905) 173 206; cf. Freud (1908) 215 9, Freud (1931) 228, Kahn (2002) 35 54.  Freud 
believed envy was rooted in the ‘Oedipus complex’ as ‘penis envy’ – Freud (1925) 248 58; cf. Burke (1998) 
4 6; Laverde Rubio (2004) 406; other psychoanalysts link it to the anal (e.g. Jones – see Joffe (1969) 535 6) 
or oral (e.g. Abraham – see Spielman (1971) 67) phases; Klein (1957/1975) 176 dates it from birth – see ch.1 
n.8. 
6 I shall in this chapter consistently use ‘patient’ to refer to the person feeling the emotion, and ‘agent’ to refer 
to the person arousing it. 
7 Rosenblatt (1988) 63 calls the third perception “a sense of entitlement”; Elster (1999) 169 agrees, labelling 
the  perception  “it  could  have  been  me”;  Wierzbicka  (1999)  98  prefers  the  weaker  “this  is  bad”.    Klein 
(1957/1975) 198 9, 203 notes some specific examples of envy triggers, including: ambition; “the relative 
absence of envy … in others”; those who grudge others’ happiness; and those who in old age cannot resign 
themselves to the fact “that youth cannot be regained” and cannot “take pleasure and interest in the lives of 
young people … without undue bitterness”. 
8 Parrott (1991) 7; cf. Festinger (1954).  The work of Tesser is particularly associated with self esteem and its 
maintenance, as approaches in social comparison theory: e.g. Tesser and Campbell (1980), Tesser (1991); see 
also Salovey and Rothman (1991). 
9  Rawls  (1999)  469.    Ben Ze’ev  (2000)  286 7  states  that  “psychological  research  has  failed  to  reveal  a 
significant positive correlation between envy and jealousy and a person’s low self esteem.”  This is clearly 
disputed by psychologists – see pp.25 6, p.30 below. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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than  non peers:
10  we  might  feel  entitled  to  the  promotion  our  colleague  has  just  been 
awarded, but we are less likely to feel entitled to be king.
11  Finally there are what Parrott 
calls “personal variables” (i.e. character): some people are just more likely to feel envy than 
others.
12 
 
The  feeling  of  envy  itself  is  generally  seen  by  psychologists  and  psychoanalysts  as 
‘blended’: a number of simpler affects are simultaneously aroused, with all or most needing 
to  be  present  for  envy  to  result.    While  modern  scholars  agree  it  is  blended,  there  is 
considerable diversity on the number and nature of its components.   Spielman notes four 
components:  emulation,  a  ‘narcissistic  wound’,  covetousness,  and  anger;  emulation 
involves admiration for what the other person is or has, with consequent (healthy) rivalry; 
the ‘narcissistic wound’ implies “feelings of inferiority, smallness, or injured self esteem” 
which can be mild (disappointment) or severe (mortification, humiliation), or “a sense of 
inadequacy at not being able to realise one’s ambition”; covetousness is directed at what the 
Other is or has, seen as desirable; anger is directed against the current possessor, and can be 
mild (chagrin, discontent), moderate (resentment, ill will) or severe (spite, maliciousness, 
malevolence, hatred, a wish to harm).
13  Joffe sees six elements to envy: aggression, hate, 
resentment, admiration, covetousness and narcissism (a desire to boost one’s self image).
14  
Ben Ze’ev notes envy involves both hostility and admiration, and occasionally self pity, 
hope or despair.
15  Parrott believes it can involve (though not all have to be present): a 
longing or frustrated desire, a feeling of inferiority (which may manifest as sadness, anxiety 
or despair), resentment (generalised or agent specific, manifesting as displeasure, anger or 
hatred),  guilt  at  feeling  these  affects,  and  admiration  or  emulation.
16    Rosenblatt  notes 
feelings  of  helplessness  to  acquire  the  desired  good,  “inadequacy  and  inferiority”,  and 
                                                 
10 Parrott (1991) 7; cf. Ben Ze’ev (2000) 287: “envy is … concerned with … specific inferiority regarding 
people who are emotionally significant to us.”  Foster (1972) 170 notes one can feel envy for equals and for 
non equals, by which he means those society deems eligible for competition and those not.  See also n.114 
below.  There is some overlap with Aristotle’s view that envy (or rather phthonos) is felt for those similar and 
equal to us – see p.86. 
11  Elster  (1999)  169 70,  who  further  notes  that  in  a  hierarchy  we  are  most  likely  to  envy  the  person 
immediately above us on the ladder, which he terms “neighbourhood envy”; cf. Ben Ze’ev (2000) 305 6. 
12 Parrott (1991) 8; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 317.  Aristotle would say that this is because they have a base character 
– see ch.4. 
13 Spielman (1971) 76 7 for the part paragraph from his name to this point, including quotes.  Shengold 
(1994) 628, 639 believes that envy proper is “wanting what the other has [or] is”, but that it can regress to the 
“primitive, regressive, murderous manifestation” of infanthood, which he calls “malignant envy”. 
14 Joffe (1969) 543 4. 
15 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 301. 
16 Parrott (1991) 12 5. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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agent directed anger.
17  Clearly any synthesis will be contentious; however, a number of 
affects command sufficient (if not universal) approval as part of the blend to allow us to 
operate  with  them  as  an  irreducible  minimum,  and  these  are:  emulation,  covetousness, 
anger/aggression, resentment, hostility/hatred, and a feeling of inferiority or damaged self 
esteem. 
 
Envious  feelings  lead  to  a  variety  of  actions.    Elster  notes  that  primarily  “the  action 
tendency of envy is to destroy the envied object or its possessor”;
18 Wurmser and Jarass 
agree, saying envy “wants the humiliation, disempowerment, and destruction of the envied 
one”.
19  This is true even if such destructive action is to our own detriment also.
20  This 
action tendency is the most fundamental, and verbal and physical actions prompted by envy 
will frequently act towards this goal.  However, we should note that destruction does not 
have to be total; damage also helps relieve envious feelings – e.g. we are more likely to be 
driven to scratch our neighbour’s new car than destroy it completely.
21  Alongside direct 
destructive or damaging actions, anthropologists also tell us about indirect expressions of 
invidious  hostility  found  in  all  sorts  of  cultures,  including:  “gossip,  backbiting,  and 
defamation”,
22 invocations of (or wards against) the Evil Eye, curses and other types of 
spells.
23 
 
                                                 
17 Rosenblatt (1988) 63 4 actually says envy has six components, confusing these three affects with the three 
antecedent conditions referred to above (see also n.7 above). 
18 Elster (1999) 171.  This destructive urge is one of the primary factors that distinguish envy from other 
emotions such as greed or emulative rivalry (see pp.35 6). 
19 Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) xii. 
20 Rawls (1999) 466 7, 469; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 283. 
21 This suggests that envy is not an all consuming emotion, as it does not blind us to such considerations as 
“will the police care enough to investigate?”, “will we be caught?”, and “what will be our punishment?”. 
22 Foster (1972) 172. 
23  Wolf  (1955)  460  identifies  these  three  categories  in  a  study  that  focuses  on  Latin  American  peasant 
societies.    Foster  (1972)  172 82  concentrates  on  gossip,  compliments,  and  the  envious  eye.    Schoeck 
(1966/1969) 40 76 examines black magic in general and the Evil Eye in particular.  See also Dundes (1992) 
on the Evil Eye; Spooner (1976) 284 and Dionisopoulos Mass (1976) 43 4 also note the connection between 
the Evil Eye and envy; see Kilborne (2008) and Jarass and Wurmser (2008) for two recent studies from a 
psychoanalytic perspective.  Paine (2004) 66 notes the prevalence of Evil Eye superstitions throughout the 
“Indo European and Semitic worlds, and its power is based on jealousy.”  See F. Bowie (2000) 219 32 on 
envy  and  witchcraft,  mainly  focusing  on  the  Azande  in  north central  Africa,  who  make  copious  use  of 
amulets, “incantations, spells, ritual objects” (219), though not written spells or curses. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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2.2.3  Transmutation of envy 
 
Like all painful emotions, the feeling of envy is subject to a number of coping mechanisms, 
or ‘defences’.  These attempt (consciously or sub consciously) to amend one of the three 
perceptions  that  has  given  rise  to  the  envious  feelings.
24    Such  defences  include  e.g.: 
devaluation  of  the  desired  good  (so  as  not  to  want  it);  idealisation  of  the  good,  or 
devaluation of the self (to convince myself I am not worthy of it); convincing myself the 
other person deserves it more; devaluing other aspects of my rival; turning my attention to 
other goods; “stirring up envy in others by one’s own success, possessions, and a good 
fortune”;
25 intensifying the feeling of hatred (easier to bear, as less guilt ridden, than envy – 
see  below);  redoubling  my  efforts  to  succeed  too;  trying  to  think  about  other  things; 
choosing friends that I will not be envious of; etc. 
 
While all painful emotions are subject to defences, they are particularly necessary for envy 
because of our cultural taboo surrounding expression of that emotion.
26  Envy – one of the 
Seven Deadly Sins, and (as a prohibition of covetousness) one of the Ten Commandments 
– is deemed both morally wrong and socially disruptive, and therefore, as Jon Elster notes, 
“it is the only emotion we do not want to admit to others or to ourselves”.
27  Accordingly 
we seek to ‘veil’ or ‘mask’ it – the difference being “between hiding an emotion one feels 
and showing an emotion one does not feel. // [A] mask can also serve as a veil.”
28  Elster 
elaborates by noting that, when one envies, one feels the primary pain of lacking something 
another has; however, if aware that our feeling is envy, we feel a second pain, which is 
shame or guilt at feeling a morally taboo emotion.
29  The primary pain of envy can cause us 
to act (destructively) against the other person or the desired object/attribute, or can cause 
the  sort  of  psychological  adjustments  (suppression  or  pre emption  of  the  emotion, 
                                                 
24 Klein (1957/1975) 215 20; Rosenblatt (1988) 64 6; Elster (1999) 172 5; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 232 3. 
25 Klein (1957/1975) 218. 
26 Schoeck (1966/1969) 14. 
27  Elster  (1999)  164;  Ben Ze’ev  (2000)  321;  R.H.  Smith  (1991)  85  says  this  is  because  it  “betrays  … 
inappropriate hostility” and undermines the envious person’s claims of injustice.  It should be noted that the 
Seven Deadly Sins and Ten Commandments relate directly to Judaeo Christian culture, and indirectly to 
Muslim; it is conceivable that envy is not considered morally wrong in other cultures. 
28 Elster (1999) 96 7. 
29 Ibid; La Caze (2001) 34 also notes this pain enhancing guilt.  Recent psychoanalytical research into envy 
has  also  noted  the  overlap  between  envy  and  shame:  Rosenberger  (2005);  Kilborne  (2008);  Jarass  and 
Wurmser (2008); Morrison and Lansky (2008). Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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i.e. defences) discussed above.  However, the secondary pain of the shame or guilt attached 
also causes psychological adjustments.  As Elster puts it: “I can tell myself a story in which 
the other obtained the envied object by illegitimate and immoral means, and perhaps at my 
expense, thus transmuting the envy into indignation or anger…”.
30 
 
The processes of ‘transmutation’ (which unconsciously hides envy both from oneself and 
others)  and  ‘misrepresentation’  (which  consciously  tries  to  hide  it  from  others)  are  of 
enormous  importance  for  a  scholarly  exploration  of  the  emotion,
31  because  one  must 
examine not just speech and behaviour that is caused by overt envy, but also speech and 
behaviour ostensibly caused by such motivations as: a desire for equality (or “justice” or 
“fairness”), moral (or “righteous”) indignation; resentment; anger; and hatred.
32  As Elster 
points out, such a transmutation can be very “difficult to document”, though it might not 
be:  disinterested  observers  often  correctly  spot  envy,  and  say  so,  even  if  the  patient 
cannot.
33  Reading an entire situation, through an understanding of the phenomena, can be 
very  informative  –  especially  when  language  points  in  a  different  direction.
34    In  this 
section  I  have  shown  the  significant  insights  modern  research  has  given  us  into  the 
phenomenology of envy scenarios.  Careful attention to such details allows us to read envy 
scripts in many situations in which the emotion itself is not mentioned, or is mentioned 
only to be denied. 
 
                                                 
30 Elster (1999) 97 8, 169.  Parrott (1991) 5 6 and Etchegoyen et al. (1987) 50 also note that envy is prone to 
disguise itself, and can be hard to distinguish from jealousy, greed and frustration.  Rawls (1999) 473 4 
specifically  states  that  “…  the  appeal  to justice  is  often  a  mask  for  envy”,  “envy  often  masquerades  as 
resentment”, and “What is said to be resentment may really be rancor.”  See also R.H. Smith (2004). 
31  See  Elster  (1999)  341 402  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  transmutation  and  misrepresentation,  between 
interest, reason and passion. 
32 Elster (1999) 97 8; Parrott (1991) 6; Etchegoyen et al. (1987) 52; Rawls (1999) 471 4.  Parrott (1991) 
10 11  notes  that  the  key  difference  between  envy  and  anger  is  whether  the  hostility  is  justified;  that  is 
something often easier for an outsider to spot than for protagonists.  We will find an understanding of envy’s 
tendency  to  masquerade  as  other  emotions  invaluable  to  an  exploration  of  the  emotion  in  Greek 
literature/culture. 
33 Elster (1999) 165; cf. Parrott (1991) 6: “it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or jealous 
person is the last person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions.”  Whether envy is or is 
not objectively present will be frequently of less interest to me than whether it can be portrayed as present, 
and how. 
34 Silver and Sabini (1978a) 109: “Envy is not identifiable with a particular behavior, but emerges out of 
specific contexts.” Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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2.3  Jealousy 
 
2.3.1  Etymology 
 
“Jealousy”  derives  from  the  Greek  ζῆλος,  meaning  “eager  rivalry,  zealous  imitation, 
emulation, jealousy, zeal; (used passively as) the object of emulation or desire, happiness, 
bliss,  honour,  glory;  extravagance  of  style;  fierceness.”
35    Dictionary  definitions  for 
“jealousy” include:
36 anger, wrath, indignation; devotion, eagerness, anxiety to serve; the 
state of mind arising from the suspicion, apprehension, or knowledge of rivalry; suspicion, 
mistrust.  The related adjective is “jealous”, which means: vehement in wrath, desire, or 
devotion;  vigilant  in  guarding,  suspiciously  careful  or  watchful;  troubled  by  the  belief, 
suspicion, or fear that the good which one desires to gain or keep for oneself has been or 
may be diverted to another; resentful towards another on account of known or suspected 
rivalry; suspicious, fearful. 
 
2.3.2  Jealousy scenarios 
 
Jealousy is often believed by laypersons to be similar to envy.
37  Like envy, jealousy has 
three  antecedent  perceptions:  (1)  I  have  an  exclusive  relationship  with  someone  (a 
“partner”) or something (a “possession”); (2) I am in danger of losing that exclusivity or the 
entire relationship with them/it; (3) because I have a rival for their affection/possession.
38  
The prototypical jealousy scenario is sexual jealousy;
39 however one can feel jealous when 
the rival is a thing (my husband’s car or prized rose bushes), or non love rival (the friends 
my wife ignores me for); and one can feel jealous at the potential or actual loss of an 
object/attribute (jealous of one’s status or privileges).  Unlike envy, which is rooted in 
social comparison, jealousy is based on personal rivalry and fear of loss.  It involves a 
unique  bond  with  a  unique  individual  or  item,  exclusivity,  and  (imagined,  potential  or 
                                                 
35 LSJ.  The English word “zealous” is also derived from ζῆλος. 
36 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary for the remainder of the paragraph, which is abridged direct quotation. 
37 Indeed they are often used, incorrectly, as partial synonyms – Cairns (2008) 50.  I discuss this further 
below. 
38 Parrott (1991) 15 6; Neu (1980) 432 3; see Wierzbicka (1999) 99 for a slightly different formulation. 
39  Ben Ze’ev  (2000)  289 90;  Parrott  (1991)  15 16;  Sharpsteen  (1991)  32 4,  who  also  discusses  emotion 
‘prototypes’; Kristjánsson (2002) 155ff. disagrees with the choice of sexual jealousy as a prototype for all 
jealousy.    Some  psychologists  see  sexual  jealousy  as  distinctly  separate  from  possessive  jealousy,  while 
others do not – see pp.31 3. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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actual) alienation of affection or ownership.
40  Parrott argues that the partner or possession 
must be formative to our own self concept for jealousy to be possible: what we fear to lose 
is not so much a beloved partner or valued possession, but actually a part of ourselves.
41 
 
Like envy, jealousy is generally considered a blended emotion, but again scholars differ 
considerably on the number and nature of its components.   Freud believes it compounds 
four  affects:  grief,  a  narcissistic  wound,  enmity  against  the  rival,  and  (perhaps)  self 
criticism.
42  Shengold more vaguely says it is an individually varying mixture of hate and 
love.
43  Spielman believes it has a similar mix to envy (emulation, narcissistic wound, 
covetousness, anger) with less emulation and more anger, combined with an unconscious 
homosexuality, and suspicion or mistrust (or paranoia).
44  Sharpsteen argues for a blend 
principally  of  anger,  fear  and  sadness.
45    Parrott  argues  for  fear  of  loss,  anger,  and 
insecurity.
46  Kristjánsson plumps for envy, anger and indignation.
47  Ben Ze’ev gives a 
particularly  generous  list:  anger,  hostility,  resentment  and  suspicion,  as  well  as  love, 
admiration, and distrust.
48  As with envy we find no consensus; but affects that would 
command widespread (if not universal) approval, as an irreducible minimum to operate 
with, are: anger, envy, hostility, fear of / grief at loss, and damaged self esteem.
49  It is 
perhaps surprising that love is rarely included; possibly it is taken for granted, but perhaps 
it is simply not necessary: what matters is not that I love the person/object, but that they are 
mine.
50 
                                                 
40 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 289 90; Parrott (1991) 15 16. 
41 Parrott (1991) 16 17; cf. Tov Ruach (1980) 466 8. 
42 Freud (1922) 223. 
43 Shengold (1994) 619. 
44 Spielman (1971) 78 9.  Freud (1922) also argues for a connection between homosexuality and extreme 
jealousy. 
45 Sharpsteen (1991) 31, 36; cf. Planalp (1999) 174. 
46 Parrott (1991) 4; Neu (1980) 433 agrees with fear of loss and insecurity. 
47 Kristjánsson (2002) 141 2, 144; Kristjánsson (2006) 17 8. 
48 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 301. 
49 Parrott (1991) 18 21 draws attention to the difference between ‘suspicious’ jealousy (when the partner’s 
infidelity  is  merely  suspected),  and  ‘fait  accompli’  jealousy  (when  the  partner  is  known  to  have  been 
unfaithful, or has already left the subject for the rival).  In suspicious jealousy, suspicion and fear of loss will 
be a large part of the jealousy blend.  In fait accompli jealousy these are no longer present; however grief will 
be heightened, as will envy and associated feelings (hostility, aggressiveness, destructive hatred).  Parrott 
notes that since ‘suspicious’ approximates to ‘fait accompli’ jealousy as the patient’s suspicions move from 
doubt to certainty, the subjective perception of loss is more important than the objective fact. 
50 Wurmser and Jarass (2008c) 15 19 discuss the conflict between love and jealousy: love is theoretically 
unconditional and about the individuality and unconditional acceptance of the other, while jealousy is about 
my sexual desires, my loss, my humiliation, my aggression; however love seems almost inherently to contain 
the capacity to be overpowered by jealousy when sexual desire is frustrated. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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Hupka argues that jealousy is more properly a type of anger, distinguished by the situations 
in which it occurs (these situations being culturally determined); thus when societies do not 
value romantic or monogamous attachments, and when the group is more important than 
the family or known paternity, jealousy as we know it is not observed.
51  However, as 
Elster argues: “If a person is unaware of his emotion, it may be because he lives in a society 
that  does  not  provide  a  unifying  cognitive  label  for  the  behavioural  and  physiological 
expressions of that particular emotion.”
52  I.e. jealousy may not be commonly observed 
simply because there is no convenient label for it – it does not necessarily mean that it does 
not exist in that society.
53 
 
Like  envy,  jealousy  can  be  disguised,  though  as  it  is  more  socially  acceptable  the 
complexity and variety of disguise is much reduced.  However Parrott notes that, while an 
outside person would perceive jealousy, the patient themselves will most likely experience, 
or believe they are experiencing, anxious insecurity (in the case of ‘suspicious’ jealousy) or 
indignant anger (with ‘fait accompli’ jealousy).
54  This may lead to revenge against either 
the partner (if love turns to hatred) or the rival (if there is a strong admixture of envy).  In 
the absence of such closure, a natural path would be a period of recriminations, followed by 
some measure of acceptance.
55 
 
2.3.3  Comparison of envy and jealousy 
 
The above analyses concentrate on prototypical envy and jealousy scenarios.  By nature 
such  analyses  highlight  (and  exacerbate)  differences  between  the  two  emotions.  
Differences so far noted are: (1) envy is a desire for what someone else has, while jealousy 
is a desire to retain or regain something we see as ours; (2) jealousy involves an exclusive 
bond  with  a  particular  object/person,  while  envy  does  not;  (3)  envy  involves  social 
comparison, while jealousy involves personal rivalry; (4) envy is always destructive, while 
jealousy  aims  at  possession,  and  only  becomes  destructive  when  fait  accompli  (which 
                                                 
51 Hupka (1991); Hupka (1981); see also Sharpsteen (1991) 34 and Salovey (1991b) 280. 
52 Elster (1999) 412. 
53 Kristjánsson (2002) 21 makes the same point for other emotions.  As mentioned in chapter 1, and as will 
become clear in chapter 8, Classical Greek exhibits exactly this lack of label. 
54 Parrott (1991) 5 6, 18; see n.49 above for these terms. 
55 Hupka (1991) 255 6; Sharpsteen (1991) 43 5. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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involves a strong admixture of envy);
56 (5) envy has relatively more tendency to hatred, 
while  jealousy  has  relatively  more  tendency  to  anger;  (6) jealousy  is  more  socially 
sanctioned than envy, so defences are fewer, while (7) envy tends, both consciously and 
unconsciously, towards disguise.
57  Further distinctions have been noted.  For instance, 
envy  normally  involves  two  people  while  jealousy  must  involve  three  (or  at  least  a 
triangular relationship, if one of the three is not a person).
58  Foster notes that we envy a 
person, and the possession is only a trigger; however we are jealous of a possession/partner, 
and perception of a rival is the trigger.
59  And finally, R.H. Smith et al. have found that 
envy  tends  to  be  associated  with  such  affective  states  as  longing,  inferiority  and  self 
awareness, while jealousy is more concerned with suspiciousness, anxiety, hurt, and fear of 
loss.
60 
 
While I believe it can be analytically helpful to separate envy from jealousy conceptually so 
as to understand both better, such sharp distinction over emphasises their differences at the 
expense of their similarities.  First, in real life people tend to conflate the two: while “envy” 
is rarely used for a jealousy situation, “jealousy” is frequently used for an envy situation.
61  
Second,  many  situations  (especially  three person  situations)  involve  both  envy  and 
jealousy.
62  Peter Salovey and others have argued that, instead of trying to separate envy 
                                                 
56 We might think suspicious jealousy is also destructive, but this is only the case when it leads to extreme 
anxiety,  and  the  jealous  person  has  become  almost  convinced  of  the  loss  of  the  loved  one/possession  – 
i.e. when suspicious jealousy approximates to fait accompli. 
57 Parrott (1991) 23; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 281; Klein (1957/1975) 182; Neu (1980) 432 5. 
58 Klein (1957/1975) 181; Spielman (1971) 80; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 289 90; Kristjánsson (2002) 139 40, who 
notes three person situations that involve envy rather than jealousy.  The two person/three person distinction 
may be too simplistic: Sandell (1993) 1216 argues that in envy, by identifying a despised person in possession 
of  a  desired  object/attribute,  we  split  a  whole object  into  two  part objects  thus  setting  up  a  three object 
situation: “Thus, envy turns out to be as much a triangular situation as jealousy, albeit with part objects where 
jealousy involves whole objects.”  Laverde Rubio (2004) also disagrees, for more complex reasons. 
59 Foster (1972) 168; cf. Neu (1980) 432 3. 
60 Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); cf. Parrott and Smith (1993).  R.H. Smith and Parrott are prominent among 
scholars arguing for a sharp distinction between envy and jealousy. 
61 Smith, Kim and Parrott (1988); Parrott (1991) 24; Parrott and Smith (1993) 906; Salovey and Rodin (1984) 
780.  Note that the dictionary definition of “jealousy” above does not include “envy” as a synonym, while the 
definition of “envy” does include “jealousy”.  Ben Ze’ev (2000) 281 2 argues that the one way confusion of 
envy and jealousy arises because of the frequency of situations in which these emotions co occur, and because 
of the social unacceptability of envy. 
62 Kristjánsson (2002) 147 8 delivers a strongly worded denunciation of any attempt to distinguish envy from 
jealousy in the way I have done in this chapter.  Kristjánsson’s criticism of (principally) Parrott and R.H. 
Smith is primarily that their methodologies presuppose their conclusions, and thus the experiments designed 
merely reinforce those presuppositions; this is not unfounded, though I believe Kristjánsson overstates the 
case in arguing that envy and jealousy are never distinguishable. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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from jealousy as distinct emotions, one should look at situations that combine them.
63  This 
‘situational’ approach sees two rivals O and P, and an object (or person) X: in envy, O has 
X, while P desires it; in jealousy, P has X, and fears to lose it to O; in rivalry, neither O nor 
P have X, but both try to possess it.
64  Instead of focusing on the distinction between envy 
and  jealousy  (conflating  possessive  and  sexual  jealousy  in  the  latter),  this  approach 
therefore  distinguishes  between  social  comparison  situations  and  sexual  ones,  both  of 
which might involve any combination of envy and jealousy.
65  This situational approach is 
a more helpful analytical tool.  It is a rare situation that will clearly involve either envy or 
jealousy alone (and the sharp distinction is undermined even further if we consider that 
envy is generally seen as part of the jealousy complex).  More useful is to recognise that 
there are many situations that will involve some combination of envy and jealousy, and the 
prototypical scenarios above can help us pinpoint where these occur.
66  As will become 
clear later, Greek phthonos covers both English envy and possessive jealousy (see chs.3 4), 
while Greek sexual jealousy seems necessarily to involve phthonos (see ch.8).  While the 
envy and jealousy prototypes will therefore be useful as an analytical tool for reading Greek 
‘scripts’,  we  should  be  wary  therefore  of  concentrating  on  one  English  emotion  to  the 
complete exclusion of the other.  Phthonos scripts may involve both envy and (possessive) 
jealousy; and sexual jealousy scripts in Greek (as in English) can involve envy. 
 
2.4  Emotions that overlap with envy and jealousy 
 
To achieve a full understanding of the psychological make up of envy and jealousy, and to 
ensure that we have the tools to identify them properly, we must first compare and contrast 
them with a number of other related emotions.
67  In this section I consider emotions that 
have similarities to envy and jealousy. 
 
                                                 
63 Salovey and Rodin (1984) 780; Bers and Rodin (1984) 766 7; Salovey (1991b); Kristjánsson (2002) 147 8. 
64 Salovey (1991b) 265 6; cf. Salovey and Rodin (1986) 1111: “Envy may merely be jealousy in a social 
comparison context.” 
65 Salovey and Rodin (1986).  However, it is clear that even the ‘situational’ approach does not totally elide 
the difference between envy and jealousy. 
66 Rather than being used primarily to distinguish envy from jealousy. 
67 Kristjánsson (2002) 137 makes the same point regarding jealousy.  In general the psychological literature 
distinguishes other emotions only from envy; however I footnote my own deductions as to how they will 
relate to jealousy (see n.78, n.81, n.84, n.90, n.96, n.107 below). Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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2.4.1  Emulation and admiration 
 
It has often been pointed out that there are two possible responses to the three perceptions 
listed as antecedent conditions for envy (or at least similar perceptions):
68 malicious envy, 
and another emotion.  Envy will cause the patient to balance things out by depriving the 
agent of whatever has caused the envy; the other emotion accepts the merit of the agent, 
and will instead cause the patient to focus on his own shortcomings.  This second emotion 
is termed “non malicious envy” by Parrott, “admiring envy” by Jerome Neu, and connected 
to (if not identified with) admiration by Ben Ze’ev and Sandell.
69 
 
However, admiration differs from this second emotion, which I term “emulation”,
70 due to 
the lack or presence of a desire to improve myself.  Ben Ze’ev says “admiration” requires 
that,  when  I  consider  another  person  with  an  object/attribute  I  desire,  my  feelings  are 
entirely  directed towards him and are entirely  positive.  This will only  happen  when  I 
consider him to be outside my reference group (e.g. because he is not similar to myself, or 
is not nearby).
71  If I want to be rich, I might admire Bill Gates, but envy my neighbour on 
a slightly higher salary than me: my neighbour is within my reference group; Bill Gates is 
not.  Sandell takes a slightly different view.  He notes, perceptively, that in admiration we 
do not separate the desired object/attribute from the agent (the agent effectively becomes a 
“trait object”) – for instance, we may think we admire Bill Gates for being a successful 
businessman,  but  what  we  really  admire  is  Bill Gates the successful businessman;  we 
might know nothing else about him, and so do not separate the individual from the admired 
quality.    However,  in  envy,  we  do  separate  the  agent  (whom  we  despise)  from  the 
object/attribute (which we desire).  It is admiration, not envy, that is properly a two object 
emotion.
72  However looked at, though, admiration does not necessarily drive us to take any 
action. 
                                                 
68 “Something good happened to them; it didn’t happen to me; this is bad”, to use the  weak  version in 
Wierzbicka (1999) 98; however see n.69 below. 
69 Parrott (1991) 9; Neu (1980) 433 4; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 304; Sandell (1993) 1213.  Wierzbicka (1999) 98 
refuses to distinguish between the two, hence her softer version of the three antecedent perceptions.  La Caze 
(2001) 32 also does not appear to distinguish them, merely referring to “other forms of envy” including a 
“mild response to a friend’s good fortune”. 
70 “Emulation” is both less cumbersome and less susceptible of ambiguity than “admiring envy” or “non 
malicious envy”; cf. Kristjánsson (2002) 139. 
71 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 304.  In this view, if he is inside my reference group I will not simply feel admiration. 
72 Sandell (1993) 1213 6. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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“Emulation”, though, requires that when I see someone with that vital object/attribute, I am 
motivated to improve myself:
73  I decide to work hard so as to gain a promotion to a similar 
salary band as my  colleague, or to be  able to  buy the same type of sports car or take 
holidays  in  similarly  fashionable  resorts.    However,  this  is  different  from  envy,  which 
might motivate me to circulate malicious rumours about him at work, scratch his car, or 
break his legs just before his skiing trip (i.e. destructive, agent focused actions).  It is a 
matter of controversy whether emulation is a type of envy.
74  There is no doubt that many 
see it as a benign form of envy, a view that is strengthened by the first person comment “I 
envy  you”.
75  However,  my view is that properly  it is not  a type of envy.   While the 
antecedent  perceptions  may  be  similar,  they  are  not  identical:  envy  notes  “You  have 
something,  but  you  should  not”;  emulation  notes  “You  have  something,  and  I  want  it 
too”.
76  When it comes to the third antecedent condition (“This is wrong”), envy focuses 
primarily on the agent losing the good, but emulation on the patient acquiring such a good 
too.  Envy expresses itself in the language of rights (“should”),
77 emulation in the language 
of desires (“want”).  These differences may be a matter of self esteem; they may have a 
psychological basis (e.g. a tendency to introspection compared to a resentment of Fate); 
they may be culture driven (some cultures prize equality of outcome, some hard work and 
appropriate remuneration, more than others); or they may be due to personal distinctions 
(i.e. ‘character’).  For whatever reasons, there is a difference in an antecedent condition, 
which drives differences in both affective response and resulting action tendency.  It is 
clear, therefore, that at every stage of the emotional episode emulation works differently 
                                                 
73 Silver and Sabini (1978b). 
74 Parrott (1991) 10, with references; Parrott inconsistently includes non malicious envy within envy because 
laypersons  use  “envy”  to  mean  both,  while  separating  envy  and  jealousy  despite  laypersons  often  using 
“jealousy” to mean “envy”. 
75 If someone says “I envy you”, they are not expressing malicious hostility, but rather a kind of admiration or 
emulation.  Schoeck (1966/1969) 14 argues that this is because it is taboo to express genuine malicious envy; 
accordingly the phrase “I envy you” is deemed non malicious.  An alternative interpretation can be explained 
by the view of Parrott and Harré (1996) 42 that stating that we feel an emotion is often a socially sanctioned 
way of saying something different (e.g. they see a first person statement of anger as a “ritual rebuke rather 
than an expression of genuine anger”, and similarly a first person statement of embarrassment is “a ritual 
opening for presenting an apology”).  In a similar way,  Silver and Sabini (1978a) 106 believe the phrase “I 
envy you” expresses a compliment – i.e. the first person statement of envy is part of the hyperbole of the 
compliment.  Conversely, Foster (1972) 172 3 links compliments to envy proper, and Elster (1999) 77 argues 
that “damning by faint praise may … be an indirect behavioural effect of envy”. 
76 Kristjánsson (2002) 139.  Clearly this cannot operate in zero sum situations, or where the nature of the 
good does not allow possession by more than one person. 
77 Though, as we saw above (pp.27 8), this is a transmutation to a publicly acceptable rationale. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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from envy.  At best they are kindred reactions to similar situations; one is not a subset of 
the other.  As with jealousy and envy, we can note the philological overlap between (the 
layperson’s) envy and emulation, but should be wary of confusing the phenomena.
78 
 
2.4.2  Greed and covetousness 
 
There has not been much research published on the connection of envy and jealousy with 
these  two  emotions.    Klein  notes  the  similarity  between  envy  and  greed,  as  both  are 
“impetuous and insatiable craving[s], exceeding what the subject needs and what the object 
is able and willing to give”.
79  However, she distinguishes them by noting that greed is 
merely introjective, envy also projective:
80 greed makes us desire someone else’s good, but 
that other person is largely irrelevant; envy will accompany our desire for the good with a 
stronger one to deprive the other person of it.  If the good cannot be acquired, envy will try 
to destroy it (or the rival), while greed will merely remain frustrated.
81  We can see that, as 
with emulation, there has been a change to the antecedent conditions, this time to the first 
condition: instead of “Someone else has a good”, greed says “There is a good” (both being 
followed in the same way by “I do not have it” and “This is bad”).  The absence of a 
reference to another person explains why other affects are not triggered (emulation, anger, 
hostility etc.), and the different action tendency. 
 
Covetousness is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as inordinate desire or lust for 
another’s  possessions.    Ben Ze’ev  notes  that  it  involves  desiring  what  someone  else 
possesses with “an excessive or culpable desire”; however, where envy is a two person 
emotion,  covetousness  is  really  a  one person  emotion  –  it  is  “concerned  with  having 
something”, while envy is “concerned with someone who has something”.
82  Covetousness, 
then, sounds very similar to greed.  A possible distinction may lie in the emphasis placed 
                                                 
78 There is no connection between emulation and jealousy: emulation only operates when not in possession of 
the desired good; it makes no comment about the other person’s continued possession as well; and it does not 
involve either an exclusive bond or a unique object. 
79 Klein (1957/1975) 181; cf. Silver and Sabini (1978a) 106. 
80 Klein (1957/1975) 181. 
81 Greed can also operate when we already possess an object (we can be greedy to keep it), so by analogy it 
can be related to jealousy in the same way: greed wants to hold on to everything we have, but with no 
reference to who else might possess it, while jealousy necessarily perceives a rival. 
82 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 303; Kristjánsson (2002) 138 9 makes the same point.  Frankel and Sherick (1977) (see 
ch.1 n.8) suggest that covetousness (and greed) is developmentally prior to envy in young children. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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on getting more than one needs:  I might covet my neighbour’s ass because I need an ass,
83 
but  I  am less likely to  do so if  I do not;  I might, however, still be  greedy  for it as  a 
possession.  A stronger distinction is that covetousness does seem in fact to involve some 
reference to a current possessor.  This may only be suggested by the familiarity of the 
aforementioned biblical injunction; however it is hard to think of “coveting” (as opposed to 
merely desiring) something that belongs to no one.  It is possible then that we should put 
coveting somewhere between emulation and envy: emulation wants what someone else has, 
without a desire to deprive them; coveting wants what someone else has, with a desire to 
deprive  them;
84  envy  wants  to  deprive  them,  but  is  less  concerned  with  obtaining  it.
85  
Greed would then differ from coveting by not referring to a current possessor.
86 
 
2.4.3  Schadenfreude, spite and malice 
 
R.H. Smith et al. note that envy, a painful feeling, is linked to Schadenfreude, a pleasurable 
one.  They argue that this is because envy involves a feeling of inadequacy and a sense of 
injustice, leading to hostility and dislike of the envied person.  When the latter suffers a 
misfortune, the patient’s invidious dislike makes him feel his misfortune has somehow been 
earned, which gives him pleasure.
87  This pleasure in another’s misfortune, a misfortune 
that  is  subjectively  seen  as  deserved,  has  no  English  name  –  the  German  word 
Schadenfreude  (Schaden  meaning  “harm,  damage,  injury”,  Freude  meaning  “joy”)  is 
generally  used.    This  misfortune  need  not  directly  “right  the  wrong”  (or  counter  the 
perception)  that  led  to  the  envy;
88  for  instance,  we  can  feel Schadenfreude  at  our  rich 
(hence envied) neighbour’s car being damaged – he is no less rich, but we feel that on some 
level he “deserves” it.  This feeling that someone “deserves” the misfortune, a feeling that 
derives from the invidious comparison, is important – Anna Wierzbicka points out that 
sadism is also a pleasure taken in another’s misfortune, but it lacks this element (among 
                                                 
83 Referring to Exodus 20.17. 
84 Coveting has fewer differences from jealousy than emulation does (n.78 above), as it does refer to an 
alternative possessor, and does involve an exclusive bond; however it is still incompatible with jealousy since 
it does not involve a unique object (any ass will do), nor can it operate when we are in possession of the good. 
85 On this interpretation, covetousness and envy are very close to each other; one could make a case for seeing 
covetousness as a subset of envy. 
86 Unless one defines greed as wanting more than your fair share, as this would also bring in a reference to 
other possessors or potential possessors, though in the plural and perhaps less clearly identifiable. 
87 R.H. Smith et al. (1996) 158 9, 167; cf. Wurmser and Jarass (2008b) xii. 
88 R.H. Smith et al. (1996) 159. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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others).
89    Experiments  have  shown  that  invidious  comparison  is  necessary  for 
Schadenfreude  to  be  felt.
90    Like  envy,  Schadenfreude  is  based  on  the  subjective 
perceptions of the interested party: the misfortune may, or may not, be seen by disinterested 
parties (i.e. those with no personal desire for the envied good) as deserved.
91 
 
Schadenfreude  is  seen  as  a  shameful  emotion,  like  envy,  and  similarly  it  tends  to  be 
concealed in public – a certain guilt attaches.
92  However, as with envy, an alternative to 
concealment  is  a  mask:  the  envious  person,  when  he  feels  Schadenfreude,  might 
consciously (through misrepresentation) or unconsciously (through transmutation) attempt 
to show that the agent’s misfortune was objectively deserved.
93  This is analogous to an 
envious person attempting to show that someone’s good fortune is objectively undeserved, 
concealing their envy with the mask of indignation.  This suggests that Schadenfreude (like 
envy) is bivalent, that it can be felt both when the misfortune is subjectively, but also 
objectively,
94 deserved: i.e. I would not, in fact, need to envy someone to think they “got 
their comeuppance”.  However, when invidious comparison is not present, we may believe 
someone  has  “got  their  comeuppance”,  but  we  will  not  feel  pleasure  at  it,  merely 
satisfaction – the pleasurable element is solely derived from our prior envy.  The mask of 
Schadenfreude, then, lies in persuading others that we have not taken pleasure in another’s 
misfortune,  merely  that  we  feel  satisfied  that  a  wrong  has  been  righted,  that  someone 
undeserving of his good fortune has been “taken down a peg or two”.
95 
 
                                                 
89 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 356, 369 and Wierzbicka (1999) 103 4 note this distinction, and that the misfortune 
should not be serious in Schadenfreude, but it might be in sadism.  Other differences include that sadism takes 
an  active  part  in  the  misfortune  while  Schadenfreude  does  not,  sadism  is  narrower  in  focus  and  less 
discriminate in object, and it is linked to sex, physical pain, humiliation and notions of control – none of 
which are applicable to Schadenfreude.  Klein (1957/1975) 176 believes that sadism is an element of envy. 
90 R.H. Smith et al. (1996) 159, 167; Brigham et al. (1997) 364 5.  As jealousy can involve envy in its blend 
(see p.30), a jealous person can also feel Schadenfreude for his rival. 
91 Brigham et al. (1997) 375 6.  For misfortune that is seen as deserved even by disinterested parties, see 
ch.2.5.1. 
92 Brigham et al. (1997) 365; Parrott (1991) 13 4 notes guilt can be part of envy too; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 367 8 
compares the desires to conceal envy and Schadenfreude (which he terms “pleasure in others’ misfortune”).  
See n.29 above. 
93 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 356 7; cf. Brigham et al. (1997) 374 6 see also ch.2.5.1. 
94 By which I mean, from the point of view of the patient, and that of personally disinterested observers – see 
n.100 below. 
95  Kristjánsson  (2006)  96  refers  to  this  feeling,  which  stands  in  the  same  relation  to  indignation  as 
Schadenfreude does to envy, as “satisfied indignation”.  We could say that envy and Schadenfreude both seek 
to hide one’s subjective involvement behind a veneer of disinterestedness. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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Spite and malice (the two words seem to imply the same phenomenon, and differ merely in 
their idiomatic usage) are similar to Schadenfreude inasmuch as they are invidious: we act 
to spite someone to whom we have an invidious hostility, and “malice” likewise involves 
an active hostility.
96  However they differ in that spite and malice in some way involve 
action by the patient against the agent; Schadenfreude, however, does not. 
 
2.5  Emotions that envy and jealousy masquerade as 
 
Having considered how to distinguish envy and jealousy from a range of related emotions, I 
now turn to those they overtly masquerade as, through either transmutation (unconscious 
masking/veiling), or through misrepresentation (conscious masking/veiling).
97 
 
2.5.1  Indignation and anger 
 
Ben Ze’ev  has  noted  that  envy  appears  to  have  two  concerns:  first,  with  our  own 
inferiority;  second,  with  someone  else’s  undeserved  superiority.    He  has  argued, 
persuasively, that it is in fact the former that is properly envy, while the latter is indignation 
or  (as  he  terms  it)  resentment.
98    There  are  two  issues  here:  perceived 
inferiority/superiority, and desert.  Envy often  positions itself as a moral emotion (“He 
shouldn’t have that”, “It’s not right”); however this is a mask – envy can never be moral.
99  
If a disinterested observer would also see the difference in outcome as unfair or morally 
wrong, then the agent will not deserve his superiority, and so the patient’s moral outrage 
will  be  justified  –  this  is  indignation.    However,  if  the  patient  argues  that  an  agent’s 
possession of a good is wrong or not fair, while disinterested observers believe the patient’s 
                                                 
96 Rawls (1999) 467 8.  This invidious hostility means we can act to spite someone we are jealous of too. 
97 See pp.27 8 on the transmutation of envy, p.31 on that of jealousy. 
98 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 282 4, 287 8; cf. Rawls (1999) 467, R.H. Smith (1991) 81ff.  I generally prefer to use 
‘indignation’,  as  ‘resentment’  has  occasionally  been  used  when  the  moral  emotion  ‘indignation’  and  the 
immoral one ‘envy’ have been conflated (as I intentionally sometimes use ‘resentment’ in ch.5, ch.6, for 
reasons that will become clear there) – e.g. La Caze (2001); cf. see Van Hooft (2002) 146.  Even more 
confusingly, the French ressentiment has (particularly because of Scheler’s tract of the same name) been used 
widely in the literature on envy – Scheler (1915/2007) 25 described ressentiment as including “revenge, 
hatred, malice, envy, the impulse to detract, and spite.” 
99 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 283 5; Parrott (1991) 10 11; Rawls (1999) 467.  R.H. Smith (1991) 81ff. for a contrary 
view, though he confuses the personal sense of moral outrage that is often part of envy with disinterested 
indignation.    La  Caze  (2001)  35  also  seems  to  believe  that  envy  can  be  moral,  but  that  is  because  she 
distinguishes indignation concerning a good we want for ourselves from indignation concerning a good we do 
not, and calls the former ‘moral envy’ – I cannot see any justification for this distinction; Ben Ze’ev (2002) 
also argues that La Caze is mistaken. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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inferiority is deserved, then while the patient may think he feels indignation, observers will 
correctly perceive him to be experiencing envy.
100  As Parrott points out: “The distinction 
between resentment and malicious envy is one that is made using the objective facts of the 
social world….”
101  Parrott notes that the patient may realise that his resentment is not 
justified, that his indignation is not so righteous after all.  When he does, he may not give 
over  his  resentment,  but  may  shift  its  focus  from  the  agent  to  a  more  generalised 
dissatisfaction with “the unfairness of life itself”.
102  While envy tends to mask itself, true 
indignation, being personally disinterested and hence socially sanctioned, has no need of a 
mask.  Similarly, while envy seeks the destruction of the envied person or desired (but 
unattainable)  object,  indignation,  being  a  less  personally interested  emotion  directed  at 
someone breaching collective boundaries, merely seeks appropriate punishment.  Because 
of the high frequency of transmutation or masking of envy, the ‘outsider’s’ evaluation of 
the facts can be crucial in determining whether expressed indignation is truly indignation, 
or really envy in disguise: indignation will only properly be felt at someone who does not 
deserve  the  object/attribute  in  question;  envy  masquerading  as  indignation  will  be  felt 
irrespective of whether he deserves it or not. 
 
Both Parrott and Ben Ze’ev note that indignation/resentment is more akin to anger than to 
envy.
103  But is there a qualitative difference between indignation and anger, or is it merely 
a matter of degree?  The psychological/psychoanalytical literature on envy tends to conflate 
the  two.
104  However,  Wierzbicka  says  that  anger  is  agent specific,  while  indignation is 
more generalised,
105 and Ben Ze’ev similarly suggests that indignation is a response to a 
transgression  of  societal  norms,  while  anger  is  a  response  to  a  more  personal 
                                                 
100 When I talk about disinterested observers here, I am not referring to some objective ‘truth’, rather I mean 
personally disinterested; they may still be interested from a societal point of view.  Thus possession of the 
good may appear wrong to the individual but be socially sanctioned (envy transmuted into indignation), or 
appear  wrong  both  to  the  individual  and  the  observer  (genuine  indignation).    Objective  ‘truths’  are  an 
irrelevance: they are of necessity independent of observers, and it is only observers (whether personally or 
only socially involved) who can have emotions.  We can note that different people in different societies, or 
even within the one society, may agree with the individual personally involved, while others do not: i.e. what 
some refer to as “fair”, others may call “the politics of envy” – see Cairns (2003b) 235 8.  This suggests that 
in practice an attribution of envy will depend on one’s point of view, and in later chapters I demonstrate how 
Athenians manipulated listeners’ points of view, so as to portray an opponent as motivated by envy (see 
especially ch.5.2). 
101 Parrott (1991) 11. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Parrott (1991) 10 11; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 283. 
104 And, incidentally, also conflates anger with hatred in an ambiguous “hostility”. 
105 Wierzbicka (1999) 87 90; she also says that it contains some element of surprise. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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transgression.
106  This is plausible, and if true suggests that a patient will misrepresent or 
transmute his envy sometimes into one, and sometimes into the other.
107 
 
2.5.2  Desire for justice, and desire for equality 
 
A related emotion that envy is also frequently transmuted into or misrepresented as, is a 
desire for “justice” or “equality”.  Those who are envious often express themselves with 
such comments as, “You’re no better than the rest of us!”, or “Why should he have that, we 
haven’t?”, or “That’s an obscene amount to earn!”.  There are similarities here to moral 
indignation, but whereas that emotion is aroused by someone stepping outside of socially 
agreed norms of behaviour, the desire for justice appeals to a more universal abstraction.
108  
It initially seems somewhat controversial as to whether there is a justice element to envy: 
Ben Ze’ev and Rawls, for instance, argue that there is not, R.H. Smith that there is.
109  
However, the two camps miss each other’s points.  Ben Ze’ev and Rawls argue from a 
personally disinterested, R.H. Smith from a personally interested, standpoint.  Just as with 
indignation/resentment, someone who is envious might think he is motivated by a sense of 
injustice – this would, after all, merely mean his invidious hostility has been transmuted 
rather than misrepresented.  In that sense, the sense of injustice is indeed often central to 
envy,  as  R.H.  Smith  asserts.    However,  even  R.H.  Smith  does  not  believe  that  a 
disinterested observer will corroborate that personally interested sense of injustice.
110 
 
                                                 
106  Ben Ze’ev  (2002)  152 3,  who  goes  on  to  argue  that  anger  is  more  transient  than  indignation  (or 
‘resentment’, as he terms it), and that it is more inclined to seek redress. 
107 It also suggests that envy will be relatively more likely to masquerade as indignation, while jealousy will 
be relatively more likely to masquerade as anger. 
108 Elster (1999) 350 describes “rewriting the triggering situation as a violation of some impartial standard of 
fairness, justice, or entitlement” as a transmutation of passion into reason, or “passion into passion, mediated 
by reason”.  Considering n.100 above, we might say that indignation refers to expected norms, while desire 
for justice refers (incorrectly) to an objective truth. 
109 See n.99 above.  La Caze (2001) 35 6 too makes the same error with a sense of injustice as she does with 
‘moral envy’. 
110 R.H. Smith does not appear to be aware of the distinction between transmutation and misrepresentation.  
He seems to argue that the envious person will always be aware that his feeling of injustice is partial, and will 
therefore always be aware that he should keep his (invidious) hostility to himself; when he knows his hostility 
(i.e. sense of injustice) is shared, that is when he will speak out – R.H. Smith (1991) 85 6.  However R.H. 
Smith then immediately cites a literary example (most of his examples are taken from literature) who is 
unaware that his hostility is partial (Cassius in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, who appears to persuade an 
audience that he was right to kill Caesar, until Mark Antony persuades them he is motivated by envy (86 7)), 
thus undermining his own argument. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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A desire for equality is related to the desire for justice, and like the latter can be argued for 
as a ‘just’ end in itself: some societies will aim to redistribute goods,
111 not to manage a 
specific instance of envy, but in an attempt to lessen the level of envy in society more 
generally.
112  Rawls argues that there are three conditions required for general envy: 1) that 
people feel undervalued, and do not think they can do anything about it; 2) this is felt as 
“painful and humiliating”, and social conditions are such that this painful and humiliating 
situation  is  constantly  brought  to  one’s  attention;  3)  their  social  position  gives  no 
alternative to trying to pull down the rich, even at some loss to themselves.  Societies that 
try to manage envy (or, from Rawls’ point of view, societies that set out to create just 
institutions)  will  aim  to  ameliorate  one  or  more  of  these  conditions  –  for  instance  by 
forbidding ostentatious displays of wealth, by placing burdens on wealthier citizens, or by 
enshrining citizen rights that enhance the status even of the lowliest.
113  This may well not 
do any good, however: many psychologists believe that reduced inequality is at least as 
likely to lead to a rise as a fall in envy, due to the oft noted tendency of envy to be directed 
at one’s peers.
114  Ben Ze’ev notes two distinctions between envy and a genuine desire for 
equality: the former will only call for equality when it favours the envious person, while the 
latter will call for it when it disadvantages them as well; second, envy will also occur in 
respect of goods which cannot be equal by their very nature – e.g. beauty or intelligence.
115 
 
2.6  Conclusion 
 
Envy  is  a  hostile  emotion,  usually  felt  for  our  peers,  when  they  have  some  object  or 
attribute we want.  It is characterised by a stronger desire for them to be deprived of the 
object/attribute than for us to acquire it ourselves, and motivates us to act even if depriving 
them means losing something ourselves as well.  Its action tendency is highly destructive, 
both to the desired good and its current possessor, and operates through such expression as 
                                                 
111  At  least,  alienable  goods  such  as  money  or  property;  inalienable  goods  such  as  beauty  cannot  be 
apportioned evenly. 
112 Rawls (1999) 468 9 distinguishes between particular, and general, envy. 
113 Rawls (1999) 469 71.  Rawls argues (471) that some, e.g. Schoeck (1966/1969), see all “tendency to 
equality … [as] the expression of envy”; Neu (1980) 437 9 disagrees strongly with Schoeck.  Kristjánsson 
(2006) 83 notes that we have a concept of justice based emotions from early childhood, and since we are not 
aware of legal institutions at that stage, our innate sense of ‘what justice is’ is essentially pre institutional. 
114 Silver and Sabini (1978a) 107; Parrott (1991) 7; Elster (1999) 170; Ben Ze’ev (2000) 316; Ben Ze’ev 
(2002) 151; see also my comment on Aristotle in n.10 above.  None of these studies, however, quote any 
experiential evidence for decreased equality leading to a rise in envy. 
115 Ben Ze’ev (2000) 316.  See also R.H. Smith (1991) 90 2 on ‘natural inequalities’. Chapter 2:  Phenomenology  
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physical aggression, gossip and slander, compliments designed to arouse the Evil Eye or 
invidious feelings in others, and curses or other types of black magic.  Envy has a tendency 
to disguise itself as moral indignation, or some disinterested desire for justice or equality, 
but in fact it is never a moral emotion as the invidious hostility blinds the patient to the 
agent’s true deserts. 
 
Jealousy differs from envy in a number of respects, but has many similarities too.  It is 
principally felt when there is some object/person with which/whom we see ourselves as 
having  an  exclusive  bond.    It  frequently  includes  envy  in  its  blend,  along  with  anger, 
hostility, and potentially suspicion, fear of loss, or grief.  It necessarily takes place in a 
three person scenario (unless possessive rather than sexual jealousy, when one person can 
be replaced by an object), whereas envy can (and usually does) occur  in a two person 
scenario;  three person  scenarios  tend  to  contain  various  mixtures  of  rivalry,  envy  and 
jealousy.  Jealousy carries less of a social stigma than envy, and so has less tendency to 
disguise itself; when it does, righteous anger is the usual mask. 
 
Envy  overlaps  with,  has  similarities  to,  or  can  coexist  with  a  large  variety  of  other 
emotions:  jealousy,  emulation,  covetousness  and  greed,  spite  and  malice,  and 
Schadenfreude.    Of  these  we  should  particularly  note  that  envy  can  be  mislabelled  as 
jealousy, though this does not occur in reverse.  Emulation is sometimes mislabelled as 
envy, especially in first person attributions such as “I envy you” – however true envy is 
such a socially taboo emotion that it is in fact almost never claimed.  Spite, malice and 
(particularly) Schadenfreude are contingent on envy: without invidious comparison they 
cannot be felt. 
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Chapter 3:  The Vocabulary of Greek Envy and Jealousy 
 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
The two Greek words most closely related to envy/jealousy are phthonos and zêlos,
1 and 
this chapter accordingly concentrates on these and their cognates.
2  While my focus in this 
thesis is on the Classical period, I begin my lexical survey by examining the evidence for 
phthonos  and  zêlos  in  the  Archaic  period.    Given  the  somewhat  sketchy  nature  of  the 
Archaic  evidence,  it  is  not  totally  clear  if  differences  of  meaning  reflect  diachronic 
development or generic differences (the evidence suggests the latter); certainly by the fifth 
century both terms had developed the meanings they later held more or less unchanged.  
Zêlos having been shown to be of limited relevance to envy/jealousy, I cover its Classical 
usage as an addendum to my Archaic survey, before moving on to a detailed survey of 
phthonos in the Classical period. 
 
3.2  The Archaic background 
 
Before considering phthonos and zêlos separately, I want first to look at the earliest passage 
in Greek literature where they are placed side by side.  In a famous passage in Works and 
Days, Hesiod links both phthonos and zêlos to rivalry: 
Οὐκ ἄρα  οῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ γαῖαν 
εἰσὶ δύω  τὴν  έν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας, 
ἣ δ’ ἐπι ω ητή  διὰ δ’ ἄνδιχα θυ ὸν ἔχουσιν. 
ἣ  ὲν γὰρ πόλε όν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει, 
σχετλίη  οὔ τις τήν γε φιλεῖ βροτός, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης  
ἀθανάτων βουλῇσιν Ἔριν τι ῶσι βαρεῖαν.  
τὴν δ’ ἑτέρην προτέρην  ὲν ἐγείνατο Νὺξ ἐρεβεννή, 
θῆκε δέ  ιν Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος, αἰθέρι ναίων,  
γαίης [τ’] ἐν ῥίζῃσι καὶ ἀνδράσι πολλὸν ἀ είνω  
ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλα όν περ ὁ ῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει  
εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τίς τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων  
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει  ὲν ἀρό εναι ἠδὲ φυτεύειν 
                                                 
1 See Walcot (1978) 2 (whose claim that phthonos should be always translated as envy and zêlos as jealousy I 
disagree with, as will become clear), and the individual contributions to Konstan and Rutter (2003), which 
mostly focus on these two words. 
2  Other  words  can  occasionally  imply  the  idea  of  begrudging  envy  or  resentment  (e.g.  agaasthai  and 
megairein – see ch.7 n.33), but too infrequently to be of interest to the phenomenology. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι  ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων 
εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’  ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσιν. 
καὶ κερα εὺς κερα εῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, 
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. 
  Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα τεῷ ἐνικάτθεο θυ ῷ,  
 ηδέ σ’ Ἔρις κακόχαρτος ἀπ’ ἔργου θυ ὸν ἐρύκοι  
νείκε’ ὀπιπεύοντ’ ἀγορῆς ἐπακουὸν ἐόντα.  
            Hes. Op. 11 29 
 
Not only one Strife was born, but upon the earth 
there are two: those who know her praise the one, 
the other is blamed; and this is because they have a different spirit. 
For the one is cruel, tending to war, evil, and contest; 
no mortal loves her, but only under compulsion 
of the will of the immortals do they honour heavy Strife. 
The other, dark Night bore first, 
and high throned Zeus, dwelling in the air, placed her 
in the roots of the earth – and she is much kinder to men. 
She rouses even the good for nothing to work: 
for someone in need of work saw another 
getting wealthy, and so hastens to plough and nurture, 
and put his house in order; and neighbour emulates neighbour, 
hastening to wealth; for this Strife is good for mortals. 
And potter grudges potter and carpenter, carpenter; 
and beggar envies beggar and bard, bard. 
O Perses, put this by in your heart, 
and do not let evil loving Strife keep your heart from work, 
watching a wrangle, and being attentive to the market place. 
 
Hesiod identifies two types of Eris (Strife), conventionally labelled Bad Strife and Good 
Strife  –  though  perhaps  better  reflected  in  the  difference  between  English  “strife”  and 
“striving”.  Bad Strife (or “strife”) is “cruel, tending to war, evil, and contest”.  This is 
destructive rivalry, which Hesiod had already depicted as a daughter of Night in Theogony, 
and which is itself the parent of painful Toil, Forgetfulness, Famine, tearful Pains, Battles, 
Murders, Quarrels etc. (Theog. 223ff.), and this Strife is briefly revisited at Op. 14 16.  
However  Hesiod  now  introduces  Good  Strife  (or  “striving”),
3  on  which  he  prefers  to 
concentrate.  Good Strife is emulative rivalry: we see someone else doing well, and we are 
encouraged to emulate them, to work to achieve the same ends, and both we and they end 
up better off for the rivalry.
4  In English this is clearly what we call “emulation” (see p.35), 
and we will later see that this matches Aristotle’s definition of zêlos in Greek (see p.72).  
                                                 
3 West, (1978) 142, 144. 
4 We should note that both Bad and Good Strife are respectively bad and good in terms of their result, not of 
their psychology. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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Hesiod too uses the verb zêloô, saying “neighbour emulates neighbour”.  However, contra 
Bulman’s suggestion that zêlos and phthonos are related respectively by Hesiod to Good 
and Bad Strife,
5 Hesiod goes on immediately to say “And potter grudges (koteei) potter and 
carpenter, carpenter; and beggar envies (phthoneei) beggar and bard, bard.” (Op. 25 6), the 
initial  “ands”  showing  that  both  kotos  and  phthonos  also  relate  to  Good  Strife.    This 
conclusion has been regularly rejected by scholars, on the grounds that what Hesiod says 
contradicts  our  usual  understanding  of  phthonos  (and  kotos),
6  but  it  is  an  inescapable 
conclusion from the καί: phthonos and zêlos are more or less equivalents here, and both 
relate to professional, emulative rivalry between neighbours.
7  This suggests that the later 
sharp division between phthonos and zêlos (which will become clear later in this section, 
and to which Aristotle refers – see p.72) might not yet have developed by Hesiod’s time,
8 
and this should be borne in mind when considering the rest of the Archaic evidence. 
 
3.2.1  The development of phthonos in the Archaic period 
 
Phthonos, or rather the verb phthoneô, occurs ten times in Homer.  In all instances bar one 
(Il. 4.55,  4.56,  Od.  1.346,  6.68,  11.381,  17.400,  18.16,  19.348;  and  epiphthoneô  at 
Od. 11.149) the word is used of gods or heroes, and means “refuse” or “begrudge”.
9  The 
one exception is when it is used of the beggar Iros (Od. 18.18), where it means “resent” or 
“envy”: “Stranger, I neither do nor say anything bad to you, nor do I begrudge someone 
taking even a lot and giving it to you.  This threshold will hold us both, and you should not 
resent/envy  things  which  belong  to  others.”  (Od. 18.15 18:  δαι όνι’,  οὔτε  τί  σε  ῥέζω 
κακὸν  οὔτ’  ἀγορεύω,  οὔτε  τινὰ  φθονέω  δό εναι  καὶ  πόλλ’  ἀνελόντα.  οὐδὸς  δ’ 
ἀ φοτέρους ὅδε χείσεται, οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ ἀλλοτρίων φθονέειν ).  It seems that in Homer 
phthoneô could refer to envy, but generally did not.  Most suggests, plausibly, that the 
                                                 
5 Bulman (1992) 7. 
6 West (1978) 147: “κότος and φθόνος are not in the spirit of the good Eris, but [my italics] the idea of rivalry 
makes the lines relevant enough for Hesiod….”, cf. Duran Lopez (1996) 387.  Most (2003) 130 2 does not 
directly contradict Hesiod, but does conflate phthonos and zêlos when talking about Hesiod’s good and bad 
envy, the bad relating to Op. 195 – see p.52 below. 
7 In sociological terms, they have a shared origin in status distinctions in a peer group.  Walcot (1978) 3 
highlights “three basic categories of [Greek mortal] envy, … ‘professional envy’, ‘sibling envy’ and ‘sexual 
envy’.” 
8 It is possible that Hesiod’s could merely be an idiosyncratic usage, though the nature of our evidence makes 
it hard to track the idiosyncratic. 
9 Most (2003) 129 – he prefers the translation “to wish to forbid”, though I find this cumbersome; it also 
overlooks the continuity that phthonos can imply begrudging from Homer through to Aristotle and beyond. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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reason for envy’s near absence from Homer is that it is unheroic; this is supported by the 
fact that we do see it (i.e. it was not a meaning that developed later), but only in an unheroic 
character.    Envy  could  appear  much  more  readily  in  Hesiod’s  Works  &  Days  then,
10 
because of the mortal and unheroic subject of the poem.
11 
 
In lyric poetry, which is frequently  concerned  with the relationship between prominent 
individuals in the real (i.e. non heroic) world, we find phthonos taking on more of a tone of 
envy – and particularly of destructive envy.  Mimnermos contrasts feeling envy for a live 
man of great fame with praising a dead one (fr.25(West).1 2: δεινοὶ γὰρ ἀνδρὶ πάντες 
ἐσ ὲν εὐκλεεῖ / ζῶντι φθονῆσαι, κατθανόντα δ’ αἰνέσαι.).
12  A number of sayings are 
recorded  under  the  heading  of  the  ‘Seven  Sages’.
13  “Envy  no  one”  (Apophth. 
fr.7.3(Mullach):   ηδενὶ  φθόνει).    “Do  not  feel  envy  for  mortal  goods”  (Sent.  fr.l.31 
p.216(Mullach):  ὴ φθόνει θνητά).  “Flee the envy of all, and guard against the plots of 
those who hate  you” (Apophth. fr.1.7(Mullach): φεῦγε  ὲν τὸν φθόνον τῶν πολλῶν, 
φυλάσσου δὲ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τῶν  ισούντων).  “As the red blight is a disease peculiar to 
food, so envy is a sickness of friendship” (Apophth. fr.7.4(Mullach): ὥσπερ ἡ ἐρυσίβη 
ἴδιόν  ἐστι  τοῦ  σίτου  νόση α,  οὕτω  φθόνος  φιλίας  ἐστὶν  ἀῤῥώστη α).
14    “As  rust 
attaches to iron, so phthonos does to the possessing soul itself” (Apophth. fr.7.5(Mullach): 
ὥσπερ ὁ ἰὸς σίδηρον, οὕτως ὁ φθόνος τὴν ἔχουσαν αὐτὸν ψυχὴν ἐξαναψήχει).  “For 
however much you might envy, so much do you become a patron of greater goods to the 
envied”  (Apophth.  fr.7.6(Mullach):  ὅσῳ  γὰρ  ἂν  φθονῇς,  τοσούτῳ   ειζόνων  γίνῃ 
πρόξενος ἀγαθῶν τῷ φθονου ένῳ).  “Having been shot in a hunt by a brother, he dies 
saying he was saved outside Greece by his repute, but destroyed in his house out of envy” 
(Apophth.  fr.10.30.3 5(Mullach):  τοξευθεὶς  ἐν  κυνηγεσίῳ  πρὸς  τἀδελφοῦ  τελευτᾷ 
εἰπών, διὰ  ὲν τὸν λόγον ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος σωθῆναι, διὰ δὲ τὸν φθόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ 
ἀπολέσθαι).    Begrudging  is  still  a  possible  meaning,  however,  e.g.  in  Theognis:  “The 
servant  and  messenger  of  the  Muses  must,  if  he  knows  something  uncommon,  not  be 
                                                 
10 Whether as phthonos or zêlos, which Hesiod uses as equivalents (see p.47, p.52). 
11 Most (2003) 132.  In Archaic epic, the only other uses of phthonos words are four instances of ἄφθονος 
(Hes.  Op.  118;  Hom.  Hymn  3.536,  30.8,  30.16),  a  word  meaning  “abundant,  plentiful,  generous”  – 
etymologically formed a phthonos, this is again closer in meaning to “ungrudged” than “unenvious”.  
12 Arist. Rh. 2.10.1388a9 11 notes that one does not feel rivalry, and hence envy, for the dead.  The opposition 
of envy and praise occurs again in Pindar – see p.50. 
13 These are Archaic if genuine, though some may be later mis attributions. 
14 This rather strange (to us) idea that phthonos is only felt for friends finds its echo in Pl. Phlb. 48a8 50a9 – 
see p.126 8. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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grudging  of  his  wisdom”  (769 770:  χρὴ  Μουσῶν  θεράποντα  καὶ  ἄγγελον,  εἴ  τι 
περισσόν / εἰδείη, σοφίης  ὴ φθονερὸν τελέθειν).  In Lyric then, it is clear that phthonos is 
used in its expected (i.e. Classical) sense of (be)grudging or destructive envy: phthonos is 
felt against someone who has desired possessions; it is linked with hatred; and it leads to 
destructive actions.
15  Finally, it is something that can be felt even against a friend or a 
brother.  It is also felt against neighbours, i.e. our peers, as Pindar notes: “Then one of the 
envious neighbours straightaway secretly told the tale” (Ol. 1.47: ἔννεπε κρυφᾷ τις αὐτίκα 
φθονερῶν  γειτόνων);
16  the  casual  juxtaposition  of  the  two  words  indicating  that  his 
audience would not find this an unusual idea. 
 
When one moves from the individual to the group within the larger society of the polis, 
similar feelings occur.  We see this particularly in the epinician poetry of Pindar, where 
phthonos words occur twenty five times in surviving odes and fragments.
17  A group of 
these relate to phthonos within a community, aimed at those who have (athletic or political) 
success,
18 happiness, nobility, or virtue. “Censure from envious others hangs over those 
men who drive first in the twelfth race, [and on whom] august Grace let fall well famed 
beauty” (Ol. 6.74 6:  ῶ ος ἐξ ἄλλων κρέ αται φθονεόντων τοῖς, οἷς ποτε πρώτοις 
περὶ δωδέκατον δρό ον ἐλαυνόντεσσιν αἰδοία ποτιστάξῃ Χάρις εὐκλέα  ορφάν).  “I 
rejoice somewhat at this new happiness; but I am pained too, that envy answers fine deeds.  
Indeed they say thus for man, that steadfast, blooming happiness brings both one and the 
other” (Pyth. 7.14 18: νέᾳ δ’ εὐπραγίᾳ χαίρω τι  τὸ δ’ ἄχνυ αι, φθόνον ἀ ειβό ενον τὰ 
καλὰ ἔργα. φαντί γε  άν οὕτω κ’ ἀνδρὶ παρ ονί αν θάλλοισαν εὐδαι ονίαν τὰ καὶ τὰ 
φέρεσθαι).  “For happiness brings with it no lesser envy” (Pyth. 11.29: ἴσχει τε γὰρ ὄλβος 
                                                 
15 All these aspects of phthonos are also important to English envy (see p.24 6). 
16 An insight shared by several later Greeks (see p.63), especially Aristotle (see p.86), and also by modern 
scholars (see ch.2 n.10, n.114).  In this Pindar fragment we see the connection of gossip with neighbours (see 
V. Hunter (1990) 301 for this connection more generally, especially in the Attic orators), and see ch.7 n.32 for 
the connection of gossip with phthonos. 
17 Nearly twice as many as in the surviving passages of all other Archaic poets put together.  On envy in 
Pindar,  see  especially  Kirkwood  (1984),  Vallozza  (1989),  Kurke  (1991)  195 224,  Bulman  (1992),  Most 
(2003).  We should note that epinician texts are not transparent sources: there is a rhetoric of praise, which 
may involve elements of hyperbole; however for the rhetoric to work it must be rooted in agreed perceptions.  
This rhetoric of praise incorporates phthonos as something both to be desired (as an indicator of success) and 
shunned (as potentially destructive). 
18 Kurke (1991) 195: “That the victor’s fellow citizens feel phthonos at his good fortune is an epinician 
commonplace.”    Most  (2003)  134  argues  that  envy  of  anyone  successful  was  so  prevalent  in  such  a 
competitive society as ancient Greece, that “the epinician poet had no choice but to attempt to confront and 
defeat it.”  This applies not just to Pindar; Bacchylides appears to have a similar, if less subtle, approach to 
confronting and defeating phthonos in the handful of instances in his surviving poetry – see Most (2003) 137. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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οὐ  είονα φθόνον).  “Words are relish for envy, which attaches itself always to the noble, 
and  does  not  quarrel  with  the  inferior”  (Nem.  8.21 2:  ὄψον  δὲ  λόγοι  φθονεροῖσιν, 
ἅπτεται δ’ ἐσλῶν ἀεί, χειρόνεσσι δ’ οὐκ ἐρίζει).  “If he lays down all his rage at virtue, 
both with expenditure and with toil, we must give noble praise to those who have found it, 
and  not  bear  it  with  envious  thoughts”  (Isthm.  1.41 5:  εἰ  δ’  ἀρετᾷ  κατάκειται  πᾶσαν 
ὀργάν, ἀ φότερον δαπάναις τε καὶ πόνοις, χρή νιν εὑρόντεσσιν ἀγάνορα κό πον  ὴ 
φθονεραῖσι  φέρειν  γνώ αις).    “Βecause  envious  hopes  hang  around  the  thoughts  of 
mortals, let him now not ever keep silent his father’s virtue, nor these songs” (Isthm. 2.43 
5:   ή  νυν,  ὅτι  φθονεραὶ  θνατῶν  φρένας  ἀ φικρέ ανται  ἐλπίδες,   ήτ’  ἀρετάν  ποτε 
σιγάτω πατρῴαν,  ηδὲ τούσδ’ ὕ νους).  “But envy hangs over every man for virtue, 
while the one who has nothing hides his head under black silence” (fr.94a.8 10(Maehler): 
παντὶ δ’ ἐπὶ φθόνος ἀνδρὶ κεῖται ἀρετᾶς, ὁ δὲ  ηδὲν ἔχων ὑπὸ σιγᾷ  ελαίνᾳ κάρα 
κέκρυπται).    Pindar  seems  to  see  phthonos  from  one’s  fellow  man  as  an  automatic 
concomitant of these good things in life (success, happiness, nobility, and virtue) – they are 
two sides of the same coin, inescapable companions.
19 
 
These  good  things  are  particularly  likely  to  arouse  phthonos  when  praised.    Human 
phthonos  is  linked  to  praise  or  hymns  for  the  victor  four  times.    “If  a  man  were  an 
Olympian victor, a steward for the oracular altar in Pisa, and fellow colonist in famous 
Syracuse, what hymn might that man avoid, to fall in with unenvious fellow townsmen in 
longed for songs?” (Ol. 6.4 7: εἰ δ’ εἴ  η  ὲν Ὀλυ πιονίκας, βω ῷ τε  αντείῳ τα ίας 
 ιὸς ἐν Πίσᾳ, συνοικιστήρ τε τᾶν κλεινᾶν Συρακοσσᾶν, τίνα κεν φύγοι ὕ νον κεῖνος 
ἀνήρ, ἐπικύρσαις ἀφθόνων ἀστῶν ἐν ἱ ερταῖς ἀοιδαῖς;).  “Unbegrudging, this praise is 
dedicated to Olympic victors.  This our tongue wants to cherish…” (Ol. 11.7 9: ἀφθόνητος 
δ’ αἶνος Ὀλυ πιονίκαις οὗτος ἄγκειται. τὰ  ὲν ἁ ετέρα γλῶσσα ποι αίνειν ἐθέλει); 
also Isthm. 1.44 and 2.43 (see above). 
 
                                                 
19 Most (2003) 139.  Kurke (1991) 195 224 and Most (2003) 135 41 argue that the emphasis on envy of the 
athletic victor was most apparent where there was a concern that the victor might seek to set himself up as a 
tyrant; or (if he were a tyrant already) that he would change from ruling benevolently and seeking to minimise 
the differences between himself and the rest of the polis, to acting arrogantly and self aggrandisingly.  On this 
view, then, envy is something that must either be managed by the encomiast, or confronted directly and 
shown to be baseless. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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But phthonos also comes from the gods.
20  “I pray, Xenarkes, for the unenvying gaze of the 
gods  on  your  fortunes”  (Pyth.  8.71 2:  θεῶν  δ’  ὄπιν  ἄφθονον  αἰτ<έω>,  Ξέναρκες, 
ὑ ετέραις τύχαις).  “Of the delightful things in Greece they have obtained not a small gift; 
may they not fall in with envious changes of fortune from the gods” (Pyth. 10.19 21: τῶν 
δ’ ἐν Ἑλλάδι τερπνῶν λαχόντες οὐκ ὀλίγαν δόσιν,  ὴ φθονεραῖς ἐκ θεῶν  ετατροπίαις 
ἐπικύρσαιεν).  “Highest far reaching ruler of Olympia, may you be unbegrudging of our 
words  for  all  time,  father  Zeus”  (Ol.  13.24 6:  ὕπατ’  εὐρὺ  ἀνάσσων  Ὀλυ πίας, 
ἀφθόνητος ἔπεσσιν γένοιο χρόνον ἅπαντα, Ζεῦ πάτερ).  “Fitting a garland to my hair I 
shall  sing.    And  may  the  phthonos  of  the  gods  not  cause  reversal”  (Isthm.  7.39 39b: 
ἀείσο αι χαίταν στεφάνοισιν ἁρ όζων. ὁ δ’ ἀθανάτων  ὴ θρασσέτω φθόνος).
21 
 
Differences  in  Archaic  authors,  then,  are  best  explained  by  the  requirements  of  genre.  
Homer’s poetry focuses on gods and heroes, and envy is too unheroic to play much part 
beyond some limited grudging.  Hesiod, whose Works & Days is concerned with a farmer 
and his peers, matter of factly sees envy as an integral part of daily life.  Lyric, focusing on 
interpersonal relations (primarily within an aristocratic group), is the earliest genre that 
explicitly problematises envy as a destructive emotion even (or especially) towards those 
closest to one.  Finally, the polis context of Epinician ensures that envy becomes ever more 
central, and attached to the success of the athlete and the praise lavished upon him.  It is 
possible that some aspects of phthonos grew over the Archaic period, i.e. that its scope 
changed between the late eighth and early fifth centuries – and in particular that it became 
more destructive – but the evidence is too limited for any firm conclusions.  However we 
should note that phthonos clearly means envy for someone else’s property even at Hom. 
Od. 18.18, and so we should not look too hard for diachronic changes in its scope over the 
Archaic period. 
 
I have concentrated on the Archaic evidence for phthonos to such an extent primarily to 
show the literary background and thus intellectual understanding of the term by educated 
Greeks on the threshold of the Classical era, which I consider in depth in ch.3.3.  The focus 
on Pindar also reflects the fact that he is our best Archaic source. 
                                                 
20 Bulman (1992) 1, 11 2, who notes its similarity to nemesis in Homer.  On phthonos theôn, see ch.7 n.33. 
21 Bulman (1992) 2 sees the gods’ phthonos as directed at the poet in the last two examples; see also Goldhill 
(1991) 138 41.  However it is the poet’s praise for the success gained by the victor that draws the phthonos, 
not the poet qua poet who is the target. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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3.2.2  Zêlos in the Archaic and Classical periods 
 
I  noted  above  (see  pp.46 7)  that  Hesiod  does  not  distinguish  at  Op. 23/26  between 
emulative zêlos and destructive phthonos; rather both are emulative.  The picture becomes 
more complicated, since Hesiod later says that at the end of the race of men, “zêlos will 
walk with all wretched men, discordant, rejoicing in ills, horrible” (Op. 195 6: ζῆλος δ’ 
ἀνθρώποισιν  ὀιζυροῖσιν  ἅπασι  δυσκέλαδος  κακόχαρτος  ὁ αρτήσει  στυγερώπης).
22  
Zêlos here sounds much more like the destructive phthonos we see in Archaic lyric and 
epinician poetry (and later), rather than the emulative rivalry referred to earlier, and that we 
see again in the one other place it is used in Works & Days, where the non working person 
will feel zêlos for the working one as he grows richer (Op. 312 13: εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζῃ, τάχα 
σε ζηλώσει ἀεργὸς πλουτεῦντα  πλούτῳ δ’ ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ).  If I am right that 
(as  suggested  earlier)  phthonos  and  zêlos  are  near equivalents  in  Hesiod,  a  possible 
explanation may be that both terms can cover destructive as well as emulative envy, and it 
is zêlos that fits metrically into the line. 
 
Hesiod is not the only one for whom zêlos implies more than emulative rivalry. The verb 
zêloô occurs twice in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter: Kallidike says that if the disguised 
Demeter were to bring up her brother, her mother would give her [Demeter] such gifts that 
anyone  would  feel  envy  for  her  (Hom.  Hymn  2.166 8:  εἰ  τόν  γ’  ἐκθρέψαιο  καὶ  ἥβης 
 έτρον ἵκοιτο ῥεῖά κέ τίς σε ἰδοῦσα γυναικῶν θηλυτεράων ζηλώσαι  τόσα κέν τοι ἀπὸ 
θρεπτήρια δοίη), repeated more or less word for word by the mother (2.221 3).  A handful 
of cognates and compounds are also informative.  Kalypso says the gods are cruel and 
jealous, and resent (agaasthe – see ch.7 n.33) a goddess sleeping with a mortal and making 
him her husband (Hom. Od. 5.118 20: σχέτλιοί ἐστε, θεοί, ζηλή ονες ἔξοχον ἄλλων, οἵ 
τε  θεαῖσ’  ἀγάασθε  παρ’  ἀνδράσιν  εὐνάζεσθαι  ἀ φαδίην,  ἤν  τίς  τε  φίλον  ποιήσετ’ 
ἀκοίτην).  Odysseus expected Alkinoos, as men are, to be jealous if he saw him with his 
daughter  (Od. 7.307:  δύσζηλοι  γάρ  τ’  εἰ ὲν  ἐπὶ  χθονὶ  φῦλ’  ἀνθρώπων).    Hera  feels 
jealousy at Leto giving birth to a perfect son (Hom. Hymn 3.98 101: ἧστο γὰρ ἄκρῳ 
Ὀλύ πῳ  ὑπὸ  χρυσέοισι  νέφεσσιν  Ἥρης  φραδ οσύνῃς  λευκωλένου,  ἥ   ιν  ἔρυκε 
                                                 
22 Most (2003) 130 1 – his translation (“evil sounding, gloating, hideous faced”) is even harsher. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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ζηλοσύνῃ ὅ τ’ ἄρ’ υἱὸν ἀ ύ ονά τε κρατερόν τε Λητὼ τέξεσθαι καλλιπλόκα ος τότ’ 
ἔ ελλεν).    Clearly  all  these  words  (zêlêmôn,  dyszêlos,  zêlosynê)  mean  something  more 
painful, and potentially destructive, than emulative rivalry, but we should note that two are 
compounds and all are unusual.  It is noteworthy though that they all imply jealousy (i.e. 
the fear to lose a possession/person, and one with whom we feel some exclusive bond), and 
this is something we have not yet seen with phthonos. 
 
In early Archaic lyric poetry, there remains some ambiguity as to whether zêlos represents 
emulative or destructive envy,
23 where Arkhilokhos says he does not feel zêlos for Gyges’ 
gold (fr.19(West).1 2: οὔ  οι τὰ Γύγεω τοῦ πολυχρύσου  έλει, οὐδ’ εἷλέ πώ  ε ζῆλος), 
and  tells  a  conquering  queen  that  many  will  feel  zêlos  for  her  glory  (fr.23(West).21: 
πολλοῖσί θην ζηλωτὸς ἀνθρώπων ἔσεαι).
24  However, a century later Theognis can say 
without  ambiguity  that  someone  with  intelligence  and  sense  would  be  admired  (453 6: 
Ὤνθρωπ’, εἰ γνώ ης ἔλαχες  έρος ὥσπερ ἀνοίης καὶ σώφρων οὕτως ὥσπερ ἄφρων 
ἐγένου,  πολλοῖσ’  ἂν  ζηλωτὸς  ἐφαίνεο  τῶνδε  πολιτῶν  οὕτως  ὥσπερ  νῦν  οὐδενὸς 
ἄξιος εἶ.), and this is clearly emulative.  Neither of the Arkhilokhos fragments portray envy 
as obviously and solely destructive, and both they and the Theognis fragment could be 
paraphrased by the English “I envy you for [some good]”, which is at best a weak form of 
envy (see p.35).  This is essentially what zêlos has become by the end of the Archaic 
period:  emulative  envy  (which  I  term  emulation  –  see  p.34),  or  admiration.    We  see 
something that someone has, and we would like to have that good too, but we do not wish 
to take the good away from them, and we do not hate them or desire to destroy them – the 
salient features of phthonos, and sometimes zêlos, in most Archaic literature. 
 
Emulation, admiration, or “I envy you”, also account for the vast majority of instances of 
zêlos words  in  the  Classical  period.
25    We  often  find  it  used  to  mean  “imitate”,  either 
directly or linked to a word with this meaning such as mimeisthai (e.g. Isoc. 1.11.7, 1.36.3, 
                                                 
23 The meaning of jealousy, seen in compounds, is not common again till the coining of zêlotypia, another 
compound, in the fourth century – though see p.201 3. 
24 He may be saying he does not want Gyges’ gold, or making a stronger ou phthonô type comment; similarly 
people may merely admire the queen, but could envy her glory. 
25 It would be tedious, not to mention unnecessary for this thesis, to go through a large number of examples.  
In the remainder of the paragraph I merely concentrate on where zêlos does not have this meaning in the 
Classical period.  Analysed instances of zêlos words include 56 in tragedy (Aesch. 9, Soph. 14, Eur. 33), 16 in 
Aristophanes, 5 in Thucydides, 34 in Plato, and 101 in the oratorical corpus (Lys. 9, Isoc. 36, Aeschin. 14, 
Dem. 38, others 4); a total of 212 instances. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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2.38.4, 8.142.10, 12.16.3), and frequently in connection with the dead, especially the war 
dead or ancestors.
26  Occasionally it can mean zeal, as when Tekmessa believes people will 
say of her: “Look at the partner of Ajax, who was the greatest in strength in the army; such 
servitude is the return for her zeal” (Soph. Aj. 501 3: ἴδετε τὴν ὁ ευνέτιν Αἴαντος, ὃς 
 έγιστον ἴσχυσε στρατοῦ, οἵας λατρείας ἀνθ’ ὅσου ζήλου τρέφει). 
 
The links and differences between phthonos and zêlos are most notable when the two words 
are juxtaposed.  Clytemnestra incites Agamemnon by saying that the unenvied person is 
also  not  admired  (Aesch. Ag.  939:  ὁ δ’ ἀφθόνητός γ’ οὐκ  ἐπίζηλος  πέλει).    Oedipus 
laments that the good things he has (wealth, power, skill surpassing skill) make Kreon feel 
so much (poly ) zêlos that it turns to phthonos (Soph. OT 380 4: ὦ πλοῦτε καὶ τυραννὶ καὶ 
τέχνη τέχνης ὑπερφέρουσα τῷ πολυζήλῳ βίῳ, ὅσος παρ’ ὑ ῖν ὁ φθόνος φυλάσσεται, 
εἰ τῆσδέ γ’ ἀρχῆς οὕνεχ’, ἣν ἐ οὶ πόλις δωρητόν).  Pelops, who was so admired by men 
that he invited retribution (phthonos) from the gods and ill willed murderousness from his 
citizens  (Eur.  Or.  972 5:  γέννα  Πέλοπος  ὅ  τ’  ἐπὶ   ακαρίοις ζῆλος  ὤν  ποτ’ 
οἴκοις  φθόνος νιν εἷλε θεόθεν ἅ τε δυσ ενὴς φοινία ψῆφος ἐν πολίταις).  Perikles says 
that those who wish to do as Athens has will emulate her, but if they do not succeed in 
gaining  overseas  possessions,  will  envy  her  (Thuc.  2.64.4.2 5.1:  ὁ  δὲ  δρᾶν  τι  καὶ 
αὐτὸς       βουλό ενος ζηλώσει  εἰ δέ τις  ὴ κέκτηται, φθονήσει).  Socrates says that when 
Athens did well, it gained first admiration, but then envy (Pl. Menex. 242a2 4: εἰρήνης δὲ 
γενο ένης καὶ τῆς πόλεως τι ω ένης ἦλθεν ἐπ’ αὐτήν, ὃ δὴ φιλεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων 
τοῖς  εὖ  πράττουσι  προσπίπτειν,  πρῶτον   ὲν  ζῆλος,  ἀπὸ  ζήλου  δὲ  φθόνος).    The 
Athenian says when there is neither wealth nor poverty in a city, there will be neither hybris 
nor  injustice,  nor  would  emulation  nor  envy  occur  (Pl.  Leg.  679b7 c2:  ᾗ  δ’  ἄν  ποτε 
συνοικίᾳ   ήτε  πλοῦτος  συνοικῇ   ήτε  πενία,  σχεδὸν  ἐν  ταύτῃ  γενναιότατα  ἤθη 
γίγνοιτ’ ἄν  οὔτε       γὰρ ὕβρις οὔτ’ ἀδικία, ζῆλοί τε αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται.; 
cf. Ar. Eccl. 565:  ὴ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον).  And Demosthenes says that funeral orations 
should  inspire  emulation  for  the  courage  of  the  dead,  not  envy  for  their  honours 
(Dem. 20.141.5 6:  καίτοι  τοῦτ’  ἔστι  τοὐπιτήδευ α  ζηλούντων ἀρετήν,  οὐ  τοῖς  ἐπὶ 
ταύτῃ τι ω ένοις φθονούντων).  While at the border, then, phthonos and zêlos might 
shade into one another, they are clearly (at least after Homer/Hesiod) distinguished in both 
                                                 
26 For instance all 9 instances in Lys., both in Hyp., and 2/5 in Thuc. occur in funeral speeches. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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their related affects and their action tendencies.  Sometimes one is the evil twin of the other, 
sometimes one is caused by a superfluity of the other – and juxtaposition highlights these 
distinctions. 
 
While exact uses of (particularly phthonos) terminology  were therefore not unchanging 
between Hesiod’s time and the beginning (or indeed the end) of the Classical period, the 
post Hesiodic distinction between destructive, begrudging, envious phthonos and admiring, 
emulative zêlos remained germane throughout the Classical period and beyond.  Zêlos will 
crop up occasionally in this thesis; but it generally does not cover the ground of English 
envy  (except  the  conventional  “I  envy  you”)  or  jealousy  (except  in  the  compound 
zêlotypia), and will therefore appear mainly as a foil for phthonos. 
 
3.3  Phthonos in the Classical period 
 
Throughout the Classical period,
27 phthonos generally covers the ground of English envy, 
begrudging  and  (possessive)  jealousy;
28  there  are  some  minor  additions,  such  as 
spite/malice and (conceptually most divergent from English) moral censure.
29  Common 
uses of phthonos, phthoneô, phthoneros and epiphthonos are to accuse others of phthonos, 
to instruct others not to feel it, or to deny feeling it oneself.  Accusations can be specific, 
                                                 
27 In the remainder of this section, I consider how phthonos words were used in Athenian literature in the 
period 479 322: 123 instances in tragedy (Aesch. 39, Soph. 16, Eur. 65, others 3), 43 in comedy (Ar. 19, 
others 24), 26 in Thucydides, 105 in Xenophon, 129 in Plato, and 170 in the oratorical corpus (Lys. 13, Isoc. 
57, Dem. 78, Aeschin. 15, others 7); a total of 596 instances (compared with 58 pre Classical: 15 in epic, 18 
in Archaic poetry, 25 in Pindar).  In this review I ignore non Athenian Classical texts (around 150 instances), 
first since they are outside the scope of this thesis, and second because (unlike in the Archaic period) there is 
no paucity of Athenian sources.  It is worth noting though that non Athenian Classical texts do not present a 
substantially different picture from Athenian; the only issue of note is Herodotus’ view of phthonos theôn 
(cf. Harrison (2003)), which ties in with that of Aeschylus – see ch.7 n.33.  In this chapter I also ignore 
Aristotle (98 instances), as he is discussed at length in ch.4. 
28 Possessive jealousy is expressed by phthonos in the Classical period.  Cairns (2003b) 239 notes that the 
Irish term “begrudgery” likewise covers both envy and jealousy.  Vocabulary wise, out of the 596 instances 
analysed in the Classical period (see n.27), we see the substantive phthonos 162 times (and phthonêsis once – 
Soph. Trach. 1212), the verb phthoneô 198 times (Aristophanes, Xenophon and Isocrates show a marked 
preference  for  the  verbal  form  over  the  substantive),  and  the  adjective/adverb  phthoneros/ ôs 
(envious/jealous/grudging)  30  times.    Other  related  words  are:  epiphthonos/ ôs  (liable  to  envy/jealousy, 
regarded  with  envy/jealousy)  33  times;  anepiphthonos/ôs  (the  opposite  of  epiphthonos/ ôs)  16  times; 
hypophthonos/ eô used 3 times (and possibly coined) by Xenophon to mean “secretly jealous” (Hell. 3.2.13.6, 
Cyr.  4.1.13.2)  or  “quite  jealous”  (Hell.  7.1.26.1).    We  also  see  aphthonia/ os/ ôs  (abundant,  plentiful, 
generous – see n.11 above) 152 times (Aeschylus 14/39, Xenophon 54/105, Plato. 33/129, and Demosthenes 
18/78 have a striking taste for aphthon  words), and the related aphthonêtos once (Aesch. Ag. 939 – cf. Pind. 
Ol. 11.7, 13.25). 
29 I discuss moral phthonos in ch.5.3. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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and are frequently made by orators against their opponents;
30 there are similar agonistic 
accusations in plays,
31 and (in oratory) against other cities vis à vis Athens.
32  Prohibitions 
are, of course, another form of accusation – instead of saying merely “you are envious”, the 
prohibition  adds  “but  you  shouldn’t  be”.
33    A  particular  type  of  prohibition  craves  the 
audience’s  indulgence  before  speaking  (i.e.  “Don’t  begrudge  me  for  speaking”);
34  and 
Isocrates in particular occasionally comments that phthonos is what any speaker can expect 
for  offering  good  advice.
35    Denials  of  feeling  phthonos  are  also  not  uncommon.
36  
Logically, denials will only be made where one might be expected to feel phthonos; one 
must wonder, therefore, whether any denial of phthonos should be taken as an indicator of 
its presence.  Certainly they should be treated sceptically: a speaker will be keen to show 
that  they  are  not  acting  under  this  basest  of  emotions,  and  so  will  hasten  to  justify 
themselves by ‘explaining’ the true cause of their actions. 
 
                                                 
30 This occurs most notably in Demosthenes’ and Aeschines’ defence speeches against each other: Dem. 18 
(§§ 13.3, 121.5, 279.6, 303.2, with similar accusations of baskania (looking maliciously at someone – see 
pp.105 6) at §§ 108.8, 119.6, 132.4, 139.7, 189.6, 242.2, 252.2, 307.5, 317.7), and Aeschin. 2 (§§ 10.6, 22.9, 
51.3, 54.3, 139.3 – though at §139.9 Demosthenes allegedly does not feel phthonos that Aeschines is on a 
capital  charge!).    As  well  as  these  many  accusations  of  phthonos  and  baskania,  Aeschines  accuses 
Demosthenes of using diabolê against him fourteen times (§§ 2.2, 10.6, 11.4, 44.2, 69.5, 81.2, 89.2, 109.1, 
113.6, 121.1, 145.3(x2), 145.10, 153.17), and sykophantia against him ten times (§§ 5.12, 39.3, 66.2, 99.8, 
145.2, 145.4, 145.7, 145.11, 170.5/6, 183.4), and we shall see below that these might be typically destructive 
action tendencies occasioned by phthonos (pp.66 7).  Accusations of phthonos also occur several times in 
Lys. 24 (§§ 1.6, 1.8, 2.1, 3.2) and Isae. 2 (§§ 23.4, 24.8, 27.5), and also at Isoc. 15.259.4 and Dem. 9.54.5, 
19.343.5, 25.52.10, 39.34.8, 45.35.1, Epist. 3.41.3 – see ch.5.2.2 for further discussion. 
31 E.g. Eur. IT 503; Ar. Eq. 880, 1051, Thesm. 252, 757, Eccl. 1043. 
32 E.g. Lys. 2.48.2, 2.67.4; Isoc. 4.48.2, 14.20.5; Dem 15.15.8.  Isocrates denies Athens felt phthonos of rivals 
at 4.29.4, 4.104.2, in line with the usual positionality of phthonos (“our city doesn’t feel it, yours does”) – see 
main text below. 
33  Prohibitions  occur  at  e.g.  Aesch.  Sept.  480,  PV  584;  Soph.  OT  310;  Eur.  Med.  63,  Rhes.  193, 
fr.703.1(Nauck), fr.1064.5(Nauck); Eupolis fr.316(Kock), fr.358(Kock); Ar. Ach. 497, Eq. 580, Lys. 649, 
Eccl. 900; Pl. Symp. 223a1, Euthydem. 297b6, Prt. 320c1, Grg. 489a4, Meno 71d6, H.min. 372e7; Resp. 
338a3, 528a2; Xen. Cyr. 8.5.24.5; Andoc. 2.6.8; Lys. 21.15.4; Isoc. 3.60.1, 15.302.8, 19.23.8; Isae. 6.61.1; 
Dem. 59.15.4. 
34 E.g. Dem. 20.74.2, Exord. 13.1.1; cf. Ar. Ach. 497, Lys. 649. 
35 E.g. Isoc. 9.39.2, 10.30.6, 15.8.4; and he says he specifically is envied at 12.15.8, 12.21.5, 12.23.3, 15.4.10, 
15.13.6, 15.62.5, 15.163.6, Epist. 2.22.6, Epist. 9.15.11.  See Saïd (2003) on phthonos in Isocrates. 
36 Denials occur at e.g. Aesch. Sept. 236, PV 628; Soph. Ant. 553; Eur. Med. 312, Hipp. 20, Hec. 238, HF 
333, Bacch. 1005; Ar. Lys. 1192, Thesm. 252; Pl. Ap. 33a8, La. 200b7, Prot. 361e1, H.maj. 283e8; Xen. 
Cyrop. 8.4.16.3; Lys. 20.15.1; Isoc. 4.29.4, 4.104.2, 8.124.8, 14.47.3; Dem. 23.188.5, 35.40.3, 42.22.6, Epist. 
3.32.2.  A particular type occurs several times in Plato: φθόνος οὐδεὶς … λέγω implying that “I speak 
willingly” (Phd. 61d10, Soph. 217a10, 217b1, Ti. 23d4, Leg. 641d8, 664a8), and οὐδεὶς φθόνος ἐκλέγω (“I 
willingly select”) at Leg. 802a8; Xenophon uses the similar οὐ φθονήσω εἰπεῖν at Symp. 3.5.3. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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Between them, direct accusations, prohibitions and denials make up around a quarter of all 
instances of phthonos words in the Classical period.
37  This positionality, that phthonos is 
something YOU do, but I do not, is extremely important.
38  There are only a handful of 
instances where the speaker claims the emotion for himself, or a group of which he is part, 
and these are worth individual consideration.  Isocrates notes that “we” envy all those who 
are foremost in intelligence or anything else (Isoc. 10.56.1 3: Καὶ τοῖς  ὲν κατὰ σύνεσιν ἢ 
κατ’ ἄλλο τι προέχουσιν φθονοῦ εν), and that all men suffer from feeling envy, as well 
as ignorance, confusion and disorder, none of these things being irrational or foreign to 
human nature (Isoc. 15.130.5 10: ἢν δ’ ἀναλογίσησθε τὴν ἄγνοιαν ὅσην ἔχο εν πάντες 
ἄνθρωποι, καὶ τοὺς φθόνους τοὺς ἐγγιγνο ένους ἡ ῖν, ἔτι δὲ τὰς ταραχὰς καὶ τὴν 
τύρβην  ἐν  ᾗ  ζῶ εν,  οὐδὲν  τούτων  ἀλόγως  οὐδ’  ἔξω  τῆς  ἀνθρωπίνης  φύσεως 
εὑρεθήσεται γεγενη ένον).  Pseudo Demosthenes rhetorically asks why Greek cities do 
not  help  less  fortunate  cities  but  sit  on  their  hands,  concluding  it  is  because  of  envy 
(Dem. 10.39.1 4: τί οὖν  αθόντες τοῦτ’ ὀνειδίζο εν ἀλλήλοις καὶ προφάσει χρώ εθα 
τοῦ   ηδὲν  ποιεῖν,  πλὴν  εἰ  τῇ  παρὰ  τῆς  τύχης  βοηθείᾳ  γεγονυίᾳ  τοῖς  ἀπόροις 
φθονοῦ εν;), and says that all Greek states contend to be first, and envy and mistrust one 
another, which they should not (Dem. 10.52.4 6: καὶ τοῦ πρωτεύειν ἀντιποιοῦνται  ὲν 
πάντες, ἀφεστᾶσι δ’ ἔργῳ, καὶ φθονοῦσι καὶ ἀπιστοῦσιν αὑτοῖς, οὐχ οἷς ἔδει).  In all 
these instances, the speaker is saying phthonos is something “we” do, but “we” should not, 
i.e. he is generalising about the human condition; this positioning is a rhetorical device to 
palliate his criticism by removing a suggestion of superiority.
39  In the whole Classical 
corpus, there are only two cases where someone explicitly says “I” feel phthonos: one is 
spoken by the insane Pentheus, who begrudges Dionysus his time (Eur. Bacch. 820: ἄγ’ ὡς 
                                                 
37 Indirect accusations, where an individual other than an opponent, or a part or the whole of a group, is 
accused of being envious, account for many more – 52 within the oratorical corpus alone: Lys. 3.9.7, 12.66.5; 
Isoc. 5.68.8, 5.73.2, 5.131.3, 6.61.8, 8.13.7, 9.6.6, 12.81.9, 12.158.5, 12.172.5, 12.241.10, 12.251.11, 13.19.9, 
15.142.1 and 8, 15.316.7, Epist. 2.21.3, Epist. 4.4.4 (plus those in n.35 above); Dem. 4.8.3, 19.22.8, 19.228.3, 
20.10.10,  20.56.6,  20.139.8,  20.151.8,  20.157.2,  20.164.10,  23.164.4,  25.75.7,  47.70.7,  57.6.6,  59.97.1, 
Epist. 2.4.3, Epist. 3.6.4, Epist. 3.10.7, Epist. 3.20.6, Epist. 3.28.2; Aeschin. 2.111.3/4; Lycurg. 1.69.2. 
38 Especially considering that zêlô (“I envy/admire you”) is commonplace in Greek, accounting for around a 
third  of  all  instances  of  zêlos words  in  Aeschylus  (2/9:  Pers.  712,  PV  330),  Sophocles  (4/14:  Aj.  552, 
El. 1027, fr.584.1(Radt), fr.703.1(Radt)), Euripides (10/33: Alc. 866, 882, Med. 60, IT 1117, Or. 1673, IA 16, 
17, 19, 677, 1406), and Aristophanes (5/12: Ach. 1008, Eq. 837, Vesp. 1450, Thesm. 175, 1118); it is much 
less common in the oratorical corpus, surprisingly, occurring only four times (Isoc. 12.260.5, Epist. 6.14.1; 
Lys. 2.72.2, 2.81.1) in 101 instances. 
39 It is also revealing of an underlying perception that phthonos is ‘normal’ as an initial reaction, and not 
simply a symptom of bad character – though bad character might be suspected if the initial envious response 
remains unmodified. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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τάχιστα·  τοῦ  χρόνου  δέ  σοι  φθονῶ);  the  other  is  spoken  by  someone  who  censures 
nobles  who  act  like  those  of  baser  status  (Eur.  fr.334.1 2(Nauck):  πολλοῖς  παρέστην 
κἀφθόνησα δὴ βροτῶν ὅστις κακοῖσιν ἐσθλὸς ὢν ὅ οιος ᾖ).
40  The extreme rarity of 
these instances, and their extenuating factors, ‘prove the rule’ of how taboo it is to claim to 
feel phthonos.
41 
 
The  large  majority  of  instances  of  phthonos words  are  translatable  as  “envy”  or 
“(be)grudging”,  or  some  combination  thereof.
42    While  phthonos  does  include  jealous 
possession, this crops up considerably less frequently than envy.  Paphlagon is jealous of 
his position in the household (Ar. Eq. 879 80: Κοὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως ἐκείνους οὐχὶ φθονῶν 
ἔπαυσας, ἵνα  ὴ ῥήτορες γένοιντο).  Odysseus jealously protects his reputation for being 
the  wisest,  by  destroying  Palamedes  (Xen.  Mem.  4.2.33.11:  Τὰ  δὲ  Παλα ήδους  οὐκ 
ἀκήκοας πάθη; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες ὑ νοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ  τοῦ 
Ὀδυσσέως ἀπόλλυται).  Someone is so jealous of sharing his good fortune that he will 
not make friends (Pl. Leg. 730e5: τὸν δὲ φθονοῦντα καὶ ἑκόντα  ηδενὶ κοινωνὸν διὰ 
φιλίας  γιγνό ενον  ἀγαθῶν  τινων  αὐτὸν   ὲν  ψέγειν).    Spurious  Platonic  comments 
about  those  who  are  jealous  of  sharing  their  virtue  (Pl.  Spur.  376d5:  Ἀλλ’  ἆρα   ὴ 
ἐφθόνουν  εταδιδόναι τῆς ἀρετῆς τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις;) or their professional skills 
(Pl. Spur. 376d8: Ἆρα ἵνα  ὴ ἀντίτεχνοι αὐτοῖς γίγνοιντο, ὥσπερ οἱ  άγειροί τε καὶ 
ἰατροὶ καὶ τέκτονες φθονοῦσιν;).  Athens does not begrudge its goods to other Greeks 
(Isoc. 4.29.4: οὕτως ἡ πόλις ἡ ῶν οὐ  όνον θεοφιλῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρώπως ἔσχεν, 
ὥστε κυρία γενο ένη τοσούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ’ ὧν ἔλαβεν 
ἅπασιν   ετέδωκεν).    A  running  Platonic  conceit  that  the  wise  man  will  not  begrudge 
sharing his wisdom;
43 Aristotle mentions this too in his analysis of phthonos, as well as 
noting that people who do great deeds and have good fortune (including being honoured for 
a distinction, or especially having wisdom or happiness) can feel phthonos at thinking that 
others will try to take something away from them (see pp.86 7).  Why jealous possession 
                                                 
40 Karamanou (2006) 181 7.  For phthonos as (socially acceptable) moral censure, see ch.5.3. 
41 We will see in ch5.3 that an exception is ‘appropriate’ phthonos, the type of moral censure that Aristotle 
calls to nemesan, but which by the Classical period was within the purview of phthonos. 
42 To cite examples would be tedious, and necessarily partial.  Instead, in the following paragraphs I highlight 
where phthonos words have other meanings. 
43 Including prohibitions and denials listed in n.33, n.36 above, the topos accounts for 26/129 phthonos words 
in Plato (Ap. 33a8; Tht. 169c2, Alc.2 147c2; Hipp. 228c6; Theag. 125a5; La. 200b7; Euthydem. 297b6, d8; 
Prot. 316d2, 316e4, 320c1, c2, 327a7, a8; Gorg. 489a4; Meno 71d6, 93c8; H.maj. 283e6, e8; H.min. 363c4, 
372e7; Ion 530d4; Rep. 338a3, 476e6, 528a2).  Xenophon uses the same phrase at Symp. 4.43.5. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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occurs less frequently than envy is something that can only be guessed at.  A likely reason 
is  that,  notwithstanding  the  shared  term,  the  Greeks  could  tell  the  two  emotions  apart 
psychologically and were much more concerned about the latter.  It is envy, far more than 
possessive jealousy, that has the power to shatter society (consider Thucydides’ comment 
about  participants  in  civil  strife  begrudging  that  anyone  might  survive  unscathed  – 
3.82.8.21 3:  τὰ  δὲ   έσα  τῶν  πολιτῶν  ὑπ’  ἀ φοτέρων  ἢ  ὅτι  οὐ  ξυνηγωνίζοντο  ἢ 
φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο); and indeed Classical Athens did not generally have a 
problem with possessive jealousy, with the ‘haves’ falling over themselves to assure the 
‘have nots’ that they used their possessions liberally for the benefit of all, so as to give the 
latter’s potential envy no excuse to take hold.
44 
 
In  the  vast  majority  of  its  uses,  aphthonos  (or  cognates  aphthonôs,  aphthonia)  means 
“plentiful”,  “generous”,  “abundant”  (see  n.11  above).    Extremely  rarely,  it  takes  its 
etymological meaning of “lack of envy”: the Argive Chorus choosing unenvied prosperity 
(as opposed to glory that will be envied by Zeus – Aesch. Ag. 471: κρίνω δ’ ἄφθονον 
ὄλβον); an unbegrudging willingness to teach the aulos (Pl. Prt. 327b5: εἰ οὖν οὕτω καὶ ἐν 
αὐλήσει  πᾶσαν  προθυ ίαν  καὶ  ἀφθονίαν  εἴχο εν  ἀλλήλους  διδάσκειν);  wondering 
whether someone [sc. naturally] unenvious and easygoing, will be harsh to someone not 
harsh, and envious to someone not envious (Pl. Resp. 500a5: ἢ οἴει τινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ 
 ὴ χαλεπῷ ἢ φθονεῖν τῷ  ὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾷον ὄντα;).  The related, but 
very rare, aphthonêtos can similarly imply a lack of envy/jealousy: “Highest far reaching 
ruler of Olympia, may you be unbegrudging of our words for all time, father Zeus” (Pind. 
Ol.  13.24 6:  ὕπατ’  εὐρὺ  ἀνάσσων  Ὀλυ πίας,  ἀφθόνητος  ἔπεσσιν γένοιο  χρόνον 
ἅπαντα, Ζεῦ πάτερ); “for the unenvied person is also not admired” (Aesch. Ag. 939: ὁ δ’ 
ἀφθόνητός γ’ οὐκ ἐπίζηλος πέλει). 
 
Epiphthonos/ ôs  generally  means  “liable  to  phthonos”  or  “inducing  phthonos” 
(i.e. invidious), but a secondary meaning is being odious or hateful.  Jason is odious in 
saying he was driven by Erôs (Eur. Med. 529 30: ἀλλ’ ἐπίφθονος λόγος διελθεῖν ὡς 
Ἔρως σ’ ἠνάγκασεν).  The Nurse says it is not hateful to save Phaidra’s life (Eur. Hipp. 
497: σῶσαι βίον σόν, κοὐκ ἐπίφθονον τόδε).  Parthenopaios, a foreigner, did not make 
                                                 
44 Fisher (2003); see also Ober (1989) 192 247, Cairns (2003b) 244 7. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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himself odious to his adoptive city (Eur. Supp. 892 5: ὡς χρὴ τοὺς  ετοικοῦντας ξένους, 
λυπηρὸς οὐκ ἦν οὐδ’ ἐπίφθονος πόλει οὐδ’ ἐξεριστὴς τῶν λόγων, ὅθεν βαρὺς  άλιστ’ 
ἂν εἴη).  A quibbling and clever tongue is hateful (Eur. IA 333: εὖ κεκό ψευσαι πονηρά  
γλῶσσ’ ἐπίφθονον σοφή).  Pushing away one’s allies is also hateful (Eur. Rhes. 334: 
ἄναξ, ἀπωθεῖν συ  άχους ἐπίφθονον).  The aristocratic Knights say that insulting the 
base is not odious (Ar. Eq. 1274: Λοιδορῆσαι τοὺς πονηροὺς οὐδέν ἐστ’ ἐπίφθονον).  
The Spartans are worthy of their empire because of their past zeal, will and ability, and did 
not acquire it by force but by invitation, and so they should not be hated (Thuc. 1.75.1.1 
2.5:  Ἆρ’  ἄξιοί  ἐσ εν,  ὦ  Λακεδαι όνιοι,  καὶ  προθυ ίας  ἕνεκα  τῆς  τότε  καὶ  γνώ ης 
ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχο εν τοῖς Ἕλλησι  ὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι; καὶ 
γὰρ  αὐτὴν  τήνδε  ἐλάβο εν  οὐ  βιασά ενοι,  ἀλλ’  …  ἡ ῖν  δὲ  προσελθόντων  τῶν 
ξυ  άχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγε όνας καταστῆναι).  Perikles draws a parallel with 
misos (hatred), saying that those who try to rule others are hated (miseisthai), but it is worth 
being thought hateful (epiphthonon) for great ends, and that hatred (misos) does not last for 
long (Thuc. 2.64.5.2 5:  τὸ δὲ  ισεῖσθαι καὶ λυπηροὺς εἶναι ἐν τῷ παρόντι πᾶσι  ὲν 
ὑπῆρξε δὴ ὅσοι ἕτεροι ἑτέρων ἠξίωσαν ἄρχειν  ὅστις δὲ ἐπὶ  εγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον 
λα βάνει, ὀρθῶς βουλεύεται.  ῖσος  ὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἀντέχει).  Socrates says his 
conversation and words have become rather heavy and hateful, so that Athens desires to be 
free of them (Pl. Ap. 37d1 2: ἀλλ’ ὑ ῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε 
ζητεῖτε  αὐτῶν  νυνὶ  ἀπαλλαγῆναι).    The  Athenians  hate  moneylenders,  and  so 
Nikoboulos  is  hateful  (Dem.  37.52.2 3:   ισοῦσι,  φησίν,  Ἀθηναῖοι  τοὺς  δανείζοντας  
Νικόβουλος δ’ ἐπίφθονός ἐστι). 
 
In two of the above examples (Thuc. 2.64.5.2 5, Dem. 37.52.2 3), phthonos is actually 
juxtaposed to, and hence linked with, misos; other examples include: Cyrus says he will be 
envied and hated for his treasures (Xen. Cyr. 8.2.19.3/4: φθονεῖσθαί τε δι’ αὐτοὺς καὶ 
 ισεῖσθαι).  A loser envies the winner and hates the judge (Xen. Cyr. 8.2.27.6 7: ὁ δὲ  ὴ 
νικῶν τοῖς  ὲν νικῶσιν ἐφθόνει, τοὺς δὲ  ὴ ἑαυτὸν κρίνοντας ἐ ίσει).  Being envied and 
hated for one’s superiority (Xen. Cyr. 8.8.12.7: φθονοῦντες αὐτοῖς δῆλοι ἦσαν καὶ ὡς 
βελτίονας  αὑτῶν  ἐ ίσουν).    Isocrates’  opponent  aims  to  arouse  envy  against  him  by 
talking  about  his  wealth,  and  anger  and  hatred  by  talking  about  his  legal  practice 
(Isoc. 15.31.2 7: ἡγού ενος ἐκ  ὲν ὧν καταλαζονεύεται περί  ου καὶ τοῦ πλούτου καὶ Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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τοῦ πλήθους τῶν  αθητῶν φθόνον ἅπασι τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐ ποιήσειν, ἐκ δὲ τῆς περὶ 
τὰ δικαστήρια πραγ ατείας εἰς ὀργὴν καὶ  ῖσος ὑ ᾶς καταστήσειν).  Hatred, envy (or 
rather  resentment  –  see  p.117)  and  anger  are  appropriate  responses  to  Meidias  (Dem. 
21.196.5 6: ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον  ῖσος καὶ φθόνος καὶ ὀργή  τούτων γὰρ ἄξια ποιεῖς).  
We might conclude from this that Greek phthonos contains hatred or hostility within its 
mixture of affects, or at least is often associated with it, in just the same way as English 
envy (see pp.25 6). 
 
Anepiphthonos/ ôs, the contrary of epiphthonos, can imply that one is not arousing these 
feelings; but it also frequently takes the meaning of “without blame/reproach”.  Heracles 
tells his son to kill him without blame (Soph. Trach. 1031 3: ἰὼ παῖ, τὸν φύτορ’ οἰκτίρας, 
ἀνεπίφθονον εἴρυσον ἔγχος, παῖσον ἐ ᾶς ὑπὸ κλῃδός).  The Spartans should take both 
Greeks  and  barbarians  into  their  alliance,  and  since  they  are  being  undermined  by  the 
Athenians, this is not censurable (Thuc. 1.82.1.4 9: κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡ έτερ’ αὐτῶν 
ἐξαρτύεσθαι ξυ  άχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων… (ἀνεπίφθονον 
δέ, ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ εῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευό εθα,  ὴ Ἕλληνας  όνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
βαρβάρους προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι)).  The tyrant Hipparkhos generally exercised 
power in such a way as not to invite others’ censure (Thuc. 6.54.5.1 2: οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν 
ἄλλην ἀρχὴν ἐπαχθὴς ἦν ἐς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀλλ’ ἀνεπιφθόνως κατεστήσατο).  The 
Athenians are not blameworthy for invading Sicily in support of their own security (Thuc. 
6.83.2.4 5: πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὴν προσήκουσαν σωτηρίαν ἐκπορίζεσθαι).  It would 
irreproachable to speak (Pl. Soph. 243a4: ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον ἀποφήνασθαι; cf. Resp. 
612b7 8: Ἆρ’ οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστιν…). 
 
We can see that many instances of (an)epiphthonos imply blame or reproach, and indeed 
phthonos is sometimes linked to the verb epitimaô (I censure).  A challenger to a will 
censures  someone  for  adopting  and  not  dying  childless,  this  being  hateful  and  unjust 
because  the  censurer  has  children  (Isae.  2.23.1 6:  Ἀλλὰ  νῦν  οὗτος  ἐπιτι ῶν  αὐτῷ 
φαίνεται οὐχ ὅτι τὸν ὑὸν οὐκ ἐποιήσατο τὸν αὑτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ παράπαν ἐποιήσατο 
καὶ οὐκ ἐτελεύτησεν ἄπαις  τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὃ ἐπιτι ᾷ, ἐπίφθονον πρᾶγ α καὶ οὐ δίκαιον 
ποιῶν   ὄντων  γὰρ  αὐτῷ  παίδων  ἐκείνῳ  ὄντι  ἄπαιδι  καὶ  ἀτυχοῦντι  φαίνεται 
ἐπιτι ῶν).    Isocrates  will  not  give  way  to  those  who  habitually  censure  and  envy  all Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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speakers (Isoc 10.30.4 7: ὡς ἂν δύνω αι συντο ώτατα διελθεῖν, ἵνα τὰ  ὲν ἐκείνοις, τὰ 
δ’ ἐ αυτῷ χαρίσω αι καὶ  ὴ παντάπασιν ἡττηθῶ τῶν εἰθισ ένων φθονεῖν καὶ τοῖς 
λεγο ένοις ἅπασιν ἐπιτι ᾶν).  Those who cannot write well themselves will censure and 
envy (baskainein) Isocrates’ words,
45 and grudge (phthonêsousin) him saying them (Isoc. 
15.62.1 5: φανήσονταί τινες τῶν εὑρεῖν  ὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ’ εἰπεῖν ἄξιον λόγου δυνα ένων, 
ἐπιτι ᾶν δὲ καὶ βασκαίνειν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων  ε ελετηκότων, οἳ χαριέντως  ὲν εἰρῆσθαι 
ταῦτα φήσουσιν, – τὸ γὰρ εὖ φθονήσουσιν εἰπεῖν).  A speaker who says he has never 
begrudged or censured anyone spending money on Isocrates (Dem. 35.40.1 5: ἐγὼ δέ … 
οὐδενὶ  πώποτε  ἐφθόνησα  οὐδ’  ἐπετί ησα,  ὦ  ἄνδρες  δικασταί,  εἴ  τις  βούλεται 
σοφιστὴς  εἶναι  καὶ  Ἰσοκράτει  ἀργύριον  ἀναλίσκειν).    Phthonos  is  not  just  linked  to 
censure through the verb epitimaô though: sometimes it actually implies (moral) censure 
itself, with no hint of (malicious) envy.  In ch.5.3.2 I will discuss a number of passages in 
the  Attic  oratorical  corpus  (Lys. 27.11.1 2;  Isoc.  4.184.1 6,  18.51.1 3;  Isae.  6.61.1 3; 
Aeschin.  3.42.1 6;  Dem.  21.29.3 5,  21.196.4 6,  28.18.2 3,  37.52.1 3),  in  which  orators 
openly  call  on  their  audience  to  feel  phthonos  (meaning  censure)  for  their  opponents’ 
inappropriate behaviour.
46 
 
In the Classical period, phthonos can often be understood to involve malicious or spiteful 
action, so as to provide some sort of pleasure to the person feeling it.
47  Electra keeps her 
voice down, lest someone maliciously decide to spread rumours (love of gossip mongering 
being  the  assumed  pleasure;  Soph.  El.  638 42:  οὐ  γὰρ  ἐν  φίλοις  ὁ   ῦθος,  οὐδὲ  πᾶν 
ἀναπτύξαι  πρέπει  πρὸς  φῶς  παρούσης  τῆσδε  πλησίας  ἐ οί,   ὴ  σὺν  φθόνῳ  τε  καὶ 
πολυγλώσσῳ βοῇ σπείρῃ  αταίαν βάξιν εἰς πᾶσαν πόλιν).  Some maliciously sabotage 
a hunt (Xen. Cyn. 3.10.5 7: αἱ δὲ πεπλασ ένως, φθονερῶς δὲ ἄλλαι ἐκκυνοῦσι παρὰ τὸ 
ἴχνος διὰ τέλους συ περιφερό εναι).  Some gossip maliciously about Socrates, leading to 
general bad feeling against him, and his subsequent conviction (Pl. Ap. 18d2 3: ὅσοι δὲ 
φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώ ενοι ὑ ᾶς ἀνέπειθον; Ap. 28a7 9: καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὃ ἐ ὲ αἱρεῖ, 
ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος).  
                                                 
45 On baskania, see pp.105 6, esp. n.40. 
46 This ‘censure’ aspect of real life usage of phthonos, is the only one that is significantly divergent from 
Aristotle’s understanding of the emotion (see ch.4, ch.5.3.1). 
47  In  the  same  way  that  English  envy  is  connected  to  Schadenfreude.    This  malicious  phthonos  is  not 
necessarily felt towards those particularly fortunate, nor is it necessarily due to personal animosity – rather its 
primary motive usually seems to be pleasure seeking, with no care that the pleasure involves someone else’s 
hurt (Pl. Phdr. 240a5 6, mentioned below, being an exception). Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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The jealous lover who feels envy when his beloved possesses something, and rejoices when 
he  loses  it  (Pl.  Phdr.  240a5 6:  ἐξ  ὧν  πᾶσα  ἀνάγκη  ἐραστὴν  παιδικοῖς  φθονεῖν   ὲν 
οὐσίαν κεκτη ένοις, ἀπολλυ ένης δὲ χαίρειν).  And the comic playwright Alexis links 
epikhairekakia (spite) to phthonos in how someone views their neighbours (fr.51.1(Kock): 
ἐπιχαιρέκακος  εἶ  καὶ  φθονεῖς  τοῖς  πλησίον)  –  note  once  again  the  connection  of 
neighbours with phthonos, a connection we saw in Pind. Ol. 1.47, and which appears again 
when Praxagora says that the abolition of private property will lead to an end to envying the 
neighbours (Ar. Eccl. 565:  ὴ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον).
48  The clearest link of all between 
phthonos, neighbours, and pleasure in their misfortunes, is given by Plato, who argues that 
one goes to see comic plays in order to enjoy the misfortunes of one’s friends (he initially 
says neighbours, then changes this to friends), and that this is phthonos (Pl. Phlb. 48a8 
50a9 – see pp.126 9 for a detailed discussion). 
 
We have seen that phthonos can be contrasted with zêlos (see ch.3.2.2), and linked to hatred 
(misos) and spite (epikhairekakia). Other emotions it is linked to include orgê and thymos 
(Pl.  Euthydem.  3d1;  Isoc.  12.81.9,  15.31.4;  Dem.  21.196.6),  dyskolia  or  dysmeneia 
(Pl. Phdr.  241c2,  Prt.  316d2,  Resp.  500c1,  586c3,  Leg.  844c7;  Isoc.  5.68.7),  baskania 
(Isoc. 15.62.5), and zêlotypia (Pl. Symp. 213d2 – see p.201 3).  Plato several times includes 
it in long lists of emotions and desires, mostly painful ones (Pl. Phlb. 47e2, 50c1, 50c5, 
Leg. 863e7).  It is further linked to to phaulon (the word Aristotle uses – see p.72), kakia, 
poneria and to aiskhron (Dem. 20.140.3 and 6, 20.164.10, 20.165.8; Aeschin. 2.51.3), and 
a treacherous and untrustworthy character (Aeschin. 2.54.3: τὸ ἦθος ὡς ἐπίβουλον καὶ 
ἄπιστον).    Isocrates  describes  it  as  a  disease  (Isoc.  15.13.6:  τοὺς  δὲ  φθονοῦντας  ἔτι 
 ᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου ταύτης λυπεῖσθαι). 
 
Phthonos  is  also  commonly  linked  with  philonikia  (love  of  victory,  eager  rivalry, 
contentiousness  –  implies  love  of  strife)  and  philotimia  (love  of  distinction,  ambitious 
rivalry).  Socrates, commenting on the Hesiod “potter envies potter” passage (Op. 25 6) 
says that things most similar are filled with envy and rivalry and hatred, while those unalike 
feel friendship (Pl. Ly. 215d2 4:  άλιστα τὰ ὁ οιότατα <πρὸς> ἄλληλα φθόνου τε καὶ 
φιλονικίας  καὶ  ἔχθρας  ἐ πί πλασθαι,  τὰ  δ’  ἀνο οιότατα  φιλίας).    One  disputant 
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believes the other criticises his argument out of grudging and contentiousness, rather than 
in  a  desire  to  find  the  right  solution  (Pl.  Grg.  457d2 5:  ἀλλ’  ἐὰν  περί  του 
ἀ φισβητήσωσιν  καὶ   ὴ  φῇ  ὁ  ἕτερος  τὸν  ἕτερον  ὀρθῶς  λέγειν  ἢ   ὴ  σαφῶς, 
χαλεπαίνουσί τε καὶ κατὰ φθόνον οἴονται τὸν ἑαυτῶν λέγειν, φιλονικοῦντας ἀλλ’ οὐ 
ζητοῦντας τὸ προκεί ενον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ).  The person seeking to satisfy the spirited part 
of  his  soul  will  become  envious  due  to  his  ambitious  rivalry,  violent  due  to  his 
contentiousness, and angry due to his bad temper (Pl. Resp. 586a7 9: περὶ τὸ θυ οειδὲς 
οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ 
φιλοτι ίαν ἢ βίᾳ διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυ ῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν).  An ambitious soul breeds envy, 
which is hard to live with, especially for the person feeling it (Pl. Leg. 870c5 7: δεύτερον 
δὲ φιλοτί ου ψυχῆς ἕξις, φθόνους ἐντίκτουσα, χαλεποὺς συνοίκους  άλιστα  ὲν αὐτῷ 
τῷ  κεκτη ένῳ  τὸν  φθόνον).    Cyrus  saw  that  many  soldiers,  being  rivalrous  in 
competition, felt envy for each other (Xen. Cyr. 3.3.10.1 3: ἔτι δ’ ὁρῶν ὅτι φιλοτί ως 
ἔχοντες  ἐν  οἷς  ἀντηγωνίζοντο  πολλοὶ  καὶ  ἐπιφθόνως  εἶχον  πρὸς  ἀλλήλους  τῶν 
στρατιωτῶν).    Agamemnon’s  soldiers  were  filled  with  anger  and  rage  and  envy  and 
ambitious rivalry (sc. yet he kept them together; Isoc. 12.81.8 9: ἀλλ’ ὀργῆς καὶ θυ οῦ καὶ 
φθόνου καὶ φιλοτι ίας  εστοὺς).  Demosthenes says a law is shameful and vicious, and 
similar  to  envy  and  contention  (Dem.  20.157.1 3:  Αἰσχρός,  ὦ  ἄνδρες  Ἀθηναῖοι,  καὶ 
κακῶς  ἔχων  ὁ  νό ος,  καὶ  ὅ οιος  φθόνῳ  τινὶ  καὶ  φιλονικίᾳ  καὶ—τὸ  λοιπὸν  ἐῶ).  
Athenians allowed legal appeals, knowing that there would be occasional unjust results due 
to contention, envy, hatred and other reasons (Dem. 57.6.3 8: εἰ γὰρ πάντ’ ἐνο ίζετε τὰ 
δίκαια δυνήσεσθαι τοὺς δη ότας διακρῖναι, οὐκ ἂν ἐδώκατε τὴν εἰς ὑ ᾶς ἔφεσιν  νῦν δὲ 
καὶ διὰ φιλονικίαν καὶ διὰ φθόνον καὶ δι’ ἔχθραν καὶ δι’ ἄλλας προφάσεις ἔσεσθαί τι 
τοιοῦτον ἡγού ενοι).  Sometimes philotimia on its own represents envy/jealousy, e.g.: 
Dionysus  argues  it  was  Heracles’  jealousy  that  Dionysus  might  copy  him  in  bringing 
someone back from Hades that led him to exaggerate the dangers of attempting it (Ar. Ran. 
280 1:  Ἠλαζονεύεθ’  ἵνα  φοβηθείην  ἐγώ,   εἰδώς   ε   άχι ον  ὄντα,  φιλοτι ού ενος); 
Isocrates,  repeating  his  own  topos  that  others  envy  him,
49  uses  philotimôs  to  mean 
phthonerôs  (Isoc. 15.244.2 4:  ἡγοῦ αι  πάντας  τοὺς  φιλοτί ως  διακει ένους, 
ἐπιθυ ητικῶς ἔχοντας τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ καὶ λέγειν). 
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The examples given in the previous paragraph show many of the same status relationships 
breeding phthonos that Aristotle discusses in the Rhetoric (2.10 – see ch.4.4.2), and his 
analysis confirms many other points that we find elsewhere about the nature of phthonos.  
Gnomic utterances confirm that phthonos is felt for kin (Aesch. fr.610.1 3(Mette)), the rich 
(Eur.  Supp.  241;  Xen.  Cyr.  7.5.77.4,  8.2.19.3/4),  or  by  the  base  for  the  worthy 
(Soph. fr.188.1(Radt); Eur. fr.295.2(Nauck),  fr.334.1(Nauck); Ar. Eq. 1274;  Lys. 3.9.7), 
and  that  one  envies  the  wise  (Agathon  fr.25.1(Snell);  Anaxandrides  fr.54.5(Kock); 
Isoc. 2.46.3; this phthonos works both ways – cf. n.43 above).  Phthonos is felt against 
tyrants who abuse their powers, but not against benevolent ones or monarchs (Xen. Lac. 
15.8.4;  Pl.  Resp.  579c1,  580a3;  Isoc.  3.18.11);  it  is  felt  for  political  rivals  (Xen.  Hell. 
2.4.29.7, 3.2.13.6, 3.4.8.3, Mem. 2.6.20.6); and it is regularly contrasted with pity (mostly 
eleos,  occasionally  oiktos  or  (to)  synakhthesthai:  Andoc.  2.6.8;  Lys.  20.15.1,  21.15.4; 
Isae. 11.38.2; Isoc. 1.26.7; Dem. 21.196.4, 28.18.3, 29.2.4).  All these points are made by 
Aristotle (see ch.4).  One passage of Xenophon is particularly instructive about the nature 
of phthonos, where Socrates argues that true friendship is sufficient to conquer it: 
φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ  ὲν φιλικά  δέονταί τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων 
καὶ  ἐλεοῦσι  καὶ  συνεργοῦντες  ὠφελοῦσι  καὶ  τοῦτο  συνιέντες  χάριν 
ἔχουσιν  ἀλλήλοις   τὰ  δὲ  πολε ικά   τά  τε  γὰρ  αὐτὰ  καλὰ  καὶ  ἡδέα 
νο ίζοντες  ὑπὲρ  τούτων   άχονται  καὶ  διχογνω ονοῦντες 
ἐναντιοῦνται  πολε ικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή  καὶ δυσ ενὲς  ὲν ὁ τοῦ 
πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως,  ισητὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος. ἀλλ’ ὅ ως διὰ τούτων πάντων 
ἡ φιλία διαδυο ένη συνάπτει τοὺς καλούς τε κἀγαθούς. διὰ γὰρ τὴν 
ἀρετὴν αἱροῦνται  ὲν ἄνευ πόνου τὰ  έτρια κεκτῆσθαι  ᾶλλον ἢ διὰ 
πολέ ου  πάντων  κυριεύειν,  καὶ  δύνανται  πεινῶντες  καὶ  διψῶντες 
ἀλύπως σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κοινωνεῖν καὶ τοῖς τῶν ὡραίων ἀφροδισίοις 
ἡδό ενοι καρτερεῖν, ὥστε  ὴ λυπεῖν οὓς  ὴ προσήκει  δύνανται δὲ καὶ 
τὴν  ἔριν  οὐ   όνον  ἀλύπως,  ἀλλὰ  καὶ  συ φερόντως  ἀλλήλοις 
διατίθεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὀργὴν κωλύειν εἰς τὸ  ετα ελησό ενον προϊέναι  
τὸν  δὲ  φθόνον  παντάπασιν  ἀφαιροῦσι,  τὰ   ὲν  ἑαυτῶν  ἀγαθὰ  τοῖς 
φίλοις οἰκεῖα παρέχοντες, τὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων ἑαυτῶν νο ίζοντες.   
Mem. 2.6.21.2 23.7 
 
For  by  nature  men  are  friendly:  for  they  need  each  other,  and  pity  and 
benefit from cooperating,  and understanding this have  gratitude  for  each 
other.  But they are also hostile: for thinking the same things fine and sweet, 
they fight over them and, differing, are opposed; both strife and anger tend 
to hostility; and a desire to be greedy leads to ill will, and envy to hatred.  
But nevertheless friendship evades all these things and unites gentlemen.  
For due to their virtue they choose to possess a moderate amount without 
difficulty,  rather  than  to  rule  everyone  through  war,  and  they  can,  even 
when hungry and thirsty, painlessly share their food and drink and staunch Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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their pleasure in sexual attractions to youthful beauty, so as not to pain those 
who have nothing to do with the matter.  And they can settle strife with each 
other not only painlessly, but also in a useful way, and check anger so as to 
go forward without ruing anything; and they totally set aside envy, giving 
their own goods to their friends as possessions, and using those of their 
friends as their own. 
 
This passage is fascinating for its discussion of how envy arises, showing that it is not just 
modern scholars who have noticed that emotions occur in episodes, following situational 
antecedents with psychological affects.  It also accords with Gill’s analysis of Aristotle, 
when he shows that a perfect friend will not feel envy.
50 
 
We  also  find  frequent  mention  in  Greek  texts  of  situations  where  phthonos  leads  to 
destruction.  Heracles asks how anyone could worship Hera who, envying the amount of 
extramarital sex Zeus has, destroys the innocent benefactors of Greece (Eur. HF 1307 10: 
τοιαύτηι θεῶι τίς ἂν προσεύχοιθ’; ἣ γυναικὸς οὕνεκα λέκτρων φθονοῦσα Ζηνὶ τοὺς 
εὐεργέτας Ἑλλάδος ἀπώλεσ’ οὐδὲν ὄντας αἰτίους).  Envy, in destroying the minds of 
many people, will kill both “him” and “me” (Eur. fr.551.1 2(Nauck): φθόνος δ’ ὁ πολλῶν 
φρένα διαφθείρων βροτῶν ἀπώλεσ’ αὐτὸν κἀ ὲ συνδιώλεσεν).  A wish for someone to 
destroy all those who have something, envying their goods (Agathon fr.23.1(Snell): ὄλοιθ’ 
ὁ  τοῖς  ἔχουσι  τἀγαθὰ  φθονῶν).    Mnesilokhos  stabs  a  wineskin  out  of phthonos  that 
someone else has it (Ar. Thesm. 757: Κακῶς ἀπόλοι’. Ὡς φθονερὸς εἶ καὶ δυσ ενής).  
Parties in civil strife destroy those not taking part, out of envy that they should survive 
(Thuc. 3.82.8.21 3: τὰ δὲ  έσα τῶν πολιτῶν ὑπ’ ἀ φοτέρων ἢ ὅτι οὐ ξυνηγωνίζοντο 
ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο).  Odysseus destroys Palamedes, sensing a challenge 
to his reputation as wisest (Xen. Mem. 4.2.33.10 12: Τὰ δὲ Παλα ήδους οὐκ ἀκήκοας 
πάθη; τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ πάντες ὑ νοῦσιν ὡς διὰ σοφίαν φθονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως 
ἀπόλλυται).  The son of Gobryas is murdered by a prince jealous of his hunting prowess 
(Xen. Cyr. 4.6.4.5 8: ἐν τούτῳ δὴ οὐκέτι κατίσχει ὁ ἀνόσιος τὸν φθόνον, ἀλλ’ αἰχ ὴν 
παρά τινος τῶν ἑπο ένων ἁρπάσας, παίσας εἰς τὰ στέρνα τὸν  όνον  οι καὶ φίλον 
παῖδα ἀφείλετο τὴν ψυχήν).  Socrates is destroyed by the slander and envy of the many, 
not the prosecution of one man (Pl. Ap. 28a7 9: καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὃ ἐ ὲ αἱρεῖ, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, 
οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος).  The lover 
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jealous of his beloved, and therefore wanting him to be less attractive to rival suitors, will 
be  harmful  to  his  beloved’s  property,  the  state  of  his  body,  and  most  of  all  to  the 
development of his soul (Pl. Phdr. 241c1 5: εἰ  δὲ  ή, ἀναγκαῖον εἴη  ἐνδοῦναι αὑτὸν 
ἀπίστῳ, δυσκόλῳ, φθονερῷ, ἀηδεῖ, βλαβερῷ  ὲν πρὸς οὐσίαν, βλαβερῷ δὲ πρὸς τὴν 
τοῦ σώ ατος ἕξιν, πολὺ δὲ βλαβερωτάτῳ  πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς παίδευσιν).   Envy 
tends to level down, so when there is neither wealth nor poverty in a community, envy will 
disappear (Pl. Leg. 679b9 c1: ᾗ δ’ ἄν ποτε συνοικίᾳ  ήτε πλοῦτος συνοικῇ  ήτε πενία, 
σχεδὸν ἐν ταύτῃ γενναιότατα ἤθη γίγνοιτ’ ἄν  οὔτε       γὰρ ὕβρις οὔτ’ ἀδικία, ζῆλοί τε 
αὖ καὶ φθόνοι οὐκ ἐγγίγνονται; cf. Ar. Ek. 565).  Some people destroy others out of envy 
(Isoc. 15.142.8: οἷς δ’ ἂν φθονήσωσιν ἀπολλύουσιν ἤνπερ δυνηθῶσιν).  That we find so 
many  instances  where  phthonos  leads  to  destruction,  again  ties  in  well  with  modern 
research on envy. 
 
A  particularly  common  way  of  damaging/destroying  someone  is  to  slander  them,  and 
phthonos is frequently linked to diabolê (slander – e.g. Pl. Ap. 18d2, 28a9, Leg. 731a3, 
731a5, Epist. 3.316e1; Xen. Hell. 3.4.8.3; Isoc. 5.73.2, 12.21.5, 12.251.11, 15.30.1 31.5, 
15.163.6,  15.258.1 259.4;  Aeschin.  2.10.6).
51    Further  evidence  for  the  connection  of 
phthonos with diabolê occurs at Arist. Rh. 1.1, where Aristotle says it is not right to lead 
the juror astray using orgê or phthonos or eleos (1.1.1354a24 5: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν 
διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον), having previously talked about 
diabolê and eleos and orgê and other passions of the soul as not being anything to do with 
the facts of the case, but an appeal to the juror (1.1.1354a16 18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος 
καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγ ατός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς 
τὸν δικαστήν).  By juxtaposing these lists so closely, Aristotle seems to be suggesting that 
diabolê is how one ‘does phthonos’.  The idea that slandering someone is how one puts 
one’s  phthonos  into  effect,  accords  with  the  findings  of  anthropologists  that  “gossip, 
backbiting, and defamation” are natural action tendencies of envy,
52 and we saw above  that 
the pleasure of gossip and rumour mongering is occasionally linked with the malicious 
pleasure phthonos brings (n.16; cf. ch.7 n.32). 
                                                 
51 This is already present in Pind. Ol. 1.47: ἔννεπε κρυφᾷ τις αὐτίκα φθονερῶν γειτόνων; see also n.30 
above.  See ch.6 n.70 for various other references to this connection in Greek literature. 
52 Foster (1972) 172 – see p.26.  See also my discussions of Phaidra (p.155) and Hermione (p.188), with 
respect to gossip. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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3.4.  Conclusions: a comparison of phthonos usage with modern theory 
 
It can therefore be seen from this survey of phthonos in Classical Athenians texts, that 
Greek  phthonos  covers  approximately  the  same  ground  as  both  English  envy  and 
(possessive) jealousy.  However, it is not completely coterminous with these two English 
emotions; indeed there are a number of noteworthy differences.  First, we should note the 
ubiquitous strong sense of begrudging in phthonos.  Second, the ability of phthonos to 
imply moral  censure,
53 which neither  envy nor jealousy  can do in English.  Third, the 
exclusion  of  sexual  jealousy  from  phthonos:  i.e.  sexual  and  possessive  jealousy  are 
definitely not two branches of the same emotion in Greek, separated merely by a desired 
person rather than object.
54  Fourth, the idiomatic use of “I envy you” to show emulation, 
which falls within the purview of zêlos rather than phthonos in Greek.
55 
 
In terms of its phenomenology (and leaving aside moral censure for now), phthonos does 
appear to work quite similarly to envy and (possessive) jealousy.  First, it is either aroused 
by someone having something I do not, or by a desire to retain or regain something I want 
to keep to myself.  Second, related affects appear to be similar, especially for envy:  it is 
frequently tied to hostility, hatred, rivalry (and a desire to beat one’s rival), spite, and taking 
pleasure in the rival’s misfortunes.  Finally, it frequently leads to damaging or destructive 
action, often slander.  Such similarity in the phenomenology is strong indication that we are 
justified in using a phenomenological approach to understand situations where phthonos is 
present but not mentioned by name (or named only to be denied).
56  For fuller justification, 
for  further  insights  into  the  socio psychology  of  phthonos,  and  finally  for  the  most 
                                                 
53 Discussed in greater detail in ch.5.3. 
54  The  ‘situational’  approach  of  Salovey  and  others  (see  pp.32 3)  is  therefore  particularly  helpful  for 
understanding phthonos.  I discuss Greek sexual jealousy in ch.8, and we will see that phthonos does in fact 
have some part to play. 
55 Greek draws its lexical boundaries differently, but also its experiential boundaries: zêlos is contrasted with 
phthonos, it is not a continuum. 
56 No tendency to transmutation has been noted from this lexical survey; however, by definition a lexical 
survey would be unlikely to show this.  We should consider, though, that the prevalence of accusations of 
phthonos in Greek texts – when the accused would almost certainly be denying the accusation – does suggest 
a) that phthonos might well have been transmuted or misrepresented in the same way envy is, and b) that 
there would have been a similar first person attribution of indignation or desire for justice, where there was a 
second person attribution of envy.  See ch.5.3, ch.6 on transmutation and phthonos. Chapter 3:  Vocabulary  
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sustained attempt in the ancient world to explore the complex nexus of emotions aroused by 
others’ good fortune, I now turn to Aristotle. 
 Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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Chapter 4:  Aristotle on Phthonos 
1 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
We have looked at the socio psychology of envy and jealousy from a modern perspective.  
However,  in  the  mid fourth  century,  Aristotle  developed  his  own  socio psychological 
theory of the emotions, the first person ever to analyse them systematically in this way.  
Aristotle’s theory is laid out in The Art of Rhetoric.
2  In this treatise Aristotle argues that an 
orator, in trying to persuade an audience, has three modes of persuasion available to him: 
logical argument (logos), the speaker’s own character (êthos), and “putting the hearer into a 
certain  frame  of  mind”  (1.2.1356a1 4:  ἐν  τῷ  τὸν  ἀκροατὴν  διαθεῖναί  πως).
3    He 
elaborates: “[The orator persuades] through his hearers, when they are led to emotion by his 
speech”  (1.2.1356a14 15:  διὰ  δὲ  τῶν  ἀκροατῶν,  ὅταν  εἰς  πάθος  ὑπὸ  τοῦ  λόγου 
προαχθῶσιν).    The  third  mode  of  persuasion  is  thus  emotion  (pathos),
4  which  can 
legitimately be used as part of an orator’s armoury of rhetorical weapons to influence his 
listeners.
5 
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter, plus ch.5.2.1, has been published as Sanders (2008). 
2 There has been a large amount of scholarship on the Rhetoric in recent years, beginning with Grimaldi’s 
commentaries on Rh. Books I (1980) and II (1988), the first since Cope (1877).  Furley and Nehamas (1994), 
Garver (1994), Rorty (1996), and Gross and Walzer (2000) are all collections entirely on the Rh.  Three 
articles in Konstan and Rutter (2003) also deal with this treatise: Gill (2003), Viano (2003) and Ben Ze’ev 
(2003).  Excepting Grimaldi’s commentary on Book 2, this scholarship has tended to treat Aristotle’s account 
of the emotions as a whole – or at best successively, with minimal commentary on each individual emotion.  
One notable exception is Konstan (2003a): ‘Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: the Strategies of Status’.  
As  Konstan  shows,  Aristotle  believed  anger  to  be  appropriate  in  certain  situations,  and  only  morally 
problematic in excess.  This is axiomatic to his approach to the emotions, and explains why for him they are 
an acceptable tool in oratory. More recently, Konstan (2006) examines in significant detail the philological 
phenomenology of most of the emotions treated in the Rhetoric, comparing them with literary use especially 
in Homer, tragedy, oratory and Hellenistic philosophy. 
3 Note: all references in this chapter are to Arist. Rh. unless otherwise stated. 
4  Leighton  (1996)  223 30  shows  that,  while  Aristotle  generally  (e.g.  NE  2.5.1105b21 23)  includes  both 
emotions and epithymia (appetite – e.g. hunger, thirst, sex drive) within the pathê, in the Rhetoric he excludes 
epithymia.  Leighton argues convincingly that this is because Aristotle is only interested here in pathê that 
affect judgment (i.e. emotions), and appetites do not do so, or at least not cognitively – Viano (2003) 94 
agrees; see also Grimaldi (1988) 14 5, who reviews the various meanings of pathos in the Aristotelian corpus.  
Several other pathê mentioned at Eth. Nic.  2.5.1105b21 23 (confidence, joy, longing) are also not included in 
the Rhetoric, probably because Aristotle did not believe they affected judgment either.  Aristotle himself notes 
in the Rhetoric that he has discussed the pathê that relate to persuasive argument (2.11.1388b29 30). 
5 Rh. 1.2 appears to contradict 1.1, in which Aristotle said that “slander, pity, anger and such emotions of the 
soul have nothing to do with the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror” (1.1.1354a16 18: διαβολὴ γὰρ 
καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγ ατός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν 
δικαστήν), and again “one should not lead the juror into anger, envy or pity – it is like warping a carpenter’s Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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Aristotle discusses emotions in Book 2 of the Rhetoric, defining them as feelings that affect 
judgment and are accompanied by pain and pleasure (2.1.1378a19 21: ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ 
ὅσα  εταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή).
6  This 
definition  sees  emotions  as  cognitive:
7  we  perceive  something  (consciously  or 
subconsciously, through any of our senses); that perception makes us feel something; and 
this  feeling  alters  our  judgment,  which  in  turn  can  affect  our  actions.
8    In  Rh.  2.2 11, 
Aristotle  analyses  fifteen  named  (and  several  unnamed)  emotions,  stating  the  general 
psychological condition under which each arises, and who might feel each emotion, for 
whom, and in what circumstances.  One of these emotions is phthonos. 
 
4.2  The placement of phthonos in the Rhetoric 
 
4.2.1  Pain and pleasure at the fortunes of others 
 
Aristotle generally treats the emotions in named pairs – anger and calmness, friendship and 
hate, etc.  However, he treats as a group emotions (some unnamed) relating to the fortunes 
of others.  In Rh. 2.8 he begins with eleos (pity), which he describes as pain at someone’s 
undeserved bad fortune (1385b13 14: ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινο ένῳ κακῷ ... 
τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν).
9  In 2.9, Aristotle discusses the relationship between pity and a 
number of other emotions.  He begins by stating that to nemesan (indignation) lies most 
                                                                                                                                                     
rule” (1.1.1354a24 26: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον   
ὅ οιον γὰρ κἂν εἴ τις ᾧ  έλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν).  Dow (2007) is persuasive on 
how to resolve this contradiction; see also Fortenbaugh (1979) 147, Grimaldi (1980) 9 11, Wisse (1989) 
17 20, J.M. Cooper (1994) 194 6, and Barnes (1995) 262.  Whatever the tensions, it is clear from the rest of 
the Rhetoric that Aristotle did see a role for pathos in persuading an audience, so his comments in 1.1 need 
not detain us unduly.  Carey (1996) 399 406 and Conley (1982) 307 8 give real life examples from forensic 
oratory of manipulation of emotions throughout speeches. 
6 Frede (1996) discusses whether each emotion involves both pain and pleasure (pleasure in anticipating an 
action to alleviate pain), or just one or the other.  She argues that Aristotle tends towards the former view in 
Rh. Book 1, and the latter in Book 2. 
7 Aristotle was the first scholar to highlight the role of cognition in emotion, an approach that has regained 
much currency in the last thirty years, decreasing emphasis on physiological explanations – see ch.1 n.3. 
8  While  Greeks  had  long  understood  the  role  of  emotion  in  decision  making  –  e.g.  Agamemnon 
acknowledging  he  had  acted  under  the  influence  of  atê  (Hom.  Il.  19.86 9)  –  it  was  Aristotle  who  first 
presented it as a normal phenomenon, and not inherently problematic; cf. Grimaldi (1988) 12. 
9  Aristotle  goes  on  to  say  that  we  must  believe  we  could  suffer  the  same  bad  fortune  in  order  to  pity.  
Kristjánsson (2006) 89 92 argues that eleos is more properly translated ‘compassion’, and that ‘pity’ should 
be reserved for pain at deserved bad fortune – his attempt to show that Aristotle implies this as a separate 
emotion  when  he  talks  of  putative  pain  (or  lack  of  it)  at  parricides  and  murderers  being  punished 
(2.9.1386b28 29), is highly unconvincing. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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opposed to pity in being pain at someone’s undeserved good fortune, both emotions being 
felt by someone of good character (1386b8 12: ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν  άλιστα  ὲν ὃ 
καλοῦσι νε εσᾶν  τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις ἀντικεί ενόν ἐστι 
τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις.  καὶ 
ἄ φω τὰ πάθη ἤθους χρηστοῦ).  Phthonos (envy) appears to be similarly opposed to pity, 
and perhaps even the same thing as indignation, but in fact it is a pain excited by the 
perceived good fortune, not of someone undeserving, but of those like us (2.9.1386b16 20: 
δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον, ὡς  σύνεγγυς ὢν 
καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νε εσᾶν, ἔστι δ’ ἕτερον   λύπη  ὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν 
καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁ οίου).
10  He goes on to say 
that  these  feelings  will  be  accompanied  by  their  opposite  emotions  (2.9.1386b25 26: 
φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις),
11 which will be pleasurable 
or  at  least  not  painful  (2.9.1386b27:  ἡσθήσεται  ἢ  ἄλυπος  ἔσται).
12    Finally,  in  2.11, 
Aristotle discusses zêlos (emulation).  This is, like envy, a pain at someone else’s good 
fortune  (2.11.1388a32 33:  εἰ  γάρ  ἐστιν  ζῆλος  λύπη  τις  ἐπὶ  φαινο ένῃ  παρουσίᾳ 
ἀγαθῶν  ἐντί νω),  though  not  because  they  have  something,  but  because  we  do  not: 
emulation (as Aristotle parenthetically explains) is a good emotion felt by good people, 
whereas envy is a bad emotion felt by bad people;
13 emulation makes us act to acquire 
goods ourselves, envy to deprive someone else of them (2.11.1388a34 38: οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ 
ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ ἔστιν (διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν 
φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων   ὁ  ὲν γὰρ αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν, ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον  ὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον)).
14  The opposite of emulation is 
                                                 
10 See p.86 for a discussion of the phrase τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁ οίου. 
11 Aristotle clarifies “accompanied”, saying that the type of person who feels indignation is the same type of 
person who feels its opposite in a contrary situation (not that each individual episode of indignation will be 
accompanied by its opposite). 
12 Aristotle often finds his desire to schematise restrictive.  Here, for instance, if something is opposite to 
painful, it should be pleasurable, but in some situations might not be.  For instance, any good person will be 
pained by a criminal escaping justice, but one’s response to a convicted murderer being hanged will depend 
partly on one’s attitude to the death penalty.  Aristotle is aware of this difficulty, and gets round it by saying 
that if one does not feel pleasure, one at least will not feel pain.  A modern ethicist might disagree, arguing 
that such a situation tests one’s opposition to the death penalty. 
13 I do not see why a bad person might not emulate another bad person (e.g. a mugger emulating a bank 
robber), but Aristotle does not seem to envisage this possibility.  Perhaps his desire to schematise, to present 
emotions as either “good” or “bad”, has led him to ignore such situations. 
14 This self improvement vs. other deprivation dichotomy reflects that between envy and emulation in English 
– see p.35. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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kataphronêsis  (disdain)  (2.11.1388b22 3:  ἐναντίον γὰρ ζήλῳ καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ 
τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν).
15 
 
This collection of emotions, and their relationship to each other, is on first reading rather 
bewildering.  Ben Ze’ev has proposed a categorisation based on two factors: whether the 
subject is better or worse off than the object; and whether the situation is deserved.
16  Ben 
Ze’ev maps his reading of Aristotle as in Fig. 4.1 below. 
 
    Fig. 4.1:  Source: Ben-Ze’ev (2003) 104 
 
As  Ben Ze’ev  shows,  pity  is  an  emotion  triggered  by  seeing  someone  worse  off  in  an 
undeserved situation, while indignation, envy and emulation are all emotions triggered by 
                                                 
15  Kataphronêsis  is  difficult  to  translate,  as  no  English  word  does  it  full  justice.    Barnes  (1984)  uses 
“contempt”, but this does not capture the self satisfaction and desire to avoid similar misfortune implied by 
Aristotle (I discuss this in more detail at p.76).  I believe “disdain” does so better, but these aspects should be 
borne in mind wherever “disdain” occurs below. 
16  Ben Ze’ev  (2003)  102 4.    He  notes  that  Aristotle  likewise  ignores  other  determinants  of  emotional 
response, such as culture (i.e. whether an emotion was acceptable and how intensely it was felt).  I would add 
individual personality traits to the list: some people are more disposed to a particular emotional response than 
others – however we should note that Aristotle is interested in mass audiences, and while intensity of response 
might differ across an audience, one would expect some sort of normal distribution centred on the effect 
Aristotle predicts, with crowd mentality doing the rest. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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seeing someone better off in an undeserved situation.
17  These emotions lie across an axis 
from,  and  so  are  opposed  to  (antikeisthai),  pity.    We  cannot  believe  someone  to  be 
simultaneously better off and worse off than ourselves in relation to some desert, which is 
why Aristotle argues that if you envy or are indignant at someone, you cannot pity them.
18  
Emotions in the top left quadrant are also directed at someone worse off than ourselves, like 
pity, but they differ in being felt in a deserved situation.  They are also therefore opposed 
(antikeisthai) to pity, if in a different way to indignation, envy and emulation, and similarly 
cannot  co exist  with  it.    Emotions  in  diagonally  opposite  quadrants  are  true  contraries 
(enantia),  opposed  both  in  the  subject object  relation  and  in  the  deservingness  of  the 
situation.
19    A  painful  emotion  felt  in  an  undeserved  situation  is  indeed  most  directly 
contrary to a pleasurable emotion felt in a deserved situation, and again one cannot feel 
both sorts of emotion for the same person simultaneously.  We can also note with Ben 
Ze’ev that emotions on the left of the diagram are pleasurable, while those on the right are 
painful.
20 
 
Ben Ze’ev’s diagrammatic representation is very useful, but in a number of points it does 
not reflect Aristotle.  First, it should not include either admiration or compassion: Ben 
Ze’ev has been influenced by his own research as a philosopher into reading these without 
warrant in Aristotle’s discussion.
21  Second, Ben Ze’ev has ignored disdain, which clearly 
should be on the map somewhere, and probably (since it is enantion to emulation) in the 
                                                 
17 Note it is the entire situation (including our lack of goods) that we perceive as undeserved, not necessarily 
the object’s possession of goods – this allows emulation to appear in this quadrant, though (as I argue below) 
deservingness is still not that important to emulation. 
18 2.9.1387a3 5; 2.9.1387b17 21; 2.10.1388a27 30.  We could of course believe them better off and worse off 
for different deserts, e.g. I could envy someone’s wealth but also pity them for having cancer.  However at 
any instant one emotion or the other would predominate, depending on which thought was uppermost. 
19 Arist. Cat. 10 notes that there are four ways in which something can be opposed (ἀντικεῖσθαι): as relatives 
(τὰ πρός τι – e.g. double and half); as contraries (τὰ ἐναντία – e.g. good and bad; black and white); as 
privation and state (στέρησις καὶ ἕξις – e.g. blindness and sight); as affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ 
ἀπόφασις – e.g. he is sitting, and he is not sitting).  Metaph. 5.10.1018a25 notes that contraries are the most 
strongly opposed. 
20 Ben Ze’ev (2003) 103. 
21 Ben Ze’ev (2000) discusses a number of emotions felt at others’ fortunes which do not occur in Aristotle, 
and his binary categorisation comes from this work and is imposed onto Aristotle.  In general it works well.  
Ben Ze’ev (2003) 113, however, believes Aristotle’s discussion of kindness in Rh. 2.7 is the same as our 
compassion – Konstan (2006) 156 68 argues, in my view correctly, that the emotion Aristotle treats is not 
kharis (kindness), but kharin ekhein (gratitude) – but Aristotle does not relate this emotion to any of those in 
2.8 11.  Similarly, Aristotle’s comments on admiration quoted by Ben Ze’ev (2003) 118 are that we emulate 
those  we  admire  (2.11.1388b20),  which  does  not  amount  to  another  emotion,  merely  a  descriptive  verb 
applied to the emulator.  Ben Ze’ev goes on to argue “that admiration, rather than emulation, is the opposite 
of contempt” (118), and proceeds to put admiration in a different quadrant from emulation; none of this is 
justified by Aristotle’s text. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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top left quadrant.  Third, Ben Ze’ev has included spite, but his evidence for this emotion 
comes from the Nicomachean Ethics and, as I  will show, these treatises cannot simply 
supplement each other.  Finally, I believe he has mis positioned some of his emotions, 
partly because his analysis does not take account of something crucial: character. 
 
4.2.2  A three way categorisation 
 
To go back a stage, Aristotle discusses three emotions in the Rhetoric that are pains we (the 
subject) feel on perceiving that someone else (the object) has some good.  These emotions 
are indignation, envy and emulation, and in a number of short passages Aristotle tells us 
how to distinguish them.
22  We feel indignation because the other person does not deserve 
the good (1386b10 11: τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπραγίαις), but this is explicitly 
contrasted  with  envy,  where  it  is  not  a  concern  (2.9.1386b18 20:  λύπη   ὲν  γὰρ 
ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἐστὶν καὶ ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἴσου 
καὶ ὁ οίου), nor is the other’s deservingness mentioned in connection with emulation.
23  
We feel emulation because we want the same good as someone else, though we have no 
desire to deprive them of theirs (2.11.1388a34 37: οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὑτῷ 
ἔστιν ...   ὁ  ὲν γὰρ αὑτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνειν τῶν ἀγαθῶν), but 
in both indignation and envy our concern is with someone else owning the good, not with 
our own lack (2.9.1386b20 21: τὸ δὲ  ὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συ βήσεται ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ δι’ αὐτὸν 
τὸν πλησίον, ἅπασιν ὁ οίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν; 2.11.1388a37 38: ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον  ὴ ἔχειν 
διὰ  τὸν  φθόνον).    Finally,  Aristotle  states  it  is  bad  to  feel  envy,
24  but  good  to  feel 
                                                 
22 He characterises each emotion according to who feels it, when, and against whom (2.1.1378a23 26); but 
this is not how he distinguishes one emotion from another. 
23 The object’s desert is not relevant to emulation, but the subject’s (i.e. our own) perceived desert is: the 
more we feel we deserve similar goods now, the more we will feel pain.  However, if we assess our self worth 
as currently low, but potentially high (if we work hard / study ethics / raise a large family etc.), we might 
anticipate attaining a greater allocation of goods only once we deserve them, so such minimal pain as we feel 
now will merely be at the thought that we might not fulfil our potential. 
24 It is perhaps odd that Aristotle does not mention envy’s badness in the chapter he nominally devotes to that 
emotion (2.10).  However, its badness is irrelevant to the “Who feels it? When? Against whom?” questions 
that are the main focus of each chapter; the point most logically belongs where he compares one emotion with 
another.  He has already told us at 2.9.1386b33 1837a1 that the phthoneros (and the epikhairekakos) is of a 
contrary  character  to  the  khrêstos  who  feels  indignation  (and  various  other  emotions),  so  it  would  be 
unnecessary  to  repeat  it  until  he  compares  phthonos  with  another  emotion,  which  he  does  not  do  till 
2.11.1388a34 38  (after  which  follow  a  number  of  situations  inspiring  zêlos  that  contrast  directly  with 
individual situations inspiring phthonos – see n.55 below).  In the Eth. Nic. too, envy is one of only a handful 
of  bad  emotions,  along  with  spite  and  shamelessness  (Eth.  Nic. 2.6.1107a9 11).    These  remarks  are  all 
consistent, so we should not take the absence of a statement of envy’s badness in 2.10 as problematic. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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emulation (2.11.1388a35 36: διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν 
φαῦλον  καὶ  φαύλων),  and  indignation  is  also  associated  with  good  character 
(2.9.1386b11 12:  καὶ  ἄ φω  τὰ  πάθη  [to  eleein  and  to  nemesan]  ἤθους  χρηστοῦ; 
2.9.1386b33 1387a1: καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα [to nemesan and others 
(see  below)],  τὰ  δ’  ἐναντία  τοῦ  ἐναντίου   ὁ  γὰρ  αὐτός  ἐστιν  ἐπιχαιρέκακος  καὶ 
φθονερός).
25  We can see, therefore, that Aristotle describes how these emotions differ 
from each other by reference to three, not two, factors: whether the subject’s character is 
good or bad; whether the object’s deservingness is important; and whether the good itself is 
specifically desired.  Each factor shows one emotion differing markedly from the other 
two.
26 
 
Turning to pleasurable emotions at someone else’s bad fortune, Aristotle has provided one, 
disdain, and stated that it is the opposite of emulation (2.11.1388b22 23: ἐναντίον γὰρ 
ζήλῳ καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν): if we emulate those who 
have certain goods, we disdain those who do not; if we wish to copy someone in achieving 
something  positive,  we  do  not  wish  to  copy  them  in  achieving  something  negative 
(2.11.1388b23 26: ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλῶσαί τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι 
καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν 
ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν).
27  Just as in emulation we feel a pain at not having the same 
goods as someone else, so in disdain we feel pleasure that we are not suffering such evils 
ourselves, what Grimaldi calls “the pleasure which comes with self satisfaction”.
28 
 
The opposites of indignation and envy are more complicated, not least because it is not 
immediately clear whether there are two feelings or one.  Having compared indignation 
                                                 
25  Grimaldi  (1988)  56  cites  Vahlen,  J.  (1914)  Beiträge  zu  Aristoteles’  Poetik  (Berlin)  266 8,  on  “the 
similarity, if not the identity, in the Poetics of ἐπιεικής, χρῆστος (sic), σπουδαῖος to denote the morally 
good”.  Bonitz (1870) 813b37 8 notes that ἐπιεικής and χρηστός are opposite to φαῦλος. 
26 We should note that Aristotle is not overly interested in mixed motives here, but presumably one can feel 
both indignation and emulation simultaneously, if one both wants what someone else has and thinks the other 
person shouldn’t have it.  However, since one cannot be both morally good and morally bad, for Aristotle 
feeling envy precludes feeling either of the other two emotions as well (though see n.13 above). 
27 Aristotle goes on to say that we can also feel kataphronêsis for those with good fortune, when it does not 
come with the right sort of goods (2.11.1388b26 28: διὸ πολλάκις καταφρονοῦσιν τῶν εὐτυχούντων, 
ὅταν  ἄνευ  τῶν  ἐντί ων  ἀγαθῶν  ὑπάρχῃ  αὐτοῖς  ἡ  τύχη)  –  equivalent,  in  the  modern  world,  to  our 
contemptuous feeling for those we know will squander their lottery winnings, or for the nouveaux riches who 
buy vulgar status symbols. 
28 Grimaldi (1988) 179. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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with envy (see above), Aristotle goes on to talk about the opposite emotions accompanying 
the ones to which he has just referred, and I quote the passage in full for clarity: 
φανερὸν δ’ ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις   ὁ  ὲν γὰρ 
λυπού ενος  ἐπὶ  τοῖς  ἀναξίως  κακοπραγοῦσιν  ἡσθήσεται  ἢ  ἄλυπος 
ἔσται  ἐπὶ  τοῖς  ἐναντίως  κακοπραγοῦσιν,  οἷον  τοὺς  πατραλοίας  καὶ 
 ιαιφόνους,  ὅταν  τύχωσι  τι ωρίας,  οὐδεὶς  ἂν  λυπηθείη  χρηστός   δεῖ 
γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δ’ αὔτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι 
κατ’ ἀξίαν  ἄ φω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν ἐπιεικῆ   ἀνάγκη 
γὰρ  ἐλπίζειν  ὑπάρξαι  ἂν  ἅπερ  τῷ  ὁ οίῳ,  καὶ  αὑτῷ.  καὶ  ἔστιν  τοῦ 
αὐτοῦ ἤθους ἅπαντα ταῦτα, τὰ δ’ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου  ὁ γὰρ αὐτός 
ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός  ἐφ’ ᾧ γάρ τις λυπεῖται γιγνο ένῳ 
καὶ  ὑπάρχοντι,  ἀναγκαῖον  τοῦτον  ἐπὶ  τῇ  στερήσει  καὶ  τῇ  φθορᾷ  τῇ 
τούτου χαίρειν. 
Rh. 2.9.1386b25 1387a3 
 
And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones.  For whoever 
is pained by someone suffering bad fortune undeservedly, will be pleased or 
at  least  not  pained  by  those  who  suffer  bad  fortune  oppositely 
[i.e. deservedly]. For instance, no good person (khrêstos) would be pained at 
parricides or murderers being punished; one must rejoice at such things, just 
as at people having good fortune deservedly.  For both things are just, and 
make  the  good  person  (epieikês)  rejoice,  since  he  must  expect  the  same 
thing to happen to him as to someone like him.  And all these emotions are 
felt  by  the  same  character  (êthos);  and  contrary  feelings  are  felt  by  the 
contrary  character:  for  the  same  person  is  spiteful  (epikhairekakos)  and 
envious  (phthoneros),  as  someone  pained  by  something’s  existence  or 
genesis will necessarily rejoice at its absence or destruction. 
 
Where Aristotle says “And clearly the opposite emotions will accompany these ones”, he 
initially  appears  to  be  talking  about  indignation  and  envy,  the  emotions  he  has  been 
contrasting in the immediately preceding paragraph.  In fact, in the following sentence, 
Aristotle talks about being pained by undeserved misfortune, which is not indignation but 
pity.  “These ones” therefore refers to all the emotions so far discussed, pity as well as 
indignation and envy, and Aristotle deals with these three emotions one after another.
29 
 
First, Aristotle says that the man pained by undeserved misfortune (i.e. the person who 
feels pity), already identified with the person who feels indignation, will also feel joy at 
deserved misfortune (2.9.1386b26 28 and 30)  and deserved good fortune (2.9.1386b30 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 155. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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31).
30  We therefore have four emotions: pity; indignation; pleasure at deserved misfortune 
(a sort of satisfaction at someone “getting their comeuppance”);
31 and pleasure at deserved 
good fortune (for which I shall use Ben Ze’ev’s ‘happy for’).
32  All these emotions will be 
felt by people of the same, i.e. good, character (the epieikês or khrêstos) – people who can 
diagnose others’ deserts correctly and feel appropriate pain or joy.  Aristotle goes on to 
state that contrary feelings will be felt by the contrary, i.e. bad, character (the phaulos) – 
that the phthoneros (the envious man) is also epikhairekakos (spiteful).
33  Aristotle says 
later  that  this  joy  is  roused  similarly  to  envy  (2.10.1388a24 27:  δῆλον  δὲ  καὶ  ἐφ’  οἷς 
χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες  ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται, οὕτως 
ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἡσθήσονται), which must mean: by the misfortunes of equals, 
rather than the deserving.  This is appropriate, as someone morally bad will be unable to 
diagnose deserts correctly.  He will feel envy and spite whether the object deserves it or 
not.
34 
 
Ben Ze’ev’s diagram would therefore be more in tune with Aristotle’s thinking if it looked 
something like Fig. 4.2 below.  There are three pleasurable emotions – pleasure at deserved 
misfortune, spite and disdain – respectively opposite to indignation, envy and emulation.  
Pity  also  has  an  opposite:  ‘happy  for’.    Each  pair of  emotions  is  aroused  in  the  same 
individual in directly contrary circumstances, which is why each emotion is linked to its 
direct opposite. 
 
                                                 
30 Cf. 2.9.1387b16 18; see J.M. Cooper (1996) 242, who draws attention to this unnamed good contrary to 
indignation. 
31 Kristjánsson (2006) 96 99 refers to this emotion as ‘satisfied indignation’ (see ch.2 n.95), on the basis that 
it can only be felt after some injustice causing righteous indignation has been remedied; cf. p.38, where I 
argue that satisfied indignation is in fact not pleasurable, merely satisfying (though I am using ‘pleasurable’ in 
the everyday, rather than Aristotelian, sense). 
32 Ben Ze’ev (2003) 118. 
33 Kristjánsson (2006) 94 100 insists on translating this emotion as ‘Schadenfreude’, by explicit contrast with 
‘spite’ or ‘malice’.  I prefer ‘spite’ because in Schadenfreude the patient does not usually take part in the 
action causing the pleasurable feelings, whereas if epikhairekakia is to be a true opposite to phthonos (and, 
indeed, be included in the Rh.) it must be able to motivate action. 
34 Aristotle devotes almost the entirety of one chapter to each painful emotion, with no more than a few lines 
for each contrary pleasurable emotion (cf. Ben Ze’ev (2003) 103), a scanty treatment similarly applied to 
shamelessness (2.6.1385a14 15) and ingratitude (2.7.1385b7 10). Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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    Fig. 4.2:  Revised diagram of emotions relating to others’ fortunes 
 
 
I would mention three qualifications to this diagram.  First, I am following Ben Ze’ev in 
excluding a character axis (which would be in a third dimension perpendicular to the page), 
though for clarity rather than oversight – it is this that makes envy and spite appear close to 
the centre, since (bad) character is the only significant factor in these emotions.  Second, 
emotions will not always be felt to the same degree, so a response will be somewhere along 
a line rather than at a fixed point.  Finally, the exact emotional response will vary between 
individuals and in different situations, so each emotion could perhaps best be represented 
by  a  teardrop  centred  on  the  origin,  the  line  being  an  average  response.    While  this 
representation is therefore not quite as exact as it might be, I believe its extra clarity makes 
up for these minor imperfections so long as they are borne in mind.  The diagram is perhaps 
overly schematising, but no more than Aristotle’s thought in the Rhetoric.
35 
 
                                                 
35 See n.12, n.13, n.26 above. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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4.3  The placement of phthonos in the Ethics 
 
In saying in the Rhetoric that ‘good’ (epieikês or khrêstos) people feel indignation and 
emulation, while bad (phaulos) people feel envy, Aristotle appears to suggest there are only 
two types of character (êthos): good, and bad.  The former would then feel a number of 
emotions  related  to  others’  fortunes  (pity  and  ‘happy  for’,  indignation  and  ‘pleasure  at 
deserved misfortune’, emulation and disdain); the latter only envy and spite, depending 
whether the fortune is bad or good.  Good people would not be able to feel envy and spite at 
all;  bad  people  would  feel  nothing  else.    If  this  interpretation  were  valid,  an  orator’s 
audience could consist only of people whose characters were either good or bad.  People 
whose  characters  were  somewhere  in  the  middle,  or  who  were  sometimes  good  and 
sometimes bad, would not be envisaged.  Anticipating slightly the Nicomachean Ethics, 
where Aristotle argues that to be morally virtuous requires an ethical education, this would 
imply that those without such moral virtue (i.e. virtually everyone) are bad.
36 
 
Is Aristotle really arguing that the vast majority of his orator’s audience will be morally bad 
individuals,  capable  of  feeling  only  envy  and  spite?    It  seems  inherently  unlikely.    If 
nothing else, why would Aristotle then devote 186 lines to good people (66 lines to pity, 82 
to indignation and 38 to emulation) and only 44 to bad (envy)?  Indeed, if the vast majority 
of the audience could only feel envy and spite, why even bother teaching an orator about 
pity and indignation?  Such an interpretation would place Aristotle at odds with oratorical 
practice,  where  appeals  to  an  audience’s  pity  and  indignation  (or  righteous  anger)  are 
commonplace.
37 
                                                 
36 We should note that there are two ways in which the terms good (ἐπιεικής or χρηστός) and bad (φαῦλος) 
can be used: morally and socially.  For an Archaic aristocrat such as Theognis, the two senses are identical, 
‘the good’ being synonymous with aristocracy and ‘the base’ with commoners.  In democratic Athens, with 
its strong demotic ideology, the two become separated, so Euripides can talk about an honest poor man 
(φαῦλος χρηστός), contrasted with a bad cleverer one (κακὸς σοφώτερος) – Ion 834 5.  While Aristotle’s 
aristocratic audience in his Ethics lectures might well think of themselves as both socially and morally good, 
for Aristotle himself these two senses are not identical, though it should be noted that to become morally good 
(through studying ethics), social “goodness” (i.e. wealth and leisure) would be a pre requisite – Hutchinson 
(1995) 203; Nussbaum (1994) 55 6.  It is possible Aristotle adopts a lower standard of ‘goodness’ for the 
mass audience his orator (in the Rhetoric) will address, but there is no reason to suppose this is necessarily so. 
37 Carey (1996) 402 5 discusses righteous anger and pity, among other emotions roused; Dover (1974) 195 6 
notes that orators often attempted to rouse a jury’s pity, sometimes by bringing their children into court; Allen 
(2003) 80 6 argues that juries were roused to controlled righteous anger (orgê), in an amount appropriate to 
the crime, an emotion Aristotle separates off as τὸ νε εσᾶν; Webb (1997) 120 5 shows that Roman oratory 
likewise attempted to arouse misericordia (pity) and indignatio (indignation).  Note it is possible that appeals 
to indignation are equally/instead appeals to transmuted envy – see ch.5.3, ch.6. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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However, we should realise that the Greek words phaulos, epieikês and khrêstos are much 
more flexible, and have a broader application both socially and morally (see n.36 above), 
than the English words ‘bad’ and ‘good’, and in both interpretations (social and moral) 
moving from one to the other is possible.  It is likely that Aristotle intends they should be 
understood in this way (even in the Rhetoric), i.e. as “characteristic of moral goodness” and 
“characteristic  of  moral  badness”,  which  is  suggestive  of  a  continuum.
38    In  the 
Nicomachean Ethics it is much clearer that Aristotle does not believe most people to be 
either uniformly bad or uniformly good, but somewhere in the middle.
39  Most people’s 
characters have been partially educated, partially encouraged towards moral goodness (I 
discuss how in ch.4.4.3).  Much of the time people will not feel emotions that are either 
phaulon or epieikes.  There will be instances where they feel one or the other, but with no 
reliability, and it is the orator’s job to try to tug them towards one end of the spectrum or 
the other, to try to awake an indignant or envious emotional response by appealing to their 
moral education or lack of it. 
 
Aristotle (unlike the Stoics) does not believe that emotions are inimical to reason, and 
should therefore be eliminated as far as possible.
40  In the Nicomachean Ethics, he argues 
that a proper measure of emotion is the morally desirable response, and he calls that proper 
measure the mean ( εσότης).  Aristotle goes so far as to define virtue in relation to feeling 
appropriate emotion.
41  However, one might not feel the proper amount of emotion: one 
might feel an excess or a deficiency (both are opposed to the mean and to each other), and 
both these extremes are vices (Eth. Nic. 2.6.1107a2 3:  εσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς  ὲν 
καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ’ ἔλλειψιν; 2.8.1108b11 12: τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο 
 ὲν  κακιῶν,  τῆς   ὲν  καθ’  ὑπερβολὴν  τῆς  δὲ  κατ’  ἔλλειψιν,   ιᾶς  δ’  ἀρετῆς  τῆς 
 εσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως).  For instance: feeling a lack of fear when 
proper (the mean) is bravery, a virtue; feeling a lack of fear even when one should feel fear 
(the excessive vice) is rashness; feeling fear too often (the defective vice) is cowardice 
                                                 
38 As these formulations are clumsy in English, I shall continue using the designations ‘bad’ and ‘good’, but 
the broader interpretation of these words should be borne in mind. 
39 Broadie (1991) 102. 
40 Nussbaum (1994) 9 10, 41 2; Gill (2003) 29; Knuuttila (2004) 6. 
41 As Nussbaum (1996) 316 17 points out, this means that even a correct action is not virtuous unless it has 
been motivated by morally appropriate emotions. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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(Eth. Nic. 3.7.1115b11 1116a9).  Aristotle argues (Eth. Nic. 2.6.1106a25 1106b3) that the 
location of the mean will vary, not just from situation to situation, but from person to 
person.  For instance, if eating two measures of food would be too little for all and ten too 
much, the right amount (the mean) will not necessarily be six measures: this would be too 
little for a champion athlete, but too much for a beginner.  Thus six measures might be an 
excess, a deficiency, or a mean.  Means are therefore relative to us, not to the object.  It is 
for this reason that a proper emotional response might be part way along a line in Fig. 4.2 
above, rather than at the line’s end. 
 
In the Eudemian Ethics, νέ εσις is a mean, and covers four emotions: pain at undeserved 
good or bad fortune (indignation and pity), and pleasure at deserved good or bad fortune 
(‘happy for’ and ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’).
42  The excessive vice is φθόνος, which 
is described as a pain felt at deserved good fortune (envy);
43 the defective vice is unnamed, 
but  is  felt  by  the  ἐπιχαιρέκακος,  and  is  a  joy  at  undeserved  misfortune  (spite) 
(Eth. Eud. 3.7.1233b19 25:  ὁ   ὲν  φθόνος  τὸ  λυπεῖσθαι  ἐπὶ  τοῖς  κατ’  ἀξίαν  εὖ 
πράττουσιν  ἐστίν,  τὸ  δὲ  τοῦ ἐπιχαιρεκάκου  πάθος  ἐπὶ  τὸ  αὐτὸ  ἀνώνυ ον,  ἀλλ’  ὁ 
ἔχων δῆλος, ἐπὶ τὸ χαίρειν ταῖς παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις.  έσος δὲ τούτων ὁ 
νε εσητικός, καὶ ὃ ἐκάλουν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέ εσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι  ὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν 
ἀξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις). 
 
In  the  Nicomachean  Ethics,  νέ εσις  is  again  the  mean,  and  thus  a  morally  acceptable 
emotion, providing it is felt only when the object’s good fortune is undeserved (righteous 
indignation, what Aristotle calls τὸ νε εσᾶν in the Rhetoric; the other three good emotions 
                                                 
42 While this definition is idiosyncratic (to say the least), these are the same four emotions that Aristotle treats 
together at Rh. 2.9.1386b25 33 where he argues they are all the product of the same good character, so there 
is at least some logic here.  One of the four emotions (pain at undeserved good fortune) is the same as to 
nemesan in the Rh. (and nemesis in the Eth. Nic.).  See Coker (1992) 70. 
43 Kristjánsson (2006) 95 disputes phthonos’ equation with envy, as he believes that would imply that we 
want the good ourselves, which we would not necessarily if we merely felt indignation (nemesis) on too many 
occasions; he prefers ‘begrudging spite’ as a translation.  While noting in passing that (as I show in ch.3) the 
scope  of  phthonos  is  wider  than  English  ‘envy’  and  includes  such  ideas  as  ‘begrudging  spite’,  I  would 
disagree  with  Kristjánsson:  first,  he  seems  to  have  overlooked  the  (earlier  –  see  n.45,  n.47)  Rhetoric’s 
discussion of phthonos, where it is very plainly ‘envy’ (as well as ‘jealousy’, ‘begrudging spite’ etc); second, 
like phthonos (see Aristotle’s definition – p.85), envy also does not show a strong desire for the good, rather a 
desire  that  the  other  person  not  have  it  (see  p.26,  p.35).    The  problem  with  the  phthonos nemesis 
epikhairekakos triad is not that phthonos has changed its meaning; rather it is that Aristotle is trying to fit into 
his doctrine of the mean, three emotions that do not really work as an excessive vice virtuous mean deficient 
vice triad in the way he would like.  See also Coker (1992) 65 8. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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are  dropped  from  the  definition).
44    φθόνος  is  once  again  identified  with  an  excess  of 
indignation, feeling pain even when good fortune is deserved (envy); and this time the 
defective vice, being so far short of pain that one feels joy (presumably at undeserved bad 
fortune), is named as ἐπιχαιρεκακία (spite)
45 (Eth. Nic. 2.7.1108b1 5: νέ εσις δὲ  εσότης 
φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συ βαίνουσι 
τοῖς  πέλας  γινο ένας   ὁ   ὲν  γὰρ  νε εσητικὸς  λυπεῖται  ἐπὶ  τοῖς  ἀναξίως  εὖ 
πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ’ ἐπιχαιρέκακος 
τοσοῦτον  ἐλλείπει  τοῦ  λυπεῖσθαι  ὥστε  καὶ  χαίρειν).
46    In  the  Nicomachean  Ethics, 
Aristotle seems to have replaced four emotions identified in the Rhetoric with only three, 
having lost ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’, the second virtuous emotion.  However, let 
us look closer.  In suggesting that, in moving from indignation to envy, one moves from 
virtue to vice and ceases to concern oneself with desert, Aristotle is paralleling what he said 
in the Rhetoric, albeit in the language of his newly developed doctrine of the mean.
47  It is 
by no means so obvious why spite should be the defective vice: one would expect the 
defect to be an inability to be indignant even when appropriate.
48  M.J. Mills notes that the 
triad  envy  –  indignation  –  spite  is  the  only  one  in  the  Ethics  in  which  there  are  two 
excesses,  and  he  has  suggested  that  really  there  ought  to  be  two  triads,  corresponding 
                                                 
44 Kristjánsson (2006) 102 believes that the definition given for nemesis in Eth. Eud. is correct, and that is 
why he chooses a different term from that used in the Rh. (to nemesan), which refers only to ‘indignation’; 
however  his  subsequent  attempt  to  explain  the  difference  in  meaning  of  nemesis  between  Eth.  Eud. and 
Eth. Nic. is not persuasive. 
45 While the adjective ἐπιχαιρέκακος is used in the Rh. (2.9.1386b34), Eth. Eud.  (3.7.1233b19 and 21) and 
NE (2.7.1108b5), the abstract noun ἐπιχαιρεκακία is only used in the Eth. Nic.  (2.7.1107a10 and 1108b1).  
Neither word appears in surviving Greek literature before the fourth century.  ἐπιχαιρέκακος is used by the 
comic  poets  Anaxandrides,  Alexis  and  Timokles  (the  last  as  a  title  to  a  play!),  all  of  whom  were 
contemporaries of Aristotle, per W. Smith (1867).  It is unlikely that comic poets would use a word coined in 
a philosophical treatise and familiar only to philosophy students, hence ἐπιχαιρέκακος was very likely in 
common  parlance  when  first  used  by  Aristotle.    ἐπιχαιρεκακία  makes  its  first  appearance  (in  surviving 
literature) in the Eth. Nic., and continues to be used only in philosophical circles, so it is likely Aristotle 
coined the abstraction himself to address the noted lack in the Eth. Eud.  This suggests Eth. Nic. postdates 
Rh. and  Eth.  Eud.  in  composition  (cf.  n.47  below)  –  contra  Kenny  (1978)  215 39,  who  argues  that  the 
Eth. Eud. might have been written after the Eth. Nic.  Both words appear once in the Mag. mor. (27.1 and 
27.2), which is consistent, if my argument is correct, with this treatise postdating the other three works. 
46 φθόνος and ἐπιχαιρεκακία are not equivalent to other emotions treated in the ethical works, as they are not 
means that can be morally good in some measure, but are always vicious (Eth. Nic. 2.6.1107a9 12) – M.J. 
Mills (1985) 10; Broadie (1991) 102; Garver (2000) 66. 
47 I believe the development of the doctrine of the mean, and hence the composition of both Eth. Eud. and 
Eth. Nic., must postdate the Rh. (or at least the part of Book 2 that is concerned with the emotions), as 
Aristotle is very unlikely to have avoided all mention of it in the Rh. if that were a later work; see Irwin 
(1996) 161 2 for a different view.  Taken with n.45 above, I therefore believe the order of composition was 
Rh., Eth. Eud., Eth. Nic., Mag. mor., an order of composition I occasionally assume in the argument in the 
main text. 
48 Grimaldi (1988) 152; cf. Coker (1992) 70. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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respectively to pain at good fortune and joy at bad fortune, which he shows as in Fig. 4.3 
below. 
 
    φθονερός  -------  νε εσητικός  -------  ἀνώνυ ος 
       (envious)           (righteously indignant)           (unnamed) 
ἐπιχαιρέκακος  -------  ἀνώνυ ος  -------  ἀνώνυ ος 
         (spiteful)                       (unnamed)                   (unnamed) 
    Fig. 4.3:  Source: M.J. Mills (1985) 10 
 
The  virtuous  mean  in  each  triad  is  the  ability  to  diagnose  desert  correctly  and  feel  an 
appropriate amount of pain or pleasure at it, while the excess in each triad is the lack of this 
ability  coupled  with  feeling  pain  or  pleasure  indiscriminately.    Ignoring  the  deficient 
extremes,  which  are  merely  a  lack  of  feeling,  we  can  see  in  Fig.  4.4  below  that  this 
formulation  gives  four  emotions  that  are  the  envy,  indignation,  spite,  and  ‘pleasure  at 
deserved misfortune’ (PaDM) of the Rhetoric: 
 
envy           indignation           apathy 
spite           PaDM           apathy 
      Fig. 4.4:  The ‘corrected’ triads 
 
As M.J. Mills points out, Aristotle has tried to show how his “doctrine of the mean” covers 
rivalrous emotions but, perhaps led astray by so many unnamed emotions, he mistakenly 
included one triad too few.
49 
 
In the Rhetoric, envy and spite were depicted as emotions that afflict bad people in certain 
situations.  In the Ethics, however, they have become paradigms of badness: excessive 
feelings by the ethically uneducated of emotions that an ethically aware person would feel 
more judiciously, and which in that judiciousness would be perfectly acceptable. 
 
                                                 
49 M.J. Mills (1985) 10; see also Urmson (1980) 166 7; Konstan (2006) 115.  Coker (1992) 71 80 postulates 
four triads of emotions, each based on nemesis in a different one of its four Eth. Eud. guises. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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4.4  Envy and enviers 
 
4.4.1  What goods excite envy? 
 
Envy is defined as a pain we feel when we see those like ourselves having good fortune 
concerning their goods, not because we want their goods, but purely because they have 
them  (2.10.1387b22 25:  ἐστὶν  ὁ  φθόνος  λύπη  τις  ἐπὶ  εὐπραγίᾳ  φαινο ένῃ  τῶν 
εἰρη ένων  ἀγαθῶν  περὶ  τοὺς  ὁ οίους,   ὴ  ἵνα  τι  αὑτῷ,  ὰλλὰ  δι’  ἐκείνους).    This 
definition is largely Platonic in origin.
50 
 
Aristotle says in 2.10 that he has already spoken about the good things in life that incite 
envy.  These are discussed in Rh. 1.5, which deals with the external and bodily goods that 
bring happiness: good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty 
of children, a happy old age, bodily excellences (such as health, beauty, strength, height, 
athletic prowess), fame, honour, good luck, and virtue (1.5.1360b18 22).  Aristotle says all 
these things are the product of good fortune, and as such incite envy (1.5.1362a5 6: ὅλως 
δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστιν ἀπὸ τύχης ἐφ’ οἷς ἐστιν ὁ φθόνος). 
 
Aristotle  goes  on  to  talk  in  Rh.  1.6  about  the  good  (τὸ  ἀγαθόν)  and  the  useful 
(τὸ συ φέρον).  These are goods that should be chosen for their own sake, and not for the 
sake of something else (1.6.1362a21 23).  They include pleasure, happiness, goods of the 
soul (such as justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity and magnificence), health, wealth, 
friends and friendship, honour and reputation, good memory, the ability to learn, and more 
(1.6.1362b5 28). 
 
Two points should be noted here.  First, there is some considerable overlap between goods 
desirable for their own sake (1.6), and those that bring happiness (1.5).  Second, there is no 
mention in 1.6 that the goods listed are the product of good fortune (on the contrary, as the 
                                                 
50 The various elements of this definition can be extracted from Pl. Phlb. 49c8 50a10, though he talks about 
friends and neighbours rather than equals.  The definition is repeated in the pseudo Platonic Definitiones 
(416a13):  Φθόνος λύπη ἐπὶ φίλων ἀγαθοὶς ἢ οὖσιν ἢ γεγενη ένοις.  Xenophon records a similar Socratic 
formulation, that envy is a pain, and consists in being grieved at the good fortune of friends (Mem 3.9.8.1 4): 
Φθόνον δὲ σκοπῶν, ὅ τι εἴη, λύπην  έν τινα ἐξηύρισκεν αὐτὸν ὄντα, οὔτε  έντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀτυχίαις 
οὔτε  τὴν  ἐπ’  ἐχθρῶν  εὐτυχίαις  γιγνο ένην,  ἀλλὰ   όνους  ἔφη  φθονεῖν  τοὺς  ἐπὶ  ταῖς  τῶν  φίλων 
εὐπραξίαις ἀνιω ένους. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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Nicomachean Ethics shows, many of them are virtues that must be developed by hard work 
over many years), nor that they incite envy.  If Aristotle is saying that goods appearing in 
both lists – wealth, friends, honour – incite envy when judged to be the product of good 
fortune rather than hard work, that is tantamount to saying they incite envy when they are 
seen  as  undeserved.    Aristotle  is  throwing  into  doubt  his  own  distinction  between 
indignation (to do with desert) and envy (to do with the bad character of the observer) 
discussed above.  We shall see that in other authors the distinction between indignation and 
envy is not nearly so clear cut as Aristotle would like (see ch.5.3).  Aristotle has, perhaps 
inadvertently, given an insight here into a more popular socio psychology. 
 
4.4.2  Who feels envy, and when? 
 
Aristotle  elaborates  on  “those  like  ourselves”  (2.10.1387b24:  τοὺς  ὁ οίους),  elsewhere 
referred  to  as  equals  (2.9.1386b19 20:  τοῦ  ἴσου  καὶ  ὁ οίου).
51    People  will  feel  envy 
towards those who are or appear similar to them in birth, relationship, age, disposition, 
distinction,  or  wealth  (2.10.1387b25 7:  φθονήσουσι   ὲν  γὰρ  οἱ  τοιοῦτοι  οἷς  εἰσί 
τινες ὅ οιοι ἢ φαίνονται  ὁ οίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ’ ἡλικίας, 
κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα), and near them in time, place, age and 
reputation  (2.10.1388a6:  τοῖς  γὰρ  ἐγγὺς  καὶ  χρόνῳ  καὶ  τόπῳ  καὶ  ἡλικίᾳ  καὶ  δόξῃ 
φθονοῦσιν).  Additionally people feel envy for kin (e.g. sibling rivalry) and anyone else 
they are in rivalry with, which will include people who are contemporaries, who live near 
them, who are not too far above or below them, and who compete for the same things both 
in sport and in love – and presumably occupation: he quotes the famous line from Hesiod 
that “potter envies potter” (2.10.1388a7 16).
52 
 
People will feel envy when they fall a little short of having all the good things in life 
(2.10.1387b26).  People who do great deeds and have good fortune can also feel phthonos 
(this is possessive jealousy),
53 as they think others will try to take something away from 
them – this includes those honoured for a distinction, especially wisdom or happiness (29 
30).  Ambitious people are more envious than unambitious ones (though this implies the 
                                                 
51 A number of modern scholars agree that envy is felt most for equals – see ch.2 n.10, n.114. 
52 Hes. Op. 25 26:  καὶ κερα εὺς κερα εῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ 
ἀοιδὸς ἀοιδῷ. – see pp.45 7. 
53 As we saw at pp.58 9, phthonos can mean possessive jealousy – cf. Cairns (2003b) 239. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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unambitious  can  be  envious  too),  as  are  those  with  a  reputation  for  wisdom,  who  are 
ambitious as regards wisdom (possessive jealousy again).
54  In general, anyone wishing to 
be distinguished in anything can be envious (or jealous) in regard to that thing (31 33).  The 
small minded ( ικρόψυχοι) are also envious, because everything seems great to them (34).  
People  envy  those  whose  possessions  or  successes  they  feel  to  be  a  reproach  to  them 
(1388a18 21).  Those who have lost something, or who never had it, envy those that do 
have it, as do those who have not got it yet; this includes youth, so older men envy younger, 
and money, so those who have spent much envy those who have spent little (1388a21 
24).
55 
 
Three other envious situations occur in the Politics: (1) the rich are prone to treat the poor 
as  masters  do  their  slaves  –  they  feel  kataphronêsis  for  them,  and  the  poor  will  feel 
phthonos for the rich in return (Pol. 4.11.1295b19 23: ὥσθ’ οἱ  ὲν ἄρχειν οὐκ ἐπίστανται, 
ἀλλ’  ἄρχεσθαι  δουλικὴν  ἀρχήν,  οἱ  δ’  ἄρχεσθαι   ὲν  οὐδε ίαν  ἀρχήν,  ἄρχειν  δὲ 
δεσποτικὴν ἀρχήν.  γίνεται οὖν δούλων καὶ δεσποτῶν πόλις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐλευθέρων, καὶ 
τῶν  ὲν φθονούντων τῶν δὲ καταφρονούντων);
56 (2) anyone great in a city is apt to 
cause civil strife, either through being envied or because they get ‘too big for their boots’ 
(Pol. 5.4.1304a34 8: οἱ δυνά εως αἴτιοι γενό ενοι, καὶ ἰδιῶται καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ φυλαὶ καὶ 
ὅλως  έρος καὶ πλῆθος ὁποιονοῦν, στάσιν κινοῦσιν:  ἤ γὰρ οἱ τούτοις φθονοῦντες 
τι ω ένοις ἄρχουσι τῆς στάσεως, ἤ οὗτοι διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι  ένειν ἐπὶ τῶν 
ἴσων); and (3) kings unrestricted by law are more despotic, so more envied, than those 
more  restricted  (Pol. 5.11.1313a20 23:  ὅσῳ  γὰρ  ἂν  ἐλαττόνων  ὦσι  κύριοι,  πλείω 
χρόνον  ἀναγκαῖον   ένειν  πᾶσαν  τὴν  ἀρχήν:  αὐτοί  τε  γὰρ  ἧττον  γίγνονται 
                                                 
54 Presumably as regards their reputation for wisdom, that no one else match it – while competition for 
wisdom is not a zero sum game, competition for a reputation for wisdom can be. 
55 There are some instructive contrasts with zêlos.  While the small minded ( ικρόψυχοι) and the old are 
prone to phthonos (2.10.1387b, 2.10.1388a21), the high minded ( εγαλόψυχοι) and  the  young  will  feel 
emulation (2.11.1388a38 b3).  Both phthonos (2.10.1387b26) and zêlos (2.11.1388b3 7) can be felt for those 
who fall short of having all the goods mentioned at pp.85 6; however the one must be felt by bad people, and 
the other by good. 
56 In Pol. 1.6 Aristotle argues that, with the exception of (Greek) slaves captured in inter polis strife, in 
general slaves are so by nature and they recognise the fact.  Because they accept their slavery and are properly 
obedient, the slave and his master are bound together by common interest and will be friends.  However, 
slaves by convention (i.e. Greeks enslaved contrary to nature) will not have the same interest as their masters 
– their interest will be to regain their natural freedom – and so friendship with their masters is ruled out 
(Pol. 1.6.1255b5 15).  In Pol. 4.11 Aristotle is presumably drawing an analogy, not between masters and 
slaves by nature, but between masters and slaves by convention – it is these, who should properly be political 
equals of their masters, who will feel envy for them. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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δεσποτικοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἴσοι  ᾶλλον, καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχο ένων φθονοῦνται ἧττον).  
These situations do not on the face of it appear in the Rhetoric.  However that treatise 
presupposes the context of a polis, and it is in that context that envy is described as being 
felt for equals (τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁ οίου).  As Schofield points out, for Aristotle “a polis is an 
association of free and equal persons”.
57  In a polis, a man’s homoioi and isoi are his fellow 
citizens.    Sparta  indeed  called  its  citizens  Homoioi,
58  while  in  Athens  and  elsewhere 
isonomia (equality before the law) implied democracy.
59  The idea was the same in both 
cases: that all (male) citizens were equals, both politically and legally.
60  In the examples of 
envy given in the Politics, someone or some class is seeking to surpass his/their natural 
homoioi and isoi; the rest of his/their society responds with phthonos.  Phthonos as moral 
censure plays no part in Aristotle’s thinking in the Rhetoric or Ethics, in these brief remarks 
in the Politics he is (once again) showing some reflection of a more popular morality.
61 
 
4.4.3  Who does not feel envy? 
 
In reading the above, it can seem as if almost anyone can envy nearly anyone else for just 
about anything at all.  However, there are some situations given even in the Rhetoric that 
exclude envy.  People who are not similar or equal in any of the ways listed will not feel 
envy for each other.  Even being dissimilar in only one respect can preclude envy: e.g. 
people who live a century apart, or at opposite ends of the Mediterranean, or those far 
above or below us (2.10.1388a9 12).
62  But for a more detailed analysis of those who will 
not feel envy, we must turn to Aristotle’s discussion of virtue and ethical education in the 
Ethics. 
                                                 
57 Schofield (1998) 45. 
58 Cartledge (1987) 15. 
59 Hdt. 3.80.26 (Athens), 3.142.15 (Samos), 5.37.2 (Miletus); Thuc. 3.82.8 (in general). 
60 See Ober (1989) 7, 70, 197, 240 etc. for the ideology of political and legal equality underpinning the 
Athenian democracy.  Dem. 51.11 (τὸ πάντας ἔχειν ἴσον καὶ δη οκρατεῖσθαι) shows the link between 
equality and democracy being invoked in fourth century oratory. 
61 See ch.5.3. 
62 I am not convinced that one does need this similarity to feel envy as such.  There is no reason, for example, 
why someone might not burn to surpass the deeds of someone long dead.  Cope (1877), commenting on 
2.10.2, argues that one “may envy a baby its innocence, its health, its rosy cheeks,” and that any involuntary 
comparison  can  give  rise  to  an  unsatisfied  desire,  bringing  painful  feelings.    However  Aristotle  is  not 
necessarily  excluding  such  situations  from  inspiring  envy.   The  Rhetoric  is  concerned  with  oratory,  and 
therefore deals with instances where oratory is important, i.e. where envy motivates action (2.11.1388a36 38).  
Since envy of a baby’s innocence does not lead to action, it is irrelevant in the context of a speech, and so to 
Aristotle’s argument. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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We have already seen that morally good people cannot feel envy, but how does one become 
morally good?  Aristotle believes the human soul is divided into an alogical half and a 
logical half (Eth. Nic. 1.13.1102a26 32).  The alogical half is the passionate, desiderative 
part of the soul, the seat of the emotions and bodily desires.  However, since emotions are 
cognitive (i.e. they involve judgment), it is possible for them to be controlled by the logical 
half of the soul: the alogical half of the soul is (potentially) subordinate to the logical half.
63  
Ethics involves training both halves of the soul.  As Sarah Broadie notes: “human virtue, 
when achieved, is precisely an excellence of reason and feeling in partnership.”
64  Training 
of the logical half of the soul aims at practical wisdom (φρόνησις) (Eth. Nic. 6.5.1140b25 
9).  Training of the alogical half aims at moral excellence (ἀρετὴ ἠθική), which is brought 
about by the character (ἦθος) developing the habit (ἔθος) of acting in a certain way.
65  One 
cannot truly have either moral excellence or practical wisdom without both being present 
(Eth. Nic. 6.13.1144b30 2). 
 
In order to eliminate envy and spite, one must habituate the alogical half of the soul, which 
feels emotions based on its training, only to feel pain or pleasure at someone’s perceived 
good or bad fortune when it ought to be felt.  This habituation is brought about by many 
influences: e.g. parental upbringing, the influence of society’s norms and laws, the scrutiny 
of peers, etc.  By habituation one builds up a kind of mental database of situations in which 
one has been taught that indignation is a proper response, or that someone has ‘got their 
comeuppance’ deservedly.  When someone so trained perceives an instance of good or bad 
fortune,  his  cognitive  response  will  recognise  this  fortune  and  say  “deserved”  or  “not 
deserved” correctly, causing him to feel (or not) pain or pleasure accordingly.  This ability 
is moral excellence, and is the training that a well brought up child might have, or an adult 
man before starting on a course of ethics.
66 
 
Fortenbaugh  believes  that  perfecting  the  alogical  side  of  the  soul  is  sufficient:  since 
deliberation is not necessary for every individual virtuous response (sometimes there isn’t 
                                                 
63 Fortenbaugh (2002) 23 7. 
64 Broadie (1991) 64. 
65  Ibid.  72;  see  also  Kosman  (1980).    Aristotle  notes  the  close  similarity  in  the  Greek  words 
(Eth. Nic. 2.1.1103a14 b25); LSJ confirms ἦθος is a lengthened form of ἔθος. 
66 A.D. Smith (1996) 60 notes that, for Aristotle, education in habit must come before education in reason. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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sufficient  time),  practical  wisdom  is  not  necessary  for  a  virtuous  response  to  be 
guaranteed.
67  Sorabji rightly disagrees (see Eth. Nic. 6.13.1144b30 2), but in my view goes 
too far in the other direction, by arguing that deliberation (by the logical half of the soul) is 
required to find the mean in every instance of ethical emotional response, even if only 
subconsciously.
68    Fortenbaugh  focuses  too  much  on  habituation,  Sorabji  too  much  on 
deliberation;
69  the  truth  is  somewhere  between  the  two.    Aristotle  makes  plain  that 
excellence is built through habituation: “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by 
doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.” (Eth. Nic. 2.1.1103b1 2: οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ 
 ὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινό εθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ’ ἀνδρεῖα 
ἀνδρεῖοι).
70  A good upbringing should habituate one to be properly indignant but avoid 
envy,  to  feel  proper  pleasure  at  others’  misfortunes  but  avoid  spite.    However,  while 
someone with a good upbringing might hit on the morally correct response repeatedly, there 
is no guarantee that they will hit on it invariably, since for that to happen they must have 
true knowledge of where the mean lies, and that requires practical wisdom and (sometimes) 
deliberation. 
 
The  man  who  has  perfected  both  his  moral  excellence  and  his  practical  wisdom  is 
megalopsykhos – the virtue is megalopsykhia
71 – and such a man will not be able to feel 
envy.  Gill has argued that the megalopsykhos should not feel any of the rivalrous emotions 
covered by chapters 2.9 11, since he has a goodly measure of all appropriate goods, and 
knows that what he does not have is unimportant.
72  However, while this might preclude 
emulation and disdain, and his virtue stops him feeling envy and spite, I see no reason why 
the megalopsykhos might not feel indignation or ‘pleasure at deserved misfortune’.  Indeed, 
if he were unable to feel these, he would be practising the defective vice. 
 
                                                 
67 Fortenbaugh (2002) 73 5. 
68 Sorabji (1980) 210 11. 
69  A.D.  Smith  (1996)  argues  that  Fortenbaugh  takes  a  Humean  approach,  pitting  himself  against  the 
“intellectualists”, each side stressing either character or intellect has priority in “determining good moral 
ends” (58). 
70 Translation from Barnes (1984). 
71  Megalopsykhos  is  normally  translated  “magnanimous”  (Barnes    (1984)  uses  “properly  proud”),  while 
megalopsykhia is “magnanimity”.  In n.55 above I translated it “high minded”, to highlight the comparison 
with “small minded” (for mikropsykhos). 
72 Gill (2003) 36 7. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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One other context Gill identifies as precluding rivalry for the many goods of life is (perfect) 
friendship: a friend will only compete with his friend in virtue, and will willingly lose all 
his possessions, and his life itself if need be, for his friend’s sake.
73  However, Gill does not 
show why a friend will not emulate his friend, and indeed Aristotle states that we wish 
someone to be our friend if we want them to emulate but not envy us (2.4.1381b21 3: ὑφ’ 
ὧν ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ  ὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἢ φιλοῦσιν ἢ βούλονται φίλοι 
εἶναι). 
 
4.5  Conclusions: a comparison of Aristotelian phthonos with modern theory 
 
It will be fairly obvious that again there is considerable overlap between Aristotle’s views 
on phthonos and modern scholarship on envious emotions.
74  Aristotle says phthonos is an 
emotion aimed at those similar to us;
75 consensus opinion in modern scholarship says envy 
is most strongly felt for peers, and the more like someone you are, the stronger your envy is 
likely to be.
76  Aristotle says phthonos is primarily felt when we see someone in possession 
of some good;
77 modern scholarship talks about social comparison when someone has some 
object or attribute that we desire.
78  Aristotle says that the primary drive of phthonos is that 
the  other  person  should  not  have  (i.e.  should  be  deprived  of)  the  good;
79  modern 
scholarship notes envy’s tendency to deprive the other of the envied object/attribute, even if 
that involves some loss for ourselves.
80  Phthonos is connected with its spiteful opposite,
81 
in the same way that envy is required for Schadenfreude or spite/malice to be felt.
82  It is 
clear that envy and phthonos are very similar emotions, and that Aristotle’s understanding 
of how the latter works is very similar to modern scholarship’s understanding of the former.  
                                                 
73 Ibid.; this might suggest a zero sum element to rivalry, which I do not believe Aristotle intends. 
74 At least one reason for this is that, since the cognitive approach has become so ubiquitous from the 1970s, 
modern scholars are much more receptive to absorbing points from Aristotle’s analysis than pre cognitivists.  
Also important is the sociological dimension of at least some of the modern studies, a perspective shared with 
Aristotle. 
75 2.10.1387b22 5: ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις … περὶ τοὺς ὁ οίους – see p.86. 
76 See ch.2 n.10, n.114; I note there that the assertion is not backed up with experiential proof, but it is widely 
held by scholars in a variety of disciplines, and is not strongly challenged. 
77 2.10.1387b22 5: ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ φαινο ένῃ τῶν εἰρη ένων ἀγαθῶν – see p.85. 
78 See pp.24 5. 
79 2.11.1388a37 8: ὁ δὲ τὸν πλησίον  ὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον – see p.75. 
80 See p.26, p.35. 
81 2.9.1386b34 1387a1: ὁ γὰρ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός – see pp.76 8. 
82 See pp.37 8. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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This is important because it means that we can (and I will) often use Aristotle’s work on 
phthonos to explain, in Greek terms, our reading of envy scenarios in Greek literature. 
 
There are some significant differences between (Aristotle’s understanding of) phthonos and 
envy however.  The most obvious (and noted in my conclusions to ch.3) is that phthonos 
includes  the  emotion  we  call  possessive  jealousy.
83    In  relation  to  Aristotle’s  socio 
psychology,  Salovey’s  ‘situational’  approach,  which  considers  three person  rivalry 
situations that may involve any combination of envy and jealousy, is therefore more helpful 
for understanding how phthonos works than the rigid envy/jealousy separation of Parrott 
and R.H. Smith.
84  Second, admiring envy (as in “I really envy you”) is philologically not a 
part of phthonos (also noted in my conclusions to ch.3) – zêlos words are used instead for 
this  type  of  first person  claim,  and  zêlos  is  a  perfectly  acceptable  emotion.
85    A  third 
difference is that Aristotle does not draw out the action tendencies of phthonos, except in 
his comment that we want our neighbour not to have the good;
86 modern scholarship is 
much more interested in both the destructive tendency of envy,
87 and ‘defences’ against it 
(i.e. ‘coping’ mechanisms designed to lessen the pain we feel on experiencing envy, and the 
secondary pain of guilt at feeling a taboo emotion).
88  Fourth, Aristotle does not mention 
any tendency of phthonos to disguise itself (whether advertently or inadvertently), which 
modern scholarship does note for envy;
89 however he does say that to nemesan (which is 
pretty much like our righteous indignation) is easily confused with phthonos,
90 and that the 
former is ‘good’ while the latter is ‘bad’.
91  Fifth, there is the moral aspect: Aristotle makes 
clear, both in the Rhetoric and the Ethics, that phthonos is a morally base emotion felt by 
                                                 
83 Note Aristotle does not highlight the requirement for an exclusive bond. 
84 See pp.32 3. 
85 2.11.1388a35: διὸ καὶ ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν – see p.76. 
86 See n.79 above. 
87 As indeed are pre Aristotelian sources – see pp.66 7. 
88 See pp.27 8. 
89 See ch.2.2.3, ch.2.5. 
90 2.9.1386b16 20: δόξειε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁ φθόνος …, ὡς  σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νε εσᾶν, ἔστι δ’ ἕτερον 
– see p.72. 
91 2.11.1388a35 6: τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων; 2.9.1386b11 12: καὶ ἄ φω τὰ πάθη [to eleein and 
to nemesan] ἤθους χρηστοῦ – see pp.75 6.  Aristotle’s separation of phthonos from the rather spurious 
to nemesan  /  nemesis  (see  ch.5.3.1,  where  I  argue  the  latter  was  an  idiosyncratic  reinvention),  and  his 
examination of the phenomenology solely from a supposedly objective standpoint (i.e. ignoring the first 
person experience of either the subject or personally disinterested observers) militated against his noticing this 
tendency. Chapter 4:  Aristotle  
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morally  base  people;
92  despite  envy  being  socially  taboo,  modern  scholarship  does  not 
focus on the characters of those who feel it:
93 Ben Ze’ev comes closest by saying that any 
moral pretensions envy has are false, that envy can never be moral no matter how it cloaks 
itself; Kristjánsson will not even go that far, questioning whether envy should even be 
classed as a ‘negative emotion’ at all.
94 
 
These differences are instructive for a variety of reasons.  First, they confirm (as we saw in 
ch.3) that the parameters of ancient Greek phthonos and modern envy (or even envy plus 
(possessive) jealousy) are not coterminous.  This means at a basic level that translation of 
phthonos will always require thought; more subtly it requires us to be wary of assumptions 
we  might  make  on  seeing  phthonos  terminology.    Second,  we  should  not  assume  that 
phthonos will dissipate in the way envy does when the person feeling phthonos has gained 
whatever it was they  wanted, or the target of their emotion has been  brought low; the 
bivalent (envy/jealousy) aspect of phthonos combines with the competitive nature of Greek 
life to ensure that phthonos may remain even after its apparent aim (to bring low) has been 
achieved.  Finally, the fact that phthonos is not so much reified as a bad emotion (as is 
‘envy’), but rather reflects back on the character of the person feeling it, requires us to 
consider the motivations of an accusation of phthonos: unlike an accusation of ‘envy’, it 
will not merely be questioning the moral motivation of someone at a particular moment, but 
will be branding them as someone morally base at all times and in all aspects – it is a 
statement about their character. 
 
                                                 
92  2.11.1388a35 6:  τὸ  δὲ  φθονεῖν  φαῦλον  καὶ  φαύλων  –  see  pp.75 6;  cf.  Eth.  Eud. 3.7.1233b19 25, 
Eth. Nic. 2.7.1108b1 5, Eth. Nic. 2.6.1107a9 11 – see n.24 above. 
93 Pre Aristotelian sources are also unclear on this. 
94 See ch.2 n.99, n.109; cf. Kristjánsson (2006) 23 35 on ‘negative emotions’.  
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Chapter 5:  Phthonos in the Attic Oratorical Corpus 
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
Armed now with the fullest information on the phenomenology of phthonos, the range and 
spread of its correlation with a variety of English emotions (envy, possessive jealousy, 
begrudging spite etc.), and the phenomenology of episodes of those English emotions, we 
are  now  in  a  position  to  move  beyond  surveys  and  Aristotle’s  personal  (if  insightful) 
analysis, to a detailed examination of phthonos scenarios in the three mass audience literary 
genres of Classical Athens: oratory, Old Comedy and tragedy.  Each genre presents its own 
challenges, and accordingly I consider them in three separate chapters. 
 
It may seem more appropriate to proceed through the genres in more or less chronological 
sequence (i.e. tragedy, Old Comedy, oratory).  However, phthonos changes little during the 
Classical period, and therefore these genres can to large extent be treated isochronically.  In 
fact I treat these genres in reverse chronological order, because it is the order in which my 
arguments  can  most  easily  be  presented:  first,  oratory  involves  direct  use  and  real  life 
(despite  elements  of  fabrication  and  distortion),  making  it  easier  to  recognise  there  the 
dynamics  of  the  emotions  simulated,  stimulated  and  denied  than  in  dramatic  fiction; 
second, Old Comedy’s arousal of audience phthonos cannot be fully appreciated without 
the in depth discussion of phthonos as moral censure that I undertake in ch.5.3; third, as 
this  chapter  moves  from  accusations  of  phthonos  within  speeches,  to  explicit  and  then 
covert arousal of audience phthonos, so I continue with covert arousal of audience phthonos 
in Old Comedy before coming back to direct portrayal of phthonos onstage in tragedy; 
finally,  finishing  with  phthonos  in  tragedy  ensures  the  most  appropriate  lead  in  to  my 
discussion of sexual jealousy in Part IV, which begins with an in depth analysis of three 
tragedies before moving full circle back to oratory. 
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5.2  Phthonos accusations in oratory 
 
5.2.1  Phthonos and the Aristotelian orator 
 
Picking up on the closing point of the previous chapter, clearly those with sufficient virtue 
never to feel envy (megalopsykhoi and perfect friends) will be few and far between, and 
accordingly the vast majority of an orator’s listeners will be susceptible to envy.  However, 
the morally bad nature of phthonos raises problems that do not apply to other emotions. 
 
Emotion arousal is useful as an oratorical tool because emotions, by application of pain or 
pleasure through rational argument, affect judgment.  In an insightful article, Leighton has 
discussed exactly how judgment can be affected by the emotions:
1 this will either be as the 
consequence  of  emotion,  or  as  a  constituent  of  emotion.    Judgement  alteration  as  a 
consequence of emotion can come about in four ways.  The first is by allowing our reason 
to be overruled (e.g. if we pity someone, we let them off for a crime we know they have 
committed).  Secondly, if we can be brought to favour or disfavour someone, we will be 
better or worse disposed towards giving them the benefit of the doubt when the situation is 
ambiguous.  Thirdly, through perception: for instance, our strong support for one of two 
tennis players will affect whether we think a ball she hit is in or out.  The final way is 
through  strong  emotion  causing  us  to  give  more  attention  to  an  issue.    Alteration  of 
judgment as a constituent of emotion is more complex.  It is not that one emotion rules out 
another,  rather  that  the  “emotions  are  complexes  involving  judgments,  each  complex 
excluding certain other emotion complexes, their judgments, and certain other judgments as 
well.”
2  Aristotle gives one, and only one, effect of envy: he says that if an orator can put 
the jury into an envious state of mind, then his opponent will not be able to win pity from 
them (see ch.4 n.18, and pp.97 8 below).  In Leighton’s words: “It is not that envy brings 
about a change of judgments such that one does not show or feel pity; rather, to be moved 
to envy involves being moved to a particular set of judgments that excludes those of pity.”
3 
 
                                                 
1 The remainder of the paragraph summarises Leighton (1996) 206 17 – these are his own views, not his 
interpretation of Aristotle’s views, on emotion arousal. 
2 Ibid. 210. 
3 Ibid. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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But can an Aristotelian orator make use of this?  Another of the three modes of persuasion 
(see p.70) is the orator’s character (ἦθος):  an orator must make his argument in a way that 
makes him appear worthy of trust, and it is good men that we trust; a good man’s character 
is  demonstrated  by  what  he  says,  and  it  is  pretty  much  the  most  effective  means  of 
persuasion available to him (Arist. Rh. 1.2.1356a4 13: διὰ  ὲν οὖν τοῦ ἤθους, ὅταν οὕτω 
λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα  τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύο εν 
 ᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον….  δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συ βαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου… σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν 
κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος).  However, since Aristotle specifically says that envy is 
a  bad  (φαῦλον)  emotion  (see  pp.75 6),  if  an  orator  presents  himself  as  envious  of  his 
opponent in trying to rouse similar envy in his audience, he will show his own character to 
be base.  If his character is “pretty much the most effective means of persuasion” available 
to him, displaying envy is not worth that sacrifice.  Second, he cannot present himself as 
not  envious,  but  still  explicitly  attempt  to  rouse  envy  in  his  audience:  they  will  either 
believe he shares that envy, or that he does not and is merely spinning sophisms.  Worse, 
by appearing to impute bad character to his audience, he may alienate them. 
 
A third, and more complex, possibility is that the orator might seek to rouse envy in the 
audience while seeming not to.  However, I do not believe this is possible either.  First, the 
audience might spot it, which leads to the problems already mentioned – though this merely 
makes it risky, not impossible.  A more serious objection is that, although rhetoric (like 
dialectic) is a skill that can be used to argue anything, an Aristotelian student must pursue a 
life of moral excellence and practical wisdom, and politics is an extension of this ethical 
life;
4 accordingly an Aristotelian orator must not use unethical arguments, even if they 
might  be  rhetorically  effective.
5    A  fourth  explanation  also  fails:  Aristotle  cannot  be 
instructing his orator how to deal with envy if it is used against him,
6 because he does not 
                                                 
4 Schofield (2006). 
5 Hesk (2000) 219 says Aristotle believes that rhetoric without moral purpose is merely sophistry. Garver 
(1994) 8 argues that for Aristotle, rhetoric is an “integration of thought and character in an art of practical 
reason”, and Fortenbaugh (1991) 97 8 notes that the alliance of excellences of thought and of character, 
assimilated respectively to the rational and irrational halves of the soul, is what makes someone virtuous 
(Eth. Nic. 1.13.1103a3 10, 2.1.1103a14 15, 6.1.1138b35 1139a1).  It should be noted that this argument does 
not rely on support from within the Rhetoric.  The balance of scholarly opinion is that the Rhetoric itself does 
contain injunctions to behave ethically: Irwin (1996) argues that 1.1.1355a29ff should be read in this way; 
Grimaldi (1972) 19 21 agrees; see also Halliwell (1994); however Engberg Pedersen (1996) for an alternative 
view. 
6 Irwin (1996) 144 says Aristotle (Rh. 1.1.1355a29ff) believes that an orator needs to be able to recognise 
illegitimate arguments when his opponent uses them against him, even if he should not use them himself. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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tell him how to counter envy, only that envy can be used to counter pity (Rh. 2.10.1388a27 
30).
7  There are therefore problems with any use the orator might wish to make of envy 
within the purposes of Rh. 2.1 – i.e. arousing it in an audience to affect their judgement. 
 
So what use can an Aristotelian orator make of the chapter on envy?  Well, first, it has a 
negative role.  This chapter has didactic purpose: if there were no discussion of what envy 
is and how it differs from indignation and emulation, how could an Aristotelian orator 
avoid straying from these acceptable emotions to envy?  This, I believe, is why Aristotle 
devotes so much space to telling his orator exactly how one distinguishes these emotions 
from each other, and why he makes such a point of saying how acceptable and worthy 
indignation and emulation are, when envy is so immoral (see pp.75 6).  If envy did not 
exist, Aristotle would have had to invent it. 
 
However, there is something more an Aristotelian student might extract from the Rhetoric.  
There is a second type of rhetorical use for the emotions, more acceptable for envy than 
manipulating  an  audience,  and  this  is  to  explain  one’s  opponent’s  motivation 
(Rh. 1.10.1369a15 19).
8    Prosecutors  must  consider  all  the  motives  that  can  affect 
defendants, and how many apply to their opponent, while defendants must consider how 
many do not apply to them (Rh. 1.10.1368b30 32).  Aristotle argues (Rh. 1.10.1368b33 
1369a6) that all of a person’s actions are caused either by the person himself (δι’ αὐτούς), 
or something external to him.  The latter comprises things done out of chance or necessity 
(which itself subdivides into compulsion and nature); the former out of habit or desire 
(ὄρεξις).  Desire subdivides into rational desire, or will (βούλησις), and irrational desire, 
which  further  subdivides  into  appetite  (ἐπιθυ ία)  and  anger  (ὀργή).
9    In  fitting  the 
emotions into these, it would seem that at least all pleasurable emotions are subsumed 
within appetite: appetite is a desire for what is pleasant (Rh. 1.11.1370a18: ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυ ία 
τοῦ ἡδέος ἐστὶν ὄρεξις).  For painful emotions, it is helpful if we recall that anger (ὀργή) 
is  a  pain  accompanied  by  a  desire  for  revenge,  and  that  revenge  brings  pleasure 
                                                 
7 Cf. Rh. 2.9.1387a3 5 and 2.9.1387b17 21, where he makes a similar comment about indignation. 
8 It should be noted that Aristotle does not say phthonos should be used in this way (let alone only in this 
way).  Striker (1996) 288 notes that the idea of emotions being motivational is Platonic. 
9 Leighton (1996) 222 3 notes that in De an. 414b2, De motu an. 700b22, and Eth. Eud. 1223a25 27, this 
subdivision of desire is thymos, or spirit, a name less likely, in the context of the subsequent discussion, to 
cause confusion with orgê as the emotion discussed in Rh. 2.2. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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(Rh. 2.2.1378a30 1878b2).
10  In fact in general, painful emotions are accompanied by a 
desire to escape from pain, and that desire will be pleasant (Rh. 1.10.1369b26 8): hatred is 
attended by a desire to harm,
11 pity by a desire to aid, envy by a desire to bring low, 
emulation by a desire to succeed.  Thus pleasant feelings are aroused by a desire to act in 
certain ways, and painful feelings by a desire to act in other ways. 
 
This then is the second use an Aristotelian orator can make of the emotions, and, if the first 
use is ruled out of court, the only use he can make of envy: he can show that his opponent 
is motivated by it.  The association of this negative emotion with his opponent allows the 
speaker to alienate the listeners from the opponent, making them less inclined to vote for 
him, and reducing his credibility.  If Aristotle (on this reading) is right, then we should 
expect phthonos’ use in oratory to be confined to positioning statements, i.e. as to the 
opponent’s phthonos, and/or the speaker’s lack of it (countering his opponent’s explicit 
accusation, or the audience’s potential perception). 
 
5.2.2  Phthonos accusations in the Attic oratorical corpus 
 
I do not intend to make a comprehensive review of the theme of phthonos in oratory.  Such 
a major study would require far more space than one chapter, and in any event the topic has 
already been well examined.
12  My interest in this section is more selective, and will focus 
on two specific aspects: first to confirm whether my analysis of Aristotle’s views, to the 
effect that phthonos can only be used effectively to explain one’s opponent’s motivation, is 
reflected in actual oratorical practice or not; second, to consider how overt cases for an 
opponent’s  phthonos  are  built  up,  beyond  direct  accusation  –  i.e.  the  situational  and 
behavioural  indicators  highlighted  to  make  their  supposed  phthonos  obvious  to  the 
audience.  In the remainder of the chapter I shall move on to consider arousal of phthonos 
in the audience.
13 
 
                                                 
10 Viano (2003) also locates pleasures within the epithymia and anger within the thymos; she argues that the  
thymos  is  probably  also  the  seat  of  the  competitive  emotions.    Elster  (1999)  60 1  has  some  interesting 
comments on emotions and action tendencies in Aristotle. 
11 Strictly, Aristotle says that hatred, unlike anger, is not painful (Rh. 2.4.1382a12 13); see J.M. Cooper 
(1996) 247 9 and Leighton (1996) 232 3, n.14 for discussion of this point. 
12 See especially Ober (1989) 192 247, Fisher (2003), Saïd (2003), Cairns (2003b); also Walcot (1978) 67 76. 
13 This, contra Aristotle, does happen.  In the conclusion to this chapter I consider why Aristotle got it wrong. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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The first issue can be quickly dealt with.  Out of 170 instances of phthonos cognates in the 
oratorical corpus, aphthon words (implying something being plentiful or abundant) account 
for 31; of the remaining 139, we have already listed in ch.3.3 a total of 98 accusations 
(against the opponent or another), prohibitions and denials – which I argued were merely 
variants on accusations.
14  We can add to this four statements that the opponent wants to 
arouse the audience’s envy against the speaker (Isoc. 15.31.4; Isae. 11.38.2; Dem. 21.29.4, 
29.2.4), and five that the speaker is not blameworthy or is seeking to avoid the audience’s 
phthonos (Isoc.15.100.2; Dem. 18.305.6, 18.321.3, Epist. 2.24.4; Aeschin. 2.167.4) – both 
of  these  being  unusual  types  of  accusation.    Of  the  remainder:  twelve  are  gnomic 
statements about phthonos and, often, whom it is directed against (Isoc. 1.26.5, 1.26.7, 
2.46.3, 3.18.11, 11.49.2/3; Dem 3.24.9, 18.315.3, 19.99.5, 19.313.7, 20.140.3, 20.140.6, 
60.23.6); eight are statements that someone does not, or will not, feel phthonos (Isoc. 7.31.7 
(the poor); Dem. 8.71.8, 20.141.6, 20.141.9, 20.165.8 (the audience); 25.97.6 (ancestors); 
Isoc. 19.45.6, Aeschin. 2.139.9 (ironically, against the opponent)); and we have already 
seen (p.57) that in four cases the speaker appears to claim envy for a group of which he is 
part, but as a necessary rhetorical prelude to advising his listeners not to feel the emotion 
(Isoc. 10.56.3, 15.130.7; Dem. 10.39.4, 10.52.5) – i.e. his ‘admission’ is required for him to 
finesse telling his audience they feel phthonos without alienating them.  It  can be seen 
therefore that Rh. Book 2 style arousal of phthonos to influence decision making, does not 
in  any  way  account  for  131/139  instances  of  phthon words  in  the  oratorical  corpus.
15  
Rather, as my analysis of Aristotle (see ch.5.2.1) would seem to indicate, these are Rh. 
Book 1 style positioning statements about who does (normally the opponent, sometimes 
another person) or does not (normally the speaker) feel phthonos.  In the remaining eight 
instances of phthon words in the oratorical corpus (Lys. 27.11.2; Isoc. 4.184.1, 18.51.3; 
Aeschin. 3.42.1; Dem. 21.196.4, 21.196.6, 28.18.3, 37.52.3),
16 the speaker does try to rouse 
phthonos in his audience.  Crucially, however, this phthonos does not relate to the emotion 
we call envy; rather it is a type of moral censure.
17  Never once, in the whole oratorical 
                                                 
14 170 phthonos words in the oratorical corpus (ch.3 n.27).  Aphthon words occur 18 times in Dem., 6 times in 
Aeschin., 5 in Isoc., and twice in Lys.  28 direct accusations (ch.3 n.30, n.32); 52 indirect accusations (ch.3 
n.37, n.35); 9 prohibitions (ch.3 n.33, n.34); 9 denials (ch.3 n.36); total: 98. 
15 Though of course the sociological insights of Aristotle’s analysis in Rh. 2.10 will be germane. 
16 We can perhaps add Lys. 18.16.1 to this list (see n.77 below). 
17 I deal with this in ch.5.3, where I introduce the hypothetical analytical constructs of envy phthonos and 
indignation phthonos, highlighting the fact that phthonos can relate both to the morally bad English envy, and 
to the morally good English indignation. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
 
101 
corpus, does a speaker attempt to arouse the emotion we call envy, by explicitly calling for 
phthonos.
18 
 
I now turn to speeches in which accusations of phthonos occur.  In Isae. 2, On the Estate of 
Menekles, Menekles’ brother disputes the will in which Menekles leaves what he owns to 
his adopted son, by challenging the legality of the adoption.  As the speaker says that nearly 
all the family money and property was already in the hands of the brother, and the estate 
under dispute actually amounted to very little (2.40 41), one might expect that it would be 
hard for him to maintain an accusation that his uncle’s prosecution was motivated by envy.  
But the brothers had fallen out over money, and this partly happened because Menekles 
divorced the sister of the man he later adopted (i.e. the sister of the speaker) and had to 
repay her dowry; accordingly there was a history of bad blood between Menekles’ brother 
and the speaker’s family.
19  The speaker argues, therefore, that his uncle blames Menekles 
for adopting at all, having wanted him to die childless, and since the uncle himself has a 
son, his censure of Menekles is epiphthonos (2.23.4 6: τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὃ ἐπιτι ᾷ, ἐπίφθονον 
πρᾶγ α  καὶ  οὐ  δίκαιον  ποιῶν   ὄντων  γὰρ  αὐτῷ  παίδων  ἐκείνῳ  ὄντι  ἄπαιδι  καὶ 
ἀτυχοῦντι φαίνεται ἐπιτι ῶν).  One does not begrudge the right to adopt even to a non 
relative and try to steal it from them, but the uncle does to his own brother (2.24.5 8: ὁ δὲ 
θεῖος οὑτοσὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνεται τὸν αὑτοῦ ἀδελφὸν ταύτης τῆς ἐξουσίας ἀποστερῶν νῦν, 
τοῦ ποιήσασθαι, ἧς οὐδὲ τοῖς οὐδὲν γένει προσήκουσιν οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐφθόνησεν).  
Since, he says, there is almost no money or property remaining, this must be phthonos 
(2.27.5 8:  πῶς  οὐ  φθονερός  ἐστιν;  Εἰ  δὲ  περὶ  χρη άτων  ἐστὶν  ὁ λόγος  αὐτῷ, 
ἐπιδειξάτω ὑ ῖν ὁποῖον χωρίον ἢ συνοικίαν ἢ οἰκίαν κατέλιπεν ἐκεῖνος, ἃ ἐγὼ ἔχω 
νυνί).  Based on our theoretical understanding, we can say that the speaker is trying to rule 
out mere greed or coveting as a motivation, in order to pin phthonos, that basest of motives, 
on his uncle.
20 
 
                                                 
18 Speakers do, however, sometimes attempt to arouse envy covertly, and I discuss this in more detail in 
ch.5.3.3. 
19  See  Edwards  (2007)  27 32  for  the  background  to  the  speech,  and  explanation  of  the  structure  of  the 
argument. 
20 From an Aristotelian point of view, we might see the case for the uncle’s baseness being augmented by οὐκ 
αἰσχύνεται  (24.4),  anaiskhyntia  being  one  of  three  emotional  phaulotêtes,  alongside  phthonos  and 
epikhairekakia (NE 2.6.1107a9 11) – see ch.4 n.24. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
 
102 
Another accusation of phthonos is found in Lysias 24, On the Invalid.  The speaker, who is 
in receipt of the meagre dole handed out to those whose property was less than three minae 
and who were too disabled to earn a decent wage, is being prosecuted on the twin grounds 
that his property is above this minimum threshold and that he is not too disabled to work in 
any case.  He responds to these accusations, which are probably well founded, not with 
logical argument but with evasion and irreverence, presumably (as Todd says) trying to get 
the case laughed out of court.
21  He begins by saying that his opponent is a liar, and that he 
deserves  praise  not  envy  (24.1.4 6:  καὶ  πειράσο αι  τῷ  λόγῳ  τοῦτον   ὲν  ἐπιδεῖξαι 
ψευδό ενον, ἐ αυτὸν δὲ βεβιωκότα  έχρι τῆσδε τῆς ἡ έρας ἐπαίνου  ᾶλλον ἄξιον ἢ 
φθόνου).  He then says his opponent is motivated by nothing except envy (24.1.6 8: διὰ 
γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλλο  οι δοκεῖ παρασκευάσαι τόνδε  οι τὸν κίνδυνον οὗτος ἢ διὰ φθόνον), 
and that he envies where others pity (24.2.1: καίτοι ὅστις τούτοις φθονεῖ οὓς οἱ ἄλλοι 
ἐλεοῦσι).
22  He jokingly suggests his opponent might be prosecuting him maliciously for 
money;
23  at  any  rate  he  cannot  be  prosecuting  him  out  of  enmity  to  gain  revenge
24  – 
because of his baseness (poneria) the speaker has never had any dealings with him before – 
and so clearly his opponent feels phthonos for him as a better citizen (24.2.2 3.3: εἰ  ὲν 
γὰρ  ἕνεκα  χρη άτων   ε  συκοφαντεῖ—   εἰ  δ’  ὡς  ἐχθρὸν  ἑαυτοῦ   ε  τι ωρεῖται, 
ψεύδεται  διὰ γὰρ τὴν πονηρίαν αὐτοῦ οὔτε φίλῳ οὔτε ἐχθρῷ πώποτε ἐχρησά ην 
αὐτῷ. ἤδη τοίνυν, ὦ βουλή, δῆλός ἐστι φθονῶν, ὅτι τοιαύτῃ κεχρη ένος συ φορᾷ 
τούτου βελτίων εἰ ὶ πολίτης).
25  The opponent’s case is that the speaker is in possession 
of something  (the dole) that he does not deserve, which is indignation;
26 the speaker’s 
response, that his opponent’s prosecution is really motivated by envy, implicitly recognises 
                                                 
21 Todd (2000) 254.  See also Edwards and Usher (1985) 263ff. and Carey (1990) on the speaker’s strategy, 
which includes elements of parody.  Usher (1999) 106 10 suggests that the whole speech is in fact a parody, 
an exercise or “jeu d’esprit” (106), rather than a speech written for a real case. 
22 Where others see the speaker as worse off, his opponent sees him as better off (see ch.4 n.18). 
23 See my comments on the practice of sykophantia and the sykophantos as a bad citizen, with bibliography, 
in ch.6 n.30. 
24 Rhodes (1998) argues that this is frequently a motivation for prosecution; Kurihara (2003) for a more 
nuanced assessment, where he denies its acceptability in public suits.  Cohen (1995) 82 3 argues for the 
mutual exclusivity of enmity and envy in motivating prosecutions. 
25  See  Lys.  3.9.7  for  another  case  where  a  speaker  claims  that  some  people  envy  anyone  who  is  good 
(khrêstos – a word that also suggests the speaker is politically active (Todd (2000) 43, Carey (1989) 98), 
though if this is implied by the speaker in Lys. 24 it will be as part of the parody).  Note also Pl. Menex. 
242a3 4: ὃ δὴ φιλεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι προσπίπτειν, πρῶτον  ὲν ζῆλος, ἀπὸ ζήλου 
δὲ φθόνος  
26 To nemesan rather than phthonos, in Aristotelian parlance. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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that  phthonos  (like  envy)  can  be  masked  as  indignation.
27    Whether  it  is  actually 
indignation (dole not deserved) or envy (dole deserved) is immaterial for our purposes, 
though; what matters is the rhetorical strategy, and the transmutation (real or imagined). 
 
I now turn from money to politics, the other major issue that we frequently see (ostensibly) 
arousing phthonos in Athenian oratory, to consider one of the longest running and most 
famous  political  grudge  matches  in  Classical  Athens,  that  between  Aeschines  and 
Demosthenes.  In 343, when Aeschines 2 (On the Embassy) was delivered, Aeschines was 
47 years old and a well connected politician.
28  Demosthenes was six years younger and,
29 
while he still must have been considered a major, if up and coming, player in Athenian 
politics (he had been included in the ten man embassy to Philip headed by Philokrates in 
346), was less well connected.  Nevertheless he may broadly speaking be considered a 
political contemporary of Aeschines, and certainly a political rival.
30  Let us consider how 
Aeschines characterises Demosthenes’ motivations and rhetorical strategy.  He begins by 
stating that Demosthenes does not feel orgê for him, and the jurors can be sure of this 
because of his many lies and slanders about Aeschines (2.2.1 3: Καὶ ταῦτ’ εἶπεν οὐ δι’ 
ὀργήν  οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ψευδο ένων τοῖς ἀδίκως διαβαλλο ένοις ὀργίζεται),
31 yet he 
aims to rouse orgê among the jurors through those slanders (2.3.3 4: ἀλλὰ τὴν ὑ ετέραν 
ὀργὴν  ἐκκαλέσασθαι  βεβούληται).
32    As  Allen  argues,  orgê  is  the  most  common 
retributive  (or,  more  correctly,  justicial)  emotion  an  orator  tries  to  arouse  against  his 
                                                 
27 The situation is slightly complicated because, as I show in ch.5.3, this sort of indignation is in the real 
world (i.e. not in Aristotle) also covered by the word phthonos in Greek; this creates an ambiguity not found 
in English.  See also Cairns (2003b) on the difficulty, even in English, of distinguishing genuine indignation 
from transmuted envy. 
28 Carey (2000) 88 for date of speech, and 9 for Aeschines’ birthdate of 390BC.  Carey notes that “Aeschines 
had arrayed some of the biggest names in Athenian politics in his defense” (89). 
29 Yunis (2005) 9 for his birthdate of 384BC.  Demosthenes and Aeschines both entered public life (i.e. began 
making political speeches) in the late 350s: Demosthenes with the First Philippic, dated 351BC (Yunis (2005) 
14  n.15);  it  is  not  known  precisely  when  Aeschines  entered  politics,  but  he  had  two  other  careers  first 
(Carey (2000) 9) and so despite being several years older than Demosthenes he may not have begun his 
political career till around the same time. 
30 Buckler (2000) 113; Yunis (2005) 117 8. 
31 I.e. if Demosthenes were telling the truth, he could understandably be angry, but since what he is saying is 
not true, any anger will be synthetic. 
32 Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of slander fourteen times in this speech (ch.3 n.30).  It is interesting to 
note that, of 200 instances of diabolê (and cognates) in Attic oratory, these occur most frequently in Isoc. 15 
(22 instances), Aeschin. 2 (14 instances) and Dem. 18 (9 instances), in all three speeches as part of sustained 
accusations of phthonos – it is in fact phthonos, rather than orgê, that is most usually associated with diabolê 
(see p.67).  The theme of phthonos in Isoc. 15 has been well discussed – see Saïd (2003) 226 9, Fisher (2003) 
185 7, Cairns (2003b) 244 5, Walcot (1978) 72 3.  I discuss Dem. 18 at pp.105 6. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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opponent,
33 and it will clearly be detrimental to his case if it can be shown that he himself 
does not genuinely share in that emotion.  Aeschines goes on to accuse Demosthenes of 
hybris,  lies  and  abuse  (2.8.8 10:  διατετέλεκε  γὰρ  εἰς  ἡ ᾶς  ὑβρίζων,  καὶ  λοιδορίας 
ψευδεῖς  οὐκ  ἐ οὶ   όνον  λοιδορού ενος,  ἀλλὰ  καὶ  τοῖς  ἄλλοις),  themes  that  recur 
throughout the speech.
34  He says that Demosthenes envies him and uses slanders against 
him (2.10.6: ἐφθόνησέ  ου ταῖς διαβολαῖς), and is prosecuting him out of excessive envy, 
terrible  cowardice,  and  bad  character  (2.22.9 10:  φθόνον  ὑπερβάλλοντα  καὶ  δεινὴν 
δειλίαν ἅ α καὶ κακοήθειαν).  Having thus lodged Demosthenes’ alleged phthonos in his 
audience’s  minds,  Aeschines  explains  how  these  alleged  motivations  arose:  despite 
boasting that his arguments would easily persuade Philip (2.21), Demosthenes apparently 
suffered stage fright and ‘corpsed’ (2.34 35); his arguments were treated disdainfully by 
Philip, who instead treated Aeschines’ own remarks with most respect.  These, Aeschines 
implies, were the situational antecedents which, coupled with Demosthenes’ kakoêtheia, 
caused his excessive phthonos (2.22 – see above); and it is because of this phthonos that 
Demosthenes  is  prosecuting  him  (rather  than  any  of  the  other  ambassadors)  now.  
Aeschines next describes Demosthenes betraying his fellow ambassadors while reporting 
back  to  the  Assembly,  thus  causing  uproar  in  the  audience  who  themselves  called 
Demosthenes base and malicious (2.51.2 3: πονηρὸς καὶ φθονερός); this alleged treachery, 
Aeschines  implies,  was  the  result  of  Demosthenes’  rivalrous  envy  against  the  other 
ambassadors.    Shortly  after,  Aeschines  again  lists  Demosthenes’  bad  points:  his 
inconsistency, his envy, his collusion with the traitor Philokrates, and his treacherous and 
untrustworthy character (2.54.3 5: καὶ τὴν ἀνω αλίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸν φθόνον, καὶ τὴν 
τῶν  πραγ άτων   ετὰ  Φιλοκράτους  κοινωνίαν,  καὶ  τὸ  ἦθος  ὡς  ἐπίβουλον  καὶ 
ἄπιστον),  and  finally  towards  the  end  of  the  speech  Aeschines  reminds  us  of 
Demosthenes’ cowardice and phthonos once more (2.139.2 3: τὴν σὴν ἀνανδρίαν καὶ ἅ α 
φθόνον).  We see that Aeschines can very plausibly make the case for his rival’s enmity 
being  driven  by  envy;  and  in  light  of  Aristotle’s  description  of  phthonos  as  phaulon 
                                                 
33 Allen (2003).  Orgê in this context is best translated “indignant/justicial/retributive anger”, rather than 
“rage”.  Allen argues that orgê is measurable, and should be dispensed in an amount appropriate to the crime.  
In reality orators did not generally seek to quantify the amount of orgê they were trying to arouse.  See 
Rubinstein (2004) for the types of cases in which orators might call for orgê. 
34 λοιδορ  words appears five times (and accusations of blasphêmein a further two), ὑβρ  words six times, 
and ψευδ  or ψευσ  words no fewer than 26 times in the speech.  None of this is uncommon for Greek oratory 
– see Hesk (2000) 207 13 for the oratorical topos of describing your opponent as a master of deceptive word 
spinning. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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phaulôn (“a base feeling of base men”), it is interesting and noteworthy that Aeschines 
couples it with kakoêtheia – a term Demosthenes will himself use about Aeschines (see 
n.63 below). 
 
In 330 Demosthenes had his chance for revenge.  As Carey notes, “[b]y the time Aeschines 
and Demosthenes faced each other in court again, their positions had to a large extent been 
reversed.    Demosthenes’  influence  had  increased…”,
35  and  Aeschines’  had  declined.  
Accordingly,  when  Aeschines  attacked  Ktesiphon  for  illegally  proposing  a  crown  be 
awarded  to  Demosthenes,
36  Demosthenes  defended  Ktesiphon  (in  On  the  Crown)  by 
making  the  most  sustained  case  in  surviving  Greek  oratory  for  his  opponent  being 
motivated by envy.
37  He begins in the proem, by stating that Aeschines mostly told lies 
about him (18.9.4: καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατεψεύσατό  ου) and abusive slanders (18.10.1 2: 
λοιδορού ενος  βεβλασφή ηκεν  περὶ  ἐ οῦ);  he  says  that  Aeschines  has  bad  character 
(18.11.1 2: κακοήθης δ’ ὤν, Αἰσχίνη,),
38 that he spoke abusively (18.11.4: τὰς λοιδορίας 
τὰς παρὰ σοῦ τρέψεσθαι), and that he lied  and slandered (18.11. 6: κατεψεύδου καὶ 
διέβαλλες);  that  the  case  shows  the  spite,  insult,  abuse,  and  contumely  of  an  enemy 
(18.12.3 4: ἐχθροῦ  ὲν ἐπήρειαν ἔχει καὶ ὕβριν καὶ λοιδορίαν καὶ προπηλακισ όν); and 
that Aeschines is acting out of spite and malice (18.13.2 3: ἐν ἐπηρείας τάξει καὶ φθόνου 
τοῦτο ποιεῖν).  This list of motivations is notably similar, indeed almost identical, to those 
Aeschines attributes to Demosthenes in On the Embassy, and they are repeated throughout 
the  speech.
39    A  further  word group  that  recurs  frequently  is  baskanos  /  baskania  / 
baskainein, which refers to putting the evil eye on someone, and is related to envy (possibly 
here aroused by the nature of the prosecution: i.e. the voting of an honour).
40  We might 
                                                 
35 Carey (2000) 159. 
36 See Hansen (1974) on the graphê paranomôn, esp. 37 8, 54 7 relating to this case. 
37 E.M. Harris (1995) 147 argues, very plausibly, that Aeschines’ main motivation in bringing this case was 
revenge  –  this  would  be  an  indication  of  enmity  (Aristotle  would  see  it  as  an  indicator  of  orgê  –  see 
pp.172 3).  I agree with Cohen (1995) 77 81, who believes Demosthenes argues for both Aeschines’ enmity 
and his envy – though this conflicts with Cohen’s own views on their mutual exclusivity (see n.24 above). 
38 Usher (1993) 174 notes that he hammers home the emphasis on êthos with a succession of homophones 
(18.11.2: εὔηθες ᾠήθης). 
39 The λοιδορ root appears 15 times in the speech, the βλασφη  root appears eight times, ψευδ  or ψευσ 
roots 20 times, and accusations of diabolê nine times.  The ἐχθρ root occurs no fewer than 46 times (see n.37 
above).  Accusations of εpêreia (modern psychological research connects spite with envy) occur four times 
(18.12.3,  18.13.2,  18.138.4,  18.320.6);  and  explicit  accusations  of  phthonos  also  four  times  (18.13.3, 
18.121.5, 18.279.6, 18.303.2). 
40 See Walcot (1978) 75, Aquaro (2004) 15 8, Cairns (forthcoming) 9 on the relationship between baskania 
and envy; see Jahn (1855) on the Evil Eye more generally in Greek literature; also Dunbabin and Dickie Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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draw the inference that, while hostility is to be expected between major political rivals, 
phthonos (it can at least be claimed, however disingenuously) is not a natural result of 
political  rivalry  but  rather  the  mark  of  a  vicious  character  (kakoêtheia).  
Phenomenologically, we can infer that only the kakoêthês will feel phthonos, and seek to 
give  effect  to  it  by  abusing,  slandering,  lying,  and  otherwise  being  spiteful  about  his 
political rival – these phthonos action effects aiming to destroy the rival’s career. 
 
It is not just rivals, however, who might envy major political figures: they can also be 
envied by the dêmos.  However the case must be made very carefully: accusing someone of 
envy  directly  is  highly  antagonistic,  and  when  that  ‘someone’  is  the  dêmos,  politically 
potentially suicidal.  We have already seen one way for an orator to do this: assign envy to 
“us” as a group, and then say that “we” should not feel it (see p.57).  In his third Letter, 
Concerning  the  Sons  of  Lykourgos,
41  Demosthenes  negotiates  these  tricky  waters  in  an 
altogether more subtle way, building up very gradually towards an accusation.  He begins 
by stating that Lykourgos was prosecuted many times by those who envied him, yet the 
dêmos always acquitted him (Epist. 3.6.3 4: καὶ πολλῶν αἰτιῶν ἐπενεχθεισῶν ὑπὸ τῶν 
φθονούντων αὐτῷ οὐδε ίαν πώποθ’ ηὕρετ’ ἀληθῆ) – by implication, they did not as a 
rule share the accusers’ phthonos.  Moving from the general prosecution to the particular 
one in which the fine against Lykourgos was imposed, Demosthenes says that this came 
about due to gossip and envy (by persons unstated), and if the dêmos hesitate to overturn it, 
then they are in a state of confusion regarding what is democratic (Epist. 3.10.7 9: τί η α 
δ’ ὁρῶν ὀκνοῦντας ἀφεῖναι, ὃ λόγῳ καὶ φθόνῳ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἔχω τί καταγνῶ, εἰ  ὴ 
ὅλως πικρῶς καὶ ταραχωδῶς ἔχειν πρὸς τοὺς δη οτικοὺς ὡρ ήκατε).  He goes on to 
                                                                                                                                                     
(1983) on iconographic representations; see Foster (1972) on envy and the Evil Eye in other cultures.  These 
baska root  words  first  occur  in  surviving  literature  toward  the  end  of  the  fifth  century,  in  a  handful  of 
fragments of Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes.  Demosthenes has a particular fondness for this word, 
using it 17 times (by contrast, only 25 instances survive prior to Demosthenes), more than half of these 
occurring in this one speech (18.108.8, 18.119.6, 18.132.4, 18.139.7, 18.189.6, 18.242.2, 18.252.2, 18.307.5, 
18.317.7), and all others occurring in deliberative speeches, or forensic speeches with a political background 
(8.19.3, 8.22.2, 16.19.4, 19.24.7, 20.24.7, 21.209.9, 25.80.3, 25.83.4).  One wonders why this might be.  It is 
possible that, being (probably) the wealthiest of the logographers with surviving speeches delivered in propria 
persona, Demosthenes had need to be even more than usually alert to where his fellow citizens’ envious gaze 
might fall. 
41 Goldstein (1968) considers the authenticity of this letter; he notes arguments against its authenticity (4 5), 
but following a detailed study concludes that there should be “a strong presumption in favor of authenticity” 
(181).  The evidentiary value may not be diminished by a decision against authenticity, however, since it 
would still be informed by an understanding of the nature of the political process and the psychology of the 
participants. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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talk more generally of those whom envy keeps from their just rewards (Epist. 3.20.4 6: κἂν 
… ταῖς προσηκούσαις αὐτῶν τι αῖς ὁ φθόνος ἀντιστῇ), and says that the whole dêmos 
is blameworthy if envy is more influential among them than gratitude (Epist. 3.28.1 3: 
ὅλως δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν ὄνειδος ἁπάντων, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, … τὸν φθόνον δοκεῖν  εῖζον 
ἰσχύειν παρ’ ὑ ῖν ἢ τὰς τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν χάριτας).
42  We should note that he still avoids 
accusing  any  individual  of  envy.    Before  finally  reaching  his  direct  accusation, 
Demosthenes plays still further with the opposition of gratitude and envy: he says he feels 
goodwill and friendship (Epist. 3.37.1: ἐπ’ εὐνοίᾳ καὶ φιλίᾳ) towards the dêmos, and (he is 
now talking about his own exile, rather than Lykourgos’ children’s) he has hoped for their 
gratitude and magnanimity (Epist. 3.39.1 2: βουλο ένου δέ  ου ἐν  ὲν ὑ ετέρας χάριτος 
καὶ  εγαλοψυχίας) and goodwill (Epist. 3.40.6:  ετὰ  ὲν τῆς ὑ ετέρας εὐνοίας) in return 
– but, he goes on, they begrudge (phthonountes) him words and benevolence (Epist. 3.41.2 
3: ὑ εῖς … ῥη άτων  οι καὶ φιλανθρωπίας φθονοῦντες).  We can see how gradually he 
has built up to this moment, and how, even now, his accusation is phrased as tactfully as 
possible. 
 
5.3  Arousal of envy and indignation in the audience 
 
5.3.1  Aristotle’s to nemesan 
 
In considering the relationship between Greek envy and indignation, it is helpful once again 
to begin with Aristotle.  As we saw in ch.4.2, Aristotle posits in his Rhetoric an emotion 
which  he  calls  to  nemesan,  and  which  is  generally  (and  reasonably)  translated  as 
indignation.  To nemesan is felt at someone having some good fortune that they do not 
deserve,  whereas  phthonos  is  felt  at  good  fortune  whether  it  is  deserved  or  not 
(Rh. 2.9.1386b8 12, b16 20).  However it is not acquisition or possession of any good thing 
that arouses to nemesan (e.g. virtues of character such as justice or courage), but rather of 
undeserved  wealth,  power  and  other  such  things  that  worthy  people  should  get 
(Rh. 2.9.1387a8 13:  εἰ  γάρ  ἐστι  τὸ  νε εσᾶν  λυπεῖσθαι  ἐπὶ  τῷ  φαινο ένῳ  ἀναξίως 
εὐπραγεῖν, πρῶτον  ὲν δῆλον ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νε εσᾶν  οὐ γὰρ 
εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, ἢ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νε εσήσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς 
                                                 
42 See Fisher (2003) on these two opposite responses to a politician by the dêmos; also ch.5.3.2 below. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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ἐναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνά ει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις) – i.e. the 
same goods that arouse phthonos when deserved. 
 
Aristotle is out of step with contemporary usage, however.
43  First, the phrase to nemesan 
appears  nowhere  outside  Aristotle  (nemesis  is  the  usual  substantive,  though  the  verb 
nemesaô is seen, if not in articular infinitive form).  Second, while nemesis and its cognates 
occur 78 times in Archaic epic (68 times in Homer, 10 times in Hesiod) and 39 times in 
Aristotle, there are only 55 surviving occurrences (including fragmentary texts) in other 
authors in the entire Archaic  and Classical periods.
44  Classical occurrences sometimes 
relate to the cult goddess Nemesis or her festival,
45 and frequently to retribution from, or 
something being offensive to, the gods.
46  This narrowing of focus is striking.  Fewer than 
fifteen times is it used  in the Classical period to mean something close to “indignant” 
(active form) or “censurable” (passive form) in a way unrelated to gods, and it will be 
instructive  to  consider  what  arouses  it.
47    A  lover  behaving  in  an  unloving  way  is 
censurable  (Aesch.  fr.228c.3(Mette):  καὶ  κατηγοροῦσα  τοῦ  ἐρῶντος  ὡς  ἀνέραστα 
πολλὰ  καὶ  σκληρὰ  καὶ  νε εσητὰ  ποιοῦντος).    Philoktetes  should  not  be  blamed  for 
speaking intemperately when he is out of his mind with pain (Soph. Phil. 1193 5: οὔτοι 
νε εσητὸν ἀλύοντα χει ερίῳ λύπᾳ καὶ παρὰ νοῦν θροεῖν).  It is not disgraceful for a 
man brought up in freedom and leisure to balk at menial tasks (Pl. Tht. 175d8 e3: ὁ        ὲν τῷ 
ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθρα  ένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνε έσητον 
εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ εἶναι ὅταν εἰς δουλικὰ ἐ πέσῃ διακονή ατα).  Someone should 
not be censured for becoming a slave to his lover in a search for wisdom (Pl. Euthydem. 
282b.4 6: οὐδὲ νε εσητὸν ἕνεκα τούτου ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἐραστῇ καὶ παντὶ 
ἀνθρώπῳ,  ὁτιοῦν  ἐθέλοντα  ὑπηρετεῖν  τῶν καλῶν  ὑπηρετη άτων,  προθυ ού ενον 
                                                 
43 See Konstan (2003c) 76 7, whose analysis covers not dissimilar ground to my own in this paragraph, 
though with different emphasis. 
44 Nemesis cognates occur in various Lyric poets / sayings of the Seven Sages / Aesopica (12), Pindar (3), 
Aeschylus (3), Sophocles (6), Euripides (3), various other fifth century (5), Plato (12), the oratorical corpus 
(7), various other fourth century (4). 
45 Aesch. fr.244.6(Mette); Soph. El. 792; Pl. Leg. 717d3; Isoc. 10.59.7; Dem. 41.11.8; Men. Sententiae 520, 
fr.321.2(Kock). 
46 Aesch. Sept. 235; Soph. El. 1467, Phil. 518, 602, OC 1753; Eur. Ph. 182, Or. 1362, fr.1040.4(Nauck); 
Pl. Cra. 401a6, Symp. 195a6, Minos 319a3; Dem. 20.161.4; Plato Com. fr.173.14(Kock).  We might also 
include here the fragmentary titles of two comic plays: Kratinos fr.107/20.1(Kock); Men. fr.169.1(Austin).  
Aristotle only briefly mentions to nemesan’s association with the gods (Rh. 2.9.1386b15). 
47 I range outside oratory to include other Classical genres, as there are too few examples in oratory: of six 
instances, three relate to Nemesis or phthonos theôn (see n.45, n.46 above), and one (Lycurg. 1.107.36) is a 
quote from Tyrtaios so well outside the period. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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σοφὸν γενέσθαι).  It is not blameworthy when legislating to consider that a citizen might 
be  stubborn  (Pl.  Leg.  853c6 d2:  ἀλλ’  ἄνθρωποί  τε  καὶ  ἀνθρώπων  σπέρ ασιν 
νο οθετοῦ εν τὰ νῦν, ἀνε έσητον δὴ φοβεῖσθαι  ή τις ἐγγίγνηται τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ ῖν 
οἷον κερασβόλος).  [Old men] will be exceedingly indignant at those who commit hybris 
against  orphans  and  foundlings  (Pl.  Leg.  927c1 2:  νε εσῶσίν  τε   άλιστα  αὖ  τοῖς  εἰς 
ὀρφανὰ καὶ ἔρη α ὑβρίζουσιν).  A lie is offensive by its nature to both shame and justice 
(Pl.  Leg.  943e2 3:  ψεῦδος  δὲ  αἰδοῖ  καὶ  δίκῃ  νε εσητὸν  κατὰ  φύσιν).    It  is  not 
blameworthy for a buyer to act in his own interests before oaths have been exchanged and a 
contract exists (Aeschin. 3.66.1 3: Καὶ ταῦθ’ ὁ  ὲν ἐξωνού ενος οὐκ ἠδίκει, πρὸ γὰρ τῶν 
ὅρκων καὶ τῶν συνθηκῶν ἀνε έσητον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν τὰ συ φέροντα).  It is right 
to be indignant at what Phormio has done in putting someone forward as a witness who has 
a  shameless  way  of  life  and  is  ungrateful  (Dem.  45.71.1 3:  Ἄξιον  τοίνυν,  ὦ  ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Φορ ίωνι τῷ παρασχο ένῳ τουτονὶ νε εσῆσαι τοῖς πεπραγ ένοις, τὴν 
ἀναίδειαν τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τὴν ἀχαριστίαν ἰδόντας).
48 
 
It can quickly be seen that none  of these in  fact has  anything to do  with “undeserved 
wealth, power and other such things that worthy people should get” (pace Rh. 2.9.1387a8 
13 above).
49  In fact, the emotion that is aroused by such things in (non Aristotelian) Greek 
is phthonos.
50  The (probably contemporary)
51 pseudo Aristotelian Rhetoric to Alexander 
demonstrates this by saying that the orator can arouse phthonos against: a) those who can 
be shown to have had, be having, or be going to have undeserved good fortune; b) those 
who have never been, are not being, or will never be deprived of some good; or c) those 
who have never suffered, are not suffering, and will never suffer some misfortune (Rh. Al. 
34.1440a35 39:  φθόνον  δὲ  παρασκευάσο εν  συλλήβδην  πρὸς  τούτους,  οὓς 
ἀποφαίνο εν  ἀναξίως  εὖ  πεπραχότας  ἢ  πράττοντας  ἢ  πράξοντας,  ἢ  ἀγαθοῦ 
 ηδέποτε ἐστερη ένους ἢ < ὴ> στερο ένους ἢ  ὴ στερησο ένους, ἢ κακοῦ  ηδέποτε 
τετυχηκότας  ἢ   ὴ  τυγχάνοντας  ἢ   ὴ  τευξο ένους).    The  emotion  aroused  in  a)  is 
                                                 
48 Other examples occur at Pl. Leg. 684e4, 853c7/d1, 876c8/d1, Epin. 980a7. 
49  And  a  brief  survey  of  the  130 odd  instances  of  aganakteô  (another  word  frequently  translated  “I  am 
indignant”) in the oratorical corpus shows that that word likewise is not used for undeserved wealth, power 
and the like, but rather describes a similar emotion to orgê. 
50 See Fisher (2003) 199 202, Cairns (2003b) 246 8, Konstan (2003c) 79 82 on phthonos as an appropriate 
emotion. 
51 The Rh. Al. is dated by Chiron (2002) as written after 344/333 BCE (xl – from an event mentioned in the 
treatise), and probably in the second half of the fourth century (cvii).  This would make its composition 
contemporary with, or at most a few decades later than, Arist. Rh. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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indignation,  and  that  is  made  clear  by  the  reference  to  desert  (anaxiôs),  making  this 
emotion  identical  to  that  Aristotle  calls  to  nemesan;
52  the  emotions  in  b)  and  c)  are 
respectively  envy and Schadenfreude  (the  emotion Aristotle calls epikhairekakia).  The 
author  of  this  treatise  demonstrates  that  a  contemporary  Greek  could  include  all  three 
emotions in the one word phthonos, and (as importantly) recognise phthonos as occurring 
in these three distinct scenarios.  He goes on to say: 
διαβαλοῦ εν  δὲ  τοὺς  ἀντιδίκους  καὶ  φθονεῖσθαι  ποιήσο εν  ἐκ  τῶν 
ἐναντίων  τούτοις,  ἀποφαίνοντες  ὑπὸ  τούτων  ἢ  τῶν  τούτοις  φίλων 
τοὺς  ἀκούοντας  αὐτοὺς  ἢ  ὧν  κήδονται,  κακῶς  πεπονθότας  ἢ 
πάσχοντας ἢ πεισο ένους παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον. ἐκ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων 
καὶ  ῖσος καὶ ὀργὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἕξουσιν. ἂν δὲ  ὴ ταῦτα ἐνδέχηται, 
συνάξο εν,  ἐξ  ὧν  φθόνον  τοῖς  ἀκούουσι  κατὰ  τῶν  ἐναντίων 
ἐργασό εθα  τὸ γὰρ φθονεῖν πλησίον τοῦ  ισεῖν ἐστι. φθονήσονται δὲ 
συλλήβδην, ἐὰν ἀναξίως αὐτοὺς εὖ πράττοντας ἀποφαίνω εν καὶ πρὸς 
τοὺς  ἀκούοντας  ἀλλοτρίως  ἔχοντας,  διεξιόντες  ὡς  ἀγαθὰ  πολλὰ 
πεπόνθασιν  ἀδίκως  ἢ  πάσχουσιν  ἢ   έλλουσι  πείσεσθαι,  ἢ  ἀγαθοῦ 
οὐδέποτε  πρότερον  ἐστερήθησαν  ἢ  νῦν  οὐ  στερίσκονται  ἢ  οὐ 
στερήσονται, <ἢ> κακοῦ οὐδέποτε τετυχηκότες ἢ νῦν οὐ τυγχάνοντες 
ἢ οὐ       τευξό ενοι, ἐὰν  ὴ νῦν αὐτοὺς οἱ κριταὶ κολάσωσιν.   
Rh. Al. 36.1445a12 26 
 
And  we  shall  slander  and  create  phthonos  for  our  opponents  from  the 
opposite  methods  to  these,
53  by  showing  that  our  hearers  themselves  or 
those for whom they care have suffered, are suffering, or will suffer badly at 
their hands or at the hands of their friends, contrary to what is fitting.  For 
from such arguments they will be put in a state of hatred or anger at them.  
And if this proves impossible, we shall collect together all the arguments 
from which we can create phthonos for our opponents in the audience: for 
phthonos is very near to hatred.  And, in short, they will feel phthonos if we 
can  show  them  to  be  doing  well  undeservedly  and  that  they  are 
unfavourably disposed to the audience, going in detail through a) how many 
good things they have received, or are receiving, or are likely to receive 
unjustly, or b) that they have never before been deprived,  are not being 
deprived now, or will never be deprived of some good, or c) that they have 
never suffered, are not suffering now, or will never suffer some misfortune 
– unless the judges punish them now. 
 
The latter half of this passage repeats the one above; however some important points are 
added:  first,  that  an  orator  can  be  recommended  to  attempt  to  arouse  phthonos  in  his 
audience (even phthonos as envy); second, that phthonos is a useful adjunct to hatred and 
anger; and third, that the opponent should be portrayed as unfavourably disposed to the 
                                                 
52 Cairns (2003b) 247. 
53 Note again the connection of diabolê with phthonos – see n.32, n.39 above. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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audience.  However, it is not just this Greek rhetorician who saw phthonos as potentially 
morally responsive and useful to the orator in these ways, and this is evidenced by several 
passages in fourth century oratory.
54 
 
At pp.61 2  I showed that a number of instances of phthonos in Classical literature  are 
linked to (or even imply) resentment, censure or reproach.  In the next section I explore this 
aspect of phthonos in the oratorical corpus in greater depth.
55  Where necessary for clarity, I 
shall refer to this positive aspect of phthonos (i.e. moral censure) as indignation phthonos, 
and the negative aspect (envy, begrudging, possessive jealousy etc.) as envy phthonos.  It 
should constantly be borne in mind though that these are purely hypothetical constructs 
adopted  for  analytical  purposes  only:  for  the  Greeks,  there  was  only  phthonos  (as  in 
Rh. Al.).  There is always, therefore, some ambiguity inherent in the meaning of phthonos, 
i.e. whether it refers to the morally positive or negative type – though the sense would 
normally  have  been  abundantly  clear  to  the  Greeks  due  to  the  social  acceptability  or 
otherwise of what was described.
56 
 
5.3.2  Explicit suppression and arousal of audience phthonos 
 
Demosthenes provides excellent evidence, for both the undesirability of envy phthonos and 
the  appropriateness  of  indignation phthonos,  and  shows  how  the  former  should  be 
explicitly suppressed and the latter explicitly aroused in his audience.  I first look at explicit 
suppression of envy phthonos.  In 356, a certain Leptines had proposed a law to the effect 
that  the  small  number  of  wealthy  individuals  exempt  from  liturgies  for  past  services 
rendered to Athens (either by themselves or their ancestors) would no longer be exempt, 
and this law had been enacted.
57  Demosthenes’ speech Against Leptines was in support of 
                                                 
54 For instance, we shall see below Demosthenes explicitly calling for phthonos alongside hatred and anger in 
Against Meidias, and attempting to persuade the audience that his opponent is unfavourably disposed to all of 
them, not just to him personally (pp.114 17). 
55  Phthonos  theôn  bears  some  similarity  to  this  idea  of  phthonos  as  indignation  or  censure,  though  the 
relationship is slightly different – see ch.7. n.33. 
56 I.e. it would have been obvious to the Greeks when they were referring to phthonos as something socially 
divisive and destructive (e.g. in gnomic statements, or in accusations/ prohibitions/ denials), or when they 
were talking about  it as something censuring or corrective (i.e. in stating  that it  was  appropriate to feel 
phthonos).  As a parallel, consider our word “light”: we have no difficulty in correctly interpreting it as 
meaning not heavy or not dark, depending on context. 
57 See E.M. Harris (2008) 16 17. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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an attempt to repeal this law – an attempt that was probably successful.
58  Demosthenes 
says Leptines’ law is a disgrace to the city, unworthy either of their ancestors or of the 
audience  themselves,  as  it  makes  them  seem  envious,  untrustworthy  and  ungrateful 
(20.10.7 11: νῦν τοίνυν οὗτος ὁ νό ος ταύτην ἀντὶ καλῆς αἰσχρὰν τῇ πόλει περιάπτει, 
καὶ  οὔτε  τῶν  προγόνων  οὔθ’  ὑ ῶν  ἀξίαν.  τρία  γὰρ  τὰ   έγιστ’  ὀνείδη  κτᾶται, 
φθονεροὺς  ἀπίστους  ἀχαρίστους  εἶναι  δοκεῖν).    This  association  of  envy  with 
ingratitude, i.e. the binary opposition of envy and gratitude,
59 underpins the argument of the 
entire  speech.
60    Demosthenes  says  that  the  city  cares  more  about  honour  than  money 
(20.13.1 4: τὸ  ὲν τοίνυν τῆς πόλεως ἦθος, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπ’ ἄλλων πολλῶν 
καὶ ἐφ’ ὧν εἶπον ἴδοι τις ἂν τοιοῦτον, ἀψευδὲς καὶ χρηστόν, οὐ τὸ λυσιτελέστατον 
πρὸς  ἀργύριον  σκοποῦν,  ἀλλὰ  τί  καὶ  καλὸν  πρᾶξαι),  i.e.  it  is  grateful  rather  than 
envious as a rule; this law, though, is outside its character (20.13.6 7: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ νό ου 
σκοπῶν εὑρίσκω πολὺ       τούτου κεχωρισ ένον).  If someone has a lot of money but has 
not done wrong to the city, one should not envy (baskainein) him, he says; if he has a lot of 
money unlawfully, however, he may be punished by law (20.24.5 8: εἰ  ὲν γάρ τις ἔχει 
πολλὰ   ηδὲν  ὑ ᾶς  ἀδικῶν,  οὐχὶ  δεῖ  δήπου  τούτῳ  βασκαίνειν   εἰ  δ’  ὑφῃρη ένον 
φήσουσιν  ἤ  τιν’  ἄλλον  οὐχ  ὃν  προσήκει  τρόπον,  εἰσὶ  νό οι  καθ’  οὓς  προσήκει 
κολάζειν).  Demosthenes argues that an observer of the Athenian political scene might 
condemn the moral viciousness (kakia) of the authors of this law; when the city no longer 
needs someone who was previously a benefactor, “we” are so ungrateful (akharistoi) and 
base (kakoi) as to take away their rewards (2.55).  Taking away something that has been 
given is spiteful, and “you” must not appear to be in the grip of that emotion (20.56.5 7: τὸ 
δὲ τοὺς ἔχοντας ἀφαιρεῖσθαι φθονούντων, τοῦτο δ’ οὐ δεῖ δοκεῖν ὑ ᾶς πεπονθέναι).
61  
                                                 
58 Ibid. 20 1. 
59 Klein (1957/1975) argues, in a book length paper from the psychoanalytical perspective, for the binary 
opposition of envy and gratitude. 
60 See Fisher (2003) 193 200, Cairns (2003b) 246 7 and Hesk (2000) 40 50 on Demosthenes’ strategy.  The 
association of phthonos and ingratitude can be considered to go back (at least) to the poetry of Solon.  Solon 
fr.5 6, 34, 36 7(West) describes how he went out of his way to balance the claims of both the wealthy and the 
poor (although Solon does not use the word, the latter can be seen as phthonos, i.e. envy of the wealth of the 
rich  –  cf.  Arist.  Pol.  5.4.1304a36  on  phthonos  as  the  driving  force  of  the  dêmos  in  stasis);  the  dêmos, 
however, was furious with him for not distributing the wealth of the rich, rather than grateful for his relieving 
them from debt bondage and instituting the rule of law. 
61 Initially Demosthenes goes out of his way to say he knows nothing of Leptines’ character and has nothing 
bad to say about it (20.13; cf. 20.102); it is the city that the law attributes a bad character to, not its proposer.  
However when we read 20.55 6, we might take this with a large pinch of salt.  Hesk (2000) 43 4 says that 
Demosthenes draws a distinction between Leptines’ character and that of the city (i.e. that he is base while the 
city is honourable), though he later suggests that Demosthenes does not treat him harshly at all (50).  E.M. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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This law will introduce a base habit into the body politic (20.124.5 6: ὑπὲρ τοῦ πονηρὸν 
ἔθος τὸν νό ον εἰσάγειν).  If  you make this law operative,  you will seem begrudging 
(20.139.7 8: εἰ δὲ … τὸν νό ον ποιήσετε κύριον, δόξετε φθονήσαντες).  Phthonos is a 
sign  of  a  base  nature  (20.140.3:  ὅτι  παντάπασι  φύσεως  κακίας  ση εῖόν  ἐστιν  ὁ 
φθόνος).
62  There is no greater reproach than that our city should seem phthoneros, as it 
avoids all shameful conduct (20.140.5 7: εἶτα καὶ οὐδ’ ἔστιν ὄνειδος ὅτου πορρώτερόν 
ἐσθ’ ἡ ῶν ἡ πόλις ἢ τοῦ φθονερὰ δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἁπάντων ἀπέχουσα τῶν αἰσχρῶν).  
Better men seek honours for themselves, rather than try to take away other people’s through 
envy (20.151.6 8: πολὺ γὰρ βελτίονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἐφ’ οἷς αὐτὸς εὖ πεποίηκεν ἀξιοῦν 
τι ᾶσθαι ἢ ἐφ’ οἷς ἕτεροι ποιήσαντες ἐτι ήθησαν φθονεῖν).  The law is shameful and 
base,  and  can  be  likened  to  spite  and  contention  (20.157.1 2:  Αἰσχρός,  ὦ  ἄνδρες 
Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ κακῶς ἔχων ὁ νό ος, καὶ ὅ οιος φθόνῳ τινὶ καὶ φιλονικίᾳ).  Retaining the 
law will give the city the reputation of being untrustworthy, spiteful, and base (20.164.6 10: 
ἐὰν  δ’  ἀποψηφίσησθε,  …,  ἡ  δὲ  πόλις  τἀναντί’  ὧν  εἶπον  ἀρτίως,  δόξει  ἄπιστος, 
φθονερά, φαύλη παρὰ πᾶσιν εἶναι).  Demosthenes ends the speech by appealing to the 
better nature of the jurors: their generosity over their envy, their sense of justice over vice, 
and all worthy things over all very base ones (20.165.6 9: ἐν δὲ τῇ τῶν καθη ένων ὑ ῶν 
ἑνὸς  ἑκάστου  γνώ ῃ  φιλανθρωπία  πρὸς  φθόνον  καὶ  δικαιοσύνη  πρὸς  κακίαν  καὶ 
πάντα τὰ χρηστὰ πρὸς τὰ πονηρότατ’ ἀντιτάττεται).
63  In a sustained way, spanning 
the entire speech, Demosthenes argues that Leptines’ law makes Athens seem as if it is 
responding to its benefactors with phthonos, when it should be responding with kharis.  
Since, from an objective point of view (and Demosthenes frequently asks what a named 
outsider  or  group  will  think),  these  individuals  really  do  deserve  their  exemptions, 
indignation phthonos is not a possibility; the only phthonos that might be felt, then, is envy.  
                                                                                                                                                     
Harris (2008) 18, 26 n.36 notes that Demosthenes prefers to avoid personal attacks on Leptines as it is a 
public rather than private suit; however this does not prevent personal attack in other public cases.  By the 
time  of  the  trial  Leptines’  personal  liability  for  the  law  had  lapsed,  and  it  is  this  that  may  explain 
Demosthenes’ reluctance to make too sustained and explicit a use of personal attack; however, the audience is 
left in no doubt that phthonos is associated with Leptines, as distinct from the city as a whole. 
62 Compare Aeschin. 2.22.10 (kakoêtheia; p.104), Dem. 18.11.1 (kakoêthês; p.105), Arist. Rh. 2.11.1388a36 
(phaulon … phaulôn; pp.75 6). 
63 In total χαρι  words appears 20 times in the speech, and φθον  words 13 times (only Isoc. 15, with 15 
instances, has more in the entire oratorical corpus); we can also note that αἰσχρ  words appears 14 times in 
the speech, πονηρ  words 13 times, κακ  words (excepting kakourgos) 11 times, φαυλ  words nine times, and 
ὀνειδ  words three times. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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Leptines’ law makes the city appear begrudging (phthoneros) and ungrateful (akharistos), 
and this will put off future potential benefactors.  It must therefore be overturned. 
 
A different, and much more personally abusive,
64 approach is taken in the speech Against 
Meidias, in which Demosthenes prosecutes Meidias for a punch the latter threw at him 
while he (Demosthenes) was acting as khorêgos at a civic festival, and for which he had 
already received a vote against Meidias in a probolê trial.
65  Demosthenes’ aim in this 
speech  is  to  arouse  the  audience’s  orgê,  misos,  and  indignation phthonos  against  his 
opponent, and he finally calls for these explicitly in 21.196 (see below).  Rubinstein has 
shown  that  appeals  to  orgê  and  misos  were  generally  unacceptable  in  private  disputes, 
unless the opponent had exhibited behaviour that was particularly antisocial, e.g. hybris.
66  
Demosthenes chose to bring the case as a graphê hybreôs, a public case, rather than e.g. as 
a  private  dikê  for  battery,
67  possibly  in  order  to  make  these  very  appeals.    Athenians 
believed there was a corrupting risk inherent in wealth that might cause the wealthy person 
to behave in certain ways that were unacceptable in a democracy: an ostentatious lifestyle 
(big house, expensive clothes), arrogance, frequent loud boasting, scorn for the democracy, 
and most of all a propensity to (often drunken) violence (hybris) towards those less wealthy 
than themselves.
68  Demosthenes takes this line, arguing that Meidias’ one punch at him 
was symptomatic of the man’s much wider hybris towards all Athenians, evidenced by his 
lifestyle and habits.
69  Demosthenes begins his case by stating that Meidias treats everyone 
with  aselgeia  –  the  word  normally  means  licentiousness,  but  MacDowell  argues  for  a 
translation of ‘aggressiveness’ and ‘bullying’ here, and notes that the word is often linked 
with hybris in Greek.
70  In the earlier probolê the Assembly was enraged (21.2.2: ὠργίσθη; 
21.6.3: ἀγανακτήσας καὶ συνοργισθείς) at Meidias’ blow against Demosthenes, thinking 
                                                 
64 In Against Meidias, Demosthenes is attacking a man, not a law, and so it is much easier to personalise this 
case than Against Leptines – see n.61 above. 
65 See MacDowell (1978) 195 7 on the probolê procedure; see E.M. Harris (2008) 75 81 on the earlier history 
of this case. 
66 Rubinstein (2004) 194; see also Kurihara (2003) 476.  This is reflected in the fact that the procedure for 
hybris  was  a  graphê  (a  public  indictment)  rather  than  merely  a  dikê  idia  (a  private  indictment)  –  see 
MacDowell (1978) 57 9 on the difference between graphai and dikai. 
67 See MacDowell (1978) 57 9 on the types of cases available, and 129 31 on the choice in this case.  I follow 
E.M. Harris (2008) 79, who believes it was probably a graphê hybreôs; he disagrees (80 1 n. 20) with Rowe’s 
(1994) suggestion that it might be a graphê for asebeia rather than hybris.  MacDowell (1978) 131 also 
appears to believe this is a graphê hybreôs. 
68 Ober (1989) 206 11; Dover (1974) 110 11. 
69 See Ober (1996), P. Wilson (1991), Fisher (2003) 201 2 for Demosthenes’ strategy. 
70 MacDowell (1990) 220. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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he was over bold, brutal and unrestrainable (21.2.13: θρασὺν … καὶ βδελυρὸν καὶ οὐδὲ 
καθεκτόν).  Demosthenes has received blows and wanton violence (21.6.1: αὐτὸς πληγὰς 
εἰληφὼς καὶ ὑβρισ ένος).  Meidias has committed violence against “me”, “you”, the laws, 
and everyone else (21.7.3 5: Μειδίαν τουτονὶ  ὴ  όνον εἰς ἐ ὲ ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς ὑ ᾶς καὶ εἰς 
τοὺς νό ους καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας ὑβρικότα).    The  speech  continues  in  this 
vein.
71  Demosthenes begins his call for an emotional response by saying he will not tell 
them about the various instances of epêreasmos and hybris he has suffered and which have 
angered him when he does not think the jurors would be similarly enraged, but only those 
where  they  should  be  equally  angry  (21.15.4 9:  οὐ  γὰρ  ἀγνοῶ  τοῦθ’  ὅτι  τῷ   ὲν 
ἐπηρεαζο ένῳ τότ’ ἐ οὶ καὶ ὑβριζο ένῳ τὴν αὐτὴν ὀργὴν ἕκαστον τούτων ἥνπερ 
ἄλλ’  ὁτιοῦν  τῶν  δεινοτάτων  παρίστη,  ὑ ῖν  δὲ  τοῖς  ἄλλοις,  ἔξω  τοῦ  πράγ ατος 
οὖσιν,  οὐκ  ἂν  ἴσως  ἄξια  ταῦτα  καθ’  αὕτ’  ἀγῶνος  φανείη   ἀλλ’  ἃ  πάντες  ὁ οίως 
ἀγανακτήσετε, ταῦτ’       ἐρῶ).
72  He continues his calls for orgê.  If Meidias has committed 
hybris against a khorêgos undertaking his public duties, then he deserves the people’s anger 
and punishment (21.34.1 4: εἰ δὲ χορηγὸν ὄνθ’ ὑ έτερον ἱερο ηνίας οὔσης πάνθ’ ὅσ’ 
ἠδίκηκεν  ὑβρίσας  φαίνεται,  δη οσίας  ὀργῆς  καὶ  τι ωρίας  δίκαιός  ἐστι  τυγχάνειν).  
Meidias thinks that if he can show that lots of people have suffered a similar blow but not 
prosecuted, the jurors will feel less orgê (21.36.8 9: ἧττον ὑ ᾶς ἐφ’ οἷς ἐγὼ πέπονθ’ 
ὀργιου ένους), and by implication they should not.  The laws require a greater amount of 
anger and punishment for those committing acts willingly and with hybris (21.42.4 5: καὶ 
θεωρεῖθ’  ὅσῳ   είζονος  ὀργῆς  καὶ  ζη ίας  ἀξιοῦσι  τοὺς  ἑκουσίως  καὶ  δι’  ὕβριν 
πλη  ελοῦντας).  Any Athenian who does not feel orgê at Meidias is wrong (21.70.1 3: 
Εἰ τοίνυν τις ὑ ῶν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλως πως ἔχει τὴν ὀργὴν ἐπὶ Μειδίαν ἢ ὡς 
δέον αὐτὸν τεθνάναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει).  [All the various things Meidias has done] are not 
things that Demosthenes should be angry at and take hard but the dêmos can look aside 
from, but far from this they should all feel just as angry (21.123.3 5: οὐκ ἐ οὶ  ὲν ἄξιόν 
ἐστ’ ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ βαρέως φέρειν, ὑ ῖν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις παριδεῖν, πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεῖ, 
ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ὁ οίως ὀργιστέον).  Aristotle notes that orgê is produced by offences against 
oneself, while hatred does not require this: one can hate a class of people (Rh. 2.4.1382a3 
                                                 
71 In all, ἀσελγ  words occur 18 times, ὑπερηφανία (disdain, contempt) five times, θρασ  words nine times, 
accusations of atimia 18 times, and ὕβρ  words a staggering 131 times, almost once per section. 
72  We  can  note  that  epêreasmos  and  hybris  are  two  of  the  three  types  of  belittling  (the  other  being 
kataphronêsis) that Aristotle says arouse orgê (Rh. 2.2.1378b14 15) – see pp.172 3. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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7: ὀργὴ  ὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς αὑτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ πρὸς αὑτόν  ἂν γὰρ 
ὑπολα βάνω εν εἶναι τοιόνδε,  ισοῦ εν. καὶ ἡ  ὲν ὀργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον 
Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ  ῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη); Rubinstein makes the same point, 
and agrees this is common in the oratorical corpus.
73  Up to this point, Demosthenes has 
only talked in detail about Meidias’ actions and particularly his hybris, not just against 
Demosthenes  himself  but  against  other  members  of  the  dêmos,  and  so  far  he  has  only 
therefore been able to call for the jurors’ orgê.  However, markers of his future intentions 
have been laid down.  He has said that, since Meidias is bullying and disgusting, he should 
be hated (21.98.3 5: ὅτι νὴ  ί’ ἀσελγής ἐστι καὶ βδελυρός  ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι τἀληθῆ  
ἀλλὰ  ισεῖν ὀφείλετ’, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δήπου τοὺς τοιούτους  ᾶλλον ἢ σῴζειν).  He 
has also mentioned Meidias’ (and his friends’)  wealth and linked it with his arrogance 
(thrasos, hyperêphania, hybris)  and other inappropriate behaviour at a number of places,
74 
and several times he has made general comments to the effect that bad behaviour resulting 
from wealth deserves punishment.
75  After putting down all these markers, he next brings 
Meidias’ inappropriate use of his wealth centre stage in a long section (§§151 74), deriding 
                                                 
73 Rubinstein (2004) 192 3: “The judges are told to display that sentiment [misos] towards an undesirable type 
of person of which the speaker’s opponent is but one example.” (193). 
74 “[They] were afraid of him, his reckless behavior, his cronies, their wealth, and all the other advantages this 
man possesses” (21.20.2 4: καταδείσαντες τοῦτον καὶ τὸ τούτου θράσος καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἑταίρους 
καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τἄλλ’ ὅσα δὴ πρόσεστι τούτῳ).  “If I have so and so as an enemy, whether Meidias or 
some other man equally arrogant and wealthy” (21.66.7 8: ὅτι ἂν ὁ δεῖν’ ἐχθρὸς ᾖ  οι, Μειδίας ἤ τις ἄλλος 
θρασὺς οὕτω καὶ πλούσιος).  “This is what he suffered at the hands of Meidias and Meidias’ wealth and 
arrogance because of his poverty and isolation, one man in a crowd” (21.96.1 2: καὶ ταῦτα πέπονθ’ ὑπὸ 
Μειδίου  καὶ  τοῦ  Μειδίου  πλούτου  καὶ  τῆς  ὑπερηφανίας  παρὰ  τὴν  πενίαν  καὶ  ἐρη ίαν  καὶ  τὸ  τῶν 
πολλῶν εἷς εἶναι).  “Or because he is wealthy?  But I dare say you will find that this is the very reason for his 
insolence”  (21.98.5 6:  ἀλλ’  ὅτι  πλούσιός  ἐστιν   ἀλλὰ  τοῦτό  γε  τῆς  ὕβρεως  αὐτοῦ  σχεδὸν  αἴτιον 
εὑρήσετ’ ὄν).  “[A]nd to use his wealth … in ways that make him congratulate himself for his superiority in 
driving someone unjustly into exile and vilifying him?” (21.109.5 9: καὶ χρῷτο τῷ πλουτεῖν … ἐν οἷς 
ἀδίκως ἐκβάλλων τινὰ καὶ προπηλακίσας αὑτὸν εὐδαι ονιεῖ       τῆς περιουσίας;).  “When a man’s evil and 
abusive nature is supported by power and wealth, this acts as a bulwark protecting against sudden attack” 
(21.138.1 2: τὸ γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐξουσίας καὶ πλούτου πονηρὸν εἶναι καὶ ὑβριστὴν τεῖχός ἐστι).  Translations 
from E.M. Harris (2008). 
75 “[I]t is more appropriate therefore for you to take away the assets that make him abusive rather than to save 
him because of them.  If you allow this sort of bold and disgusting person to retain control of such a large sum 
of money, you are giving him assets to be used against you” (21.98.6 10: ὥστ’ ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀφορ ήν, δι’ ἣν 
ὑβρίζει, προσήκει  ᾶλλον ἢ σῶσαι διὰ ταύτην  τὸ γὰρ χρη άτων πολλῶν θρασὺν καὶ βδελυρὸν καὶ 
τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον ἐᾶν εἶναι κύριον, ἀφορ ήν ἐστιν ἐφ’ ὑ ᾶς αὐτοὺς δεδωκέναι).  “But what will the 
majority of you do if you do not publicly deter everyone from misusing his wealth for these purposes?” 
(21.124.7 8:  οἱ  δὲ  πολλοὶ  τί  ποιήσετε,  ἂν   ὴ  δη οσίᾳ  πᾶσιν  φοβερὸν  καταστήσητε  τὸ  εἰς  ταῦτ’ 
ἀποχρῆσθαι τῷ       πλουτεῖν;).  “but so that you know, men of Athens, and understand that there is not, nor 
will there be anything, not family, not wealth, not power, that you, the majority, ought to tolerate if insolence 
is added to it” (21.143.7 10: ἀλλ’ ἵν’ εἰδῆθ’ ὑ εῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ γνῶθ’ ὅτι οὐδὲν οὔτ’ ἔστιν οὔτ’ 
ἔσται, οὐ γένος, οὐ πλοῦτος, οὐ δύνα ις, ὅ τι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑ ῖν, ἂν ὕβρις       προσῇ, προσήκει φέρειν).  
Translations from E.M. Harris (2008). Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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the small number of liturgies he has performed, and explaining why such liturgies as he has 
done should not be taken into account.  Only after this long build up does Demosthenes 
finally draw on his earlier allusions to the appropriate response, and call for the audience’s 
phthonos (resentment, at Meidias’ lifestyle and conduct) and misos, without any trace of 
pity, to accompany their orgê (21.196.4 6: φθόνον ἐξ ὧν ζῇς, καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐξαπατᾷς ἔλεον. 
οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδα όθεν σοι προσήκων ἔλεος οὐδὲ καθ’ ἕν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον  ῖσος καὶ 
φθόνος καὶ ὀργή).
76 
 
Against  Meidias  is  by  far  and  away  the  most  sustained  oratorical  case  for  the 
appropriateness of juror phthonos against the opponent, but not the only one.  In former 
times  the  Athenians  resented  those  misusing  their  patrimonies  (Lys.  27.11.1 2:  καίτοι 
ἑτέροις  ὑ εῖς  ἔστιν  ὅτε  τὰ  πατρῷα  κεκτη ένοις  ταῦτα  ποιοῦσιν  ἐφθονεῖτε).    It  is 
reasonable for those who behave moderately to resent worthless people who have aimed at 
more power than is proper for mortals (Isoc. 4.184.1 6: τίσιν δὲ φθονεῖν εἰκός ἐστιν τοὺς 
…  ετρίως τούτῳ τῷ πράγ ατι χρω ένους; οὐ τοῖς  είζους  ὲν τὰς δυναστείας ἢ 
κατ’  ἀνθρώπους  περιβεβλη ένοις,  ἐλάττονος  δ’  ἀξίοις  τῶν  παρ’  ἡ ῖν 
δυστυχούντων;).  If jurors knew the speaker’s opponent as well as he, they would not feel 
grief at his loss, but resentment at what he has left (Isoc. 18.51.1 3: ἠβουλό ην δ’ ἂν ὑ ᾶς 
ὁ οίως ἐ οὶ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν, ἵν’ αὐτῷ  ὴ τῶν ἀπολωλότων συνήχθεσθε ἀλλὰ τῶν 
ὑπολοίπων ἐφθονεῖτε).  Jurors should not feel resentment for the true heirs to an estate, 
but rather for those contesting the will if they get what they do not deserve (Isae. 6.61.1 3: 
ὥστ’ οὐ φθονεῖσθαί εἰσιν ἄξιοι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ  ᾶλλον, νὴ τὸν  ία καὶ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, 
οὗτοι, εἰ λήψονται ἃ  ὴ προσήκει αὐτοῖς).  Proxenoi deserve phthonos if they announce 
in the theatre that they were awarded crowns by other poleis (Aeschin. 3.42.1 6: ὃ δ’ ἦν 
ἐπιφθονώτατον,  προξενίας  εὑρη ένοι  τινὲς  ἐν  ταῖς  ἔξω  πόλεσι,  διεπράττοντο 
ἀναγορεύεσθαι ὅτι στεφανοῖ αὐτοὺς ὁ δῆ ος, εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, ὁ τῶν Ῥοδίων ἢ Χίων ἢ 
καὶ ἄλλης τινὸς πόλεως ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀνδραγαθίας).  Demosthenes’ guardian, in 
squandering  his  inheritance,  should  be  resented,  while  Demosthenes  himself  should  be 
                                                 
76 Demosthenes further links Meidias’ wealth with his conduct after this solitary overt call for phthonos.  
“This man is unbearable; he alone is rich; he alone is eloquent; in his eyes all people are scum, or beggars, 
and not even human beings” (21.198.5 8: οὐ γάρ ἐστι φορητὸς ἅνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλουτεῖ  όνος καὶ 
λέγειν δύναται  όνος, καὶ πάντες εἰσὶ τούτῳ καθάρ ατα       καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ οὐδ’ ἄνθρωποι).  “[He is r]ich, 
arrogant,  full  of  himself,  boisterous,  violent,  shameless”  (21.201.4 5:  πλούσιος, θρασύς,  έγα φρονῶν, 
 έγα φθεγγό ενος, βίαιος, ἀναιδής).  Translations from E.M. Harris (2008). Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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pitied  (Dem.  28.18.2 3:  τίς  δ’  οὐκ  ἂν  ὑ ῶν  τούτῳ   ὲν  φθονήσειε  δικαίως,  ἡ ᾶς  δ’ 
ἐλεήσειεν).    Nikoboulos’  opponent  says  he  should  be  hated  as  a  money lender,  and 
deserves phthonos because he walks quickly, speaks loudly, and carries a stick (suggesting 
he is getting too big for his boots; Dem. 37.52.1 3: Ἐπειδὰν τοίνυν τις αὐτὸν ἔρηται ‘καὶ 
τί δίκαιον ἕξεις λέγειν πρὸς Νικόβουλον;’  ισοῦσι, φησίν, Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς δανείζοντας  
Νικόβουλος δ’ ἐπίφθονός ἐστι, καὶ ταχέως βαδίζει, καὶ  έγα φθέγγεται, καὶ βακτηρίαν 
φορεῖ).  And Demosthenes says Meidias himself might try to arouse resentment in the 
audience, on the pretext that Demosthenes should not be prosecuting him for a private 
quarrel (Dem. 21.29.3 5: ‘ὅτι τούτῳ πολε ῶ, διὰ τοῦτό  ’ ἀναιρήσετε;’ τὰ τοιαῦτα 
πολλάκις οἶδ’ ὅτι φθέγξεται, βουλό ενος φθόνον τιν’ ἐ οὶ       διὰ τούτων τῶν λόγων 
συνάγειν).
77 
 
We can see that the majority of these instances have something to do with money, and 
particularly  the  misuse  of  it:  not  performing  liturgies;  squandering  patrimonies;  a 
democratically imposed fine not being large enough; money lending.  The other instances 
involve  the  abuse  of  democratically  voted  honours,  undemocratic  behaviour,  or 
undemocratic levels of political power.  Money, honours, power – exactly the issues that 
Aristotle said aroused to nemesan (see pp.107 8), and also the issues that we have seen 
arouse envy phthonos.  Despite these examples, though, it is striking that the attested cases 
of phthonos as (morally acceptable) resentment are so few in number, while those that 
imply  (morally  unacceptable)  envy  are  so  numerous.    It  may  be  that  the  social 
unacceptability of phthonos (as envy) is so strong, that orators feel uncomfortable using the 
word even to mean (morally acceptable) resentment.  This leaves a terminological lacuna 
regarding indignation/resentment of abuse of money and political power, which the word 
phthonos only goes part of the way to fill.
78  It may be that aganaktein serves in part to fill 
the need for an indignation verb; but the fact that Aristotle has to resort to to nemesan 
                                                 
77 We can probably add Lys. 18.16.1 to this list: that one should be indignant that those who manage the city’s 
affairs behave in such a way that orators do not propose what is best for the city, but what is most likely to 
profit them (Lys. 18.16.1 4: ἄξιον δὲ  άλιστ’ φθονῆσαι ὅτι οὕτως ἤδη οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττοντες 
διάκεινται, ὥστ’ οὐχ ὅ τι ἂν τῇ πόλει βέλτιστον ᾖ, τοῦτο οἱ ῥήτορες λέγουσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀφ’ ὧν ἂν αὐτοὶ 
κερδαίνειν   έλλωσι).    Carey  (2007)  180  tentatively  argues  for  φθονῆσαι  as  per  the  manuscript,  over 
ἀγανακτῆσαι (per the previous edition of OCT, ed. Hude), θαυ άσαι, ὀργισθῆναι, or φροντίσαι chosen by 
previous commentators.  My analysis of indignation phthonos suggests Carey is right to do so. 
78 I suggest at n.81 below one way in which this terminological lacuna might be filled. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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indicates that it is either too self regarding, or lacks an unambiguous implication of lack of 
desert. 
 
5.3.3  Covert arousal of audience envy 
 
We have seen how a speaker can make use of the distinction between indignation phthonos 
(i.e.  phthonos  when  it  is  appropriate)  and  envy phthonos  (i.e.  phthonos  when  it  is 
inappropriate),  in  order  to  call  for  the  former  or  paint  his  opponent  with  the  latter.  
However, sometimes the speaker will actually want to make use of the ambiguity inherent 
in phthonos (i.e. between indignation phthonos and envy phthonos) to arouse envy in his 
audience, and before leaving oratory I want to take a tentative look at how this might be 
done.    While  a  speaker  cannot  explicitly  call  for  envy phthonos  (pace  Aristotle,  and 
confirmed by surviving oratory), a clever logographer would know that by pulling on the 
right ideological strings with sufficient subtlety, he might be able to awaken feelings of 
envy in his audience – i.e. he could create an envy scenario. 
 
I shall briefly explore two speeches which play with democratic ideology in just this way.  
Lysias’ Against Ergokles is the peroration of a speech for the prosecution in a case of 
embezzlement and bribe taking.
79  The speaker begins by saying that Ergokles has become 
wealthy from poverty at “your” expense (Lys. 28.1.6 7: καὶ ἐκ πένητος ἐκ τῶν ὑ ετέρων 
πλούσιος γεγενη ένος).  The phrase plousios ek penêtôn (or similar) appears a number of 
times in the oratorical corpus,
80 and, as Aristotle notes in his description of to nemesan, 
while  those  who  have  been  wealthy  for  a  long  time  seem  to  be  so  justly,  those  lately 
wealthy do not (Arist. Rh. 2.9.1387a24 26: αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι οἱ  ὲν [ἀρχαιόπλουτοι] δοκοῦσι 
τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν οἱ δ’ [νεόπλουτοι] οὔ  τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινό ενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, 
ὥστε οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὑτῶν  ἔχειν).   ‘Correcting’ Aristotle in  accordance with actual 
usage,  we  might  always  expect  the  phrase  plousios  ek  penêtôn  to  (aim  to)  inspire 
indignation phthonos.
81  However, by stating that Ergokles’ becoming rich was “at your 
expense”, the speaker seems to be trying to turn this from general social disapprobation of 
                                                 
79 Todd (2000) 286 7. 
80 Isoc. 5.89.7, 8.124.7; Lys. 1.4.6, 25.27.1, 25.30.4, 27.9.6, 28.1.6; Dem. 24.124.7, 57.45.10; see also n.85 
below. 
81 One way in which the terminological lacuna noted at the end of the previous section could be filled, without 
explicitly using the word phthonos. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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the nouveau riche to a more personalised emotion.  Whether in English we would say it 
was envy or possessive jealousy he was trying to awaken (clearly “this used to be yours” 
aims  at  more  than  mere  greed),  in  Greek  it  seems  clear  that  it  is  what  I  have  for 
convenience  termed  envy phthonos.    By  avoiding  the  exhortation  “you  should  feel 
phthonos”  –  explicitly  stating  the  word  itself  would  mean  indignation phthonos  –  the 
speaker is able covertly to awaken feelings of phthonos proper, in all its ambiguity.  Having 
put down this marker at the start of the speech, he continues to play on the opposition 
between the impoverished jurors and his enriched opponent.  The jurors are weighed down 
by the war tax (eisphora), so should not forgive embezzlers and bribe takers (28.3.1 3: καὶ 
γὰρ δὴ δεινὸν ἂν εἴη, εἰ νῦν  ὲν οὕτως αὐτοὶ πιεζό ενοι ταῖς εἰσφοραῖς συγγνώ ην 
τοῖς κλέπτουσι καὶ τοῖς δωροδοκοῦσιν ἔχοιτε).  “You” would be rendered poor because 
of the eisphora, while Ergokles and Thrasyboulos’ other flatterers became the most wealthy 
citizens (28.4.5 7: καὶ ὑ ᾶς  ὲν διὰ τὰς εἰσφορὰς πενεστέρους ἀποδείξειν, Ἐργοκλέα δὲ 
καὶ τοὺς κόλακας τοὺς αὑτοῦ πλουσιωτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν ποιήσειν).
82  As soon as 
they had filled themselves up and enjoyed your possessions, they thought themselves apart 
from  the  city  (28.6.4 6:  ἐπειδὴ  τάχιστα  ἐνέπληντο  καὶ  τῶν  ὑ ετέρων  ἀπέλαυσαν, 
ἀλλοτρίους  τῆς  πόλεως       αὑτοὺς  ἡγήσαντο).    Now  the  speaker  changes  tack:  having 
already called for orgê (28.2.5 6: ὑ έτερον τοίνυν ἔργον ἐστίν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ 
τοῖς       τοιούτοις ὀργίζεσθαι), he now says that  these newly rich people will hate “you” 
(28.7.1 2: ἅ α γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ὑ ᾶς  ισοῦσι) – and enmity being reciprocal thereby 
encourages reciprocated hatred as well.  Finally he plays on the dêmos’ fear of oligarchic 
revolution, saying that now Ergokles and his friends are rich and hate (misousi) the dêmos, 
they want to rule over it; fearing to lose what they have embezzled, they need to turn 
Athens into an oligarchy (28.7.2 5: ἅ α γὰρ πλουτοῦσι καὶ ὑ ᾶς  ισοῦσι, καὶ οὐκέτι ὡς 
ἀρξό ενοι παρασκευάζονται ἀλλ’ ὡς ὑ ῶν ἄρξοντες, καὶ δεδιότες ὑπὲρ ὧν ὑφῄρηνται 
ἕτοι οί εἰσι καὶ χωρία καταλα βάνειν καὶ ὀλιγαρχίαν καθιστάναι).
83  Phthonos, orgê, 
and misos – the same three emotions called for at Dem. 21.196.6; only here, the lack of 
explicit mention of phthonos ensures it will also be (transmuted) envy, not just indignation, 
that is aroused. 
                                                 
82 Thrasyboulos was an Athenian general who had incurred huge military losses; Ergokles was one of his 
subordinate generals – Todd (2000) 286 7. 
83  Usher  (1999)  99.    Konstan  (2003c)  82  argues  that  phthonos  is  “an  emotional  response  based  on  the 
judgment that … an equal … is getting above himself” – and members of the dêmos conspiring to form an 
oligarchy would certainly fall into that category (though more than phthonos is at work here). Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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Similar themes can be found in the follow up prosecution of Philokrates, one of Ergokles’ 
friends (Lys. 29.3).  Ergokles was convicted and executed (29.2), but since no money had 
been found, the prosecutor alleges that he must have deposited it with the man he was most 
close to, Philokrates; Philokrates must now be convicted similarly for the money to be 
recouped.    The  speaker  calls  Philokrates  one  of  those  who  possess  the  city’s  property 
(29.8.3: τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως ἔχοντας), and says that on conviction he would not be losing 
any of his own property, but would be giving “yours” back to “you” (29.8.4 5: οὐδὲν γὰρ 
τῶν αὑτοῦ καταθήσει, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὑ έτερα αὐτῶν ὑ ῖν ἀποδώσει).  He refers a couple 
more times to “your” property (29.9.3 4: τοὺς δὲ τὰ ὑ έτερα αὐτῶν ἔχοντας; 29.10.1: τὰ 
ὑ έτερα ἔχοντες), before saying that Philokrates was an accomplice of Ergokles in stealing 
“your” property (29.11.5 6: οὗτος δὲ τὰ τῆς πόλεως Ἐργοκλεῖ συνειδὼς κλέπτοντι), 
and that they should grant no amnesty to those who steal “your” property (29.13.5 6: καὶ 
 ηδε ίαν  αὐτοῖς  ἄδειαν  δώσετε  τὰ  ὑ έτερα  αὐτῶν  διαρπάζουσι καὶ  κλέπτουσιν).  
Finally, he concludes that if the dêmos is wise, they will take back their property (29.14.3 
4: ἐὰν οὖν σωφρονῆτε, τὰ ὑ έτερ’ αὐτῶν κο ιεῖσθε).  While, like in Lys. 28, there is an 
explicit call for orgê (29.11.8 9: ἄξιοι δ’ ὑ ῖν εἰσιν ὀργῆς), and mention is made of the 
defendant’s enmity towards the city (29.9.5 6: τούτους χαλεπωτέρους ἐχθροὺς ἔχοιτε; 
29.10.2:  οὐδέποτε  ὑ ῖν  παύσονται  κακονοοῦντες),  it  is  the  constant  focus  on  “your 
property” that is striking.  Although the phrase plousios ek penêtôn does not appear, the 
much repeated reminder that the defendant is wrongfully in possession of  “your property” 
seems calculated to awaken the jurors’ phthonos (transmuted envy as well as indignation).
84 
 
Finally, and as a lead in to the next chapter, I want to look at one more speech, at a passage 
dealing  with  demagogues  in  Demosthenes’  Third  Olynthiac.    After  extolling  Athens’ 
political leaders of previous generations (such as Aristides and Miltiades), Demosthenes 
castigates the current crop of politicians (3.29.7: πολιτευο ένους), whose policies have led 
to Athens’ impotence in the face of Philip’s attack on Olynthos.  He begins by saying that 
some of these politicians have gone from being beggars to being wealthy (3.29.7 8: ὧν οἱ 
                                                 
84  Many  of  the  same  themes  that  appear  in  Lys.  28  and  29,  appear  also  in  Lys.  27,  Against  Epikrates, 
including the phrases “they are stealing your property” (27.6.1 2: νῦν δ’ ἀσφαλῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχει τὰ ὑ έτερα 
κλέπτειν.) and “they have become wealthy from poverty out of your property” (27.95 7: οὗτοι  ὲν γὰρ ἐν 
τῷ πολέ ῳ ἐκ πενήτων πλούσιοι γεγόνασιν ἐκ τῶν ὑ ετέρων, ὑ εῖς δὲ διὰ τούτους πένητες.).  See 
Usher (1999) 98 9, Todd (2000) 282. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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 ὲν  ἐκ  πτωχῶν  πλούσιοι  γεγόνασιν).
85    He  continues  by  saying  they  have  become 
eminent from obscurity (3.29.8: οἱ δ’ ἐξ ἀδόξων ἔντι οι), some of their private houses are 
grander  than  public  buildings  (3.29.9 10:  ἔνιοι  δὲ  τὰς  ἰδίας  οἰκίας  τῶν  δη οσίων 
οἰκοδο η άτων  σε νοτέρας  εἰσὶ  κατεσκευασ ένοι),  and  their  personal  fortunes  have 
risen  as  much  as  the  city’s  have  fallen  (3.29.10 11:  ὅσῳ  δὲ  τὰ  τῆς  πόλεως  ἐλάττω 
γέγονεν, τοσούτῳ τὰ τούτων ηὔξηται).
86  He goes on to say that today’s politicians are 
in charge because they control the city’s property and manage everything (3.31.1 2: νῦν δὲ 
τοὐναντίον  κύριοι   ὲν  οἱ  πολιτευό ενοι  τῶν  ἀγαθῶν,  καὶ  διὰ  τούτων  ἅπαντα 
πράττεται).  “You”, the dêmos, have been robbed of all your money and have become 
mere  servants  and  hangers on,  and  are  happy  to  be  given  a  little  something  from  the 
Theoric Fund or a procession, and are grateful to them for bribing you with your own 
possessions  (3.31.2 7:  ὑ εῖς  δ’  ὁ  δῆ ος,  ἐκνενευρισ ένοι  καὶ  περιῃρη ένοι  χρή ατα, 
συ  άχους, ἐν ὑπηρέτου καὶ προσθήκης  έρει γεγένησθε, ἀγαπῶντες ἐὰν  εταδιδῶσι 
θεωρικῶν ὑ ῖν  ἢ  Βοηδρό ια  πέ ψωσιν  οὗτοι,  καὶ  τὸ  πάντων  ἀνδρειότατον,  τῶν 
ὑ ετέρων αὐτῶν χάριν προσοφείλετε).  They keep you here in the city and dole this 
money out to you in dribs and drabs, so as to keep you tame and under their thumb (3.31.7 
9:  οἱ  δ’  ἐν  αὐτῇ  τῇ  πόλει  καθείρξαντες  ὑ ᾶς  ἐπάγουσ’  ἐπὶ  ταῦτα  καὶ       τιθασεύουσι 
χειροήθεις  αὑτοῖς  ποιοῦντες).
87    In  the  next  chapter,  I  shall  demonstrate  that  such 
arguments  are  designed  to  play  to  latent  phthonos  towards  politicians  in  the  dêmos, 
Demosthenes’  motivation  being  to  discredit  more  established  politicians  and  position 
himself rhetorically as being on the side of the dêmos against them, in order that his own 
advice might be more likely to be listened to.
88 
 
                                                 
85 Compare ek ptôkhôn plousioi here to plousios ek penêtôn above (p.119 and n.80 above). 
86 Compare “he is in possession of your money” above (main text). 
87 We shall find very similar arguments advanced for comic purposes at Ar. Vesp. 655 712 (see pp.138 9); 
however  the  presence  of  such  similar  arguments  in  a  public  speech  proves  that  the  prejudices 
Aristophanes/Bdelykleon plays to are very real. 
88  Thucydides  has  Diodoros  say  in  the  Mytilenean  debate  that  if  someone  gives  the  best  advice  but  is 
suspected of being influenced even slightly by private profit, then we feel censorious of his profit and refuse 
to take his good advice (3.43.1.1 4: ὧν ἡ εῖς τἀναντία δρῶ εν, καὶ προσέτι ἤν τις καὶ ὑποπτεύηται 
κέρδους  ὲν ἕνεκα τὰ βέλτιστα δὲ ὅ ως λέγειν, φθονήσαντες τῆς οὐ βεβαίου δοκήσεως τῶν κερδῶν τὴν 
φανερὰν ὠφελίαν τῆς πόλεως ἀφαιρού εθα.).  See also Lys. 18.16.1 4, per n.77 above. Chapter 5:  Oratory 
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5.4  Conclusion 
 
We  have  seen  that  there  is  one  use  for  phthonos  by  an  orator  that  is  consistent  with 
Aristotle’s philosophy: accusing one’s opponent of being motivated by it.  In practice this 
can be extended to any positional statement which loosely falls into the twin categories of 
“you (or some other person/people) feel phthonos” and “I do not feel phthonos”.  However, 
Aristotle’s analysis of the role of phthonos in oratory is limited by an unresolved paradox 
between two positions he takes: first, that an orator’s most effective weapon is his good 
character; second, that phthonos is (always) base; thus in explicitly arousing phthonos the 
orator  risks  demonstrating  his  own  character  to  be  base,  removing  his  most  effective 
weapon.  Although Aristotle does not resolve this paradox (and indeed may not even have 
been aware of it), nevertheless his analysis does raise the valid question: what role, if any, 
is there for phthonos in oratory (beyond positionality)? 
 
It  is  certainly  the  case  that  Athenian  orators  do  not  present  themselves  as  phthoneros 
(meaning envious), nor  do they  attempt explicitly to arouse phthonos in their audience 
when it would be considered inappropriate by their fellow citizens (i.e. the circumstances in 
which phthonos would be what I term envy phthonos); that type of phthonos they only 
attribute  to  their  opponents.    However  Aristotle  has  created  problems  for  himself  by 
separating off moral phthonos, phthonos when it would be considered appropriate by their 
fellow citizens (i.e. the circumstances in which phthonos would be what I term indignation 
phthonos), under the separate label of to nemesan – a separation that I have shown to be 
unjustified by reference to the minimal non philosophical usage of nemesis vocabulary.  
His less idealistic contemporary comes closer to everyday usage by including such moral 
resentment as part of phthonos, a usage we find several times in fourth century oratory.  
The rhetorician does not stop at advocating that orators arouse moral phthonos, however, 
but  also  advocates  arousing  envy  and  Schadenfreude.    It  does  seem  that  the  badness 
associated with these emotions prevents them from being aroused explicitly (all surviving 
explicit calls for phthonos being for the moral version); however orators can sometimes 
arouse  envy phthonos  covertly  alongside  indignation phthonos,  through  manipulation  of 
common  civic  values,  while  leaving  unstated  the  exact  point  on  the  envy indignation 
continuum that they are aiming for. 
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Chapter 6:  Audience Phthonos in Old Comedy 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
In ch.5.3.3, we saw prosecutors exploiting certain words and ideas in order covertly to 
awaken jurors’ phthonos.  This is infrequent in surviving oratory.  In this chapter I explore 
the same practice in Old Comedy, where it is more common.  Comedy shares some key 
features  with  oratory.    Its  pronounced  metatheatricality  keeps  its  communicative 
relationship  with  its  audience  overtly  in  view  (unlike  tragedy),  and  both  explicitly  and 
implicitly it claims the desire and the ability to influence its audience on important issues of 
public  concern.
1    However,  the  audience  at  a  comedy  was  different  from  that  in  the 
Assembly  or  courtroom,  not  necessarily  in  its  social  make up,  but  certainly  in  their 
expectations of what would be put in front of them, and the emotional reactions they might 
expect to have as they listened.  I will not be concentrating primarily in this chapter on 
representations of phthonos on stage (except in Knights – see ch.6.3.4 below), though these 
do occur,
2 but rather representations which invite or utilise it in the audience.  Though this 
effect is by no means confined to political contexts, I focus specifically on passages relating 
to  politicians  (ambassadors,  demagogues  and  generals),
3  for  a  variety  of  reasons:  first, 
because it allows us to see political phthonos (which plays a significant role in oratory, as 
                                                 
1 There has been a long running debate about the ‘seriousness’ of comedy, i.e. the intent of comic playwrights 
in giving advice to the audience – see e.g. Heath (1987), Henderson (1990), Silk (2000) 301 49.  I am less 
interested in the intent than in the fact that comedy explicitly places itself within a civic discourse with its 
audience (unlike tragedy, which only does so indirectly – see e.g. Goldhill (1987), and n.36 below for further 
discussion and contrary viewpoints), and the dynamics of how it does so – see pp.132 3. 
2 We see the usual accusations of phthonos where the other party is arguing on the grounds of what is right.  
In Assemblywomen the young girl tells the old woman not to envy the young having lots of sex when the old 
are only fit to marry Death (Ar. Eccl. 900 5:  ὴ φθόνει ταῖσιν νέαισι  τὸ τρυφερὸν γὰρ ἐ πέφυκε τοῖς 
ἁπαλοῖσι   ηροῖς, κἀπὶ  τοῖς   ήλοις  ἐπανθεῖ   σὺ  δ’,  ὦ  γραῦ,  παραλέλεξαι  κἀντέτριψαι  τῷ  θανάτῳ 
 έλη α).  The old woman later responds that the young girl is jealous (sc. that the new law has given her 
priority in sleeping with the young man) and she’ll have her revenge (Ar. Eccl. 1043 4: ὦ πα βδελυρά, 
φθονοῦσα τόνδε τὸν λόγον ἐξηῦρες  ἀλλ’ ἐγώ σε τι ωρήσο αι).  Both believe they have a right to sleep 
with the young man, the young girl by nature, the old woman by law; both argue that the other’s expressed 
indignation is really phthonos, thus making the same intuitive leap that modern psychologists have recognised 
about the tendency of expressed indignation to be transmuted envy. 
3 In using the word ‘politician’, I do not, of course, seek to imply that politicians in Classical Athens’ direct 
democracy  were  similar  to  those  in  our  modern  representative  democracy  (i.e.  who  follow  politics  as  a 
profession, and are paid a salary accordingly).  Rather I mean those who regularly and voluntarily attempted 
to direct the political life of the Athenian democracy, principally through advocating policy in the Assembly, 
by prosecuting (or defending) those elected or appointed by lot to fill political or civic posts, or by putting 
themselves forward for elected posts such as the generalship. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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discussed in ch.5) in another civic and generic context; second, the prominence of political 
phthonos in Old Comedy is a result of the visibility of politicians, and thus demonstrates 
the importance of political phthonos in Classical Athens; and finally, because the sheer 
volume of political abuse in Aristophanes’ plays (and indeed its persistence over time from 
Acharnians to Wealth – though in this chapter I concentrate on the plays of the 420s) makes 
it  a  good  test bed  and  adds  to  confidence  in  the  outcome,  compared  e.g.  with  an 
examination of the fewer and shorter passages playing to phthonos at luxurious lifestyles.  
Perforce I rely on Aristophanes, as the only Old Comic playwright whose plays survive in 
their  entirety,  to  explore  this  cultural  phenomenon;  however,  as  Wilkins  points  out, 
Aristophanes  was  not  writing  in  a  vacuum,
4  and  such  themes  will  almost  certainly  be 
traceable in the surviving fragments of other Old Comic playwrights.
5  The approach I 
adopt in this chapter is not intended as a comprehensive interpretation of the pragmatics 
and psychology of Old Comedy (even if such were possible on present evidence), but rather 
an exploration of one important aspect of the role of comic theatre and its relationship with 
its audience that has a particular relevance to my theme.  Having outlined this approach in 
ch.6.2, I turn in ch.6.3 to Aristophanes. 
 
6.2  An approach to Old Comedy 
 
At p.62 we saw Socrates talking about those spreading malicious gossip about him, which 
led to general bad feeling against him and his consequent conviction; Socrates is unable to 
name an individual involved except perhaps “some comic playwright”.
6  The connection of 
malicious phthonos with comic pleasure occurs in a number of other places too.
7  But it is 
                                                 
4 Wilkins (2000) xv.  Though see Bakola (forthcoming) 6 8 on the pitfalls inherent in assuming conclusions 
from Aristophanes can be extrapolated to all Old Comic poets. 
5 The increasing interest in the fragments of other Old Comedians (in particular Eupolis and Kratinos) can be 
seen in the growing scholarship on these playwrights: e.g. Dobrov (1995), Harvey and Wilkins (2000), Storey 
(2003), Olson (2007), Bakola (forthcoming); this research has to huge degree been rendered possible by 
Kassel & Austin. 
6 Pl. Ap. 18c8 d3: ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνό ατα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κω ῳδοποιὸς 
τυγχάνει ὤν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώ ενοι ὑ ᾶς ἀνέπειθον; 
7 Laches says that pretension to skill at arms invites resentment, and is liable to ridicule unless the claimant is 
outstanding  (Pl.  La.  184c1 4:  ἐπίφθονος  γὰρ  ἡ  προσποίησις  τῆς  τοιαύτης  ἐπιστή ης,  ὥστ’  εἰ   ή  τι 
θαυ αστὸν  ὅσον  διαφέρει  τῇ  ἀρετῇ  τῶν  ἄλλων,  οὐκ  ἔσθ’  ὅπως  ἄν  τις  φύγοι  τὸ  καταγέλαστος 
γενέσθαι φάσκων ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστή ην).  Socrates says that a lover will necessarily envy his boys 
when they have property, but rejoice when they lose it (Pl. Phdr. 240a5 6: ἐξ ὧν πᾶσα ἀνάγκη ἐραστὴν 
παιδικοῖς φθονεῖν  ὲν οὐσίαν κεκτη ένοις, ἀπολλυ ένης δὲ χαίρειν).  Demosthenes chastises the Athenians 
that due to some motive he cannot divine, which might be envy, they ask Philip’s ‘hired men’ among the 
population to speak, and laugh at their abuse (Dem. 9.54.2 8: ἀλλ’ εἰς τοῦτ’ ἀφῖχθε  ωρίας ἢ παρανοίας Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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Plato’s Philebus that has the most extended treatment of this link,
8 and this will be the 
starting point for my theoretical approach. 
 
In the Philebus, Plato discusses comedy as an example of ‘false pleasures’ of the soul.
9   I 
give relevant excerpts from this extended, but important, passage:
10 
Σ .  τὴν  δ’  ἐν  ταῖς  κω ῳδίαις 
διάθεσιν ἡ ῶν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἆρ’ 
οἶσθ’  ὡς  ἔστι  κἀν  τούτοις 
 εῖξις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς;  
… 
Σ .  τό  τοι  νυνδὴ  ῥηθὲν  ὄνο α 
φθόνου  πότερα  λύπην  τινὰ 
ψυχῆς θήσεις, ἢ πῶς;  
ΠΡ . οὕτως. 
Σ . ἀλλὰ  ὴν ὁ φθονῶν γε ἐπὶ 
κακοῖς  τοῖς  τῶν  πέλας 
ἡδό ενος ἀναφανήσεται. 
ΠΡ . σφόδρα γε. 
… 
So: Now, look at our state of mind in 
comedy.    Don’t  you  realize  that  it 
also involves a mixture of pleasure 
and pain?  
… 
So:  Since  we  just  mentioned  the  word 
“envy”: do you treat envy as a pain 
of the soul, or what?  
Pro: I do. 
So:  On  the  other  hand,  will  not  the 
envious  person  display  pleasure  at 
his neighbour’s misfortunes? 
Pro: Very much so. 
… 
[Socrates digresses on the nature of those who are ridiculous.  He argues they 
are: 1. ignorant about the extent of their (a) wealth, (b) physical attributes, or 
(c)  virtues,  especially  wisdom;  and  2.  too  weak  to avenge  themselves  when 
laughed at.]
 11 
ΠΡ .  ὀρθότατα  λέγεις.  ἀλλὰ 
γὰρ  ἡ  τῶν  ἡδονῶν  καὶ 
λυπῶν   εῖξις  ἐν  τούτοις 
οὔπω  οι καταφανής. 
Σ . τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ 
δύνα ιν πρῶτον.  
ΠΡ . λέγε  όνον.  
Σ . λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ 
ἡδονή; 
ΠΡ . τοῦτο  ὲν ἀνάγκη.  
Σ .  οὐκοῦν  ἐπὶ   ὲν  τοῖς  τῶν 
Pro:  You  are  right  about  this  division.  
But  I  am  still  not  quite  clear  that 
there  is  a  mixture  of  pleasure  and 
pain in these cases. 
So: So take first the nature of malice.  
 
Pro: Please explain.  
So: It contains a kind of unjust pain and 
pleasure. 
Pro: Necessarily.  
So: Now, if you rejoice about evils that 
                                                                                                                                                     
…,  ὥστε  λοιδορίας,  φθόνου,  σκώ  ατος,  ἧστινος  ἂν  τύχηθ’  ἕνεκ’  αἰτίας  ἀνθρώπους   ισθωτούς  … 
λέγειν κελεύετε, καὶ γελᾶτε, ἄν τισι λοιδορηθῶσιν). 
8 The Philebus is one of the ‘Late period’ dialogues; Frede (1993) lxxii speculates that it would have been 
written some time after the visit of Eudoxos to Athens circa 360, and clearly before Plato’s death in 347; the 
passage  on  comedy  would  therefore  have  related  to  Old  and  perhaps  Middle  Comedy,  but  not  to  New 
Comedy. 
9 I.e. pleasures mixed with pain – see Frede (1993) xlv xlvi, l lii. 
10 Translation from Frede (1993) 56 9, slightly adapted. 
11 During this digression, Socrates refers to παιδικὸν … φθόνον (49a8), which Frede (1993) 57 translates 
“comic malice”).  Benardete (1993) rightly 205 prefers “playful or childlike resentment”, and suggests this 
contrasts with a serious form that would be found in tragedy; he further suggests it might be playful because 
the audience do not take this resentment seriously. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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ἐχθρῶν  κακοῖς  οὔτ’  ἄδικον 
οὔτε  φθονερόν  ἐστι  τὸ 
χαίρειν; 
ΠΡ . τί  ήν;  
Σ .  τὰ  δέ  γε  τῶν  φίλων 
ὁρῶντας  ἔστιν  ὅτε  κακὰ   ὴ 
λυπεῖσθαι,  χαίρειν  δέ,  ἆρα 
οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν; 
ΠΡ . πῶς δ’ οὔ;  
Σ . οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπο εν 
ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν; 
ΠΡ . ὀρθῶς. 
Σ .  τὴν  οὖν  τῶν  φίλων 
[ἄγνοιαν]  ….  κακὸν  δ’  οὐχ 
ὁ ολογοῦ εν αὐτὴν ἄγνοιάν 
γε οὖσαν εἶναι; 
ΠΡ . σφόδρα γε.  
Σ .  χαίρο εν  δὲ  ἢ  λυπού εθα, 
ὅταν ἐπ’ αὐτῇ γελῶ εν; 
ΠΡ . δῆλον ὅτι χαίρο εν.  
Σ .  ἡδονὴν  δὲ  ἐπὶ  τοῖς  τῶν 
φίλων  κακοῖς,  οὐ  φθόνον 
ἔφα εν  εἶναι  τὸν  τοῦτ’ 
ἀπεργαζό ενον;  
ΠΡ . ἀνάγκη.  
Σ .  γελῶντας  ἄρα  ἡ ᾶς  ἐπὶ 
τοῖς  τῶν  φίλων  γελοίοις 
φησὶν  ὁ  λόγος,  κεραννύντας 
ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν 
ἡδονὴν  συγκεραννύναι   τὸν 
γὰρ  φθόνον  ὡ ολογῆσθαι 
λύπην ψυχῆς ἡ ῖν πάλαι, τὸ 
δὲ  γελᾶν  ἡδονήν,  ἅ α 
γίγνεσθαι  δὲ  τούτω  ἐν 
τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.  
Pl. Phlb. 48a8 50a9 
happen to your enemy, is there any 
injustice or malice in your pleasure? 
 
Pro: How should there be? 
So: But is there any occasion when it is 
not unjust to be pleased rather than 
pained to see bad things happen to 
your friends?
12 
Pro: Clearly not.  
So: But we just agreed that ignorance is 
bad for everyone? 
Pro: Right. 
So:  Let  us  take  now  the  ignorance  of 
friends ….  Did we not agree that it 
is bad if it is ignorance? 
 
Pro: We certainly did. 
So:  But  if  we  laugh  about  it,  are  we 
pleased or pained by it? 
Pro: We are pleased, obviously.  
So: But this pleasure in the face of the 
misfortunes of friends – did we not 
say  that  it  was  the  product  of 
malice? 
Pro: Necessarily.  
So:  Our  argument  leads  to  the 
conclusion that if we laugh at what 
is  ridiculous  about  our  friends,  by 
mixing  pleasure  with  malice,  we 
thereby mix pleasure with pain.  For 
we had agreed earlier that malice is 
a pain in the soul, that laughing is a 
pleasure,  and  that  both  occur 
together on these occasions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                     
12 Plato started by talking about phthonos being felt for the misfortunes of neighbours, but from here he 
changes this to the misfortunes of friends (cf. the pseudo Platonic Definitiones 416a13 – see ch.4 n.50).  This 
pushes the Greek binary division of the world into friends and enemies beyond breaking point.  Perhaps Plato 
is concerned to separate out people against whom we have a personal animosity from the rest, i.e. that our 
animosity can only be phthonos when it is not enmity (though this ignores the fact that phthonos is often felt 
against ekhthroi – e.g. Aeschines’ and Demosthenes’ mutual accusations of phthonos – see also ch.5 n.37), 
but he goes too far in labelling them friends.  It would not have been normal, in Classical Athens any more 
than today, to take pleasure in the misfortunes of friends (and see p.91 on Aristotelian ‘perfect friends’ being 
unable to feel phthonos).  Certainly other Greek passages also talk about phthonos being felt for neighbours: 
ἔννεπε κρυφᾷ τις αὐτίκα φθονερῶν γειτόνων (Pind. Ol. 1.47);  ὴ φθονεῖν τοῖς πλησίον (Ar. Eccl. 565); 
ἐπιχαιρέκακος εἶ καὶ φθονεῖς τοῖς πλησίον (Alexis fr.51.1(Kock)). Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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There are a number of points that can be drawn out of Plato’s analysis.  First, that phthonos 
includes the idea of malice or Schadenfreude.
13  As we saw in ch.4 (see p.78), Aristotle 
separates phthonos as a painful feeling from its opposite pleasure, epikhairekakia,
14 saying 
that the same character will feel them in opposite circumstances.  Plato however conflates 
both feelings in the word phthonos, and as we have seen, this is not the only Classical 
Greek passage that seems to show phthonos encompassing a malicious pleasure.
15  The 
second important point in the Philebus passage is the idea that we feel some sort of animus 
against characters in a comedy.  Third, that those who are funny are those made to seem 
ridiculous.
16  Fourth, Plato is right that we do not laugh at those who have the ability to 
harm us in return – and a vast crowd can laugh at someone with impunity who might be 
able  to  target  them  if  they  mocked  him  individually.
17    Finally,  and  most  importantly, 
Plato’s  main  claim:  that  phthonos  (envy,  malice,  Schadenfreude)  is  the  basis  of  comic 
pleasure.
18  It is not clear if he means that it is publicly acknowledged as such; if he does 
that is implausible.  We have seen that envy phthonos was socially taboo: Greeks did not 
admit to phthonos out loud, and surely they would have been almost as uncomfortable 
admitting  it  to  themselves;  accordingly  it  is  inherently  implausible  that  a  popular 
pleasurable art form could be founded explicitly on such an emotion, especially when the 
activity was organised and funded by or through the state.  However, we should distinguish 
between the overt basis for an activity and the actual basis, and it is perfectly possible for 
                                                 
13 But without the possible guilt that Schadenfreude implies – see p.38; cf. Frede (1993) 56 n.2, Wood (2007) 
78; Halliwell (2008) 301.  Wood (2007) 79, 81 perceptively suggests that Plato was more concerned in this 
passage to analyse the nature of phthonos than the nature of comedy.  Duran Lopez (1996) compares his 
thoughts on phthonos in the Philebus to his comments in other dialogues. 
14  Cerasuolo  (1996)  177,  181,  183  says  that  Plato’s  comic  phthonos  is  equivalent  to  Aristotle’s 
epikhairekakia; cf. Halliwell (1991) 289, (2008) 300 1, 301n.93.  See also Frede (1996) on mixed pleasures 
and pains in Aristotle.  Frede (1993) liii suggests that Plato might to some extent anticipate Aristotle’s ideas 
of catharsis of comic (and tragic) emotions in this passage. 
15 See n.7 above; also the [Arist.] Rh. Al. passages quoted at pp.109 10. 
16 Aristotle seems to agree with this: Arist. Poet. 5.1449a32 4: ἡ δὲ κω ῳδία ἐστὶν ...  ί ησις φαυλο τέρων 
... κατὰ ... τὸ γελοῖον.... ; Tract. Coislin. [10
th century AD epitome of Peripatetic views on comedy, possibly 
reflecting Aristotle] 4: κω ῳδία ἐστὶ  ί ησις πράξεως γελοίας. – see n.19 below for further discussion and 
bibliography on this treatise. 
17 I think for this reason Plato is wrong to exclude enemies from the list of those we can laugh at while safely 
hidden in a crowd. 
18 Freud (1905/2002) 218 19 says that one type of comedy relies on an unconscious comparison with the 
pleasure  we took as children in various situations, e.g. somebody  falling in the street,  which  gives  us a 
pleasurable feeling of Schadenfreude. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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phthonos to be a significant covert element in comic pleasure, while masquerading overtly 
as indignation (by whatever Greek label).
19 
 
For all the difference in emphasis, Plato’s analysis of comedy in terms of phthonos has 
certain  underlying  tendencies  in  common  with  one  of  the  major  modern  models  for 
understanding Old Comedy, the Bakhtinian theory of ‘carnival’.  Goldhill and others argue 
that the notions of ‘inversion’, ‘transgression’ or ‘reversal’, where the usual rules of society 
(e.g. respect for those in authority, laws against certain forms of abuse) are abandoned or 
turned on their head for some defined duration, match well the ribald, almost anarchic 
aspects  of  Dionysiac  worship  which  are  in  some  degree  reflected  in  Old  Comedy’s 
(probable) origins – songs performed at the kômos, or revel – and its licence.
20  Carnival 
‘inversion’ is often not truly anarchic, but rather follows a different set of rules that would 
be considered unacceptable outside of the carnival context, generally involving a “reversal 
of norms”.
21  One aspect of Old Comedy, which the carnival approach is especially helpful 
for understanding, is satires, or lampoons, in which well known people (public figures, 
frequently politicians) are represented on stage  in such a way  as to make them appear 
ridiculous.    This  ridicule  might  arise  from  the  representation  itself  (e.g.  a  physical 
caricature,  or  character  satire)
22  or,  and  this  is  common  for  lampoons  involving  those 
against whom society feels some animus (e.g. someone hated or feared), from the character 
                                                 
19 E.g. nemesis, aganaktêsis, phthonos.  Golden (1992) 91 5, in an attempted reconstruction of Aristotle’s 
views on comedy in the putative Poet. 2, argues for indignation as the comic emotion by analogy with pity as 
the tragic emotion – indignation being described as opposed to pity in the Rhetoric (see pp.71 2), and both 
becoming fear when we perceive the other’s good/bad fortune as harmful to ourselves; cf. Golden (1984).  If 
indignation is indeed the emotion aroused by comedy, then (as we saw in ch.5.3) at least as regards politics 
and money it would not be to nemesan in Greek (as Golden argues), since that is merely an Aristotelian 
construct,  but  indignation phthonos.    Bergson  (1900/1911),  while  generally  denying  emotion  a  place  in 
comedy (4), says laughter contains “an unavowed intention to humiliate, and consequently to correct our 
neighbour” (136); the former is the action tendency of envy phthonos, the latter of indignation phthonos.  In 
my  view  Golden’s  is  the  most  plausible  suggestion  for  the  Aristotelian  comic  emotion,  being  based  on 
genuinely Aristotelian texts.  Other suggestions include: L. Cooper (1922) 66 7, anger and envy, with little 
reasoning; Sutton (1994) 14 15, 24 30, aggressiveness, hostility, fear and anxiety (his preferred translation of 
eleos); Janko (1984), pleasure and laughter, taking Tract. Coislin. 4: κω ῳδία …, δι’ ἡδονῆς καὶ γέλωτος 
περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτνω παθη άτων κάθαρσιν (see n.16 above) as genuinely Aristotelian (contra 
L. Cooper (1922) 15 17, Halliwell (1986) 266, (2008) 393 n.11, Golden (1992) 98 102). 
20  Goldhill  (1991)  176 88;  cf.  Halliwell  (2008)  204 6,  Cartledge  (1990)  2 5,  A.M.  Bowie  (1993)  11.  
Henderson (1990) 285 6 disputes the use of the carnival model for Old Comedy.  See Mikalson (2005) 91 9 
on Dionysiac worship. 
21 Carey (1994) 72, who refers to this as “controlled dysfunction, a calculated subversion of the norms of 
society in a festival context which offers a controlled outlet for disruptive behaviour and vicarious satisfaction 
of the impulse to disobey” (73).  See Silk (2000) 76, who quotes Bakhtin on carnival inversion in Rabelais, on 
what inversion might include. 
22 See Carey (1994) 70. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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suffering some misfortune.
23  This bears more than a passing resemblance to Plato’s comic 
malice. 
 
As  well  as  those  actually  represented  on  stage,  Old  Comedy  often  lampoons 
contemporaries by name – a process known as onomasti kômôidein.
24  Sommerstein has 
shown that over 50% of these so called kômôidoumenoi (who must have been well known 
for  the  joke  to  work)  were  politically  active.
25    He  further  notes  that  politicians  were 
normally named in a derogatory context.
26  However, it is not only named politicians who 
are criticised in Old Comedy: several passages criticise politicians as a class (see ch.6.3). 
The abuse and ridicule at these festivals of those who are well known, as well as the abuse 
of certain privileged classes of citizens (such as politicians), can be seen as part of the 
‘carnival’ licence.  When Athenians went to the comic theatre, they enjoyed seeing abuse 
heaped  on  such  people,  and  Aristophanes  and  his  contemporaries  provided  what  they 
wanted. 
 
                                                 
23 Sutton (1994) 42 6 talks about a comic ‘surrogate’ for the intended ‘target’ (e.g. Paphlagon for Kleon); this 
surrogate  is  sufficiently  similar  to  the  target  to  remain  recognisable,  but  sufficiently  different  to  avoid 
arousing the same feelings (e.g. hatred, fear) in the audience that the original arouses.  Inasmuch as the 
surrogate is perceived as ridiculous, the audience can transfer such perceptions back to the original target, 
thus altering their emotional approach (hatred, fear) towards him.  Sutton argues that this is both educative 
and purgative – i.e. cathartic; cf. Golden (1992) 5 32, Lear (1992) on comic katharsis.  We should note that 
Greek laughter was often aggressive, or ‘consequential’, in nature: laughing at, rather than laughing with – 
Halliwell (1991), Halliwell (2008) 19 38. 
24 Allegations made as part of onomasti kômôidein may or may not have been true – see Halliwell (1984). 
25 Sommerstein (1996) 327 31 compares the list of 224 kômôidoumenoi we know about in the period 432/1 
405/4, and the 176 people who either held elective office or proposed Assembly resolutions in this period.  He 
finds that 37% (65/176) of the politicians are mentioned by name in comedy, including 26% (32/122) of those 
who “took a prominent role in politics only on one occasion”, but 61% (33/54) of those who did so on more 
than one occasion.  As well as the 65 mentioned who were elected or who proposed Assembly resolutions, 
another  50  kômôidoumenoi  are  known  to  have  been  politically  active  outside  this  period,  to  have  been 
unelected military or religious officials in the period, or are called sykophantoi (showing they were probably 
politically active despite not appearing on other lists).  This means 115 of the 224 kômôidoumenoi were active 
in some way politically.  These statistics are compelling, and we should recall that we only have a fraction of 
the full Old Comedy output of that period.  Of the other 109 kômôidoumenoi whom we do not know as being 
politicians, 45 were connected with the theatre, 13 are known from the agora (mainly prominent tradesmen), 
and 15 for their  gluttonous  or sexual appetites;  some of the remaining 36  were  known e.g. through the 
patronymics of their prominent sons, or for some topical court case; for a few we know of no reason for their 
mention.  Of the thirteen people known to have been satirised throughout a comedy, rather than just in one 
passage, six were politicians – Ibid. 334. 
26 Ibid. 334: he says that only five politicians are named in a favourable context while they are alive; see also 
Carey (1994) 69 71.  Rosen (1988) argues that abuse (psogos) in Old Comedy derived from that in the Iambic 
tradition of Arkhilokhos and Hipponax.  Zanetto (2001) 66, however, notes some major distinctions between 
the genres (not least their settings and audiences); this suggests they are related but independent traditions. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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But why were politicians so singled out for abuse?  Athens’ strong democracy may have 
been  the  cause:  ideologically,  all  Athenian  citizens  were  equal;  however,  as  Ober  and 
Strauss argue, the wealthy remained “functionally more powerful” than the poor,
27 whether 
in  seeking  to  advance  themselves  politically,  or  in  the  lawcourt  where  their  education 
would help them speak or their money buy a good speech writer.  This is equally true of 
politicians (of all social backgrounds),
28 who as a class in Athens (as in many subsequent 
systems) were frequently viewed as willing to do anything to gain and secure their position 
with the dêmos.
29  In the course of his career, a politician would expect to attract philoi 
amongst other politicians, and these might help each other out to ensure mutual political 
advancement and monetary advantage – perhaps by supporting each other’s policies in the 
Assembly,  or  perhaps  through  initiating  or  supporting  each  others’  sometimes  spurious 
prosecutions (an unpopular pursuit, which is strongly associated with the sykophantos).
30  
A  general  feeling  seems  to  have  developed  that  politicians,  while  necessary  in  the 
democracy (which paradoxically needed people to lead in a system of tens of thousands of 
nominal equals), did rather well out of the system.
31  This would have led to a popular 
                                                 
27 Ober and Strauss (1990) 244; cf. Ober (1989) 214 9. 
28  Many  politicians  (especially  the  generals,  who  were  still  elected)  came  from  the  wealthiest  and  best 
educated class, even in the later fifth century – see Ober (1989) 112 8.  Even the ‘new’ politicians from the 
420s onwards tended to be drawn from the wealthy urban commercial or industrial classes – see Connor 
(1971) 151 63. 
29 Balot (2001) 51 2. 
30  We  see  the  operation  of  such  activities  clearly  in  the  major  legal  trials  of  the  mid  fourth  century  – 
e.g. Aeschin. 1 3, Dem. 18 19.  On ‘the badness’ of sycophants see Christ (1998) 48 71, Christ (2008) 170 4, 
Fisher (2008) 297 9; for a different view see Osborne (1990).  Successful prosecutors often gained a personal 
monetary reward, and even when they did not they could gain gratitude from the dêmos for enriching the 
public treasury, which might help a political career.  Sycophants crop up several times as comic butts in 
Aristophanes (Ach. 818ff.,  Av. 1410ff., Plut. 850ff.). 
31  Sinclair  (1988)  details  the  rewards  available  to  politicians,  including  “crowns,  immunities,  free 
maintenance, and similar grants” (176), as well as material rewards: notably through bribery (by foreign 
allies, or to avoid sykophant ic prosecution), corruption (fees, i.e. kick backs) and embezzlement (179 86).  
Harvey (1985) 89 102 argues for a  widespread perception at Athens, reflected in surviving sources, that 
bribery of, and embezzlement by, public figures was endemic (though he argues it was perhaps less so than 
our sources would have us believe, as many of the allegations may have been baseless).  The prevailing 
assumption at Athens that all politicians made money out of the system is underlined by Perikles’ pointed 
commendation of himself to the dêmos as incorruptible (Thuc. 2.60.5.5 6 – see Hornblower (1991) 333 4), 
and Harvey (1985) 98 notes that only four Athenian public figures are so described in literary sources, three 
of them  from the  mid fifth century (a different picture to that painted by Dem. 19.273 5).  Hyp. 5.24 5 
suggests that it was both expected and acceptable for public figures and generals to make significant personal 
profits, provided the money was used in the interests of Athens, not against them.  This cannot have been the 
generally accepted view: Hansen (1975) notes that in surviving sources we have record of 144 Athenians 
prosecuted by eisangelia (11), 70 of whom were politicians (58), and the true figure (including those we have 
no record of) must have been much higher; Hansen rightly says this is “astonishingly high” for a city of 
20,000 40,000 citizens (11).  Politicians were also prosecuted for bribery, corruption or embezzlement under 
a variety of other procedures, notably scrutiny for office (dokimasia), removal from office (apokheirotonia, 
generally followed by eisangelia), audit at the end of a period of office (euthyna), and a dedicated procedure Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
 
132 
animus against them, which could be exploited by comic playwrights looking for targets.  I 
propose therefore that one important aspect of Old Comedy – its attacks on politicians 
(individually and collectively) – appeals to the audience’s latent phthonos at the profit they 
make, and the advantages they take, from their position.
32  It is possible too that the ‘new’, 
demagogic,  politicians  may  have  attracted  even  more  animus  than  their  aristocratic 
forebears: Aristotle argues that the newly rich are more likely than the long time rich to 
attract to nemesan (or rather indignation phthonos), as newly acquired wealth seems less 
validly theirs;
33 and in the same way, ‘new’ politicians were probably seen to profit more 
conspicuously from the system than aristocratic ones.
34  The Schadenfreude aroused in the 
audience  at  seeing  politicians  taken  down  a  peg  during  this  sacred  time  of  licensed 
transgression,  would  have  acted  as  a  safety  valve  for  the  phthonos  that  was  naturally 
aroused  against  politicians,  but  which  was  dangerous  if  left  untreated  in  a  democratic 
system  that  relied  on  politicians  to  function  properly,  since  unchecked  public  hostility 
might lead to the destruction of all politicians to the ultimate impoverishment of the state.
35 
 
Goldhill has argued forcefully that Athenian drama cannot be divorced from its setting in, 
and constant interaction with, the democratic polis;
36 he has further noted that while drama 
might not have the intention of promoting questioning of democratic values and ideology, 
one of its functions is to do precisely that.
37  However, although he notes that this applies to 
all drama, Goldhill’s interest then moves firmly towards an engagement with tragedy;
38 my 
interest here is in comedy, where (as I noted earlier – see n.1 above) the dynamics of the 
engagement  are  different  due  to  comedy’s  metatheatrical  practice  of  explicit 
                                                                                                                                                     
for recovery of state property (apographê) – see Hansen (1975) 9, Hansen (1991) 203 24, Bauman (1990) 82 
94, MacDowell (1978) 58, 62. 
32 Carey (1994) 73 4 also argues that comedy “offers an outlet for phthonos”.  
33  Arist.  Rh.  2.9.  1387a24 26:  αἴτιον  δ’  ὅτι  οἱ   ὲν  [ἀρχαιόπλουτοι]  δοκοῦσι  τὰ  αὑτῶν  ἔχειν  οἱ  δ’ 
[νεόπλουτοι] οὔ  τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινό ενον ἔχειν ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε οἱ ἕτεροι οὐ τὰ αὑτῶν ἔχειν. 
34 And hence the ‘rags to riches’ (penês ek penetôn) cliché referred to at p.119 (main text and n.81). 
35 Carey (1994) 82.  Jokes lampooning the political class in Old Comedy act as a channel for hostility that 
could find more damaging outlets, thus allowing citizens to come to terms with inequalities over which they 
have no power. 
36 Goldhill (2000), contra Griffin (1998).  See also: Goldhill (1987), where he first argues for the connection 
between  tragedy  and  its  democratic  setting;  Friedrich  (1996)  and  Seaford  (1996),  who  like  Griffin  are 
dismissive of this connection; Griffith (1995), who is closer to Goldhill’s view, but sees other ideologies 
competing with the democratic, e.g. aristocratic (Goldhill (2000) disagrees, arguing that democratic ideology, 
unusually, allows for the free expression of e.g. aristocratic criticism); Rhodes (2004), who questions the 
extent to which the link is with democratic, as opposed to civic, ideology. 
37 Goldhill (2000) 38. 
38 Ibid. 37 notes that this is relevant to comedy too – I would argue it is even more relevant to comedy than to 
tragedy. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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communication with the audience.  I believe that, while comedy as a genre was not created 
intentionally  as  an  institutional  outlet  for  phthonos,  one  of  its  functions  was  to  allow 
phthonos to find expression in non destructive ways,
39 thus helping police the boundaries 
and  manage  tensions  between  ideologically  equal,  but  in  practice  frequently  unequal, 
citizens  in  the  democratic  polis.    One  important  strand  of  this  comic  promotion  of 
questioning served to hold the lifestyle and practices of politicians up to public scrutiny, 
reminding them that they were permanently on display, and militating against egregious 
misbehaviour  that  could  ultimately  lead  to  dangerous  levels  of  mistrust  and  hostility 
building  up  between  the  political  class  and  the  rest,  thus  risking  the  stability  of  the 
democratic system. 
 
6.3  Politicians in Aristophanes 
 
6.3.1  Ambassadors 
 
There are three passages in Acharnians that deal with ambassadors.  The first (61 90) is a 
splendidly unselfconscious report back to the Assembly by the Athenian ambassadors to 
the Persian king, followed by a second in similar vein by the ambassador to Thrace (136 
54),  both  critiqued  by  Dikaiopolis.
40    The  third  (593 619)  is  an  argument  between 
Dikaiopolis and the general (and kômôidoumenos) Lamakhos.  In all cases the purportedly 
sensible,  clear sighted  opinion  of  the  common  man  is  focalised  through  Dikaiopolis.  
Ambassadors (to other Greek poleis, or to non Greek powers such as Persia) were generally 
senior  and  experienced  politicians,  who  were  entrusted  by  the  dêmos  to  negotiate  on 
Athens’ behalf.  It is intriguing that, of all types of politician, they appear to be satirised 
more than any other.
41  Aristophanes makes a number of ‘charges’ against them.  If my 
surmise as to the comic point of such passages – that they  play to popular animus by 
making such characters look ridiculous – is correct, there would seem to be a persistent 
                                                 
39 In this respect it has a similar function to ostracism – see ch.1 n.30. 
40 This passage serving to characterise him as a demotic hero. 
41 Sommerstein (1996) 328: “of thirty six known ambassadors of the Peloponnesian War period, twenty two 
or 61% are mentioned in comedy.” Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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undercurrent of popular resentment against the (supposedly) cushy life ambassadors led 
while in post.
42 
 
Six specific ‘charges’, if we can call them that, are alluded to in these passages.  The first is 
that  ambassadors  are  paid  large  amounts:  the  ambassadors’  spokesman  reminds  the 
Assembly that they set his pay at two drachmas per day (65 6), and Dikaiopolis rhetorically 
castigates ambassadors for being paid three drachmas a day on a mission to Thrace (602); 
this compares with no pay for attending the Assembly, and two or three obols a day for jury 
service.
43  The second charge is that the ambassadors draw out their negotiations, thus 
ensuring they are paid for as long as possible: the ambassadors to Persia have been gone 
since  Euthymenes  was  archon  eleven  year  ago  (66 7);
44  they  say  they  were  wandering 
about in the Causter valley (68 9); they took three years to get to the Persian capital, and 
then had to wait eight months until the Persian king returned (80 2); Theoros’ embassy to 
Thrace  was  likewise  delayed  by  freezing  weather  (136 9).    The  third  charge  is  that 
ambassadors  are  plied  with  good  food  and  drink  and  other  forms  of  luxury:  when 
wandering the Causter, they were reclining on soft cushions in covered carriages (69 70); 
their hosts “forced” them to drink undiluted sweet wine from golden and crystal goblets 
(73 5), the quantity consumed being supposedly the way men behave among the barbarians 
(77 8); the Persian king entertained them by serving up oxen whole in the pan (85 6), 
followed  by  a  bird  three  times  the  size  of  (the  politician)  Kleonymos  (88 9)  –  which 
Aristophanes names a phenax, to allow a joke about cheating (90: ἐφενάκιζες);
45 Theoros 
likewise is plied with wine (141).  The fourth charge is that ambassadors avoid fighting by 
being sent on diplomatic missions: Dikaiopolis berates Lamakhos, saying that while he 
himself has spent the war as a worthy citizen and fighting in the army, Lamakhos has been 
running for office and in the pay queue (595 7).  The fifth charge is that only young men 
get to be ambassadors, while the old have to go to fight: Dikaiopolis hates seeing venerable 
men in the ranks, while (supposedly) young men like Lamakhos run away far away (as 
                                                 
42 It is worth noting that a significant number of ambassadors were prosecuted – see Hansen (1975) 58 n.6, 
Bauman (1990) 84 94. 
43 Pay for jury service was raised from 2 to 3 obols around the time of this play – Powell (1988) 302, 331 
n.294; MacDowell (1995).  Pay for attending the Assembly was introduced around 403/402 at one obol, and 
rapidly raised to three obols – Rhodes (1984) 146; Ober (1989) 98, 133).  See also Markle (1985) 265 n.1. 
44 Sommerstein (1973) 239 n.9 notes this was some years before the Peloponnesian War started. 
45 Ibid. 240 n.12. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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ambassadors;  599 601).
46    The  final  charge  is  that  the  same  people  always  get  to  be 
ambassadors: “you” (a list of ambassadors just recited) are always getting paid posts, but 
none of “them” (the audience) do (607 9) – Lamakhos is named (614) as one who does. 
 
Let us examine these charges one by one.  First, that ambassadors are overpaid.  This 
cannot be valid: pay for ambassadors was set by the assembly, and the level must have been 
considered appropriate for the job.
47  This was considerably more than jurors were paid; but 
the work was more specialist, went on for longer, and was potentially more dangerous – not 
just because of the rigours of travelling in the ancient world, but because ambassadors were 
not always treated well (and were occasionally even executed) by those they were sent to – 
or by those who sent them.
48  Resentment among the dêmos cannot therefore be based on 
objective criteria,
49 and can only be aroused by the fact that ambassadors are well paid 
compared  with  the  average  citizen  –  i.e.  this  is  at  least  as  much  envious  as  indignant 
resentment.
50  Second, that ambassadors drag out the journey and negotiations, so as to 
draw more pay.  If this allegation is valid, then it would certainly be an objective criticism, 
and so grounds for indignation; however, ambassadors (like all officials) had to submit 
accounts  and  defend  them  at  audit,  and  if  this  type  of  misconduct  were  a  regular 
phenomenon we would expect it to crop up much more frequently in the oratorical corpus 
than it does.  Resentment is likely to arise firstly because ambassadors conducted their 
                                                 
46 See Rothfield (1999) 77 8.  In reality, this is part of the young/old antithesis which permeates Old Comedy 
– see MacDowell (1995) 350 1.  Lamakhos could not have been too young if he was a general; Aristophanes’ 
point is aimed more at ambassadors in general.  Demosthenes, for instance was about thirty seven when he 
was sent on the embassy to Philip in 346.  Alkibiades was elected general in 419/8 (Thuc. 5.52) in his early 
thirties  –  Thucydides  comments  that  he  came  to  prominence  unusually  young,  because  of  his  family 
connections (5.43).  We should note that ‘young’ and ‘old’ here are in any case relative terms. 
47 See Westermann (1910) on the voting of pay and the amounts paid, which were to cover expenses and were 
not high given the expenses that could be incurred.  See also Perlman (1976) 224 5, Harvey (1985) 203. 
48 Being sent as ambassador was a high risk activity, since ambassadors who disappointed the dêmos could 
pay a very high price (death, or exile with confiscation of all property) – see Bauman (1990) 84 94, Hansen 
(1975) 58 n.6.  Philokrates in 343 is the most high profile – see Hansen (1975) 102. 
49 I use “objective” and “subjective” in this chapter from the point of view of the dêmos.  If the dêmos 
contracts to cover a certain level of expenditure, there will be a shared understanding of the importance of the 
task, and a recognition of the potential expenses and the need not to allow these expenses to disincentivise 
people of the required calibre. Citizens could not then believe that they had paid over the odds; accordingly 
any resentment they feel must primarily be envy.  Aristophanes plays to this envy, albeit (through comic 
exaggeration) in the language of indignation (“they don’t deserve it”) – see main text below. 
50 I do not mean to imply in this chapter that genuine indignation is completely absent.  Situations can arouse 
mixed  emotions  in  people,  and  just  as  a  situation  may  not  be  obviously  completely  moral  or  immoral 
(especially in a joke which takes its humour from a variety of real life situations), so the emotion it arouses 
will not be entirely indignation or (transmuted) envy.  I believe the jokes in Aristophanes would have aroused 
a mixture of indignation and envy (the exact mixture perhaps varying considerably from joke to joke).  Cf. 
ch.1 n.20, and ch.8.2, where I argue that Medea’s emotional motivations include jealousy alongside, rather 
than instead of, anger and pride. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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business out of sight of the dêmos, and secondly because relatively high daily wages were 
paid, and (human nature being what it is) Athenians may have expected ambassadors to 
employ some creative accounting.  Third, that ambassadors are treated luxuriously by their 
hosts.  This was likely true, especially when they visited a rich kingdom such as Persia.  
However, ambassadors could not diplomatically turn down hospitality – to do so would 
insult  their  hosts;  so  again  resentment  would  owe  far  more  to  envy  that  someone  else 
(indeed someone already better off than the average citizen) was getting what the general 
citizen could not, than to indignation that they were (objectively) acting inappropriately.
51  
Fourth, that ambassadors avoid fighting, which all other citizens have to take part in, by 
being sent on diplomatic missions.  Again it is true that ambassadors would not be fighting, 
or subject to call up, for the duration of their embassy; but once again this would validly be 
in the nature of the job, and so again the allegation plays to envy more than indignation.  
Fifth, the age issue.  This may be merely embroidery; there may also be an element of Old 
Comedy’s  habitual  prejudice  that  the  younger  generation  put  upon  the  older.
52    But 
presumably ambassadors would be chosen who were right for the job, irrespective of their 
ages, so there is unlikely to be much objective validity to the allegation.  Finally, that the 
same people are always chosen to be ambassadors.  Clearly this would make sense, as 
a) politicians  tended  to  be  good  speakers,  a  useful  skill  on  an  embassy,
53  and 
b) negotiations would benefit from expertise; they must also be well known to be elected by 
the Assembly.
54  Once again, any resentment cannot be objectively supported, so must be at 
least as much (transmuted) envy as indignation.  Considering the allegations then, both 
individually and as a whole, they are made in the language of indignation: i.e. “You are 
acting  inappropriately.    You  do  not  deserve  your  benefits.”    However  in  reality,  most 
ambassadors  probably  did  not  act  inappropriately,  and  any  benefits  they  got  (whether 
expenses  or  perks)  would  objectively  have  been  earned;  accordingly  any  generalised 
resentment in the audience against ambassadors as a class would owe far more to envy than 
to indignation.  Whether or not these allegations were a valid reflection of popular hostility 
                                                 
51 It is worth noting, though, that both the ambassadors to Persia and to Thrace employ braggadocio – there 
may have been a tendency to bring back anecdotes of splendour, and the souvenirs on occasion may have 
added to this (even if not a general feature) – see Olson (2002) 90, Sommerstein (1980) 160 on Pyrilampes’ 
peacocks, probably a gift from the king of Persia. 
52 E.g. Pheidippides’ mistreatment of Strepsiades in Clouds, or the chorus of poor, old men in Wasps.  See 
n.46 above. 
53 Consider the account of the various politicians’ speeches to Philip at Aeschin. 2.22 39. 
54  This  ensured  there  would  be  some  inevitable  recycling  of  the  same  candidates  in  all  jobs  filled  by 
kheirotonia rather than klêrôsis.  See Ober (1989), Connor (1992) on the role of the elite in Athenian politics. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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to ambassadors, clearly such an attitude could be represented in front of them in a comedy, 
and the laughs sought were based on the animus of (perhaps secret) phthonos.
55 
 
We should note that it is not just ambassadors in general who are castigated, but many are 
by name.  This of course includes Lamakhos (595 619), but also Teisamenos, Phainippos, 
Hipparkhides, Khares and his friends, Geres, Theodoros, Diomeialazon,
56 others sent to 
various towns in Sicily (603 6), and Koisyra’s son (614).  The phthonos played to, then, is 
not  just  towards  ambassadors  in  general,  but  towards  many  named  individuals  who 
(presumably) could have been sent on these specific named embassies around this time.  At 
a time of war and hardship, Athenians may have seen the need to send out ambassadors; but 
Aristophanes seems to be playing to a deep seated resentment that they had to spend their 
dwindling  cash  supplies  paying  famous  and  probably  reasonably  well off  politicians  to 
have time off from the difficult and dangerous life of the average Athenian citizen/soldier.
57 
 
6.3.2  Politicians 
 
Like Acharnians, Wasps is also largely a comedy of political satire, and in the next two 
sections  I  focus  on  this  play.    Here  I  am  concerned  with  two  passages  that  discuss 
politicians in general (i.e. demagogues).  Aristophanes introduces the subject by having 
Philokleon extol the source of his pleasure as a juror: no living creature, he says, is happier, 
more blessed, more in the lap of luxury or more terrible than a juror; great tall men wait for 
him at the entrance to the court, and one puts his hand in Philokleon’s, a soft hand that has 
stolen things from the dêmos, and they all plead: “Pity me, father, I beg you, if you yourself 
have  ever  filched  anything,  when  holding  a  magistracy,  or  when  in  the  army,  going 
shopping for the common mess.” – all of them talk this way (Ar. Vesp. 550 8).  Underlying 
Philokleon’s words is the belief that abusing one’s power for private gain through theft is 
absolutely standard for public officials. 
 
                                                 
55 It comes close to surfacing when Dikaiopolis turns to members of the audience and asks “Have you ever 
been an ambassador?” (609ff.). 
56 Possibly including a pun on lazomai = I grasp.  Aristophanes runs several of the names together, as if all 
these ambassadorial candidates are really indistinguishable. 
57 Compare the ambassador to Persia lying down in covered coaches, while Dikaiopolis has to sleep among 
the rubbish by the city battlements (70 72). Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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This foreshadows a later, lengthy section (655 712), devoted to the crimes of the political 
class.  With some internal plot inconsistency, Philokleon must now be instructed in these 
by Bdelykleon.  As with ambassadors in Acharnians, a number of ‘charges’ are made.  The 
first is that little of the city’s income goes to jurors: while the city makes nearly 12,000,000 
drachmas  (2,000  talents)  a  year  –  from  tribute  from  the  Empire,  other  taxes,  many 
percentages,  lawsuit  deposits,  the  mines,  market  taxes,  harbour  charges,  rewards,  and 
confiscated  goods  –  jurors’  pay  accounts  for  only  900,000  drachmas  (150  talents), 
somewhat less than 10% (656 65).  The second charge, in reply to Philokleon’s question, is 
that the rest goes to politicians: Bdelykleon satirizes how politicians talk to the dêmos, who 
are taken in by such speeches and elect them (665 8).  Thirdly, that politicians take bribes: 
Bdelykleon says politicians intimidate the subject cities by threatening  to destroy them 
through a speech,
58 unless the cities bribe them 300,000 drachmas a time not to (669 71).  
Fourthly, that politicians collude to defraud the dêmos: they share each others’ bribes then 
support  each  others’  cases,  and  get  away  with  it  because  Philokleon  (as  the  average 
Athenian) keeps gaping at the jury paymaster (692 5).
59 
 
Having made these charges, Bdelykleon then compares charge one to charges two and three 
in more depth, playing on a politicians versus non politicians dichotomy: the subject cities 
give politicians bribes, but Philokleon is content gnawing at the offal of the empire, and the 
subject cities see the rabble starving at the ballot box and wolfing down nothing, and think 
they are worthless because of it (672 5); politicians are bribed – with pickles, wine, carpets, 
cheese, honey, sesame seeds, cushions, bowls, shawls, crowns, necklaces, drinking cups, 
anything to keep them healthy and wealthy – but from all the land he rules from his naval 
duties, no one gives Philokleon even a garlic head for his boiled fish (675 9); all those men 
are  in  powerful  positions  themselves,  and  paying  out  all  sorts  to  their  toadies;  but  if 
someone  gives  Philokleon  just  three  obols,  which  he  gained  for  the  city  himself  by 
marching  and  fighting  and  besieging  and  many  other  toils,  he  is  content  –  and  this  is 
slavery (682 5); Philokleon is ordered to be in the jury box at first light else he will lose his 
three obols, by some bullying stripling who will get his drachma however late he turns up 
                                                 
58 We might consider Kleon’s speech in the second Mytilenean debate (Thuc. 3.37 40). 
59 See Rhodes (2004) 228 9 on the ease with which demagogues could fool and flatter the Assembly. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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(687 91); Philokleon rules over an Empire from the Black Sea to Sardinia,
60 but gets almost 
nothing out of it at all – and that little is dribbled out like olive oil, just enough to keep him 
alive  (700 2).    The  contrast  here  could  not  be  clearer:  Philokleon  and  other  normal 
Athenians do all the work of running the empire, while the political class reaps the rewards.  
Politicians are rolling in every kind of luxury, and splurging money on their favourites, but 
those who do an honest day’s work for the city get merely a pittance. 
 
In the above passages, Aristophanes alludes three times to the military service elderly jurors 
will have done to win and keep the Empire.  In contrasting this with the politicians who 
swan off to the subject cities to be bribed, he paints a similar picture to that in Acharnians, 
where  young politicians avoid the fighting the  average (and older) citizen must do, by 
procuring lucrative and luxurious postings as ambassadors.  As there, we might ask how 
much validity there was in these assertions; once again it is hard to be certain.  However, 
the possibility of abuse was always present; certainly the Athenians were constantly aware 
of the possibility and took great pains to prevent it.  Anyone caught with their hand in the 
till, or taking bribes, could expect serious sanctions from the dêmos: in Lys. 28 and 29 we 
saw officials prosecuted for alleged bribe taking and embezzlement (see pp.119 21), and 
this was almost certainly the norm.  Politicians could not be corrupt as a rule therefore 
(albeit in a gift giving culture the grey area was large), but certainly Aristophanes seems to 
be playing to a general resentment that the political class as a whole did rather well out of 
the system.
61  It is notable to what extent the fictional ‘charges’ in Wasps foreshadow those 
actually laid against Ergokles and Philokrates: they started their term in office poor, they 
ended it rich, so they have embezzled and taken bribes from “your” money.  And in Wasps 
these accusations presage Bdelykleon’s final charge: “They want you to be poor,” he says, 
drawing a parallel to underfeeding a dog to make it more savage against enemies; “if they 
wanted to provide a living wage to the dêmos, they could do it easily.” (703 6).
62  Not only 
are politicians feathering their own nests, then, but they are purposely keeping everyone 
                                                 
60 Where Knights distils the dêmos into a collective allegorical figure, Wasps takes a representative individual 
(though Philokleon is more than just a single ordinary Athenian, and sometimes plays incompatible parts: 
e.g. a man who loves to wield power over thieving politicians, but who has to be instructed in how politicians 
steal; a poor juror who needs his three obols, but rich enough to choose the lifestyle of an aristocrat). 
61 See n.31 above. 
62 Again, this argument is not just comic satire: this charge, and indeed all charges in this passage in Wasps, 
are very similar to those made seventy years later in real life by Demosthenes (Dem. 3.29 32 – see pp.121 2).  
When Athens was awash with money from the Empire, as it was when Wasps was produced in 422, they may 
well have been even more plausible. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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else poor so as to control them better.  Behind their backs, the political class is wilfully 
enslaving the dêmos, and training them to be ever more fierce against enemies, so as to win 
ever greater Empire for them to exploit.  And Bdelykleon proposes the solution: get rid of 
the politicians.  “If you were not constantly being confined in some way by the cheats, 
think  how  rich  you  and  all  these  men  would  be”  (698 9:  σκέψαι  τοίνυν  ὡς  ἐξόν  σοι 
πλουτεῖν  καὶ  τοῖσιν  ἅπασιν  ὑπὸ  τῶν  ἀεὶ  δη ιζόντων  οὐκ  οἶδ’  ὅπῃ  ἐγκεκύκλησαι).  
“They’ve cheated you,” he says.  “They have it, and you don’t.  Get rid of them, and then 
you will.”  The language is that of indignation; but with little objective to support it, we can 
see that the emotion primarily played to is envy. 
 
6.3.3  Generals 
 
Along  with  ambassadors,  another  prominent  special  class  of  politician  was  generals.
63  
Wasps,  written  nine  years  into  a  major  war  when  generals  will  have  been  especially 
prominent, lays into them too.  The unfortunate kômôidoumenos is Lakhes,
64 a general who 
had been leading operations in Sicily since 427.
65  Early in the play Philokleon says he is 
off to see the trial of Lakhes, whom everyone says has a hoard of money, and against whom 
Kleon has enjoined them to turn up with three days’ worth of anger, so as to punish him for 
all  his  misdeeds  (240 4:  ὡς  ἔσται  Λάχητι  νυνί   σί βλον  δέ  φασι  χρη άτων  ἔχειν 
ἅπαντες αὐτόν χθὲς οὖν Κλέων ὁ κηδε ὼν ἡ ῖν ἐφεῖτ’ ἐν ὥρᾳ ἥκειν ἔχοντας ἡ ερῶν 
ὀργὴν  τριῶν  πονηρὰν  ἐπ’  αὐτόν,  ὡς  κολω ένους  ὧν  ἠδίκησεν).    Deprived  of  his 
                                                 
63 At this stage in Athens’ history, it was the norm for prominent generals also to be politicians – see Connor 
(1992) 144.  Perikles is the most renowned in this period, but others include Nikias and Alkibiades, and even 
Kleon had his success on the battlefield at Pylos (albeit reaping the rewards of work done by Demosthenes – 
see pp.142 3 and n.73), though unusually after rather than before his prominence in the Assembly.  Unlike 
most posts in Athens, generals were elected (Arist. Ath. Pol. 22.2, 44.4), and only one person would be 
general from each tribe.  For someone to be chosen, he would therefore have to be well known, which biased 
the selection in favour of those rich enough to buy votes, or famous because of their political career or family 
connections. 
64 Though Kleon is the more prominent target of Wasps.  Another general we see targeted is Lamakhos in 
Acharnians, who is used to exploit the ‘same people’ theme (see p.136), and is presented as someone who 
gains from the war by exploiting an apathetical political system. 
65 Thucydides briefly mentions Lakhes commanding in Sicily for around 18 months, from late summer 427/6 
to winter 426/5 (3.86, 3.90, 3.103), but then ignores him until the one year armistice agreed in spring 423 
(4.18).  For him to command in an important arena, propose an armistice, and then be one of the oath takers 
for  Athens  in  the  Peace  of  Nikias  (5.19),  he  must  have  been  a  senior  and  respected  commander,  so 
Thucydides’ silence about what he was up to after early 425 is probably unwarranted.  D. Barrett (1964) 216 
n.17 believes he achieved little in Sicily, and that this play contains enough inferences to indicate that Kleon 
accused him of taking bribes from Sicilian cities.  Plato (La.) portrays Lakhes as brave and loyal, but not 
overly intelligent – not dissimilar characteristics to Aristophanes’ dog Labes (see below). Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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chance to be a juror in that trial, Philokleon later gets to adjudicate in the trial of the dog 
Labes, prosecuted by the dog Kyon, for stealing a Sicilian cheese.  Labes (“Thief”) and 
Kyon (“Dog”) fill well the role of comic surrogates, as defined by Sutton.
66 
 
One of the household slaves from the prologue first tells us that the dog Labes has run past 
him into the kitchen, stolen a fresh Sicilian cheese, and eaten it all (836 8).  The second dog 
(Kyon) wants to prosecute him if there is a trial (841 2).  When he gets the opportunity, he 
makes his charge: Labes has committed the most terrible acts, not just against him but 
against all the rowers in the fleet, by running off into the corner with a large cheese and 
gorging himself wolfing it down in the dark (908 11); he sailed all the way round the 
plaster and ate the casing from all the cities (924 5).
67  Whether or not the charge reflects a 
real prosecution of Lakhes by Kleon (see n.65 above), it would seem to be playing to an 
Athenian fear that their generals might take bribes from an enemy instead of fighting them 
as the dêmos wished.  If any evidence came to light, this would certainly be a prosecutable 
offence; and the Athenian dêmos was in any case in the habit of convicting unsuccessful 
generals,
68 without needing other reasons for their failures.  However, given their evident 
suspicions about all politicians being on the take, bribery by the enemy must have been 
more than an occasional rumour.
69  We saw in ch.5.3.3 a latent phthonos of the entire 
political class and, as we have seen, slander was a good way to fan phthonos.
70 
 
                                                 
66 See n.23 above.  The dogs’ names are sufficiently similar to Lakhes and Kleon that no one would be in any 
doubt who was being lampooned.  D. Barrett (1964) 217 n.32 notes that Kleon even had the nickname Kyon 
(though  that  may  be  a  circular  inference  from  this  play),  and  that  his  deme  was  Kydathenaion;  in  the 
indictment, Kyon’s deme is given as Kydathenaion, and Labes shares Lakhes’ deme of Aixone (895).  That 
Labes and Kyon are both their political alter egos and dogs, and speak/act sometimes like one, sometimes like 
the other, is essential to the parody in this scene.  See MacDowell (1995) 167 70 for further discussion. 
67 The verb κατασικελίζω is a portmanteau of κατασιτέο αι (I feed on) and Σικελία (Sicily); cheeses were 
cased in plaster – D. Barrett (1964) 217 n.33.  OCT (F.W. Hall and W.M. Geldart (1906)) has these charges 
spoken by one of the slaves, but that does not fit with Kyon’s request to prosecute.  In any case, the joke 
works far better with Kyon prosecuting Labes, paralleling Kleon’s prosecution of Lakhes that very day (see 
above), and I follow most editors in having the lines spoken by Kyon.   
68 A habit to which we owe Thucydides’ history.  Dem. 4.47.5 7 says that all generals are tried two or three 
times.  Hansen (1975) 58 65 demonstrates that an astonishingly high percentage of generals were tried and 
convicted: by extrapolation from known eisangelia trials, he infers that on average two generals out of every 
board of ten might have been put on trial, and the vast majority of eisangelia trials ended in death for the 
defendant (unless he fled into exile) – e.g. Ergokles, as we saw at pp.119 20. 
69 Like ambassadors, generals operated out of sight of the Assembly, and so were difficult to control; we 
should therefore not be surprised that generals were particularly prone to prosecution. 
70 See p.67 on diabolê as a tool of phthonos; pp.103 6 (esp. n.32, n.39) on slander as part of Demosthenes’ 
and Aeschines’ mutual phthonos accusation strategies; see also pp.154 5 for Phaidra’s spiteful slander against 
Hippolytos, and p.190 (esp. n.108) for Orestes’ jealous slandering of Neoptolemos, both having fatal effect. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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But this is not all.  Kyon has a second charge: that Labes kept all the cheese for himself and 
refused to give Kyon his share.  He could not have been serving the interests of “you” (the 
‘court’ onstage, and the audience) if he did not give a share to Kyon when asked (914 16: 
κοὐ  ετέδωκ’ αἰτοῦντί  οι. καίτοι τίς ὑ ᾶς εὖ ποιεῖν δυνήσεται, ἢν  ή τι κἀ οί τις 
προβάλλῃ, τῷ κυνί;).  Labes should not be freed, as he is the most eat it yourself man of 
all dogs (922 3).  He must be punished, as one kitchen cannot support two thieves (927 8).  
Kyon’s (Kleon’s) main gripe then, is not that Labes (Lakhes) stole all the cheese (took 
bribes) himself, but that he would not share them with him.  A real prosecutor would not of 
course have made this charge; but with Kleon being both a politician and a general, it 
serves to fan the audience’s phthonos still further (i.e. politicians always have to have their 
cut, and they will destroy you if they do not get it), while allowing Aristophanes to have a 
dig at his old nemesis.
71 
 
7.3.4  Kleon / Paphlagon, a case study 
 
Phthonos is an especially significant force in Knights, not just because the play attempts to 
arouse that emotion in the audience, but because there is plenty on stage as well – and it 
does not occur in one or two isolated sections but throughout the entire play.  Onstage we 
see it first in the attitudes of the two slaves Nikias and Demosthenes towards Paphlagon.
72  
Nikias and Demosthenes have been slaves to Demos for longer, but Paphlagon has usurped 
their  place  in  the  house.    Several  ‘charges’  are  presented  by  Demosthenes.    First,  that 
Paphlagon flatters Demos grossly: he immediately got to know the ways of their master, 
and  falling  at  his  feet  he  wheedled,  fawned  upon,  flattered  and  beguiled  him  with  the 
highest scraps of phrasery (46 9); he pours Demos’ bath, and says he will cook food for 
him to gobble down greedily (50 1).  The second charge is that Paphlagon presents what 
others have done for Demos as his own work: he grabs food one of the others has cooked 
for Demos and offers it, to make Demos grateful to him – he did this only the other day 
                                                 
71 Aristophanes’ and Kleon’s quarrel dated back to the performance of Banqueters in 427, through a possible 
indictment of Aristophanes by Kleon (see the parabasis of Acharnians), and Aristophanes’ viciousness about 
Kleon in Knights (see below); cf. MacDowell (1995) 111 12, 170. 
72 I agree with most commentators that the two slaves are meant as parodies of Nikias and Demosthenes 
specifically, rather than two other generic politicians – see e.g. MacDowell (1995) 87 8, Sommerstein and 
Barrett (1978) 33; see Henderson (2003) for a contrary view.  (I take it as read that Paphlagon and Demos are 
respectively parodies of Kleon and of a personification of the Athenian dêmos.) Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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with a Spartan cake Demosthenes had baked in Pylos (52 7).
73  Third, he drives the other 
slaves off from Demos: he will not let them care for him, and during dinner he stands 
behind him with a leather thong, driving the other orators away (58 60).  Fourth, he makes 
prophecies and tells lies to Demos to get the other slaves/orators punished: he plays the 
Sibyl to the old man, and when he sees it has made him sufficiently stupid, he turns it to his 
advantage (61 3); he openly slanders the other slaves with lies indoors, so then they are 
whipped (63 5).  Finally, he blackmails the other slaves/orators: he goes round the other 
slaves and demands, stirs up, and takes bribes saying, “You saw Hylas was flogged because 
of me?  If you don’t persuade me then today you’ll die;” and they give it to him, else they 
shit eight times as hard when trampled on by the old man (65 70). 
 
The first charge (flattery and fawning) makes it sound as if Nikias and Demosthenes feel 
phthonos  (envy)  for  Paphlagon,  as  he  has  become  Demos’  favourite  despite  being  the 
newest  slave.
74    However  they  make  it  clear  that  he  has  gained  this  position  through 
flattery, not deservedly, and this brings other emotions to mind, such as indignation and 
anger.  They bolster a case for their resentment being indignation (i.e. that Paphlagon is 
objectively  acting  unjustly),  with  the  following  charge:  as  he  has  stolen  their  cakes  to 
present as his own, he does not deserve the favouritism shown him.
75  The three subsequent 
charges show Paphlagon treating the other slaves hubristically, and Aristotle tells us that 
this  arouses  orgê.
76    We  have  seen  though  that  indignation  and  anger  can  easily  be 
presented as envy by an opponent, and in the second agôn we find Paphlagon accusing his 
opponents of envious cawing (1051:  ὴ πείθου  φθονεραὶ γὰρ ἐπικρώζουσι κορῶναι).  
Such  accusations,  however,  can  cut  both  ways,  and  Demosthenes’  charges  effectively 
accuse Paphlagon of phthonos (jealousy) to retain his own position as Demos’ favourite 
slave: his insisting on being the one to serve Demos and beating off the other slaves; and 
                                                 
73 The theme of Kleon stealing Demosthenes’ victory at Pylos crops up again at 392, 744 5 and 1201. 
74 Attacking the new favourite of the dêmos might well have been a feature of political rivalry – e.g. consider 
the charges laid against Alkibiades in 415, which Thucydides says were fanned by those he had supplanted in 
the dêmos’ affections (Thuc. 6.28). 
75 Aristotle makes clear that undeserved good fortune is the criterion for to nemesan – or rather indignation 
phthonos. 
76 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30 31 (orgê is a desire for revenge for a belittlement), 1378b14 15 (there are three 
types of belittlement, including hybris) – see pp.172 3 for a more thorough discussion.  However until the two 
slaves hatch their plan, revenge seems elusive.  Hatred of Paphlagon because of his unprovoked enmity, and 
fear of his power, are two other emotions clearly present in this scene. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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especially  his  slandering  of  them.
77    We  saw  in  ch.5  that  orators  bolster  a  charge  of 
phthonos with accusations of diabolê, supported by a battery of other offences (pseudeis, 
loidoria, blasphemia).
78  It is Nikias who first accuses Paphlagon of slander (6 7: κάκιστα 
δῆθ’ οὗτός γε πρῶτος Παφλαγόνων αὐταῖς διαβολαῖς), and Demosthenes agrees he is 
a very great slanderer (44 45: Παφλαγόνα, πανουργότατον καὶ διαβολώτατόν τινα) 
before delivering the detailed accusation above; he refers to Paphlagon’s slanders three 
times  later  in  the  play  (486,  491,  496),  and  Paphlagon  himself  admits  he  will  slander 
Sausage Seller (288) – an admission that would not happen outside comedy. Demosthenes’ 
accusation  of  lying  (charge  four  above)  is  repeated  by  Sausage Seller 
(630: ψευδατραφάξυος) and admitted by Paphlagon (694 5: εἰ  ή σ’ ἀπολέσαι ’, εἴ τι 
τῶν  αὐτῶν  ἐ οὶ  ψευδῶν  ἐνείη,  διαπέσοι ι  πανταχῇ).    Demosthenes  also  calls 
Paphlagon a baskanos (103) – implying he has an envious eye.
79 Sausage Seller eventually 
explicitly accuses Paphlagon of being jealous of his position: he put a stop to buggery out 
of jealousy that any other orators might emerge (878 80: οὔκουν σε δῆτα ταῦτα δεινόν 
ἐστι πρωκτοτηρεῖν παῦσαί τε τοὺς κινου ένους; κοὐκ ἔσθ’ ὅπως ἐκείνους οὐχὶ φθονῶν 
ἔπαυσας, ἵνα  ὴ ῥήτορες γένοιντο).
80 
 
These slurs in themselves will appeal to the audience’s phthonos (Schadenfreude) against 
politicians: as well as being given almost free license to engage in this illicit emotion by its 
onstage presence, the accusations will work with the grain of the audience’s own prejudices 
against politicians that we saw Aristophanes playing to in Acharnians and Wasps.  They 
will also relish the anticipation of Aristophanes taking such overt swipes at the biggest 
politician of the day.
81  Their anticipation is soon gratified.  First, however, Demosthenes 
explains to Sausage Seller that he has all the qualifications for being a politician in Athens: 
he is knavish, brazen, and from the market place (181); he is not in any way noble (183 5); 
politics is right for him as he is uneducated and loathsome (191 3), though it may harm him 
                                                 
77 See n.70 above. 
78 See ch.5 n.32, also n.34, n.39. 
79 Ironically a slur the logographer Demosthenes later makes his own – see ch.5 n.40. 
80 Probably a reference partly to the prevalence of homosexual relationships in the upper classes from which 
politicians traditionally came, partly to the initially educative and later patronage aspects of many of these 
relationships, which helped an aspiring politician’s rise; it may also be a simple slur that Paphlagon does not 
want anyone to get buggered except by him. 
81 A relish that did not (as has been frequently noted) stop them re electing him as general a few weeks later.  
Comic poets were in the habit of picking out the leading political figure for humiliation: e.g. Perikles in 
Kratinos’ Dionysalexandros, or Hyperbolos in Eupolis’ Marikas – see Sommerstein (1996) 335. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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that he can read a little (190); politics is a very base art, like making a sausage – he can stir 
up and make mincemeat of all the city’s affairs, and win over the dêmos by sweetening 
them with words like a cook seasons a sausage (213 16); he has a foul voice and a base 
lineage, and is market born (218).
82  In other words, Demosthenes says that politicians are 
the lowest of the low and the vilest of the vile.  If this were so, we might infer, they should 
never  have  reached  the  top;  and  if  their  position  were  totally  unmerited,  indignation 
phthonos would be appropriate.  However, Demosthenes’ description is a comic distortion.  
From  outside  the  play,  while  the  audience  may  see  some  (even  much)  truth  in  his 
caricature,  they  will  know  the  description  is  only  partly  merited  –  and  so  the  animus 
Aristophanes plays to is phthonos proper, with all the nuances of this Greek term (i.e. both 
envy phthonos and indignation phthonos). 
 
Turning to the two agônes, much of the raillery is general insulting,
83 or other types of 
shamelessness,
84 and I shall pass over these as irrelevant to my topic.  However, several 
accusations are important to an examination of phthonos.  First, that Paphlagon has been 
bribed  by  a  foreign  power:  the  Potidaians  gave  him  ten  talents  (438)  –  Paphlagon 
immediately offers one talent to Sausage Seller for his silence (439).  We have seen that the 
accusation that politicians take bribes from foreign powers recurs in Wasps, as does the 
idea that they share the spoils between them (both in one of the general accusations against 
politicians, and in Kyon’s desire to prosecute Labes because he would not share his gains).  
A second charge also appears in Wasps: that Paphlagon has been cheating Demos of his 
due,  while  only  paying  him  a  salary  (presumably  the  three  obols  made  so  much  of  in 
Wasps) – in fact, says Sausage Seller, he is intentionally prolonging the war so the dêmos 
does not notice him plundering and bribe taking his way round Greece (801 7).  The third 
charge is that Paphlagon bribes Demos (first levelled by Demosthenes in the prologue – 
charge three above), and Paphlagon himself boasts that he knows how to feed the dêmos 
(715).  He and Sausage Seller compete as to how much they can do for Demos/dêmos: first 
they  try  to  bribe  them  with  huge  sacrifices  (652 64),  from  which  public  meat  will  be 
                                                 
82 For the view that Aristophanes expresses views on politics and politicians typical of his class, and works 
these serious views into his jokes wherever possible, see De Ste. Croix (1972).  Gomme (1938) argues the 
opposite:  that  Aristophanes’  views  were  irrelevant  to  his  writing,  his  only  goal  being  to  produce  good 
comedy.  See Heath (1987) for a more balanced approach. 
83 See Rosen (1988) on the iambic nature of much of the comedy of this play. 
84 Accusations of shamelessness, mostly against Paphlagon, occur eight times: at 277, 325, 385 (twice), 397/8, 
409, 638 and 1206. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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distributed;  Paphlagon  later  says  he  has  filled  the  common  Treasury  with  money,  has 
racked and choked and extorted on their behalf, and cared nothing for the individual in his 
aim to please (773 6); Sausage Seller replies that he will offer him bread, and put a cushion 
under him, which Paphlagon never did (777 85); he even gives him new shoes (871 2) and 
a tunic (881 3). 
 
The final accusation (related to the second) is that Paphlagon has abused his position for 
personal gain.  The Chorus first makes the charge: Paphlagon devours the goods obtained 
in common (258); he examines those submitting their accounts like someone squeezing 
figs, to see if it is unripe or ripening or juicy, and if he knows one is inexperienced and 
gawping, he drags him back from the Chersonese, throws him down with slander, twists his 
arm round and gulps him down (259 63); and if he finds any citizen who is a simpleton, 
rich and not base and trembling at public affairs, he does the same (264 5).  Demosthenes 
adds that whenever Paphlagon goes into the public dining hall, he not only comes out full, 
but carrying away broken off hunks of bread and meat and slices of fish (282 3).  Sausage 
Seller says later that for every bite he gives the dêmos, he devours three times as much 
(717 18).  Indeed Paphlagon’s embezzlement is comically all about food, and the charge is 
proved when Sausage Seller opens Paphlagon’s box to find all the food he has embezzled 
(1218 20).  Sausage Seller explains: Paphlagon has always carried out his role in this way; 
he gives Demos a small part of his takings, and sets aside the greater part for himself 
(1221 3: τοιαῦτα  έντοι καὶ πρότερόν σ’ ἠργάζετο  σοὶ  ὲν προσεδίδου  ικρὸν ὧν 
ἐλά βανεν, αὐτὸς δ’ ἑαυτῷ παρετίθει τὰ  είζονα).  Again this is similar to the charge 
made in Wasps, that less than a tenth of the profits of the city go to the dêmos in pay, the 
remainder being stolen by the politicians.  Paphlagon, true to the nature of politicians in 
Aristophanes, staunchly maintains that his theft was for the city’s  good (1226: ἐγὼ δ’ 
ἔκλεπτον ἐπ’ ἀγαθῷ γε τῇ πόλει);
85 but Demos rightly runs him out of town.  With the 
exception of the competition to bribe Demos, which Paphlagon and Sausage Seller engage 
in completely unselfconsciously, all accusations are couched in the language of indignation, 
and Paphlagon’s eventual unmasking shows that in the play the animus is truly merited.  
But, as I have argued throughout this chapter, it is unlikely that the political class as a 
whole embezzled wholesale from the dêmos; and without this objective corroboration, the 
                                                 
85 Compare Hyp. 5.24 5, discussed at n.31 above. Chapter 6:  Old Comedy 
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emotion aimed at must be (transmuted) envy as much as, if not more than, indignation.  
Aristophanes counts on his audience’s phthonos that politicians seem to do “quite nicely, 
thank you”, so as to rouse their laughter through Schadenfreude at Kleon’s discomfiture 
and Paphlagon’s comeuppance. 
 
6.4  Conclusion 
 
Plato is, then, probably exaggerating when he says that the root of all comedy is malice.  
However, this approach to Aristophanes shows that his political comedies do indeed play 
extensively  to  audience  phthonos  for  the  political  class.
86    While  kômôidoumenoi  are 
abused, at least with political kômôidoumenoi it is not just simple abuse, but rather the poet 
substitutes  socially  acceptable  bases  for  his  criticism,  i.e.  accusations  of  wrongdoing  – 
allegations that seem sometimes meant to be serious.  These accusations can, when looked 
at objectively, be shown as having little to support them in the majority of cases; but the 
fact that they can be, and regularly are, made shows one way in which the Athenian system 
evolved institutions that had a symbiotic relationship with the democracy – in the case of 
political abuse in comedy, helping to keep the majority of politicians reasonably honest, 
and thus reinforcing the stability of the democratic system.
87 
 
As I have shown, the language of these accusations is that of indignation (“they do wrong”, 
“they don’t deserve…”); however the emotion played to is phthonos.  As is generally the 
case for phthonos, this cannot be admitted to; but a skilled dramatist like Aristophanes 
knew just how far he could go in touching this nerve, without his audience realising that 
phthonos was indeed the emotion he was playing to – a realisation that, due to phthonos’ 
unacceptability,  would  have  made  the  humour  too  uncomfortable  for  the  laughter  that 
would gain him his prize. 
 
                                                 
86 And it is not just Aristophanes: Kratinos, Eupolis and other Old Comic playwrights do this too – see n.81 
above. 
87 See pp.132 3.  It is a nice paradox that Athenians (and other Greeks) both disapproved of phthonos, and 
spent large sums on a festival that utilised phthonos constantly to negotiate the relationship between the 
democratic polis, its citizens, and its public figures. Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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Chapter 7:  Onstage Phthonos in Tragedy 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter I move from a focus on emotions aroused in the audience, to look instead at 
onstage  phthonos  narratives.
1    These  are  comparatively  rare  in  Old  Comedy  (Kleon’s 
relationship  with  other  characters  in  Knights  being  an  obvious  exception),  but  more 
common  in  tragedy.    However,  phthonos  words  tend  not  to  be  associated  with  these 
episodes, or are raised briefly only to be denied.
2  Accordingly, reading these phthonos 
narratives  requires  to  the  fullest  degree  both  our knowledge  of  the  socio psychological 
phenomenology of envy and jealousy (from ch.2), to which I shall regularly refer, and (in 
order to place our analysis into Greek terms) what we have learned of phthonos to date: the 
full range of its linguistic meanings (from ch.3); its socio psychology (from ch.3, ch.4); and 
the  tendency  of  envy phthonos  (i.e.  envy,  possessive  jealousy,  grudging,  spite  etc.)  to 
masquerade as indignation phthonos (i.e. indignation, desire for justice etc.; ch.5.3, ch.6). 
 
I look here at two plays in which phthonos plays a significant part in the plot – Sophocles’ 
Ajax (ch.7.2) and Euripides’ Hippolytos (ch.7.3, 7.4).  Goldhill has argued that “[t]ragedy 
… resists the ‘rivalrous emotions’ of ‘envy, spite and jealousy’, except as brief tokens in 
rhetorical  battles”.
3    While  accepting  that  these  emotions  are  perhaps  less  frequently 
prevalent in tragedy than some others (e.g. rage, grief), I shall demonstrate that ‘envy, spite 
and jealousy’ do in fact have more than a bit part to play.
4 
 
                                                 
1 Following a much more detailed exploration in ch.8.2 8.4 of onstage sexual jealousy scenarios in tragedy, I 
show in ch.8.5 how these could be deployed in other genres, especially in oratory to manipulate audiences. 
2 This tendency to accusation and/or denial is not dissimilar to usage of phthonos words in oratory.  Aesch. 
Ag. is a notable exception, where phthonos of both gods and humans is explicitly a major concern, especially 
in the tapestries scene (Ag. 810 974). 
3 Goldhill (2003) 178. 
4 In this chapter I will show phthonos as a significant plot element in two tragedies; in ch.8 I show sexual 
jealousy as a major plot driver in three more; this totals some 15% of the thirty two surviving tragedies.  In 
each case, a phenomenological (emotion script) approach demonstrates that these go far beyond “rhetorical 
battles”. Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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7.2  Ajax (Ajax) 
 
The action of Sophocles’ Ajax revolves around two decisions taken by Ajax: first, to kill the 
Atreidai, and torture and kill Odysseus; second, to commit suicide.  The motivation for the 
second decision is generally given as shame or loss of face (atimia) – at having killed farm 
animals, at being unable to revenge himself, at being unable to take a great prize home to 
prove himself worthy to be his father’s son; the only possible way he can salvage some timê 
now is to kill himself.
5  The motivation for his first decision is more controversial: some 
argue it is also shame, or at least atimia and an attempt to regain face;
6 others that he is 
motivated  by  anger  and  a  desire  for  revenge.
7    I  do  not  intend  to  argue  against  these 
motivations; but people can do things for more than one reason, and a phenomenological 
approach  indicates  that  jealousy  is  an  additional,  or  underlying,  motivation  for  Ajax’s 
decision to torture Odysseus and to kill him and the other Greek leaders. 
 
The key to understanding Ajax’s emotional motivation is the Judgment of Arms, which 
takes place before the play begins.  Although the Arms have been awarded to Odysseus, 
Ajax believes this is wrong.  It is notable that he says in his first speech that the Arms that 
have been taken from him are “mine” (10: τἄ ’ ἀφαιρείσθων ὅπλα),
8 and this sense of 
prior possession is crucial.  Homeric tradition held that Ajax was second only in arms to 
Achilles (Hom. Il. 2.768 9),
9 a tradition that had remained intact through to the fifth century 
(e.g. Pind. Nem. 7.27),
10 and which confirmed that the Judgment should automatically have 
awarded the Arms to Ajax.
11  With no prior indication in the play that Sophocles intended 
                                                 
5 Williams (1993) 72 3, 84 5; Cairns (1993) 230 1; Easterling (1989) 48; Zanker (1992) 22.   Lansky (1996) 
for Ajax’s shame being pathological.  Winnington Ingram (1980) 27, Konstan (1996) 105 6, Hesk (2003) 43, 
and Knox (1961) 5 all note (correctly) that Ajax does not express regret for his attempt to kill the Atreidai and 
Odysseus. 
6 Lansky (1996); Hesk (2003) 43; Simpson (1969) 88; Winnington Ingram (1980) 18 19.  Konstan (2006) 
105 6 explicitly disagrees with shame as a motive, as Ajax never says he is shamed – this may be true, but he 
certainly talks about his atimia (e.g. line 98), and Kamerbeek (1953) 37 notes it is not accidental that Ajax’s 
first words are kompos paresti (= “boasting, talking big”). 
7 Konstan (2006) 105 6; Hesk (2003) 22, 42; W.V. Harris (2001) 64; W.V. Harris (2003) 124.  Easterling 
(1989) 48 tells us Ajax felt insulted and wanted revenge – insults being one of the three types of behaviour 
that Aristotle believes arouse orgê (Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378b10 15), which is a desire for revenge (Arist. Rh. 
2.2.1378a30 32). 
8 All the commentators have noted this as significant: Jebb (1896) 26 notes that with Achilles dead, Ajax 
considered the Arms belonged to him by right; cf. Garvie (1998) 133, Stanford (1963) 70.  Kamerbeek (1953) 
38 notes Ajax says they are “mine”, and not “due to me” – i.e. they are already “mine”. 
9 Hesk (2003) 32 3. 
10 Ibid. 36 7. 
11 Their value to Ajax is not so much intrinsic as symbolic. Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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to  alter  this  aspect  of  the  myth,  the  audience  would  have  approached  the  play  in  the 
traditional expectation that the Arms would more fairly have gone to Ajax, and had been 
withheld from him unjustly.  This interpretation, fed by Ajax’s reference to “my” Arms, is 
upheld through the play.  Ajax believes Achilles himself, had he lived, would have awarded 
him his armour as the prize for excellence (442 4: εἰ ζῶν ’Αχιλλεὺς τῶν ὅπλων τῶν ὧν 
πέρι κρίνειν ἔ ελλε κράτος ἀριστείας τινί, οὐκ ἄν τις αὔτ’ ἔ αρψεν ἄλλος ἀντ’ ἐ οῦ), 
and says that the Atreidai procured them dishonestly for Odysseus (445 6: νῦν δ’ αὔτ’ 
’Ατρεῖδαι φωτὶ παντουργῷ φρένας ἔπραξεν).
12  Later Teukros says Menelaus has been 
discovered to be  a thief who fixed the voting (1135: κλέπτης γὰρ αὐτοῦ ψηφοποιὸς 
ηὑρέθης).  And Menelaus tries speciously to place the blame instead on unnamed judges 
(1136: ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς, οὐκ ἐ οί, τόδ’ ἐσφάλη), but does not deny that there has been 
some error in the outcome of the voting, and thus implicitly recognises Ajax’s entitlement 
to the Arms.  It is clear then that Ajax believed that the Arms should have been awarded to 
him, indeed that they were already his by right and had been taken from him illegitimately, 
and he was probably right to do so.
13  By considering the phenomenology we can therefore 
see that the appropriate situation for a jealousy scenario has been created:
14 Ajax has an 
exclusive  relationship  with  ‘his’  Arms  (i.e.  possession),  but  has  lost  them  to  a  rival 
(Odysseus). 
 
What emotions are aroused in Ajax by this loss?
15   First, anger.  Ajax does not talk about 
his anger – perhaps surprisingly for an emotion that is supposed to motivate him.  However 
others do attribute anger to him.  Athena says Ajax was made heavy with kholos on account 
of the Arms (41: χόλῳ βαρυνθεὶς τῶν ’Αχιλλείων ὅπλων).  The Chorus (his subjects, 
who know him well) say they hope Ajax has been converted from his thymos against the 
Atreidai (717 18: Αἴας  ετανεγνώσθη θυ ῶν ’Ατρείδαις  εγάλων τε νεικέων), and later 
that  Ajax  wished  to  be  reconciled  with  the  gods  after  his  kholos  (744:  θεοῖσιν  ὡς 
καταλλαχθῇ  χόλου).    And  Teukros  knows  that  Ajax  could  be  portrayed  as  a  bad 
                                                 
12 Garvie (1998) 166 notes that the verb πράσσω implies a “secret or underhand transaction”; cf. Stanford 
(1963) 117, Jebb (1896) 76. 
13 Though in fact the rightness of his belief is irrelevant: jealousy (and envy) is a subjective response, and so it 
is not strictly relevant that Ajax’s viewpoint is validated by a friend, an enemy, and the heroic tradition; but 
these confirm that the audience will objectively (i.e. disinterestedly) agree that Ajax has been wronged, and 
will have no trouble understanding his emotional motivation(s). 
14 See pp.29 31 on the phenomenology of jealousy scenarios. 
15 The affects aroused in a jealousy scenario where the possession has already been lost are typically: anger, 
envy, hostility, grief at loss, and wounded pride (see p.30). Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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tempered man, whose thymos was roused to strife over nothing (1017 18: τοιαῦτ’ ἀνὴρ 
δύσοργος ... ἐρεῖ, πρὸς οὐδὲν εἰς ἔριν θυ ού ενος).  A second very important emotion is 
hatred; but once again Ajax does not express hatred as an emotion (misos, stygos, ekhthos) 
for his enemies, but rather enmity as a cultural value (ekhthros).
16  Menelaus says he and 
Ajax  hated  each  other  (1134:  ισοῦντ’  ἐ ίσει),  though  other  comments  by  him  (1054), 
Agamemnon (1373), and Odysseus (1336, 1347) testify only to their hatred for Ajax, not 
Ajax’s  for  them.    Ajax  does  however  describe  Odysseus  as  his  ekhthros  (389:  ἐχθρὸν 
ἄλη α – Athena too notes the enmity (2) as does Odysseus (78), who states that it dates 
from the Judgment of Arms (1337)), and more generally talks about “my enemies” (557, 
653, 772, 829), by which it is clear from context that he means Odysseus and the Atreidai – 
the Chorus (196, 1042) and Tekmessa (495, 924) also talk about these three as “enemies”.  
A third emotion Ajax expresses is wounded pride: he does not use the words aidôs or 
aiskhunê,  but  he  does  say  he  has  been  dishonoured  (426 7:  τανῦν    δ’  ἄτι ος  ὧδε 
πρόκει αι;  440:  ἄτι ος  ‘Αργείοισιν  ὧδ’  ἀπόλλυ αι)  and  that  the  Atreidai  will  not 
dishonour him again (98: ὥστ’ οὔποτ’ Αἴανθ’ οἵδ’ ἀτι άσουσ’ ἔτι), implying they have in 
the  past;  and  he  expresses  a  concern  that  his  enemies  are  laughing  at  him  (367: οἴ οι 
γέλωτος; 382: ἦ που πολὺν γέλωθ’ ὑφ’ ἡδονῆς ἄγεις – the Chorus (383, 957 8, 1043) 
and Tekmessa (961) think this is true).
17 
 
From this survey, it is clear that Ajax does not talk about his emotions much.  However, 
there are strong indications that he feels the affects listed above, and all stem from the 
decision to award the Arms to Odysseus.  Perhaps unsurprisingly for such a truly Homeric 
hero, the language he uses is predominantly that of the Homeric value system (honour and 
dishonour, friendship and enmity); however what one feels is not bounded entirely by what 
one says one feels, and we should not ignore these strong indications for Ajax’s emotional 
state.    Anger,  hatred,  and  wounded  pride,  all  directly  aroused  by  these  situational 
antecedents,  are  a  strong  indication  that  a  jealousy  scenario  is  taking  place.    But  the 
clincher  is  the  final  emotion  Ajax  feels:  envy.    In  English,  envy  is  one  of  the  affects 
                                                 
16 He says, in a beautifully rhetorical tricolon, that he is hated by the gods, the Greek army, and the whole 
Trojan plain (457 9: θεοῖς ἐχθαίρο αι,  ισεῖ δέ  ’ ‘Ελλήνων στρατός, ἔχθει δὲ Τροία πᾶσα καὶ πεδία 
τάδε); but he expresses his own hatred only for the long dead Hector (817 8, cf. 665), and makes a general 
comment  (in  his  deception  speech)  as  to  the  amount  one  should  hate  enemies  (678 80:  ἐπίστα αι  γὰρ 
ἀρτίως ὅτι ὅ τ’ ἐχθρὸς ἡ ῖν ἐς τοσόνδ’ ἐχθαρτέος, ὡς καὶ φιλήσων αὖθις). 
17 Cairns (1993) 228 9, Knox (1961) 6, Hesk (2003) 42 on Ajax’s sense of dishonour and his being mocked 
by his enemies. Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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included in the possessive jealousy blend (see n.15 above); but in Greek we have seen that 
both words are covered by phthonos, and we can understand Ajax’s situation most clearly 
through  the  ‘situational’  approach  to  envy,  jealousy  and  rivalry  (see  pp.32 3).    Ajax’s 
phthonos in this play  is not stated,
18 but we know from  ch.3 that one never admits to 
phthonos in Greek; however Ajax’s phthonos becomes clear if we consider the actions his 
emotional state impels: to kill the Atreidai, and to torture and kill Odysseus. 
 
Of the affects discussed above, it is clear that Ajax’s anger and hatred are directed at, and 
wounded pride aroused  by,  all three of his enemies; however it is only  Odysseus who 
possesses ‘his’ Arms, and this explains why Odysseus’ punishment differs from that of the 
Atreidai.  The latter have dishonoured him (98, 100), proved to be his enemies (557, 653, 
772,  829),  and  are  believed  to  be  revelling  in  his  humiliation  (367)  –  the  appropriate 
response  for  any  (heroic)  Greek  is  to  kill  them:  “Help  your  friends,  but  harm  your 
enemies.”
19    But  if  he  envies  Odysseus,
20  we  should  expect  to  see  something  more 
destructive, more ‘spoiling’, and we do.  Ajax will kill Odysseus and take back his Arms, 
but first he wishes to humiliate him: he does not want Odysseus to die yet (106: θανεῖν γὰρ 
αὐτὸν οὔ τί πω θέλω); he intends to tie him to a pillar (108: πρὶν ἂν δεθεὶς πρὸς κίον’) 
and  whip  him  until  his  back  is  crimson  before  he  dies  (110:  άστιγι  πρῶτον  νῶτα 
φοινιχθεὶς θάνῃ).
21  This shows more than enmity – for that he wished only to kill the 
Atreidai.  His behaviour towards Odysseus, now he has him in his power, is spiteful, even 
sadistic;  and  Tekmessa  says  that  while  delivering  this  whipping  he  was  laughing 
(303: συντιθεὶς  γέλων  πολύν)  –  Schadenfreude  being  another  indicator  of  envy  (see 
pp.37 8).  These indications should alert us that envy too is part of the blend of affects Ajax 
feels.  In situational antecedents, affects, and resulting action, Ajax’s behaviour matches 
well the phenomenology described at pp.29 31,
22 and we should therefore recognise that 
one of Ajax’s underlying motivations is phthonos. 
 
                                                 
18 The only mention of phthonos in the play is the Chorus’ description of the phthonos of Ajax’s enemies 
(157). 
19 Knox (1961) 3 4 lists where this well known aphorism can be found in the Lyric corpus. 
20 We can note that Odysseus is Ajax’s direct peer; cf. Aristotle’s comment that one feels phthonos for one’s 
equals (see p.86). 
21 For real life parallels of tying to a pillar and whipping, see Aeschin. 1.59 on Hegesandros’ and Timarkhos’ 
humiliation of Pittalakos – see Fisher (2001) 197 on this treatment being indicative of servile status, and for 
further bibliography; cf. Lys. fr.2b.4 on Teisis’ humiliation of Arkhippos – Todd (2000) 348, 350. 
22 I.e. we have a phthonos scenario. Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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7.3  Phaidra (Hippolytos) 
 
It is beyond doubt that the main emotion Phaidra labours under, apart from erôs, is shame 
(aidôs), and it is aidôs that is the primary motivation of her suicide and accusation of rape: 
only  by  neutralising  Hippolytos’  credibility  with  Theseus  can  she  guarantee  the 
preservation of her own, and her children’s, reputations.
23  However, there is a trail of 
evidence  that  Phaidra  also  feels phthonos  for  Hippolytos,  from  her  first  appearance  on 
stage, and that this phthonos contributes to the reasons for leaving her suicide note.  Shortly 
after  Phaidra  is  carried  on  stage,  in  her  starvation induced  delirium  she  speaks  three 
passages of fantasy: in the first she says she wishes to draw water from the spring, and lie 
beneath the poplar tree in the lush meadow (208 11); in the second she wants to go to the 
mountain,  and  hunt  wild  animals  in  the  pine wood  with  dogs,  while  she  shouts  at  the 
hounds and casts Thracian spears (215 22); in the third she prays to Artemis that she can 
train horses in the exercise ground on her sacred precinct (228 31).  It seems no accident 
that all these are aspects of Hippolytos’ care free life: he worships Artemis, and in her 
company hunts wild animals with hounds in the green pine woods (15 19; cf. 52 56); he 
goes to the virgin meadow watered by rivers (73 4, 76 8); and he exercises horses (110 12); 
as the son of an Amazon, the Thracian reference could even apply to him.  It has been 
frequently noted that this is Phaidra’s means of expressing her passion for Hippolytos.
24  
But as Goldhill points out, it is also an expression of her transgressive desire to break out of 
the cloistered female world, and run free with Hippolytos – not just to be with him, but to 
enjoy the pastimes themselves with him.
25  Even at this early stage, while she is besotted 
with Hippolytos but before his rejection, Phaidra envies Hippolytos his lifestyle – even if at 
present  that  would  be  the  emulative  envy  of  zêlos  rather  than  the  destructive  envy  of 
phthonos. 
 
This all changes however after his conversation with the Nurse, with his diatribe against 
women in general, his violent rejection and denunciation of Phaidra in particular, and his 
                                                 
23 Of the  vast literature on Phaidra’s aidôs  see especially  Dodds (1925), Segal (1970), Kovacs (1980b), 
Kawashima (1986), Sommerstein (1988) 24 8, Craik (1993), Cairns (1993) 314 40, Williams (1993) 225 30, 
S. Mills (2002) 53 60. 
24 Dodds (1925) 102; Knox (1952) 6; W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 200.  Glenn (1976), Craik (1998) 32 see these 
desires as erotic; Dimock (1977) 244 5 believes Phaidra loves Hippolytos’ chastity. 
25 Goldhill (1986) 124 5.  Goldhill describes Phaidra as  wanting the life of a Bacchant, and once again 
Hippolytos has prefigured this Dionysiac desire in returning with his friends from a kômos (55). Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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threat to reveal all to Theseus.
26  The “No” to incestuous adultery by itself would not be 
surprising, and neither would a shocked response – the Nurse and the Chorus, who are on 
Phaidra’s side, have already responded in just this way (353 61, 362 72).
27  Rather, Phaidra 
reacts to Hippolytos’ high handedness on the one hand, and the threat to expose her on the 
other.  The high handedness of his rejection is a blow to her pride;
28 and the threat to 
expose her, to destroy her, turns him into an enemy – it turns her erotic love to anger, which 
must be assuaged.
29  We can see that Phaidra now feels for Hippolytos not just erôs (sexual 
desire for, and covetousness of, him as an individual), but also emulation for his lifestyle, 
wounded pride (a “narcissistic wound” in psychologists’ terminology), hatred (enmity), and 
rage.  These are the elements of envy – and the last three were all roused by the manner of 
his rejection and his planned exposure of her to Theseus (the two things she mentions in her 
exit speech), and it is those that have turned her emulous envy to destructive envy. 
 
Phaidra gives effect to her phthonos, and carries out her revenge, by means of slander.
30  
This slander serves two purposes: first, it causes Theseus to punish Hippolytos – Phaidra 
uses her husband to mete out the punishment she cannot on her own; second, and even 
more important, it serves to deprive Hippolytos of the carefree wild existence that Phaidra 
                                                 
26 There has been some discussion as to whether Phaidra is on stage for the denunciation.  Kovacs (1987) 54 
argues  that  she  leaves  after  line  600,  returning  before  line  680.    Halleran  (1995)  200 1  cites  the  main 
scholarship for and against this view.  I am unconvinced by Kovacs’ arguments, agreeing with Halleran that 
the  scene  is  dramatically  much  stronger  with  her  present.    As  W.S.  Barrett  (1964/2001)  284 5  notes, 
Hippolytos’  “complete  and  studied  ignoring”  of  her,  except  for  one  contemptuous  throw away  comment 
immediately before he leaves the stage, is dramatically very powerful.  More tellingly, if Phaidra merely knew 
Hippolytos did not want to accept her love, but had not heard his violent denunciation and his threat to inform 
Theseus, why would she resort to the revenge she does, rather than going back to her plan to starve herself to 
death?  Why would she utter her final comment: “But in dying I shall make myself a cause of harm (kakon) to 
another, so he might learn not to be haughty (hypsêlos) at my misfortunes; by sharing in my sickness, he will 
learn to be discreet (sôphronein)” (728 31: ἀτὰρ κακόν γε χἀτέρωι γενήσο αι θανοῦσ’, ἵν’ εἰδῆι  ὴ ’πὶ 
τοῖς ἐ οῖς κακοῖς ὑψηλὸς εἶναι  τῆς νόσου δὲ τῆσδέ  οι κοινῆι  ετασχὼν σωφρονεῖν  αθήσεται)?  The 
haughty remark only  makes  sense if she has  heard Hippolytos’ virulent denunciation, and the discretion 
remark only if she has heard his threat to reveal all to Theseus. 
27 Kovacs (1987) 27 8, 46, 56. 
28 Blomqvist (1982) 403.  S. Mills (2002) 64 5 makes the point that moderns, in a world conditioned by 
Christianity’s “sex phobia”, are inclined to focus on Hippolytos’ desire for virginity, and see his downfall 
purely in that light; a Greek, though, would have focused on his arrogance in thinking he was better than 
everyone else, including Aphrodite – the excessive desire for virginity merely being the aspect of this fault 
that upsets Aphrodite, and causes her to seek revenge on him.  See Kovacs (1987) 27 also on Hippolytos’ 
‘puritanism’.  Goldhill (1986) 118 focuses on Hippolytos’ rejection of the values of the oikos (sex, marriage, 
and children). 
29 Kovacs (1987) 30, 59 60, 63 on Phaidra’s enmity, and her desire for revenge as part of traditional heroic 
pride.  See also Willink (1968) 30 and S. Mills (2002) 75 6 on Phaidra’s enmity for Hippolytos, and the 
manner of her suicide as her revenge. 
30 See ch.6 n.70 re slander as a means of giving effect to one’s phthonos; strictly, this instance is not slander 
but libel. Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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has now realised she will never attain.  An important element of phthonos is the desire to 
level down, the “If I can’t have it, no one will” urge.
31  So Phaidra’s slander serves these 
twin  purposes  (punishment,  and  levelling  down)  of  the  begrudging  envy  she  directs  at 
Hippolytos.  But it achieves a third result for Phaidra herself: in life, she enjoyed the guilty 
female pleasures of gossip (384: leskhai); but only in death, by choosing instead masculine 
slander,
32 has she finally been able to break out into the male outside world she was so 
desperate for in life. 
 
7.4  Aphrodite (Hippolytos) 
 
One type of phthonos which has (conspicuously and calculatedly) not featured in this study 
is that of the gods (phthonos theôn), since my concern here is with the human dynamics of 
phthonos.    Though  it  has  phenomenological,  psychological,  and  (to  a  lesser  extent) 
sociological  resemblances  to  its  mortal  cousin,  it  is  sufficiently  distinctive  to  require 
separate treatment (and I would like to return to it at a later date), especially since it takes 
us into complex issues of Greek religion which would require more space than is available 
to me.
33  However, occasionally the divine phthonos for mortals of a traditional kind is 
                                                 
31 This appears in other places in Greek literature, e.g.: the begrudging of survival by those involved in stasis 
to those who sit it out (Thuc. 3.82.8.23 – ἢ φθόνῳ τοῦ περιεῖναι διεφθείροντο); or the Thirty’s desire that as 
many  people  as  possible  be  implicated  in  their  own  crimes  (Pl.  Ap.  32c7 8:  οἷα  δὴ  καὶ  ἄλλοις  ἐκεῖνοι 
πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλό ενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν). 
32 For gossip as the female equivalent of male slander, operating in the oikos (the domain of women) where 
slander operates in the polis (the domain of men), see McClure (1999) esp. 160, 199 200.  On the connection 
between slander and phthonos, see ch.6 n.70. 
33 Walcot (1978) 25 6 notes that phthonos theôn in Homer involves the anger of a specific god at a failure by 
a mortal, e.g. not performing a sacrifice (e.g. Poseidon at Hom. Il. 7.446 53; Artemis at Il. 9.533 36; Apollo at 
Il. 23.863ff); Homer does not use the word phthonos, however, but the verbs agaasthai or megairein (both 
roots  imply  someone  getting  too  big  for  themselves);  other  terminology  for  the  Homeric  phenomenon 
includes kotos (a grudge) and nemesis (resentment, indignation – see pp.107 9).  In the fifth century, phthonos 
theôn changes to the striking down by god or gods unnamed of someone excessively fortunate – principally 
associated with Pindar (e.g. Pyth. 8.71 2, Pyth. 10.19 21, Ol. 13.24 6, Isthm. 7.39 39b – see p.51), Aeschylus 
(e.g. the fate of Agamemnon, esp. the tapestries scene (Ag. 810 974)), and Herodotus (e.g. the stories of 
Croesus (Hdt. 1.32.1, 1.34.1) and Polykrates (Hdt. 3.40.2); see Harrison (2003) on phthonos as a motivation 
of the gods in Herodotus); see also Aristophanes’ comic suggestion that Zeus made Wealth blind out of 
phthonos for worthy men (Ar. Plut. 87 92).  Sophocles and Euripides revert to a more Homeric view of 
phthonos theôn, where a specific god punishes a specific mortal for a lack of respect (and again, as in Homer, 
the word phthonos rarely appears): Walcot (1978) 25 gives Athena in Ajax as an example; Knox (1989) 66 
(cf. 72 3) cites Aphrodite in Hippolytos, Dionysus in Bacchae, and Athena in Troades; Zeitlin (1985) 61 also 
for  Dionysus  and  Aphrodite,  cf.  W.S.  Barrett  (1964/2001)  156  who  adds  Death  in  Alcestis  to  the  list.  
Walcot’s view is slightly different from, but not fundamentally at odds with, Ranulf (1933) 90, who explicitly 
distinguishes  three  types  of  phthonos  theôn:  “1) disasters  caused  by  the  gods  in  punishment  of  wrongs 
committed,  2)  disasters  caused  by  the  gods  merely  from  capriciousness  or  for  their  own  convenience, 
3) disasters caused by the gods out of jealousy.”  It is noteworthy that all types of phthonos theôn bear some Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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coupled with a more familiar type of phthonos: phthonos between two gods – a relationship 
that is a reflection of that between two humans.
34  The instance I wish to look at here is 
Aphrodite’s sibling rivalry with her half sister Artemis.
35  Freud says of sibling rivalry that: 
“The elder child ill treats the younger, maligns him and robs him of his toys; while the 
younger is consumed with impotent rage against the elder, envies and fears him, or meets 
his oppressor with the first stirrings of a love of liberty and a sense of justice.”
36  Even in 
Homer, the children of Zeus compete for his attention;
37 we have seen brother shooting 
brother through envy in the sayings of the Seven Sages (Apophth. fr.10.30.3 5(Mullach) – 
see p.48); and perhaps Polyneikes feels the careless destructiveness of phthonos, when he 
reportedly accepts death so long as he can kill his brother (Aesch. Sept. 636).  Sibling 
rivalry is not uncommon then in Greek literature, and with this in mind let us consider 
Aphrodite’s words. 
 
Aphrodite begins by saying she brings down those who φρονοῦσιν …  έγα against her (a 
phrase which LSJ defines not so much as “think big”, as “presumptuous, conceited, priding 
oneself”), and this is the nature of gods (6 8).
38  He has called her the vilest of the gods 
(κακίστην δαι όνων), and will take part in neither sex (λέκτρα) nor marriage (γά ων) 
(13 16) – the two main things Aphrodite is the god of.
39  She says that for these ways in 
which  Hippolytos  has  transgressed  against  her,  she  will  take  revenge  (τι ωρήσο αι) 
(21 2).    So  far,  this  looks  like  standard  Euripidean  (or  Homeric)  phthonos  theôn,  and 
                                                                                                                                                     
resemblance to phthonos as censure (i.e. indignation phthonos) of human behaviour, though the divine mortal 
relationship differs from the mortal mortal. 
34 Knox (1989) 72 3: “Euripides’ gods, Aphrodite, Artemis, Athena, Hera, Dionysus, are just like Homer’s – 
which is to say, just like us.  Torn by the same passions, pride and the vindictiveness of pride insulted, 
revengeful anger, jealousy and desire, they are huge and awesome images of everything that is violent and 
uncontrollable in man…”. 
35 This one instance is sufficient for my purposes in this thesis.  However, a phthonos reading might also be 
rewarding  for  Dionysus’  speech  and  behaviour  towards  his  cousin  Pentheus  in  Bacchae.    Although  this 
relationship is divine human rather than inter divine, Dionysus’s concern with his mother’s treatment by her 
sisters (26ff.) ensures his reactions are as much driven by his familial relationship to Pentheus and his aunts, 
as  by  divine  anger  at  their  failure  to  acknowledge  him,  and  accordingly  the  psychology  might  also  be 
interpreted partly in terms of ‘sibling’ (or cousinly) rivalry. 
36 Freud (1900) 250.  He unconsciously notes how envy transmutes itself into a desire for justice – see 
pp.41 2. 
37 For instance in Il. 5, where Athena proposes to Ares they do not compete before Zeus by supporting their 
preferred side (31 4); Athena reneges on the agreement by intervening on behalf of Diomedes (121ff.), and 
Ares then follows at Apollo’s urging (454ff.); Zeus then sends Athena to punish Ares (764ff.). 
38 Walcot (1978) 25 notes the connection to the Homeric megairein.  W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 156 notes 
similar comments by Dionysus (Bacch. 321) and Death (Alc. 53). 
39  S.  Mills  (2002)  68 9  comments  that  this  is  merely  the  most  egregious  example  of  Hippolytos’  main 
character trait, his arrogance – see n.28 above.  It is the high handedness of his dismissal of Phaidra that 
changes the latter’s erôs to enmity (see p.154). Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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combines  several  aspects  of  phthonos  already  seen:  begrudging,  jealousy  of  one’s 
prerogatives,  (transmuted)  righteous  indignation.
40    But  one  more  aspect  of  phthonos 
appears here: envy.  Aphrodite complains not just that Hippolytos is not honouring her, but 
also that he spends all his time honouring Artemis, hunting with her in the green woods – 
and he counts her the greatest of the gods ( εγίστην δαι όνων), where Aphrodite was the 
vilest (15 19).  Artemis confirms at the end of the play that the sibling rivalry exists, saying 
she  will  take  her  vengeance  (τι ωρήσο αι)  on  a  favourite  of  Aphrodite’s  in  turn 
(1416 22).    Aphrodite  herself  implies  that  her  putative  phthonos  is  felt  against  both 
Hippolytos and Artemis, as she refers to them in the plural (20: τούτοισι).
41  She herself 
denies that she feels phthonos (20: οὐ φθονῶ); but as we have already seen both in modern 
theory (where envy is veiled or masked: pp.27 8) and in ancient Greece (p.56, esp. n.36), 
such denial is typical.  “Qui s’excuse, s’accuse,” as Kovacs notes,
42 and G.J. Fitzgerald 
points  out  that  all  major  characters  in  this  play  (Aphrodite  included)  profess  their 
motivations falsely.
43  Aphrodite transmutes (or misrepresents) her emotion as righteous 
anger – it is after all orgê that Aristotle notes demands revenge (see n.40), and Artemis too 
describes Aphrodite’s emotion as ὀργαί (1418).  Halleran refers to Aphrodite’s “anger at 
his slighting her”; however Kovacs translates Artemis’ ὀργαί (1418) as “hatred”,
44 and he 
is closer to the true emotion Aphrodite feels.
45  But hatred does not explain Aphrodite’s 
begrudging of Hippolytos’ impertinence, her jealousy of her prerogatives, or her envy of 
Artemis.    These  tell  us  that  Aphrodite’s  principal  emotion  is  indeed  phthonos,  deny  it 
though she might; and phthonos too principally aims to destroy the rival (here impossible, 
Artemis being immortal) or the desired possession – Hippolytos. 
 
                                                 
40 Though orgê is also a pertinent emotion – Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30 32 suggesting it as the usual emotional 
response to a slight. 
41 W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 158 argues this must be masculine (“against them”) rather than neuter (“for these 
things”) as phthonô normally carries the dative of the person; and although there are neuters to come (20: τί 
γάρ  ε δεῖ; = for what is that to me? // 21: ἃ δ’ εἰς ἔ ’ ἡ άρτηκε = for the ways in which he has transgressed 
against me), the audience would not know to expect them on hearing toutois, and would naturally assume it 
meant “against them”. 
42 Kovacs (1987) 34 makes his comment of Aphrodite, though in the context of her excusing taking revenge 
on her enemies, and the death of an innocent woman in pursuit of that goal. 
43 G.J. Fitzgerald (1973) 20. 
44 Halleran (1995) 145; Kovacs (1987) 69. 
45 Aristotle explains that orgê demands that the revenge be perceived (Rh. 2.2.1378a30: phainomenês), and 
that cannot happen if you are dead; however hatred aims for the death of an enemy – Konstan (2006) 47 
draws attention to this distinction.  Aristotle’s systematising may not be supported by other contemporary 
evidence – e.g. in oratory anger and hatred words are frequently used side by side. Chapter 7:  Tragedy 
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7.5  Conclusion 
 
Tragedy (unlike oratory) almost never focuses on phthonos terminology.
46  However, in the 
full variety of its aspects (envy, jealousy, spite, and censure) we have seen phthonos does in 
fact occur in tragedy, if not with the regularity of some other emotions.  Because of the 
philological tendency of Greeks to avoid the language of phthonos,
47 its presence in these 
plays has previously been by and large overlooked, and this oversight is, and can only be, 
both revealed and corrected through the phenomenological approach I have taken in this 
thesis. 
 
This  is  important  for  two  reasons.    First,  on  the  level  of  interpretation:  this 
phenomenological approach has helped us to appreciate a fuller range of motivations for 
tragic  characters,  and  in  particular  to  provide  a  fuller  explanation  for  why  they  act  in 
exactly the way that they do.  But secondly, methodologically: the success of the ‘emotion 
script’ approach in exploring texts demonstrates its efficacy, and argues for its application 
across a much broader range of texts, for a much greater range of emotions.  In the bulk of 
the final chapter of this thesis, I shall continue to use this technique to probe tragedy; but 
now I turn away from phthonos proper, to examine an underexplored emotion of which 
phthonos is an important constituent part: sexual jealousy. 
 
                                                 
46 The tapestries scene in Aesch. Ag. is an exception. 
47 Particularly the case in a genre that deals with heroes who, as in Homeric epic, tend to be associated 
explicitly with grander passions – see Goldhill (2003) 178, Most (2003) 129.  
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Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
In this chapter I set out to answer four questions: (1) Does sexual jealousy exist in ancient 
Greek literature?
1 (2) How does the ancient Greek sexual jealousy phenomenon compare 
(in the situations in which it arises, and the socio psychology involved) with its modern 
English equivalent? (3) How is ancient Greek sexual jealousy expressed, verbally and in 
actions?  (4) To what extent does Greek sexual jealousy overlap with phthonos?  Classical 
Greek had no label for sexual jealousy,
2 and so (even more than for phthonos) a lexical 
approach  is  not  possible.    In  this  chapter  I  will  demonstrate  the  full  potential  of  a 
phenomenologically based script approach to answer the sorts of questions posed above. 
 
I shall mostly be concerned with tragedy in this chapter.  My primary focus will be on 
Euripides’ Medea, from which I shall provide initial answers to the above questions.  I shall 
support and modify these answers by reference first to two other tragedies, Sophocles’ 
Trachiniae and Euripides’ Andromache, before turning to a wide ranging (if necessarily 
less profound) overview of the sexual jealousy phenomenon in a variety of other Classical 
Greek genres. 
 
My concern in reading the three tragedies will not be with how the characters reflect real 
life sexual jealousy in the democratic polis.  Rather, I will focus on the phenomenology of 
the  jealousy  scenario  itself,  and  demonstrate  how  these  tragedies  can  be  more  richly 
understood by appreciating sexual jealousy as one important plot element.  In the final 
section of this chapter, I shall show first how jealousy narratives derived from tragedy 
could  be  exploited  in  other  genres  (in  particular  oratory)  to  manipulate  audiences,  and 
secondly demonstrate how genre itself limits what scenarios can be presented. 
 
                                                 
1 Konstan (2003b) and (2006) 219 43 argues that probably sexual jealousy as we understand it did not exist in 
ancient Greece.  It will quickly become clear that I disagree. 
2 ζηλοτυπία, first recorded in the 380s, is generally translated ‘jealousy’.  However, Konstan (2006) 222 32 
argues against this translation, and I broadly agree with his arguments – see pp.201 3, esp. n.148 below. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
 
161 
8.2  Medea 
 
Euripides’ Medea is about a woman who, abandoned by her husband for another woman, 
avenges  herself  by  killing  the  other  woman  (and  the  latter’s  father,  who  arranged  the 
match), as well as her own children by her ex husband.  To moderns this story seems a 
straightforward  tale  of  sexual  jealousy,  albeit  carried  to  an  unusual  degree,  and  a  few 
scholars (such as Mastronarde and Friedrich) agree that the Greeks likewise saw sexual 
jealousy as an important part of the plot.
3  However, this is a minority view.  The major 
current school of thought, first put forward by Knox and Easterling in the 1970s, sees 
Medea as a Sophoclean, or even epic hero: an Ajax, or an Achilles; she is driven, they 
argue, by a heroic pride.
4 Others, such as W.V. Harris, Goldhill or Konstan, see her driven 
by a terrible wrath, that has nothing of (in Konstan’s words) “petty jealousy” in it.
5  I do not 
intend to argue against pride or wrath as motivations.  Medea is clearly enraged – anger 
words abound in the play; and arguments for her heroic pride can point to repeated claims 
that she has been dishonoured, a repeated insistence that she cannot allow her enemies to 
laugh at her, and her clearly articulated choice to allow her passion to overrule her reason 
(1078 80).  However, Euripides’ Medea is an immensely complex character, and reducing 
her emotional state to a monolithic pride or anger is too simplistic.  Using the insights of 
modern  psychology  into  prototypical  jealousy  episodes,  I  wish  to  rehabilitate  sexual 
jealousy as a significant element in her motivation. 
 
I shall begin by considering the ‘situational antecedents’ of the jealousy prototype.  The 
Nurse informs us in the prologue that Medea lived with Jason as her husband (11: ξὺν 
ἀνδρί), assisting (13: ξυ φέρουσ’) him with all matters – an unusually close, and equal, 
partnership in the Greek world.
6  But Jason has left Medea and married (18 19: γά οις ... 
εὐνάζεται, γή ας) Kreon’s daughter, Glauke.  By line 19 we know we have an abandoned 
                                                 
3 Freidrich (1993); Mastronarde (2002) 16; also McHardy (2008). 
4 Easterling (1977) 178; Knox (1977) 196, 207; Gabriel (1992) 353; Mastronarde (2002) 8 9; Goldhill (2003) 
166 7; Holland (2003) 270. 
5 Mastronarde (2002) 17 8; Goldhill (2003) 166 7; W.V. Harris (2003) 140 1; Konstan (2006) 57 9; I dispute 
too Konstan’s epithet “petty” – for example, there is nothing petty about Shakespeare’s Othello’s emotion.  
See Allen (2003) 90 on the connection between orgê and erôs, a connection denied by W.V. Harris (2003) 
122. 
6 Mastronarde (2002) comments that the ambiguity of mood (middle/passive) leads to ambiguity about her 
equality or subordination to Jason.  He sees their partnership as equal though (9).  Page (1938/2001) believes 
equality would require the prefix be homo  rather than xym . Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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woman, her ex partner, and a rival.  The Nurse tells us too about the strength of their 
relationship: from the first moment Medea met Jason, she says, her heart was struck with 
love (erôs) for him (8: ἔρωτι θυ ὸν ἐκπλαγεῖσ’), and this was the foundation of their 
partnership.  The Chorus too are well aware of the strength, and violence, of Medea’s 
passion for Jason.  From the time she fled Iolkos with him, they say, she had mad passion 
in her heart (433:  αινο ένᾳ κραδίᾳ).  Following her first confrontation with Jason, they 
talk of love that comes too excessively (627 8: ἔρωτες ὑπὲρ  ὲν ἄγαν ἐλθόντες) and sing 
not one, but two hymns to the power of Aphrodite (627 42, 824 45).  Jason too asserts that 
Medea  feels  erôs  for  him  (530:  ὡς  Ἔρως  σ’  ἠνάγκασε),
7  though  Medea  herself  only 
speaks of it in the abstract (330: βροτοῖς ἔρωτες ὡς κακὸν  έγα).  We are never explicitly 
told that Jason felt erôs for her in return.
8  However we do know that Jason and Medea’s 
relationship  had  a  strong  sexual  element,  and  this  is  made  clear  by  the  extraordinary 
frequency with which Greek words for “the bed” (lekhos, lektron, eunê, and koitê) occur: 
twenty  times  as  a  euphemism  for  their  old  relationship,  and  twelve  for  his  new  one.
9  
Indeed Medea has the highest number of bed words (at thirty six) of any extant tragedy.
10  
In Greek “the bed” can be a euphemism for sex (and again Medea has by far the highest 
number with this meaning),
11 or marriage.  The bed motif is first introduced by the Nurse 
and Tutor in the prologue, and the Chorus in the parodos, where it appears several times 
referring  to  Jason’s  new  marriage  to  Glauke  (18: ἐυνάζεται,  88: εὐνῆς,  140:  λέκτρα, 
                                                 
7 Mastronarde (2002) 16 notes that the chorus also refer to Medea’s strong feelings for Jason directly at 433 
(κραδίᾳ), and indirectly in the second stasimon (627 44). 
8  Medea  does  say  she  knows  Jason  now  feels  erôs  elsewhere  (491),  though  to  Aigeus  (698,  perhaps 
dissembling to avoid showing her true feelings) she says his erôs is for political advancement, not for her rival 
Glauke.  The only other time the word is used is (perhaps revealingly) of Aigeus’ desire for children (714). 
9 Medea and Jason’s relationship (lekhos 41, 207, 555, 568, 571, 591, 641, 697, 999, 1338, 1354; lektron 286, 
436, 443, 639; eunê 265, 570, 640, 1338; koitê 436); Jason and Glauke’s (lekhos 156, 380, 489, 491, 887, 
1367; lektron 140, 594, 1348; eunê 18, 88, 1027).  [Here and in n.10, n.11 I exclude cognates that always 
mean spouse/bed sharer (e.g. xuneunetês, akoitis).]  These words particularly abound during Medea’s first and 
final scenes with Jason (446 626, 1317 1414). 
10 Large numbers of bed words also occur in several other Euripides plays: 33 in Helen, 28 in Andromache, 
and 23 in Hippolytos; the highest for Aeschylus is 17 in Agamemnon, and for Sophocles is 19 in Trachiniae – 
we can note that all these plays have plots that involve (potential) rivals for a legitimate spouse. 
11 Greek “bed” words (lekhos, lektron, eunê, and koitê) had always potentially been euphemisms for sex 
(though they can also mean bed, bedding, sleep, death, marriage or spouse).  For instance, if we compare 
Book 23 of the Odyssey (which focuses on Odysseus’ marriage with Penelope, centring round a very physical 
bed) with Book 10 (which focuses on Odysseus’ sexual relationship with Kirke), we find that in Book 23 
“bed” words are used 21 times, 15 meaning bed/bedding (ten lekh /lektr , five eun ), three meaning sex (219, 
254, 346; two eun , one lektr ), and three implying both (257, 294, 354; two eun , one lekh ); in Book 10 
there are ten “bed” words, two meaning bed (both lekh ), and eight meaning sex (all eun ).  This suggests that 
eun , at least in origin, has a stronger implication of sex than lekh /lektr ; we should also note that the latter 
roots only give us an object (lekhos, lektron), while the eun  root gives us both an object (eunê) and an 
activity (eunazô). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
 
163 
156: λέχη).
12  Medea is at this point said merely to have erôs for the bed of death (151 2: 
τᾶς  ἀπλάτου  κοίτας  ἔρος),  since  Jason  has  betrayed  their  marriage  (207: ἐν  λέχει 
προδόταν).  The bed is here placed at the centre of their marriage,
13 and it is the bed as 
concrete symbol (rather than e.g. the abstract γά ος) that Jason betrays.  However, it is not 
just a metonym for their marriage, but also for what is performed on it, i.e. sex.
14  Medea 
first draws attention to this herself, when she talks about going into the palace to kill Jason 
and  his  new  bride  as  they  lie  on  their  bed  (380:  ἵν’  ἔστρωται  λέχος).    The  verb 
στορέννυ ι can mean “to make a bed”, but as a perfect it also means “strewn”, and it 
conjures up the image of Jason and Glauke sprawled on the bed in post coital slumber.  The 
Chorus  alludes  to  how  Medea  has  lost  this:  she  has  lost  her  marriage  now  her  bed  is 
manless (435 6: τᾶς ἀνάνδρου κοίτας ὀλέσασα λέκτρον), and another queen now rules 
over her marriage bed (443: τῶν τε λέκτρων ἄλλα βασίλεια κρείσσων δό οισιν ἐπέστα) 
– both comments having strong sexual overtones.  In Medea’s diatribe against Jason in their 
agôn, she complains he has made a new marriage (489: καινὰ δ’ ἐκτήσω λέχη); if she had 
been  barren,  then  she  could  understand  him  feeling  erôs  for  someone  else’s  bed 
(491: τοῦδ’ ἐρασθῆναι λέχους); as things are, he has betrayed the oaths they swore to each 
other.
15  In response, Jason draws attention to her erôs, saying it would be invidious to 
point out that Medea is besotted with him (529 30: ἐπίφθονος λόγος διελθεῖν ὡς Ἔρως σ’ 
ἠνάγκασε), doing it anyway.  Jason constantly alludes to the sexual use of the marriage 
bed: he says he did not leave her because he hated having sex with her, nor through longing 
for  a  new  bride  (555 6: οὐχ  ...  σὸν   ὲν  ἐχθαίρων  λέχος,  καινῆς  δὲ  νύ φης  ἱ έρῳ 
πεπληγ ένος).    ἵ ερος  means  sexual  desire,  and  its  juxtaposition  with  λέχος  in  the 
previous line indicates we should read the latter as “sex” not “bed” or “marriage”; νύ φη 
here also draws attention to Medea and Glauke’s relative ages, a reason for Glauke being 
more sexually attractive.   Jason argues that it is Medea who is chafed by matters sexual: 
“Honestly”, he says, “all you women care about is sex.  If sex is going well, you think you 
have everything; if there’s a problem with your sex life, even the finest things are totally 
                                                 
12 Medea’s bed is also referred to in the Nurse’s opening speech (41: λέχος), but this line is almost certainly 
an interpolation, copied from 380 – see Page (1938/2001) 68. 
13 Cf. Cairns (2008) 54 5. 
14 Burnett (1998) 194 5 denies that the stress on Medea’s bed has anything to do with her sexual pleasure, but 
a focus on pleasure misses the point: for Medea, sex with her husband is both an end in itself, and also a sign 
of the continuing health of her marriage, in  which is bound up everything she holds dear (see pp.164 6 
below); cf. n.59, n.94. 
15 Presumably the marriage oaths.  Easterling (1977) 180 1, Allan (2002) 50 1 for the argument that Jason 
and Medea were legitimately married, despite her being a barbarian, and the Corinthian Women agree. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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wrong.” (568 73: οὐδ’ ἂν σὺ φαίης, εἴ σε  ὴ κνίζοι λέχος.  ἀλλ’ ἐς τοσοῦτον ἥκεθ’ ὥστ’ 
ὀρθου ένης  εὐνῆς  γυναῖκες  πάντ’  ἔχειν  νο ίζετε,  ἢν  δ’  αὖ  γένηται  χυ φορά  τις  ἐς 
λέχος, τὰ λῷστα καὶ κάλλιστα πολε ιώτατα τίθεσθε).  He exits, and the Chorus sing a 
hymn to Aphrodite (the goddess of sexual love – as usual in tragedy called Kypris for 
metrical  reasons),  primly  wishing  for  a  happy  marriage.
16    Ιn  words  recalling  Medea’s 
falling for Jason, they pray that Kypris may not strike them likewise with desire for other 
beds (639: θυ ὸν ἐκπλήξασ’ ἑτέροις ἐπὶ λέκτροις; cf. 8) – bed words occurring three times 
in as many lines (639: λέκτροις; 640: εὐνάς; 641: λέχη).  When Medea is telling Aigeus 
about Jason leaving her, he asks whether it was because of erôs for another woman or 
because his sexual union with Medea grew hateful (697: ἐρασθεὶς ἢ σὸν ἐχθαίρων λέχος) 
– again the juxtaposition of sexual desire and λέχος indicating how we should translate the 
latter.  Medea replies that it was a great erôs (698:  έγαν γ’ ἔρωτα).  Despite Jason’s 
avoidance of the word erôs, Euripides makes very clear the extraordinary role of sexual 
passion, and the sex act itself, in their marriage. 
 
Medea’s womanhood, and her wifely duties for Jason, also loom large in her rhetoric.  In 
her opening speech she says that everything in the world for her, as Jason himself knew, 
was embodied in one person: her husband (228 9: ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἦν  οι πάντα, γιγνώσκει 
καλῶς, ... οὑ ὸς πόσις).  This point is crucial.  She goes on to lament the lot of women 
(230 51): a woman must pay a dowry, take a husband (233: πόσιν), and provide him with 
sex – he becomes a master to her inheritance, her house and her body (233: δεσπότην τε 
σώ ατος).  Women must leave aside their own habits and customs (238: ἤθη καὶ νό ους), 
and work hard at taking on those of their husband (240: ξυνευνέτῃ).  She goes on to say 
that men have life easy: the hardest thing they have to do is fight in battle, but that is more 
than three times preferable to the danger of childbirth (250 1).
17  Having established the 
general hard lot of wives, and all they have to suffer as women, as home makers, and as 
mothers,
18 Medea moves on to talk about how she has personally suffered more even than 
                                                 
16 De Wet (1983) 218 19 notes that by the fourth century Aphrodite had replaced Hera as the goddess of 
marriage, and contemporaneously it was being accepted that sexual desire had an important part to play in 
marriage: “Sophokles, like Euripides, is very much at the beginning of this new thinking, openly recognising 
the emotional needs and rights of a woman as an individual in the partnership of marriage where passionate 
love is transcending the traditional role of the wife as mistress of the home.  He recognises that not only the 
man but also the woman has emotional needs and the right to seek sexual satisfaction in marriage.” 
17 See Goldhill (1986) 115 17 on the engagement of this speech with Athenian ideology. 
18 Burnett (1998) 194 5. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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other women, in the cause of being Jason’s wife.  Unlike her audience (the Chorus of Greek 
women), she does not have anywhere to turn to: she has no city, no father, no friends, no 
mother, no brother, no relatives (252 8).  This is because of all the things she did in her 
passion for Jason when she was first struck with erôs (8), before he took her from her 
home: she betrayed her father and her homeland, and murdered her brother; and later she 
killed Jason’s uncle, Pelias (32, 483, 503; cf. 1332).  In forging their partnership she cut 
herself off from, and made enemies of, all those who should naturally be her philoi, and 
now she has nowhere to turn.  In bloodily severing herself from her roles as daughter, 
sister, citizen and princess, she has made being Jason’s wife, mistress of his house, and 
mother of his children, even more formative to her self conception than is normal in ancient 
Greek society.
19  Abandoned for another woman, and on the verge of having her children 
taken away from her, Medea has at a stroke lost everything in her life.  Her entire self 
conception is now formed by being a wife and a mother, and losing it all in this way creates 
exactly the antecedent situational conditions for a sexual jealousy scenario.  That is why 
Jason’s behaviour has been such an outrage (255 6: ὑβρίζο αι πρὸς ἀνδρός), and Medea 
feels fully justified in seeking revenge, or justice, against her husband (261: πόσιν δίκην 
τῶνδ’ ἀντιτείσασθαι κακῶν).
20  She concludes  her introductory speech: “Whenever a 
woman is wronged in the marriage bed, then no other heart is more murderous” (265 6: 
ὅταν δ’ ἐς εὐνὴν ἠδικη ένη κυρῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλη φρὴν  ιαιφονωτέρα).  It is hard to 
overstate the importance of this comment.  This is Medea speaking, not others attempting to 
understand her.  To the obvious objection that Medea manipulates and deceives everyone 
she  encounters  in  the  play,  I  would  reply  first  that  the  context  is  one  in  which  she  is 
explicitly expressing her intention to take revenge (though the full extent of that revenge is 
at this stage unclear), and second that she does not conceal her motives from the Chorus 
anywhere else.  There is therefore no reason not to take this passage seriously.  Though it 
would be a mistake to regard it as the clue to her psychology, it is an important indicator of 
just how we should understand the rest of the play.  In her opening speech, Medea tells us it 
is as a wife and woman that she feels wronged, and the rest of the play must be read with 
this in mind.  “Jason has abandoned me,” she is saying, “and in doing so he has hit me 
                                                 
19 Friedrich (1993) 227; see also Gabriel (1992) 351 2.  Burnett (1998) 195 also notes that Medea’s marriage 
bed symbolises these three roles: Jason’s wife, mother of Jason’s genos, mistress of Jason’s oikos. 
20 I agree with Page (1938/2001) that line 262, in which Medea extends her planned revenge to Glauke and 
Kreon, must (for narrative reasons) be an interpolation. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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where it hurts most, in our marriage, in our bed, in our sex life, in the thing that makes us 
women more murderous than any other; and I will take revenge on my husband.” 
 
The revenge taken, then, is an organic development arising out of Medea’s abandonment as 
a wife and a woman, in favour of another.  From the beginning Medea says she will seek 
revenge, and initially Kreon says he knows that will be against the newly weds and the man 
who  gave  Glauke  away  (288:  τὸν  δόντα  καὶ  γή αντα  καὶ  γα ου ένην),  i.e.  Jason, 
Glauke and Kreon.  But Medea later conceives of a worse punishment for Jason.  She talks 
successively  with  three  men  (Kreon,  Jason  and  Aigeus),  and  each  one  mentions  the 
importance of children to them.  Kreon orders Medea out the country, lest she do some evil 
to his daughter (282 3).  He continually mentions how he loves his family, how his children 
are more dear to him than his country (327, 329).  With delicious dramatic irony, in his exit 
speech (348 56) Kreon manages to mention resolve (λῆ α, a quality he denies but Medea 
has – 176 7), the death of Medea’s children, and his fear (356: φόβος, cf. δέδοικά (282), 
ὀρρωδία (317)) that something might happen to his own.  At this stage Medea still intends 
her  revenge  to  be  to  kill  the  newly weds  and  those  who  had  arranged  the  alliance 
(366 7: ἔτ’ εἴσ’ ἀγῶνες τοῖς νεωστὶ νυ φίοις καὶ τοῖσι κηδεύσασιν οὐ σ ικροὶ πόνοι) – 
tying her revenge firmly to Jason’s re marriage, before reconfirming Kreon, Glauke, and 
Jason as her intended victims (374 5: τρεῖς τῶν ἐ ῶν ἐχθρῶν νεκροὺς θήσω, πατέρα τε 
καὶ κόρην πόσιν τ’ ἐ όν).
21  However, repeatedly expressed concern with children changes 
her mind.  In her first scene with Jason, he says his abandonment of her was because a new 
marriage would bring advantages to their children, through alliance with the royal family 
and influential brothers.  Finally, Aigeus enters, explaining he is on his way home from 
Delphi, where he went for advice to relieve his childlessness (670 1: ἄπαις).  By this point 
Medea  has  fully  grasped  the  importance  men  place  on  having  children.
22    In  begging 
Aigeus’ help, she says she will cure his childlessness.  With dramatic irony for her intended 
revenge, she says she will help Aigeus go from being childless (apais) to having paides (a 
journey she will first make Jason take in reverse), before mentioning her potions (which, in 
death  rather than life giving form, she will first use on Glauke) (717 18: παύσω δέ σ’ ὄντ’ 
                                                 
21 Mastronarde (2002) notes (to line 374) that this speech continues to maintain the illusion for the audience 
(and Chorus) that she intends to kill Jason rather than the children.  As I argue here, I do not believe she has 
yet decided to kill the children. 
22 Cf. McHardy (2008) 63. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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ἄπαιδα καὶ παίδων γονὰς σπεῖραί σε θήσω· τοιάδ’ οἶδα φάρ ακα).  When Aigeus 
leaves the stage she spells out her revised revenge in detail: she will use her paides to kill 
the pais of the king with trickery and with potions; then she will kill her own children, thus 
destroying  Jason’s  entire  (i.e.  past  and  future)  house  (774 94)  –  something  she  had 
impotently wished for in the prologue (112 14: ὦ κατάρατοι παῖδες ὄλοισθε στυγερᾶς 
 ατρὸς σὺν πατρί, καὶ πᾶς δό ος ἔρροι), before attaining the means to bring it about.
23  
Jason will neither see his paides alive again, she says, nor have more from his newly yoked 
bride thanks to her potions (803 6: οὔτ’ ἐξ ἐ οῦ γὰρ παῖδας ὄψεταί ποτε ζῶντας τὸ 
λοιπὸν  οὔτε  τῆς  νεοζύγου  νύ φης  τεκνώσει  παῖδ’,  ἐπεὶ  κακὴν  κακῶς  θανεῖν  σφ’ 
ἀνάγκη τοῖς ἐ οῖσι φαρ άκοις).  She will kill not just Glauke, but her own children too, 
as that is the best way for her husband to be hurt (817).  The Chorus now remind us that 
Medea is seeking revenge for the sake of her bridal bed (999: νυ φιδίων ἔνεκεν λεχέων) 
and  because  her  husband  abandoned  her  to  make  an  oikos  with  another  bedfellow 
(1001: ἄλλᾳ ξυνοικεῖ πόσις συνεύνῳ), and this foreshadows the final scene.  After her 
revenge has been carried out, Medea has a final showdown with Jason, and once again 
“bed” words and Medea’s role as wife and woman recur repeatedly, with both the marriage 
and Medea’s revenge (in killing the children) being linked directly to sex.  Jason says that 
after their marriage (1336: νυ φευθεῖσα – when she was a sexually ripe νύ φη) Medea 
bore  him  children,  and  now  has  killed  them  because  of  sex  and  the  marriage bed 
(1338: εὐνῆς ἕκατι καὶ λέχους σφ’ ἀπώλεσας).  Medea responds that she could not allow 
him to dishonour her marriage bed (1354: σὺ δ’ οὐκ ἔ ελλες τἄ ’ ἀτι άσας λέχη); she 
killed them because of his hybris and because of his newly built marriage (1366), and to 
bring him pain and grief (1370: δήξεται; 1398: πη αίνουσ’).  Jason cannot believe she did 
all this because of his re marriage (1367: λέχους ... οὕνεκα), but Medea says that such a 
disaster is no small thing for a woman (1368).  For her that is as full an answer as need be 
given,  and  takes  us  back  to  the  end  of  her  first  speech,  that  “Women  are  never  more 
murderous than when wronged in sexual matters” (265 6). 
 
I now turn to the emotions aroused in Medea by Jason’s betrayal of her, and how these are 
described.  The first emotion introduced is grief, and once again it is the Nurse who first 
informs us that Medea lies in bed, not eating, surrendering her body to tears (24 5).  As 
                                                 
23 Cf. Mastronarde (2002) to these lines. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Mastronarde points out: “loss of appetite and inactivity, such as staying in bed, are signs of 
severe psychic turmoil (from grief or love)”.
24  But her grief is really hammered home to us 
in  lines  131 206;  the  Chorus,  the  Nurse,  and  Medea  (from  inside  the  house)  all  use  a 
plethora  of  suffering  and  grieving  words:  cries  (132,  135:  βοάν);  wretched 
(133, 149: δυστάνου/ος); griefs (136: ἄλγεσιν); she pines (141: τάκει); alas (146: φεῦ 
φεῦ);  wail  (149:  ἀχάν);  grieving  (159: δυρο ένα);  I  suffer  (161: πάσχω);  sorrow 
(184: πένθος); and finally, in case we have not got the message, “I heard the loud groaning 
wail of her mourning, as she cries her wailing and wretched griefs” (205 6: ἀχὰν ἄιον 
πολύστονον γόων, λιγυρὰ δ’ἄχεα  ογερὰ βοᾷ). 
 
Two other strong emotions that Medea expresses are anger and hatred.  Again from the 
Nurse in the prologue we learn that Medea’s love has turned to hatred (16: ἐχθρά).  Her 
eyes  glare  bull like  (92),  and  her  rage  (94:  χόλου)  will  last  till  she  rushes  down  on 
someone.
25  She is stirring up her heart and her wrath (99: κινεῖ κραδίαν, κινεῖ δὲ χόλον),
26 
and  the  children  should  be  on  guard  against  her  wild  character  and  hating  nature 
(102 3: φυλσσεσθ’ ἄγριον ἦθος στυγεράν τε φύσιν); her thymos is enlarged (108:  είζονι 
θυ ῷ), and her spleen (109:  εγαλόσπλαγχνος δυσκατάπαυστος) is hard to check.  The 
Nurse says Medea will only give over her anger (121: χαλεπῶς ὀργὰς  εταβάλλουσιν) 
with difficulty.  The Chorus tell Medea not to sharpen her anger (157:  ὴ χαράσσου), 
despite Jason’s and Glauke’s initial injustice (165: πρόσθεν … ἀδικεῖν) against her, as it is 
wearing her down; she should put aside the orgê in the depths of her thymos, and the 
temper in her breast (176 7: βαρύθυ ον ὀργὰν καὶ λῆ α φρενῶν).
27  After Medea’s first 
great monologue (discussed above), Kreon enters, and acknowledges Medea’s thymos is 
roused at her husband (271: πόσει θυ ου ένην).  She will be feeling lypê (pain, distress, 
                                                 
24 Mastronarde (2002) 168 – this is a symptomatology of betrayed love. 
25 The word used here, κατασκῆψαι, is generally used of storms or divine wrath (LSJ). 
26  Note  the  active  voice  of  κινεῖ:  this  is  not  something  that  is  just  happening  to  Medea,  she  is  actively 
perpetuating it. 
27 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30 32: orgê is a desire for revenge for an injury.  Jason and Glauke committed the 
original (πρόσθεν) injury, hence their action was unjust.  Konstan (2006) 61 5 argues that in Trojan Women 
Hecuba unwillingly accepts the Greeks’ slaying of her daughter, since revenge is impossible; however when 
Polymester slays her son she has a means of revenge, so feels kholos.  By analogy, in Medea the Chorus 
believe she (a foreign woman) must just accept the injury; revenge is out of the question, so anger is pointless; 
Medea herself (as we find out) knows she can take revenge, so she spurs on (kinei, 99) her rage. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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grief) at being robbed of her husband’s bed (286: λέκτρων ἀνδρὸς).
28  He has heard she 
has made threats against the newly weds and against himself.  Medea dissembles: Kreon 
has done nothing wrong, she says; it is merely her husband she hates (310 1: ἀλλ’ ἐ ὸν 
πόσιν  ισῶ); she does not begrudge Kreon’s good fortune (312: οὐ φθονῶ).
29  Her next 
interview is with Jason, who, after some general comments about people who feel orgê, 
turns  specifically  to  Medea:  she  hates  him  (463: στυγεῖς),  he  says;  Medea  agrees 
(467: ἔχθιστος).  The Chorus observe that orgê is terrible (520: δεινή τις ὀργὴ) whenever 
philoi  join  in  strife  (521: ἔριν).
30    Medea  says  Jason  has  committed  hybris  against  her 
(603).
31  Jason continues to refer to her anger: the great kholos in her heart (590), her orgê 
(615), and her inability to let it go (621: αὐθαδίᾳ, cf. 103 4).  In all, Medea’s anger is 
referred to twenty one times throughout the play, by orgê (at 121, 176, 447, 520, 615, 870, 
909), kholos (at 94, 99, 172, 590, 898, 1266) and thymos (at 108, 176, 271, 865, 879, 883, 
1056, 1079); and her hatred is referred to twelve times, by misos (at 311), stygos (at 36, 
103, 113, 463, 1374), ekhthos (at 117, 290, 467, 1374) and ekhthra (at 16, 45).  These 
feelings are almost invariably aimed at Jason (who by the final scene has learned to hate her 
in return: misos (1323), ekhthos (1323, 1375)), though in the prologue a few times at their 
children (36, 103, 113, 117), whose presence or existence highlights what she has lost.  In 
addition, Kreon and Glauke are referred to on no fewer than thirteen occasions as Medea’s 
enemies (ekhthroi 45, 95, 278, 374, 383, 744, 750, 765, 767, 809, 897, 1050, 1060; and she 
theirs twice – 734, 875), though she does not use other hating words about them. 
 
A fourth emotion expressed regularly, if less frequently, is pride.  This is behind Medea’s 
claims  that  Jason  dishonoured  her  (696,  1354;  the  Nurse  agrees:  20,  33)  and  that  he 
committed hybris against her (255, 603, 1366).  Her pride is further shown by her concern, 
expressed six times, that her enemies might laugh at her (383, 404, 797, 1049, 1355, 1362): 
she could not bear to be an object of Schadenfreude to them.
32  The laughter of her enemies 
would be intolerable (797: οὐ γὰρ γελᾶσθαι τλητὸν ἐξ ἐχθρῶν; cf. 383, 404), she says; 
                                                 
28 Lypê is the word Aristotle uses, in conjunction with a desire for revenge, to describe the emotion orgê 
(Rh. 2.2.1378a30: ὀργή ὄρεξις  ετὰ λύπης τι ωρίας…). 
29 The denial of phthonos: exhibit A for the prosecution!  Begrudging, of course, is exactly what she does. 
30 For a discussion of ἔρις and its relation to Greek jealousy, see pp.185 8 on Andromache; cf. comments on 
eris in Hesiod at pp.45 7. 
31 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378b14 15 gives hybris as one of the three causes of orgê. 
32  In  the  end  she  avoids  her  misfortunes  giving  her  enemies  pleasure,  and  takes  pleasure  in  their  own 
misfortunes herself (1133 5) – Allan (2002) 74 5, 83 4, 93 notes that she wishes to feel Schadenfreude so 
they cannot. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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no one must think her low, feeble or meek (807 8:  ηδείς  ε φαύλην κἀσθενῆ νο ιζέτω 
 ηδ’ ἡσυχαίαν); rather she wants supreme kleos (810 – heroic renown).  It is for such 
reasons that Medea is often portrayed as acting from heroic pride, but this pride is not 
unconnected to her jealousy.  She will be mocked by the people who have taken away what 
defined her in life: her husband.  And it is her husband himself who first begins to mock 
her: in his first agôn with her, he belittles her feelings – he says she is merely chafed 
(555: κνίζῃ)  that  he  left  her  for  reasons  entirely  unconnected  with  her,  merely  irked 
(568: κνίζοι) by feelings of sexual inconsequentiality.  Medea fears her enemies will not 
take her seriously, and will just laugh at and degrade her; and here Jason, the very person 
who should respect her most, is the one leading the way in belittling her. 
 
Medea’s  emotions,  her  anger,  hatred,  grief  and  wounded  pride,  are  not  stand alone 
emotions,
33 but part of a jealousy complex: they are all tied up with the destruction of 
Medea’s marriage, a marriage she believed was inviolate, by Jason’s abandonment of her, 
by his forsaking of her bed and her sexual favours, for the bed and favours of a rival, and in 
general by his scorning and belittling her as a wife and a woman.  Modern psychologists 
tell  us  that  those  who  feel  jealous  typically  (through  masking)  talk  about  anger  and 
betrayal, and try to take some measure of revenge (see p.31).  In English we do not expect a 
jilted woman to say “I am so jealous”; rather she might scream “I can’t believe you cheated 
on me with that slut”, and run a nail down the side of his car.  Medea essentially does the 
same, though this being Greek tragedy her revenge is more murderous ( ιαιφονωτέρα – 
266). 
 
The form and extent of Medea’s revenge make us aware that a fifth emotion pervades the 
play, and that is φθόνος, or begrudging envy.
34  This φθόνος lacks the frequent expression 
of the other four emotions, but there is a reason for this, and that is the same reason we 
found in ch.7: the taboo on expressing phthonos.
35  Just as modern theory tells us that fait 
accompli jealousy gives rise to envy,
36 so it does for Medea in this play.  Envy’s most 
                                                 
33 Contra Konstan (2003b) 23 4: “… we must allow for the possibility that where we perceive the emotion 
jealousy, the Greeks  may have  felt distinct  sentiments, including anger, envy, sadness and emulousness, 
without  assembling  these  several  responses  into  a  single  compound.”    Cairns  (2008)  53 6  also  disputes 
Konstan’s rejection of sexual jealousy as a motivation for Medea. 
34 See Leuzinger Bohleber (2001) 332 on Medea’s envy of Glauke. 
35 See p.27 for this taboo in English, p.57 8 for the handful of first person claims of phthonos in Greek. 
36 I.e. when one has already lost the partner (see ch.2 n.49). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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salient  characteristic  is  a  malicious  hostility  and  ill will,  which  drives  acts  of  deep 
destructiveness.  Both modern English envy, and (according to Aristotle) ancient Greek 
φθόνος,
37 are characterised by a stronger desire for the other person not to enjoy something 
that the patient does not have, than a desire to obtain it too – and it is this levelling down 
urge (“if I cannot have it, then no one will”) which drives envy’s destructiveness.  It is 
characteristic of our emotion envy that it is frequently misrepresented as, or transmuted 
into, righteous indignation.
38  Similarly in Greek culture, Aristotle talks about how easily 
envy (φθόνος) can be confused with indignation (which he calls τὸ νε εσᾶν),
39 and in non 
Aristotelian usage we have seen that envy is often expressed in Greek literature as righteous 
indignation  (see  ch.5.3.3,  ch.6),  helped  by  the  fact  that  phthonos  can  imply  both  (see 
ch.5.3.1).  And this is what we see here: Medea talks many times about being wronged, and 
even more often about justice, almost from her very first words (dike: 165, 219, 221, 261, 
265, 309, 314, 580, 582, 692, 764, 767, 802).
40   This emotion is valid (the Nurse and 
Chorus agree she has been wronged – 26, 158, 208, 267, 411, 578, 1232); but Medea’s 
genuine and justified indignation comes inseparably bound with transmuted envy.
41  She 
has  been  deprived  of  her  marriage,  and  is  to  be  deprived  likewise  of  her  children.  
Begrudging envy, aroused by jealousy, ensures she will not let Jason or Glauke keep them.  
It  is  this  that  drives  her  destructiveness  against  Jason’s  new  marriage,  and  against  his 
children’s lives. 
 
But  what  about  the  emotional  vocabulary  used?    As  I  mentioned  earlier  (n.2  above), 
ζηλοτυπία is the word typically translated ‘jealousy’ from the 380s, but when Medea was 
written in 431 the word had not yet been coined.  The primary word used in the play to 
imply sexual passion is ἔρως.  ἔρως is more than a desire to acquire a sexual object; for 
instance Thucydides writes that the Athenians felt ἔρως for embarking on the conquest of 
                                                 
37 Cf. p.26, p.75. 
38 See pp.27 8. 
39 Arist. Rh. 2.9.1386b17: ὡς  σύνεγγυς ὢν καὶ ταὐτὸν τῷ νε εσᾶν – see p.72. 
40 Gentili (1972) and (2000), and Giacomoni (2000) argue that Jason’s injustice is in not sharing his wife’s 
bed; Medea wants him in her bed not because she is sexually insatiable, but because that is the proper place 
for a Greek husband to be: he should be fulfilling his conjugal duties. 
41 It is possible to read Greeks rationalising jealous revenge through the language of justice, honour and anger 
all the way back to Menelaus in the Iliad – see below p.192 and n.114 re Bonanno (1973); Pizzocaro (1994) 
21 5 on Menelaus’ jealousy.  Goldhill (2003) 167 has argued, in the context of Medea, that: “The language of 
phthonos (which is sometimes translated as ‘jealousy’) is linked, and subordinate, to the language of ‘honour’ 
(timê) and ‘wrong’ (adikein).”  I believe he has got this precisely the wrong way round: it is the language of 
honour and wrong that have been subordinated to the theme of jealousy. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Sicily  (Thuc.  6.24.3)  –  here  it  implies  a  desire  to  acquire,  enjoy  and  retain  (though 
Thucydides is, of course, employing a metaphor for sexual yearning).  This is certainly 
applicable to Medea, whose ἔρως for Jason demands exclusive possession,
42 but it cannot 
be the whole story as (after her revenge and destruction of the rival) Medea is happy to end 
the play without possessing her husband.  Our best evidence for ancient Greek emotions 
comes from Aristotle’s Rhetoric,
43 but Aristotle ignores both ἔρως and ζηλοτυπία (even 
though, as we shall see in ch.8.5, both play their part in oratory).  He does deal with ζῆλος, 
etymologically the parent emotion, but ζῆλος is merely emulation for goods and qualities 
we do not possess (see p.72).  φθόνος however, unlike ζῆλος, is bivalent: it is principally 
felt when we are lacking something we want (English envy), but also when we wish to hold 
on to something we have (English jealousy).  This is most clearly seen when φθόνος is 
directed at someone who has something we have lost (Rh. 2.10.1388a21 22: [φθονοῦσιν] 
τοῖς ἢ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἢ κεκτη ένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς ... ἐκέκτηντό ποτε).  Aristotle is not 
speaking here of sexual jealousy, rather of possessive jealousy more generally; but he goes 
on to note that, among other cases, we feel φθόνος most especially against our rivals in 
love  (Rh.  2.10.1388a15 16:  πρὸς  τοὺς  ...  ἀντεραστὰς  ...,  ἀνάγκη   άλιστα  τούτοις 
φθονεῖν).  It is clear therefore that Medea’s emotions can at least partly be described as 
φθόνος; however there are two other emotions we must consider: anger (ὀργή) and hatred 
(τὸ  ισεῖν). 
 
ὀργή, according to Aristotle, is a desire for revenge in return for a slight (ὀλιγωρία).  An 
ὀλιγωρία (cognate to ὀλίγος) is something that belittles you.  For ὀργή, it is necessary to 
actually perceive that  you have been belittled; and similarly ὀργή requires the belittler 
perceive  the  revenge.    There  are  three  types  of  ὀλιγωρία:  καταφρόνησίς  τε  καὶ 
ἐπηρεασ ὸς καὶ ὕβρις (Rh. 2.2.1378b14 15).  καταφρόνησις here involves more than the 
contemptuous desire not to be like someone else (see p.76); here it is when you show you 
believe  the  other  person  to  be  of  no  importance  (1378b15 17).    ἐπηρεασ ός  is  a 
disinterested slighting, thwarting someone’s wishes with no benefit to yourself (1378b18 
                                                 
42 She does not require monogamy, or at least does not say so (and indeed in Greece it would have been 
unusual if she had – see Kovacs (1980a) 15 16), but she does not accept Jason having any other wife but her. 
43 Aristotle is not of course commenting specifically on Eur. Med., and his treatise was written nearly a 
century later; likewise Euripides is not a philosopher, and is not bound to be consistent in his terms as would a 
philosopher.  But (as will be seen) the remarkable degree to which Aristotle’s thinking explains Medea’s 
language is a testament to how well both men understood the philological phenomenology of Greek emotions. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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20).  ὕβρις involves taking pleasure in shaming someone (1378b23 25); it is an insult, an 
insolent arrogance.  Medea several times says that Jason has treated her with hybris (255, 
603, 1366); she does not include Glauke and Kreon
44 – however they are certainly included 
in the list of people who might laugh at her, behaviour Aristotle considers hybris (1379a30 
32).  It is also fairly clear that Jason has considered Medea of no account in assuming he 
can pension her off at will, and in persistently considering her emotions merely petty.  It is 
clear then that ὀργή has an important part to play. 
 
τὸ  ισεῖν differs from ὀργή.  In Greek terms, it is the emotion one feels for one’s ekhthroi 
(personal enemies), people who harm you without provocation.  Kreon is in this position: 
he  is  peripheral  to  the  jealousy  triangle,  but  has  abetted  Medea’s  abandonment;  but 
although he has harmed her, he has not belittled her – on the contrary, he wants her out the 
country precisely because he fears how formidable an ekhthros she might be.  Medea’s 
feelings towards Kreon are thus well labelled τὸ  ισεῖν.  Her feelings towards Glauke are 
best described (in Greek terms) as hostile envy, a blend of τὸ  ισεῖν and φθόνος, both of 
which can lead to destruction of their target.  In accordance with Greek values, Medea 
cannot admit to φθόνος, so she can but talk of her hatred.  Self presentationally, she avoids 
the charge of φθόνος by lumping Glauke in with Kreon as jointly “my ekhthroi”, and she 
does so frequently (see p.169).  Although she could potentially feel ὀργή for them if they 
were to mock her, this has not yet happened.  The appropriate action to take towards one’s 
ekhthroi is to wish them harm – Aristotle describes τὸ  ισεῖν as a desire to harm (1382a8) – 
and killing someone is the most harm you can do them. 
 
Medea’s feelings for Jason, however, are best described as a mixture of φθόνος, not so 
much  with  τὸ   ισεῖν  (which,  though  present,  is  less  important),  but  rather  with  ὀργή.  
Since once again Greek cultural taboos ensure that φθόνος is not mentioned, all that is left 
for Medea to talk about is her response to her belittlement and her injury by Jason, her 
ὀργή.  David Konstan argues that: 
The object of anger … is to cause pain to the other.  A slight makes one feel 
small, and the only way to get even is to induce a similar feeling in the 
other.    It  follows  that,  for  an  angry  person  to  get  revenge,  the  original 
offender must be aware of it (aisthesthai), since there is no such thing as 
                                                 
44 She does, however, believe they would treat her children with hybris if she left them behind (782), and the 
Corinthians would too after the children were made complicit in the royal deaths (1061, 1380). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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unperceived pain (hence the stipulation in the definition of anger that the 
revenge, like the slight itself, must be perceived), whereas to one who hates 
it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  whether  an  enemy  is  aware  or  not  of  the 
damage done to him.  That is why we may wish that people whom we hate 
should die, but when we are angry, what we desire is that the other person 
feel  in  return  (antipathein)  the  kind  of  diminishment  that  provoked  our 
anger in the first place (2.4, 1382a14 15).  The death of the other would 
render that impossible.
45 
 
Kreon and Glauke wantonly inflicted harm on Medea; it is for that reason she wanted them 
dead.    At  first,  she  believes  this  is  what  she  wants  for  Jason  too  (hence  τὸ   ισεῖν  is 
present); however, as she reflects, she realises that is not sufficient punishment: his was not 
the injuring of an ekhthros, but a deeply painful belittling; her anger is stronger than her 
hatred, and accordingly Jason must remain alive to perceive her revenge.  This is why 
Medea,  having  determined  that  her  revenge  will  be  to  kill  Jason  alongside  Kreon  and 
Glauke (373 5), eventually changes her mind: Kreon and Glauke will still die, but Jason 
must be left alive to know that his children are dead because of his treatment of Medea 
(774 96). 
 
Sexual jealousy has suffered in the interpretation of this play partly because, like envy, its 
expression was taboo to the Greeks, but partly also because it does not have a convenient 
prototypical  label  in  Greek,  such  as  our  word  “jealousy”.    Greeks  could  recognise  the 
scenario  (as  the  Nurse,  the  Tutor,  the  Chorus  of  Corinthian  Women,  Jason  –  and  by 
inference the audience – all do),
46 but labelling it was more difficult.  Semantically it fell 
somewhere between ἔρως, φθόνος and ὀργή.  We should also note that Medea emphasises 
certain elements of the jealousy prototype more than we might expect from modern theory, 
especially the narcissistic wound (the hybris and the potential mocking laughter), her rage 
and her hatred.  It is possible that the status conscious Greeks were more sensitive to these 
aspects of the jealousy complex than we, and therefore their vocabulary was better adapted 
to express these rather than the complex as a whole.
47 
 
                                                 
45 Konstan (2006) 47. 
46 Cf. Cairns (2008) 55.  Parrott (1991) 6 notes: “… it is easy to imagine situations in which an envious or 
jealous person is the last person to know that envy or jealousy motivates his or her actions.” 
47 Konstan (2003a) 117 and (2006) 259 61 highlights the status consciousness and competitiveness of the 
Greek emotional lexicon.  I should reiterate, for clarity, that I see sexual jealousy as a motive alongside anger 
(and pride) for Medea, not instead of. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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8.3  Trachiniae 
 
Deianeira’s  sexual  jealousy  at  the  imminent  introduction  of  Iole  into  her  house  is  less 
controversial than Medea’s.  While many authors refer to her sexual jealousy in passing 
though,
48 they do not elaborate on it, and it is generally agreed that it does not play a major 
part in her motivation.
49  While I agree that Deianeira – at least as Sophocles portrays her
50 
–  is  no  Medea,  many  of  the  elements  I  have  identified  in  my  discussion  of  Medea’s 
jealousy can be seen likewise in Trachiniae, and a closer examination will illuminate both 
Deianeira, and our understanding of Greek jealousy.
51 
 
Deianeira has been Heracles’ wife for many years; she has born him children, has kept his 
house, has woven at his loom – all the attributes of the ‘good’ Greek wife.  The tragic 
action is precipitated by her learning that Heracles intends to set up Iole as some sort of 
permanent lover (whether as a wife or concubine)
52 within the household – it is unclear 
what Heracles’ intentions are concerning herself, but Deianeira believes the worst.  She 
thinks that if only Heracles could come to love her again, this would all be avoided, and she 
accordingly practises a piece of ‘love magic’ on him which ends up killing him. 
 
In Medea, erôs was clearly very much part of the plot, and loomed large in Medea and 
Jason’s relationship.  In Trachiniae, Sophocles uses a much lighter brush to paint Deianeira 
and  Heracles’  marriage,  to  the  extent  that  some  have  even  questioned  whether  their 
relationship was an erotic one at all.
53  It is notable that all four instances of erôs words in 
                                                 
48 E.g. Easterling (1982) 141 n.545 6, Houghton (1962), Scott (1997).  Some deny her jealousy, e.g. Faraone 
(1994) 121. 
49 E.g. Goldhill (2003) 167: “Yet for all that Erôs is thematised in this drama, and for all that erotically 
motivated revenge and intrigue are central to the plotting, it would be misplaced to describe the Trachiniae as 
a drama of jealousy or even spite.  Deianeira is carefully figured as especially generous of spirit particularly in 
relation to Iole, for whom she expresses sympathy and care.  The tragedy of her doom laden and disastrous 
expression of desire is set off by her very commitment to a nobility and propriety of character.” 
50 Errandonea (1927) notes that previous versions of the Deianeira myth had shown her as being as vengeful 
as Medea, and argues Sophocles had initially intended his Deianeira to follow this pattern.  See also Levett 
(2004) 30ff., Davies (1989) 469. 
51 Wender (1974) 1 2 highlights some similarities, and differences, in the plots of the two plays. 
52 Easterling (1982) 126, 130 argues that such words as δά αρτ’ (428) and ἔγη ε (460) do not have any legal 
significance. 
53 E.g. Faraone (1994) 120 1, Faraone (1999) 199, Heiden (1989) 84 5.  Majority (and as will be clear, my) 
opinion is encapsulated by Easterling (1982) 5: “Eros, treated in this play with an insight that rivals that of 
Euripides in Medea and Hippolytos, is a dominant motif throughout.”  See particularly Wender (1974) on 
erotic imagery in the play. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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the play (354, 433, 441, 489) refer to Heracles’ feelings for Iole, as does the sole instance 
of himeros (476), and two of the instances of pothos (368, 431) – the first of which is 
described as “heated up” (ἐντεθέρ ανται).  However Deianeira does note that, like the 
gods, she has been conquered by the power of Eros (444), without naming him.  Further, 
pothos words occur nine times in all, and five of these relate to Deianeira: the Chorus note 
that her heart is beset with longing for Heracles (103: ποθου έναι); in his absence she can 
never  put  to  bed  the  longing  (107: πόθον)  of  her  eyelids  without  weeping;  Deianeira 
herself says she fears Likhas might tell Heracles of her desire (631: πόθον) for him, before 
she knows if she is desired in return (632: ποθού εθα, sc. after the spell has had its effect); 
finally  Hyllos  tells  Heracles  that  Deianeira’s  spell  was  designed  to  awaken  his  desire 
(1142: πόθον). 
 
In Medea we saw that much of the eroticism of the play comes from the repeated use of 
“bed” words,  many  of  which  meant  “sex”.    It  is  at  least  worth  noting  that  at  nineteen 
instances (excluding words always meaning spouse/bedmate) there are more “bed” words 
in Trachiniae than in any other Sophocles play (unsurprisingly perhaps, since this play 
involves a rival for a legitimate spouse).  However, unlike in Medea, only one of these 
instances  unambiguously  means  “sex”  (360:  λέχος),  and  that  refers  to  what  Heracles 
wanted to do to Iole out of wedlock, before her father refused.  Closer examination of other 
usages  does  however  present  a  subtle  picture  of  the  role  of  the  (metaphorical)  bed  in 
Heracles’  and  Deianeira’s  relationship.    Recounting  the  story  of  Heracles’  battle  with 
Akheloos for her, when (presumably) Heracles did feel erôs for her, Deianeira says he 
chose her for his bed (27: λέχος).  In the parodos, the Chorus note that as the sun goes to 
bed (95: κατευνάζει), so does Deianeira, unable to put to bed (106: εὐνάζειν) her pothos 
for Heracles, go to her husbandless bed (109: εὐναῖς ἀνανδρώτοισι).
54  While Deianeira is 
preparing the treated robe, the Chorus sing a hymn to Aphrodite (497ff.) in which they 
recount the Heracles Akheloos battle.  Both are said to be eager for her bed (514: ἱέ ενοι 
λεχέων),
55 and Aphrodite (with the appropriate epithet εὔλεκτρος – 515) stands between 
them as judge.  The bed, with all its significance, plays such a central role in Deianeira’s 
conception of her marriage, that when she thinks of Heracles and Iole she imagines herself 
and Iole waiting under one blanket for him (539 40:  ί νο εν  ιᾶς ὑπὸ χλαίνης): even 
                                                 
54 A similar phrase occurs at Eur. Med. 436 7. 
55 LSJ: ἵε αι (Med.) + genitive = “eager for”. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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while he is screwing someone else, there she is in bed with him.
56  Finally,  and most 
tellingly, is her suicide.  The Nurse recounts a most vivid image: Deianeira preparing the 
bed (918: εὐνατηρίοις) as she would for sex,
57 clambering onto it, crying out “O bed and 
my bridal chamber, goodbye forever.  Never again will you receive me in this bed as his 
bedmate” (920 2: ὦ λέχη τε καὶ νυ φεῖ ἐ ά, τὸ λοιπὸν ἤδη χαίρεθ’, ὡς ἔ ’ οὔποτε 
δέξεσθ’ ἔτ’ ἐν κοίταισι ταῖσδ’ εὐνάτριαν), then stabbing herself through the stomach with 
a sword.  It is hard to imagine a suicide scene more laden with erotic imagery.
58  Here and 
earlier, the play insists on bringing Deianeira’s erôs for her husband to our attention.  But 
what is stressed is not the frequency or nature of the sex, but rather the fact of it (the sex act 
itself),  and  all  that  sex  with  her  husband  on  their  marriage  bed  conveys  in  terms  of 
exclusivity, and its implication for Deianeira’s value (as wife, as woman, as mistress of the 
house) to her husband.
59 
 
Turning to the other basic emotions in the jealousy prototype we can see that, at least at 
first sight, hatred and anger do not play much part in the play.  Hatred, certainly is absent, 
but is anger?  On hearing of Heracles’ erôs for Iole, Deianeira imagines getting to grips 
with the god Eros as with a boxer (441 2), and protests to Likhas that she would be raving 
mad  to  blame  Heracles  (446 7),  nor  is  it  shameful  for  the  woman  who  shares  in  the 
responsibility (i.e. Iole, 447 8).  She does not sound like someone who is not angry, but 
rather like someone who is trying to convince herself not to be angry: she states that anger 
is not a good response (οὐ καλῶς – 442).
60  At the start of the second episode, Deianeira 
describes how she has been forced to take in this girl (this “no longer girl”, as she corrects 
herself),  as  a  ship  is  loaded  with  cargo,  and  calls  this  treatment  λωβητόν  (538):
61 
                                                 
56 See Easterling (1968) 63 4. 
57 Levett (2004) 56; cf. Easterling (1982) 190, n.915 16. 
58 Winnington Ingram (1980) 81 notes the eroticism of this scene; cf. De Wet (1983) 81 n.28, Easterling 
(1968) 66.  Loraux (1987) 54 6 has some interesting comments on the symbolism of her death blow. 
59 Cf. n.14, n.94. Levett (2004) 54 7 argues, rightly, that we should not assume that our modern conception of 
love was a necessary component of Greek erôs; he also points out that, while our conception of love is self 
sacrificing rather than driven by self interest, in Greece erôs and self interest were not necessarily in conflict.  
See further my discussion of love, erôs and jealousy at pp.188 9. 
60 She cannot be trying to convince Likhas (except incidentally), as she continues in the same vein at 531ff. 
when alone (with the Chorus – traditionally not a bar to self expression in tragedy).  Holt (1981) 68 believes 
“her pride and her noble intentions will [not] allow her to admit” her anger.  I believe rather that her good 
nature will not allow her anger to take hold. 
61  Jebb  (1902)  describes  λωβητόν  as  a  “word  of  contumely”.    He  also  suggests  an  equation  between 
λωβητὸν  ἐ πόλη α  and  βλάβη  (“harm”).    See  also  Cairns  (1993)  55  on  lôbê  (which  he  translates 
“disfigurement”). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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outrageous, insulting, despicable.  She vividly imagines herself crouching under a blanket 
with Iole, waiting together for Heracles to come to bed,
62 and bitterly calls these her wages 
(542:  οἰκούρι’)  from  her  “so called  faithful  and  good”  (541:  ὁ  πιστὸς  ...  κἀγαθὸς 
καλού ενος) husband.  But then she says,  “I cannot be angry (543: θυ οῦσθαι) with him”, 
because he is often sick with this disease (i.e. erôs).  She then falls to bitter contemplation 
once again: to share a house and a husband in this way, “what woman could do it?”, she 
demands.  She imagines Iole’s bloom ripening as her own dies, and dreads Heracles being 
known as her husband (550: πόσις), but Iole’s man (551: ἀνήρ).
63  But still she resists her 
bitterness: “it is not a good thing for a woman to keep on being angry (ὀργαίνειν)”, she 
says (552 3).  In this whole passage we are presented with a series of vivid images (the 
boat, the blanket, the flowers), each presented in emotive rhetoric, laden with bitterness.  
She knows that unchecked these musings might lead to anger (thymos, orgê), but she is 
determined they will not.
64  Deianeira may not be presented in the egregious manner of 
Medea – she is a much more understated character than Medea in every way – but we 
should be in no doubt that anger is there, struggling to break through.  However, unlike 
Medea she does not wallow in it; rather she tries to see things from her husband’s point of 
view.  In (proto )Aristotelian language, she works to change her perceptions, to convince 
herself she has not been slighted – hence her arguments that it is not really Heracles’ fault 
because it is his nature (or “sickness”), and that a man has a right to treat his wife in this 
way.  It is because she does not allow orgê to take hold, that she does not seek revenge. 
 
Continuing our survey of emotions, we see that grief too does not play nearly so great a role 
in Trachiniae as in Medea.  Largely that is because Medea knew of her husband’s desertion 
for  some  time  before  putting  her  revenge  into  action.    Deianeira  no  sooner  learns  of 
Heracles’ plans than she implements her own.  She is stunned, and there is little time for 
                                                 
62 Compare Clytemnestra, saying Agamemnon intended Cassandra as additional spice for her bed (Aesch. Ag. 
1447: εὐνῆς παροψώνη α τῆς ἐ ῆς χλιδῇ). 
63 Jason is similarly referred to almost invariably as Medea’s πόσις.  In fact, of twenty one instances of the 
word in Medea, sixteen refer to Medea’s husband (three are generalised, the final two to Glauke’s husband – 
one qualified by ἀρτίως, one used rhetorically by Jason to mollify Glauke).  Jason is referred to as Medea’s 
πόσις even by Kreon (271) and Jason (910).  Several times this is juxtaposed with a word referring to Glauke, 
either as ἥν ... ἐγή ατο (262), γά ους ... ἀλλοίους (910) or συνεύνῳ (1001).  Only once is Jason referred to 
as Medea’s bedmate (159: εὐνάταν).  Clearly Deianeira’s concerns are not mere hyperbole. 
64 Holt (1981) 69: “Deianeira’s repeated assertions that she cannot be angry, or at least that she should not be 
angry, do not erase the suspicion that she is angry.  Rather, they give the impression that she has to keep 
reminding herself of how she ought to feel.”  Cf. W.V. Harris (2001) 266. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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grief, yet still we see the odd expression: to be suspicious but not to know for certain would 
grieve her (458: ἀλγύνειεν ἄν); and knowing the truth she must bewail with the Chorus 
how much she suffers (535: τὰ δ’ οἷα πάσχω συγκατοικτιου ένη).  Similarly, pride is 
less prominent in this play, though part of Deianeira’s horror is at Heracles’ potentially 
being called (550 1: φοβοῦ αι,  ὴ ... καλῆται) her husband but Iole’s man – concern for 
her reputation is therefore not entirely absent,
65 but Deianeira is not a ‘masculine’ hero in 
the way Medea is, and does not have the same obsession with ‘face’. 
 
The emotion that dominates this play is Deianeira’s fear, and from line 7 (νυ φείων ὄκνον) 
onwards it is connected to her marriage.  She is fearful of marriage; she is terrified of her 
suitor Akheloos.  Since her marriage to Heracles she has still known nothing but fear (28: 
ἀεί τιν’ ἐκ φόβου φόβον τρέφω), but until now for her husband’s safety.  Now her fear is 
for the future with Iole in her house, but still it is not entirely this that causes the tragedy of 
the play.  Deianeira has been riven with fear all her life without ever being driven by it to 
do anything.  She lived with the fear her father would marry her to a monster, and the fear 
that the monster would prevail; since her marriage she has lived with fear for Heracles’ 
safety.  Fear has never been a strong enough emotion for her to act; rather she has always 
been  paralysed  into  passivity,  and  one  must  infer  that  fear  of  being  displaced  would 
likewise, by itself, be insufficient for her to shake off her passivity. 
 
It is not therefore the fear, but the fact that she is about to be displaced – from her bed, from 
her marriage, from her home – that finally galvanises her into acting.  And the emotion this 
fact triggers above all, the emotion that finally motivates Deianeira to act, is jealousy.
66  
The  situational  antecedents  are  all  in  place.    Deianeira  has  an  exclusive  and  unique 
relationship with her husband (while his love affairs have been legion, he has only ever 
sought sex from them, and a Greek wife could expect no better).  Her whole self concept is 
(like Medea) bound up with her roles as wife, housekeeper, mother; and it is that self 
concept that is now under threat, with Heracles bringing Iole into the house as a permanent 
rival.  She does not imagine Heracles in the servant’s quarters with Iole, but rather Iole is in 
the marriage bed itself crouching under the same blanket with her (539 40); she believes 
                                                 
65 Heiden (1989) 83 4. 
66 Despite the presence of fear this is not suspicious jealousy.  Deianeira no sooner becomes aware of the 
possibility that Heracles might replace her with Iole, than she becomes certain (perhaps too certain) of the fact 
of it: Heracles’ intentions are a fait accompli.  See ch.2 n.49 for suspicious and fait accompli jealousy. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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she will lose her position as mistress of the house to become a drudge (542: οἰκούρι’); she 
pictures her own beauty fading as Iole’s ripens.   As bedmate, as mistress of the household, 
as a desirable woman – Iole threatens her in every aspect of her self conception.  And 
Deianeira cries out in her helplessness, “Living together in the house with her, and sharing 
the marriage – what woman could do it?” (545 6: τὸ δ’ αὖ ξυνοικεῖν τῆιδ’ ὁ οῦ τίς ἂν 
γυνὴ δύναιτο, κοινωνοῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν γά ων), an expression of womanly jealousy 
comparable with (if less hyperbolic than) Medea’s “Whenever a woman is wronged in the 
marriage bed, then no other heart is more murderous” (265 6).  It is Heracles’ bringing Iole 
to live in her house that triggers Deianeira’s incipient anger, grief and pride. 
 
And  it  triggers  one  more  emotion.    Deianeira  believes  she  is  to  be  usurped  from  her 
position as bedmate and wife by another woman – a rival.  This rival is younger, prettier – 
and Heracles is in love with her in a way he was once, but is no longer, in love with 
Deianeira.   In her soliloquy (531ff.) Deianeira starts by thinking of them side by side, 
comparable (“two under one blanket”).  She then uses harsh, belittling words to describe 
Iole and the situation – φόρτον (537: freight, a heavy burden, but also implying something 
low  or  vulgar),  λωβητὸν  (538:  outrageous,  insulting,  despicable),  ἐ πόλη α 
(538: merchandise).
67  Next she expresses a refusal to share the house (545: ξυνοικεῖν) and 
Heracles (546: κοινωνοῦσα τῶν αὐτῶν γά ων).  Next her dread that Iole will shine in 
comparison to her, that Iole’s youthful bloom will ripen (547: ἕρπουσαν) as her own fades 
(548: φθίνουσαν).  And finally her horror at the outcome: that to others Heracles will be 
merely her πόσις, but Iole’s ἀνήρ (550 1).  This sense of personal rivalry, this comparison 
between oneself and another with a strong desire to beat the other, to win, is phthonos – and 
this can be particularly seen if we consider Aristotle’s words on the emotion.  In every way, 
Iole stands to become an equal (Rh. 2.9.1386b19 20: τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ὁ οίου) to Deianeira, 
and it is Deianeira who will fall short (Rh. 2.10.1387b28: ἐλλείπει) of having everything 
Iole has (i.e. youthful bloom, sexual allure).  Aristotle notes that older people feel phthonos 
for  younger  (Rh.  2.10.1388a22 23:  πρεσβύτεροί τε νεωτέροις);  but  most  strikingly  he 
says one feels phthonos for one’s rivals in love beyond anyone else (Rh. 2.10.1388a14 16: 
                                                 
67 The language here is very significant in relation to her earlier references to Iole.  There is a very substantial 
change  of  tone.    The  objectification  (φόρτον,  ἐ πόλη α)  exculpates  Iole  (she  is  the  passive  object  of 
Heracles’ passion, not an agent, and Deianeira recognises a kindred spirit), but the pejorative terminology 
reflects at least her fear and also suggests an admixture of hostility, for all that she avoids letting it lead to 
aggressive action. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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πρὸς τοὺς ... ἀντεραστὰς ..., ἀνάγκη  άλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν).  An Aristotelian might 
argue that Deianeira is not a ‘bad’ person, in the way envisaged of the phthoneros in the 
Rhetoric (though Medea may be), but she is morally uneducated in the way envisaged in 
the Ethics, and as such will be susceptible to φαυλότητες such as phthonos.  Deianeira 
does not wish to destroy Iole or even to damage her (as might be expected from English 
envy), but she does recognise her as a rival she has to beat
68 – and it is this that makes her 
willing to adopt such unorthodox, and potentially dangerous,
69 methods.
70 
 
8.4  Andromache 
 
A  third  play  in  which  jealousy  is  a  major  feature  is  Euripides’  Andromache.    In  the 
prologue, Andromache sets the scene.  She was apportioned to Neoptolemos in the division 
of the spoils of Troy, and as his slave has had a sexual relationship with him for many 
years,  a  relationship  that  has  produced  a  son.    Recently  Neoptolemos  has  married 
Hermione,  a  young  Spartan  princess,  but  Hermione  has  not  since  become  pregnant.  
Neoptolemos is currently away on an extended visit to Delphi, and Hermione and her father 
Menelaus (who has come from Sparta specially) intend to kill Andromache and her son in 
his absence.  That Hermione is jealous of Andromache, and that her jealousy is behind the 
murder attempt, is widely accepted by scholars,
71 and it will be instructive to see how her 
jealousy episode compares with those of Medea and Deianeira. 
 
It  is  already  clear  that  there  are  some  similarities  in  the  situations,  but  also  some 
differences:    Medea  and  Deianeira  were  the  original  wives  jealous  of  usurpers,  while 
Hermione is the new (legitimate) wife jealous of her (concubine) predecessor; the father of 
the younger rival is actively involved here as in Medea; both ‘wives’ are living in the same 
                                                 
68 The importance of competition in Greek culture explains this difference between phthonos and envy. 
69 Faraone (1994) argues that love potions were resorted to by some Greek wives, and involved administering 
a dose of poison to their husbands.  This dose would need to be more than negligible to be effective, but it 
was hard to hit the right balance between effective and fatal, and Faraone provides some evidence of ‘real 
life’ uses of such love potions and their occasional fatal effects – see pp.191 3 on Antiphon’s Against the 
Stepmother. 
70 It is notable that Bacchylides, in his version of the myth, attributes Deianeira’s action to “widely powerful 
phthonos”  when  she  heard  Heracles  was  sending  “white armed  Iole  to  his  house  as  a  bride  (λοχον)” 
(16.23 31) – cf. Walcot (1978) 23. Levett (2004) 33 4 believes the phthonos is aimed at Heracles; but we 
know  from  Aristotle that phthonos focuses on the rival (here Iole) rather than the object of competition 
(Heracles), so Sophocles’ version of the myth is fully consistent with Bacchylides’. 
71 E.g.  Erbse (1966) 280; Walcot (1978) 23 4, who compares Hermione with Medea and Deianeira, as well as 
Clytemnestra; Kovacs (1980a) 45 inter alia; Knox (1989) 77; Allan (2000) 107 8, 116, 269 inter alia. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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house in Andromache, as they were destined to in Trachiniae, though never did in Medea; 
the husband is away from home (again as in Trachiniae) leaving the women to their own 
devices.  Other, more important connections will become clear. 
 
Andromache tells us in the prologue that since Neoptolemos married Hermione, the latter 
has  persecuted  her,  saying  that  Andromache  is  using  secret  drugs  (32: φαρ άκοις 
κεκρυ  ένοις) to make her childless (33: ἄπαιδα) and hateful to her husband (33: πόσει 
 ισου ένην), in order to supplant her as mistress of the house (34 5: ναίειν οἶκον … τόνδ’) 
and cast her out from her marriage bed (35: λέκτρα) by force.
72   Hermione later confirms 
all these points of contention: Andromache wishes to cast her out of her house and take it 
over (156 7: δό ους κατασχεῖν ... τούσδε); she is hated by her husband (157: στυγοῦ αι 
δ’ ἀνδρί) because of Andromache’s drugs (157: φαρ άκοις), and it is Andromache’s fault 
her womb is barren (158: νηδὺς δ’ ἀκύ ων). 
 
Kovacs argues that one should not assume either that Hermione really believes she is being 
administered drugs by Andromache, or that it is those drugs that are making her barren; 
rather  it  is  a  plausible  excuse,  and  if  anything  the  drugs  would  be  a  love  philtre 
administered to Neoptolemos to ensure he remains uninterested in sex with Hermione, that 
being the reason she remains barren;
73 he adduces as evidence that no one in the play takes 
Hermione’s charge seriously,
74 yet the secret administration of love philtres is not alien to 
the Greek way of thinking,
75 so it is a plausible charge for Hermione to make.  However, 
there is no suggestion in the play that Hermione is simply making this up, as a plausible 
excuse to attack Andromache; rather, such an accusation speaks to her state of mind: her 
jealousy  and  paranoid  fear  (of  being  set  aside)  have  made  her  believe  a  fantasy.  
                                                 
72 Stevens (1971) 95 6 for commentary on individual words, especially for this translation of ναίειν (line 34). 
73 Kovacs (1980a) 18 20; Faraone (1999) 7 allows for either possibility.  We may note that Andromache says 
her  drugs  are  supposedly  making  Hermione  childless  and  hateful  to  her  husband  –  the  strong  καὶ  (33) 
implying these are separate and equal results of the drugs, and that neither has caused the other – while 
perhaps Hermione’s use of δ’ as a link followed by διὰ σέ (158) implies the barrenness is a result of her being 
hateful to her husband, i.e. because he is not having sex with her.  However νηδὺς δ’ ἀκύ ων … διόλλυται 
(158) is a fairly striking phrase for a mere corollary, so perhaps I am reading too much into their alternative 
formulations. 
74 The Chorus do not pick up on this charge, nor does Menelaus repeat it.  Andromache herself only mentions 
it in passing, as Kovacs puts it: “The only φίλτρα involved, she says in 207, are the wifely virtues Hermione 
so conspicuously lacks…” (ibid. 20).  McClure (1999) 170 suggests that the false accusation is an example of 
the character flaws that have kept Neoptolemos from her bed. 
75 As Faraone (1994), Faraone (1999) 116 19 shows, and as I discuss above for Trachiniae. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Andromache dismisses the allegation (205), and addresses instead the understandable fear 
behind  it:  that  because  Hermione  continues  barren  while  Andromache  has  successfully 
borne him a son, Neoptolemos will (through desire for a legitimate heir) make Andromache 
his actual wife and mistress of his house, throwing Hermione out (156 7) or relegating her 
to a subordinate position (927 8).
76  Andromache knows that this is Hermione’s secret fear 
(34 5), and it is this she explicitly argues against at length in the first agôn.  With ironic 
questions she makes these points (192 202): Hermione’s marriage is legitimate (and by 
implication her own relationship with Neoptolemos is not);
77 her city is destroyed, while 
Hermione’s is powerful (i.e. a useful marriage alliance); she is a slave (while Hermione is a 
princess); she is ageing while Hermione is youthful; if she bears more children they will be 
slaves like her current one; and as illegitimate slave children of a slave mother, the people 
of Phthia would never accept them as kings (whatever Neoptolemos might wish).  Goebel 
agrees with Andromache’s line of argument, especially with this last point; he points out 
that Neoptolemos has already had to contract one marriage to obtain legitimate children, so 
if Hermione were sent away, he would only have to contract another: Andromache’s son 
could not inherit.
78  This would be true in classical Athens, where  a barbarian pallakê 
certainly could not replace a wife, nor the issue be legitimated,
79 but tragic social norms 
should  not  be  presumed  to  match  Classical  Athenian  ones.
80    As  far  as  this  play  is 
concerned,  clearly  Neoptolemos  has  not  yet  shown  any  signs  of  trying  to  legitimate 
Andromache’s  son,  but  is  it  (from  Hermione’s  perspective)  so  far  fetched?    Certainly 
Peleus is far more protective of Andromache and her son than one might expect from a 
Greek  of  his  grandson’s  slaves,  as  Andromache  knows  he  will  be  (hence  her  repeated 
efforts to get a message to him (81)), and in his argument with Menelaus he explicitly lays 
claim to the boy as part of his family (714: ἄπαιδας ἡ ᾶς δεῖ καταστῆναι τέκνων;).  
Further, he says he will raise the boy to be a great enemy to “these people” (724:  έγαν 
τοῖσδ’ ἔχθρόν) – presumably Menelaus’ family or the Spartans in general – and this is 
unlikely for a common slave, but perfectly plausible for an illegitimate prince.  We saw in 
                                                 
76 In all three plays I have looked at, the rival can provide the male with something the patient cannot: 
Kreon’s daughter offers power and status; Iole offers youth and sexual allure; Andromache a male offspring. 
77 She is in the position of pallakê – she stresses her slave status in her opening speech. 
78 Goebel (1989) 34. 
79  MacDowell  (1978)  89 90.    (As  MacDowell  notes,  the  extraordinary  legitimation  of  Perikles’  son  by 
Aspasia  required  a  special  decree  be  passed  to  approve  it.)    See  also  the  famous  distinction  between 
concubines (pallakas) and wives (gynaikas) at Dem. 59.122. 
80 Eur. Hipp. 304 10: the Nurse warns Phaidra that Hippolytos is a bastard who believes himself legitimate 
(309: νόθον φρονοῦντα γνήσι’); cf. W.S. Barrett (1964/2001). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Medea  that  Jason  argues  that,  even  if  his  sons  are  considered  illegitimate  to  his  new 
marriage, yet they would still have high status as half brothers to kings.  Clearly Peleus 
envisages Andromache’s son having some similar status, and he implicitly portrays him as 
a potential war leader.  As Kovacs asks, is Hermione really so wrong to be concerned at the 
implications of the boy being Neoptolemos’ only heir?
81  If she remains barren, the whole 
reason for Neoptolemos keeping her as his wife will disappear, and he is unlikely to retain 
her out of affection.  It is without dispute that Neoptolemos hates his wife: aside from the 
two brief statements noted above (33, 157), Andromache later elaborates that Hermione’s 
husband  hates  her  (205: στυγεῖ  πόσις)  (not  because  of  her  drugs  but)  because  she  is 
unpleasant to live with, and it is virtue that delights bedfellows (208: ξυνευνέτας).  Further, 
when Orestes asks Hermione if her posis instead cherishes (907: στέργει) some other lover 
(907:  εὐνὴν),  she  replies  that  Andromache  is  his  bedmate  (908: ξυνευνέτιν)  –  and  by 
implication the one he cherishes. 
 
This brings us to Hermione’s other charge against Andromache: that she is still sleeping 
with her husband, even after his marriage.  Kovacs advances strong arguments that this 
accusation is true.
82  He has to explain away two awkward comments from Andromache.  
The  first  is  that  Neoptolemos  ceased  coming  to  Andromache’s  bed  after  the  marriage 
(30: τοὐ ὸν παρώσας ... λέχος); Kovacs plausibly argues that παρώσας need not imply a 
permanent renunciation (though one might expect some indication of the temporary nature 
of the rejection).  The second is νῦν δ’ ἐκλέλοιπα (38), which he argues cannot mean that 
Andromache chose to abandon Neoptolemos’ bed, as a slave did not have that freedom of 
choice, so can only apply to her recent abandoning of the palace to take refuge at the shrine 
of Thetis.  However, the verb ἐκλείπω need not mean “abandon” in the sense of motion 
away  from  –  it  can  also  mean  “leave  off”  or  “cease”,  and  it  is  perfectly  plausible  for  
Andromache to say “I have ceased that now” without meaning that it was she who made the 
decision,  especially  as  she  has  already  attributed  the  initiative  to  Neoptolemos  (30).   
However, for my present purposes (as with Hermione’s accusation that Andromache is 
using potions against her) it does not actually matter whether Andromache is still sleeping 
                                                 
81 Kovacs (1980a) 22. 
82 Ibid. 15 8.  See e.g. Storey (1993) 182 for an alternative view. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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with Neoptolemos: the key point is that Hermione believes she is,
83 and as Kovacs points 
out, Andromache never argues against this – on the contrary, her argument that a wife 
should  accept  her  husband  having  lots  of  concubines  (215 8)  tacitly  admits  that 
Neoptolemos  has  at  least  one.
84    Thus  not  only  as  a  provider  of  children,  but  also  as 
bedmate, Andromache has succeeded where Hermione has failed, and it is at least plausible 
she could take on the third task of a wife, as keeper of the home.  Hermione is surely right 
then to fear her as a potential rival wife.  Though her account of Andromache’s actions and 
intentions is the distorted product of her own fears, and though her reaction to those fears is 
both excessive and violent, those fears remain intelligible within the world of the play. 
 
In Trachiniae we saw a vivid, but brief, image of Deianeira and Iole crouching in bed 
together awaiting their man; in Andromache “two wives” is a running theme.
85  Hermione 
introduces it first, saying it is not acceptable for one man to hold the bridle reins for two 
women (178: δυοῖν γυναικοῖν); rather the man who wishes not to live poorly should be 
content to see just one woman in his bed.  The Chorus’ immediate reaction is to refer to 
Hermione  and  Andromache  as  “rival  wives”  (182: ξυγγά οισι).    Orestes  later  agrees, 
sententiously (if not entirely altruistically) opining that it is bad for one man to have two 
wives (909: δίσσ’ λέχη). But it is the Chorus who argues this most fully, devoting the 
entire second stasimon to the theme.  They begin by saying they will never praise a man 
with two wives (465: δίδυ α λέκτρ’), and go on to compare this with a kingdom with two 
kings, a song written by two poets, two tillermen on a boat, and a crowd of experts – each 
leads to strife, and likewise two wives lead to strife in the house (467: ἔριδας οἴκων).
86  
Eris (“strife”) is a major theme of the play,
87 with the word occurring no fewer than nine 
times.  Four of these describe as eris the situation in the house between Hermione and 
Andromache (122, 490, 573, 960 – two spoken by the Chorus, one each by Andromache 
and Orestes), one is the Chorus’ comparison with strife between two craftsman (477), and 
two more are  gnomic utterances by the Chorus deploring strife between rival wives in 
                                                 
83 As Kovacs (ibid.) argues, the Chorus share that belief, and indeed it would be perfectly natural for a Greek 
man to continue having sex with a slave after marriage. 
84  Ibid.  17 18.    Storey  (1993)  182  notes  that  “neither  gamos  nor  posis  is  used  in  connexion  with  this 
[Neoptolemos’ and Andromache’s] union.” 
85 See Storey (1993) 183ff. 
86  Stevens  (1971)  153  argues  that  the  first  syllable  should  be  long,  so  ἔριδας  is  probably  corrupt.    He 
mentions, without comment, Schroeder (1928) Eur. Cantica, 215, who suggests δήριας, an Ionic accusative 
of δῆρις (= contest) as an alternative. 
87 See Storey (1993) 187, J.R. Wilson (1979) 7 9. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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general (467) and between friends (644).
88  Clearly the Chorus agree with Hermione that 
Andromache’s status in the house is problematic. 
 
Does Hermione feel erôs for Neoptolemos?  The word does not appear in the play at all, 
and neither does himeros; pothos appears only once, and refers to Hermione desiring death 
(824); and the verb stergô appears four times, but only once refers to love, and that is 
Neoptolemos’ (907: Orestes asking Hermione if her husband cherishes some other lover).
89  
At no point in the play does Hermione express any affection for Neoptolemos.
90  However 
she is highly sexualised,
91 though her erôs is expressed differently from that in Medea and 
Trachiniae, and makes much play with both her parental heritage (i.e. as the daughter of 
Helen and of Menelaus), and the connected  and antecedent story of the beauty  contest 
between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite.  The word Kypris occurs five times in the play, and 
in each case is either used to refer to Aphrodite as the bringer of sexual desire, or as an 
adjective meaning “sexual”.  Hermione is the first to use the word, perhaps inadvertently 
showing  how  much  sex  preys  on  her  mind,  when  she  says  a  good  husband  should  be 
content with one sexual partner (179: εὐναίαν Κύπριν).   Andromache picks up on this, 
first  mentioning  how  she  suckled  Hektor’s  bastards  when  sexual  desire  (223:  Κύπρις) 
caused  him  to  stray,  then  warning  Hermione  not  to  outdo  her  mother  in  man loving 
(229: φιλανδρίᾳ),
92 and finally directly admonishing her to keep silent about her sexual 
problems  (240:  Κύπριδος  ἀλγήσεις).    The  Chorus  picks  up  the  ball  and  runs  with  it, 
devoting the first stasimon (274 308) to a recapitulation of the beauty contest between the 
three  goddesses,  which  Aphrodite  won  by  delighting  Paris  with  deceptive  words 
(289: δολίοις ἕλε Κύπρις λόγοις, τερπνοῖς  ὲν ἀκοῦσαι), Helen’s failure to reject him, 
and the ten years of war that followed.  Hermione’s sexual appetites have now been firmly 
linked to her mother’s, but Peleus takes things a stage further by drawing attention to her 
father’s sexual incontinence too: in his agôn with Menelaus, he says that when the latter 
                                                 
88 See pp.187 8 for discussion of the other two instances. 
89 Two of the other three instances (180, 468) refer to a husband being content with one wife; the final one 
(214) refers to a wife putting up with a bad husband. 
90 See pp.188 9 on love and jealousy. 
91 Pagani (1968) 203 notes that Hermione “ha una concezione dell’amore puramente erotica e sessuale”.  
McClure  (1999)  179 81  discusses  Hermione’s  sexual  licence;  she  also  notes  that:  “At  Pl. Symp.  191e, 
φιλανδρία [a quality of Hermione, see main text below] is explicitly connected with adultery: “promiscuous 
and adulterous women” (γυναῖκες φίλανδροί τε καὶ  οιχεύτριαι)” (181n.60). 
92 Allan (2000) 100 suggests Hermione has tried to over compensate for her inherited lust by “demanding too 
strict a form of monogamy from her husband”; cf. McClure (1999) 180 1. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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recaptured Helen after ten years of war he should have killed her, but instead on seeing her 
breast  he  dropped  his  sword  (i.e.  was  “unmanned”)  and  welcomed  her  kiss,  being 
conquered by lust (631: ἥσσων πεφυκὼς Κύπριδος).  This scene is evoked again later, 
when Hermione, lamenting her earlier conduct, emerges from the house, tears off her veil, 
and bares her breast in public (830 5), an act of licentiousness that appals the Chorus.
93  
Finally, her sexual incontinence is shown by her willingness to elope with Orestes.  While 
Hermione  displays  no  affection  for  Neoptolemos  at  any  point  in  the  play,  her  highly 
sexualised nature ensures that she will lust for him, the only man she is allowed to sleep 
with – at least until she abandons her marriage and makes Orestes the object of her lust 
instead.
94  No less than for Medea or Deianeira then, does erôs play a part in Hermione’s 
jealousy of her “rival wife”. 
 
What of the other feelings we have seen as part of the Greek jealousy prototype?  Hermione 
does not exhibit grief, but then (unlike Medea) she does not feel affection for her husband, 
nor has he left her yet – and her attempted murder of Andromache is intended to ensure he 
never does.  She also does not express rage,
95 though some bitterness comes out – e.g. her 
comments to Andromache that she is hateful to her husband (157), and to Orestes that some 
of her misfortunes were caused by her husband (902), who avoids her bed in favour of 
someone else’s (908).    Hermione  clearly  considers Andromache a personal enemy, but 
again she does not talk about it; rather her hatred is manifested more in insults and in her 
intended murderous actions.
96  The emotion that most dominates the play, if (typically) 
rarely  named,  is  phthonos.    Having  referred  to  the  situation  between  Hermione  and 
Andromache as “hateful strife” (122: ἔριδι στυγερᾶι) in the parodos, in their very next 
interjection  (after  Hermione’s  diatribe  against  Andromache)  the  Chorus  opines  that  “a 
female heart is liable to phthonos and always exceedingly full of ill will to rival wives.” 
(181 2: ἐπίφθονόν τοι χρῆ α θηλείας φρενὸς  καὶ ξυγγά οισι δυσ ενὲς  άλιστ’ ἀεί).  
                                                 
93 See McClure (1999) 194 5. 
94 As with Deianeira (cf. n.59 above), Hermione’s erôs and self interest go hand in hand: she could feel erôs 
for Neoptolemos (without being “in love” with him in the modern sense) because sex with him would give 
her what she most wanted.  Sex is both an end in itself, and also a means to, and a measure of, other things 
(here status, worth) – see also n.76 above. 
95 Kholos does not appear in the play.  Three of the four instances of thymos (689, 728, 742 – the fourth 
(1072) just means “heart”) and the single instance of orgê (688) apply to Peleus and Menelaus. 
96 It is left to Menelaus to describe Andromache and her son as enemies – he calls them ekhthroi twice (515, 
520), and “most hated” (659: ἐχθίστους) once. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Eris is traditionally connected with phthonos,
97 and aside from the seven instances of eris 
that refer to Andromache and Hermione or comparative situations (see above), it is notable 
that the final two instances also refer to envy/jealousy scenarios: the beauty competition 
between Hera, Athena and Aphrodite (279), and the subsequent strife between Menelaus 
and Paris over Helen (362).  Given the focus on inheritance to explain Hermione’s rampant 
sexuality,  it  is  no  accident  that  Euripides  has  brought  up  these  two  episodes  from 
Hermione’s family’s past – he clearly intends eris, and by extension phthonos, to be an 
obvious theme of the play.  As Hermione explains in a lengthy attempt to shift the blame, 
this phthonos was fostered by gossip from her female friends (930 53);
98 and its result is as 
we have come to expect: (attempted) destruction of the envied person.  Phthonos has a 
tendency to drag its object down to the level of the patient,
99 and Peleus has already noted 
that Hermione and Menelaus wished to destroy Andromache’s son to make Neoptolemos’ 
line as barren as theirs (711 4).
100  And in her first speech Hermione insists that if she 
cannot kill Andromache she will ensure she ends her days as Hermione’s own personal 
drudge, cowering at her knees (164 5) – the desire to beat the rival, and make that victory 
manifest,  is  another  common  tendency  of  phthonos  (cf.  927 8:  Hermione’s  belief  that 
Andromache will treat her beaten rival likewise). 
 
Many similarities are now apparent from these three plays, and give us insights into the 
phenomenology  of  this  ancient  Greek  jealousy type  emotion.
101    In  all  three  plays, 
legitimate wives are (actually, potentially or supposedly) abandoned for rivals, and their 
three roles as Greek wives – as housekeeper, as bedmate, and (except for Deianeira) as 
bearer of children – are threatened.  All three women feel erôs for their partners, though 
what we might term “being in love” with them is not an obvious part of this (especially for 
Hermione).  All three are concerned about the exclusivity of their position as wife.  All 
three are concerned with their status, and that the rival can give their husband something 
they cannot (see n.76 above).  In two cases, the wife’s jealousy is caused or increased by 
her rival (potentially or actually) living under her own roof; and in the third by the husband 
                                                 
97 E.g. Hes. Op. 11 29 – see pp.45 7; cf. Most (2003) 130 1. 
98 For gossip as the female equivalent of male slander, see ch.7 n.32. 
99 For other examples of ‘dragging down’, see ch.7 n.31. 
100 Arist. Rh. 1.5 includes having children as one of the goods subject to good fortune that can excite envy in 
those who lack them (see p.85). 
101 I will use the word jealous(y) for convenience, though of course it should not be assumed that ancient 
Greek jealousy is identical to modern English in every respect – see ch.1.1. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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abandoning his own oikos to go to live under the rival’s roof.  The situational antecedents 
are, in all three cases, remarkably uniform.  There is a little more variety in the emotions 
aroused,  both  in  the  precise  affects  and  their  intensity,  but  there  are  some  obvious 
similarities: anger (in differing degrees) is felt for the partner who should have kept his 
marriage relationship exclusive (if not monogamous); hostility (ranging from hatred to mild 
hostility in the case of Deianeira) and phthonos are felt for the rival; and grief at least 
appears as part of the mix in Medea and (to a lesser extent) in Trachiniae.  In two cases the 
phthonos against the rival causes the jealous wife to seek the rival’s death, and in all cases 
there is a distinctly expressed desire to beat the rival. 
 
Konstan  argues  that  the  absence,  or  at  least  the  lack  of  explicit  expression,  of  love  or 
affection means that jealousy as we understand it did not exist in ancient Greece.
102  This 
position is open to two objections.  First, this contradicts Konstan’s own (valid) contention 
that there are cultural variations in emotions.
103  If these still allow us to use the obvious 
label for other emotions, why should jealousy be different?  Second, it is by no means the 
case that modern English jealousy need involve love: people from whose relationship love 
has  long  since  vanished  can  still  be  jealous  when  their  partner  goes  off  with  someone 
new.
104  What matters, even in modern English jealousy, is exclusivity (if not monogamy), 
not affection – what is important is that they are mine.  The phenomenology summarised 
above  is  very  clear,  and  its  uniformity  across  the  three  plays  I  have  examined  should 
demonstrate  beyond  doubt  the  existence  of  a  jealousy type  emotion  in  ancient  Greece, 
notwithstanding a supposed lack of emphasis on personal affection.  It is perhaps more 
germane to read this latter as merely an indication of the difference in the role of “love” (in 
a modern sense), as opposed to sexual desire (erôs), between ancient Greek and modern 
marriages – or at least a distinction in terminology and semantic boundaries. 
 
It is notable that all three plays involve jealous women, and  Goldhill’s contention that 
jealousy  is  not  a  heroic  enough  emotion  for  tragedy,
105  though  mistaken  as  a  general 
                                                 
102 Konstan (2006) 219 43.  Cohen (1991) 167 8 disagrees that the Greek marriage was necessarily devoid of 
either passion or emotional attachment, and provides a number of examples – see 168 n.131 for his examples 
of “women’s resentment at men’s infidelity”. 
103 The case is made for individual emotions throughout his book, but the Introduction (ibid. 3 40) especially 
makes the general case that emotions should be considered to be socially and culturally conditioned. 
104 See p.30 on the absence of love from most scholars’ lists of affects in the jealousy complex. 
105 Goldhill (2003) 171 2. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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principle,
106 does at least more generally seem to be borne out for men.  However, before 
turning  to  other  genres,  to  see  how  our  Greek  jealousy  prototype  survives  outside  of 
exclusive  (and  heterosexual)  marriage  relationships,  it  is  worth  considering  one  other 
character in the Andromache who could be labelled “jealous”: Orestes. 
 
Orestes narrates (957 86) how Hermione had been promised to him in marriage, but that 
Menelaus reneged on the agreement and gave her to Neoptolemos.  Later Orestes came to 
Neoptolemos and begged him to give Hermione to him instead.  He is aware of Hermione’s 
attempt to kill Andromache, and its failure, and has arrived with the intention of taking her 
away  from  Neoptolemos’  house,  if  she  wants  to  leave.    His  early  questioning  of  her, 
supposedly to learn what has happened, is therefore clearly disingenuous.
107  As far as 
Hermione is concerned, he is pushing at an open door, and he departs with her.  However, it 
is not enough for him merely to beat Neoptolemos by persuading his wife to elope with 
him.  His hatred (1006 7: ἔχθραν ἐ ήν.  ἐχθρῶν γὰρ ἀνδρῶν...), aroused by his sexual 
rivalry with Neoptolemos (and the latter’s insults of him – 977), requires that he must kill 
him too – and this he achieves, again through duplicity: he slanders (1005: διαβολαῖς τε 
ταῖς ἐ αῖς) Neoptolemos to the Delphians, who, believing the slanders (1092 5 for their 
content), then kill Neoptolemos.
108  McClure and Allan are surely right to see the link 
between the two halves of the play: that Orestes’ sexual jealousy of Neoptolemos reflects 
Hermione’s of Andromache.
109  Clearly Orestes does not want the wifely roles, but he does 
want the husband/protector role, indeed admits to begging for it (972 3).  Interestingly, for 
Orestes again the question of his promised bride appears to relate to issues of status, in his 
case his status as an outcast,
110 and the insult to his status by Neoptolemos’ withholding of 
‘his’ woman.  We are not told whether he feels erôs for Hermione – but we should note the 
following:  he  once  chose  her  for  his  wife;  he  tried  to  persuade,  indeed  begged, 
                                                 
106 It is a major plot element in at least three of the thirty two surviving tragedies – and if that ratio is 
reflective of lost tragedies, then by inference we can assume a jealousy plot was staged in Athens around 
twice a year (on average approximately one at each Lenaia and City Dionysia – not to mention other, local 
festivals). 
107 Allan (2000) 73. 
108 On slander and phthonos, see ch.6 n.70.  The language of phthonos is not present, but as will be clear from 
ch.3, the necessary conditions and phenomenology are consistent with a phthonos analysis: Orestes has a rival 
for the possession of a desired wife, he has been beaten by his rival in the past, but now has the opportunity to 
take the possession; he hates his rival; and he uses slander to destroy him. 
109 McClure (1999) 160 2, 199 200; Allan (2000) 74.  Kovacs (1980a) 5 does not see any link between the 
two halves. 
110 This status deters those who are not his philoi from offering him a wife (974 6); by returning Andromache 
to Menelaus, he will make Menelaus his philos, and thus obtain Hermione as his wife (985 6). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
 
191 
Neoptolemos  (a  marriage  rival,  hence  already  a  personal  enemy)  to  give  up  a  woman 
already married, rather than picking any other eligible princess; and he is pursuing her still.  
The main difference between Hermione’s jealousy episode and Orestes’, is that Orestes 
succeeds in murdering his target where Hermione fails.  Euripides has been able to depict 
Orestes’ jealousy with such economy, precisely because the example of Hermione is by this 
point so vividly in our minds. 
 
8.5  Sexual jealousy outside tragedy 
 
In this final section of the chapter I explore how well the closely portrayed tragic ‘type’ of 
the jealous woman is a model for jealousy in other genres, in particular in oratory and New 
Comedy.    The  most  detailed  portrayal  of  a  jealous  woman  outside  tragedy  occurs  in 
Antiphon 1, Against the Stepmother, which portrays a woman who allegedly caused the 
death of her husband,
111 by the administration of a poison she claimed was a love potion 
(1.9: ἐπὶ φίλτροις; 1.19: φάρ ακον).
112 She makes use of another woman to administer the 
drug, the mistress (1.14: παλλακή) of her husband’s friend Philoneus, whom Philoneus 
was about to put away into a brothel.
113  The stepmother describes the pallakê’s treatment 
by Philoneus as injustice (1.15: ἀδικεῖσθαι), and uses the same verb (1.15: ἀδικοῖτο) to 
describe her own treatment by her husband, thus appealing to the pallakê’s fellow feeling 
(1.15: καὶ αὐτή).  Though the text is not explicit about the fiction allegedly used by the 
stepmother to manipulate the unfortunate pallakê, the language used is highly suggestive.  
                                                 
111 As Carey (1997) 41 notes, there is “a striking lack of evidence to incriminate her”.  Gagarin (2002) 149 
notes that the speaker himself does not concentrate on either the issue of intention to kill, or whether she knew 
the drug was actually a poison.  The argument is much more along the lines of: “Is slipping us these potions 
something we men want our womenfolk to do to us with impunity?” – cf. Gagarin (2002) 150.  It is highly 
possible this case and the one cited at Arist. MM 1188b29 38, where the woman was acquitted on the grounds 
that she had no intention to kill, are one and the same – see Gagarin (1997) 140, Gagarin (2002) 149, Faraone 
(1994)  118.    I  am  much  less  concerned  here  with  whether  the  stepmother  actually  intended  to  kill  her 
husband, than with the means by which she supposedly persuaded the pallakê to administer the drug, and the 
speaker’s presentation of his stepmother’s actions to the court. 
112 This was allegedly the woman’s second attempt involving poison (§9 – and §3 suggests frequent previous 
attempts, possibly by other means).  Gagarin (1997) 111 2 notes the probable difficulty in antiquity of judging 
a dosage, and speculates that the failure of the first attempt may have led her to increase it the second time, 
with fatal results; cf. Faraone (1994) 119. 
113 This mistress was almost certainly a slave – Gagarin (1998) 12, n.6; cf. Gagarin (1997) 114, where he 
notes that that she could be put into a porneion (1.14), and that she could be tortured and executed without 
trial (1.20).  Gagarin (1998) 14, n.8 argues that the torture would have been part of her punishment; if she had 
been tortured for information, anything she said would have been cited in the speech; cf. Carey (1997) 41 2.  
Dillon (2004) 23 notes that if she had accused the stepmother, the latter would probably have been prosecuted 
immediately (which she was not). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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As Bonanno has shown, the language of dikê is frequently used to express the reciprocal 
expectations of amorous relationships in Greece – both that the one feeling philia should 
have her philia returned, and that both lover and beloved should behave in a certain way 
towards each other – and from Sappho onwards ‘adikia’ asserts that those expectations are 
not  being  met:  that  one  party  no  longer  feels  philia  for  the  other.
114    On  its  own  the 
language of adikia could be open to a number of readings, but combined with the love 
philtre it becomes more specific. This use of adikeisthai by the stepmother then, in respect 
of  both  her  and  the  pallakê’s  relationships,  must  be  designed  to  play  on  the  latter’s 
sensibilities.  Though clearly the stepmother’s husband would not be placing a legitimate 
wife  in  a  porneion,  the  connection  is  presumably  with  them  both  being  put  aside  for 
rivals.
115  The stepmother wins the pallakê over by presenting herself likewise as a jilted 
wife,  and  by  playing  on  the pallakê’s  insecurity,  to  persuade  her  of  a  commonality  of 
interest.  She tells her the potion will recapture their respective men’s affections (1.15: 
φίλον ποιῆσαι), something the pallakê believes she has lost.
116 
 
This  is  in  fact  the  only  case  in  surviving  sources  outside  tragedy  where  a  (portrayed) 
jealousy scenario actually leads to the death of either the loved one or the rival – but despite 
its uniqueness, it shows that an audience would be expected to believe such scenarios could 
happen  as  plausibly  off stage  as  on.
117    Gagarin  argues,  rightly  in  my  view,  that  the 
                                                 
114 Bonanno (1973).  The language of adikia was also seen in Medea (see n.41 above). 
115 The exact relationships between the speaker, the stepmother, the father, and his ‘other woman’ are hard to 
pin down.  Gagarin (1997) 114 15 suggests that, as the speaker was a minor when his father died, the father 
might have been having an affair with the speaker’s own mother, and the wife/stepmother felt herself in 
danger of being replaced by a younger model; this is unlikely, first as unmarried citizen women were not free 
to sleep around, and second as mêtruia (like “stepmother” in English) would normally refer to a later wife.  
Carey (1997) 41 refers in passing to the stepmother being a second marriage; however the opening of the 
speech  makes  clear  the  speaker  has  only  just  reached  his  majority,  and  as  he  is  being  opposed  by  his 
stepbrothers he is clearly younger than them, so this does not seem possible either; cf. Dillon (2004) 20 1.  
Three possible solutions can be suggested.  1. That the speaker’s mother was a citizen, but never married to 
his father (MacDowell (1978) 68 argues that to be a citizen one merely needed two citizen parents, but they 
did not need to be married) – unlikely as it is also predicated on an unmarried citizen woman having an affair.  
2. That neither the speaker nor his mother were citizens, and this type of case could be brought by an alien – 
MacDowell (1978) 76 notes some types could.  3. That the speaker was not strictly a citizen, but was accepted 
as one – MacDowell (1978) 67 notes that in the latter half of the Peloponnesian war the citizenship law was 
not strictly enforced (evidenced by it being reaffirmed in 403/2, but not applying to those born before that 
date), and Gagarin (1998) 10 suggests the speech is dated 420 410.  Either 2. or 3. would imply that the 
father’s relationship with the speaker’s mother was of some duration – also suggested by the alleged previous 
attempts on his life (see n.112 above). 
116 Faraone (1999) 119 notes that pharmaka and philtra were generally used to make husbands care more for 
their spouses, rather than desire them sexually – the words used are typically philein, stergein, or agapan, 
rather than eran.  (This is not, of course, to say that the wife might not feel erôs – see n.94 above). 
117 See P. Wilson (1996) on tragic narratives in oratory; see also Hall (1995). Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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speaker’s “vivid story of the women seeking desperate remedies when they fear they are 
losing their men’s love would fit comfortably into the (all male) jurors’ preconceptions 
about the kinds of steps desperate women take for the sake of love.”
118  However, the 
speaker does not concentrate on the jealousy angle – indeed he cannot, without risking 
creating sympathy for her.  Jealousy is used as a mask assumed by the wife, but then kept 
implicit.  Instead the speaker melodramatically, but effectively, refers to his stepmother as 
“that  Clytemnestra”  (1.17:  τῆς  Κλυται νήστρας  ταύτης).    We  might  think  from  the 
stepmother’s own arguments to the pallakê that Deianeira would be a more appropriate 
role model.  However the speaker does not want his stepmother compared with a rather 
pathetic woman, a victim, who (as Sophocles presents her) merely wished to retain her 
husband’s  affections  and  only  killed  him  by  mistake.    He  wants  to  link  her  to  an 
unambiguous husband killer, the sort of woman every right thinking Athenian would dread 
to have at home.  Aeschylus’ (the most famous tragic) Clytemnestra is also, among her 
multifarious  motivations  for  killing  her  husband,  driven  by  jealousy  at  his  bringing 
Cassandra home to live as a mistress under her roof.
119  The speaker in Antiphon 1 then, by 
using the single name “Clytemnestra”, is calling to mind a whole battery of imagery against 
his stepmother.  He rejects the ‘jealous wife’ story she spins to the pallakê – it would not 
help his case to focalise from her perspective.  He needs a monster, not a woman with a 
scrap of justification, hence “that Clytemnestra”. 
 
There are a number of other situations referred to in the oratorical corpus where a wife is 
very upset at her husband bringing a mistress into their house.  At Andoc. 1.124 5, the 
speaker mentions a certain Kallias who married a woman, then brought her mother into the 
house as a sexual partner, at which point the daughter tried to hang herself, then ran away 
(Kallias later has an affair with the granddaughter).
120  At Andoc. 4.14 15, Alkibiades is 
                                                 
118 Gagarin (2002) 147.  Gagarin goes on to note that many of them would have seen Medea; I would add 
Trachiniae and Andromache (to my mind much more apposite) – though what survives is just a portion of 
fifth century tragedy, and the theme of the jealous wife must have come up repeatedly (see n.106 above), so 
jurors might not necessarily have any particular tragedy in mind. 
119 At Aesch. Ag. 1412ff. Clytemnestra lists the reasons for her killing of her husband, starting with his 
sacrifice of their daughter.   She discusses his affairs in lines 1438 47, first sneering  at his  “soothing of 
Chryseises (plural) at Ilium”, then immediately pointing to Cassandra (1440: αἰχ άλωτος ἥδε) and calling 
her “sharer of his couch” (1441: κοινόλεκτρος τοῦδε), “his faithful bedmate” (1442: πιστὴ ξύνευνος), “his 
lover” (1446: φιλήτωρ τοῦδε), and “spice for my bed” (1447: εὐνῆς παροψώνη α τῆς ἐ ῆς). 
120 Interestingly, Andocides lampoons the man by comparing him to Oedipus or Aegisthus (1.129).  Once 
again, by drawing the audience’s attention to the theatre and pressing the right buttons, the speaker can make 
them tell the story for him – see bibliography at n.117 above. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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said to bring free and slave mistresses (plural) into the house, leading his wife to apply for a 
divorce.  She at least has somewhere to go (to her brother Kallias’, ironically the person 
who allegedly mistreated his wife in the same way in 1.124 5); Deianeira in Trachiniae 
does not, which might explain her more drastic measures to retain her husband’s affection.  
Similarly the stepmother in Antiphon 1 would be concerned for her position and status as 
wife, should her husband leave her for the other woman.
121  Such a scenario does occur in 
Isaeus  6,  where  the  old  man  Euktemon  moves  first  himself,  then  all  his  furniture  and 
possessions  to  the  house  of  his  pallakê  Alke,  leaving  the  legitimate  wife  and  children 
destitute – however, at least he had the decency to put his mistress up in a different house 
(Isae. 6.21), as did Lysias with Metaneira (Dem. 59.22).
122 
 
Most of the jealous characters we have seen so far have been women.  For the remainder of 
this chapter I turn to jealous men.  We have already seen one such character – Orestes in 
Andromache – and saw that his jealousy episode, unique in surviving tragedy, contained 
many  of  the  same  situational  antecedents  (with  appropriate  alterations  for  a  putative 
husband’s status rather than a wife’s), affective states, and resulting (destructive) action as 
the women’s.  Menander’s surviving comedies contain two portrayals of jealous men.  The 
first  is  in  Perikeiromenê.    The  soldier  Polemon  has  fallen  in  love  (128:  ἐραστοῦ 
γενο ένου; cf. 494: ἐρᾷς, 499: ἐρῶντι) with Glykera, an adopted girl of unknown origin; 
and the adoptive mother gave her to him as if she were her real daughter (130: δίδωσι τὴν 
κόρην ὡς θυγατέρα αὑτῆς ἔχειν).
123  The couple have since moved next door to the house 
in which lives Moschion, her real brother, though this family relationship is unknown to 
anyone except Glykera.  Moschion, ignorant, takes a fancy to her; in Polemon’s absence, he 
seizes an appropriate moment and rushes up to Glykera, throws his arms around her and 
kisses her (155 6: προδρα ὼν ἐφίλει, περιέβ[α]λλ’).  Polemon’s servant Sosias sees this, 
and reports it to Polemon, who is goaded into a rage (163: εἰς ὀργήν) by the goddess 
                                                 
121 Dillon (2004) 21. 
122 Kapparis (1999) 212 3; Carey (1992) 97; Davidson (1997) 99. 
123 The formulation used is that of a legal marriage, but since the girl is of unknown parentage, and hence not 
a citizen, she would not have been a candidate for a legitimate wife (at least at Athens – it is possible that 
Corinth, where the play is set, had different citizenship rules to Athens; though since the play premiered in 
Athens, Corinthian law would probably not be relevant).  Glykera then would be living with Polemon as his 
concubine (pallakê).  However Polemon later says he has regarded Glykera as his wife (489: ἐγὼ γα ετὴν 
νενό ικα ταύτην), and Sosias twice describes the rival as a moikhos (357, 370 – Polemon uses the same word 
at 986), a word that refers to an adulterer, or possibly someone having illicit sex with a close family member – 
Dover (1974) 209; see Cohen (1991) 98 109 for an argument against this extension; see also Traill (2008) 
40 45 on Polemon’s confusion of Glykera’s status between wife, concubine and hetaira. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Agnoia (whose aim is to bring about a reconciliation of the siblings).  In his mind, there is a 
‘love triangle’ (himself, his wife/mistress, and his rival); he already feels erôs for her, and 
now also orgê and, as  we shortly learn,  grief (he lies on his bed weeping (174: κλάει 
κατακλινείς) – as Medea did at the start of Euripides’ play) at her supposed betrayal of 
their  exclusive  relationship.    As  we  have  by  now  come  to  expect,  this  combination  of 
circumstances  and  affects  rouses  his  phthonos,  causing  him  to  carry  out  a  destructive 
action: he cuts off the long hair that makes Glykera beautiful (173), before throwing her out 
of the house.
124  This scenario, in situational antecedents, affective states, and resulting 
action, is very much in line with the cases we have examined so far (with the obvious rider 
that in comedy, rather than tragedy, even sharp emotion is not going to make a character 
kill another), and it is clear that Polemon is jealous.  The word Polemon himself uses (after 
the event) to describe his emotion and explain his action, is zêlotypos (987); and this word, 
first  appearing  in  our  sources  in  Aristophanes’  Wealth  (dated  388),  is  traditionally 
translated “jealous” (I discuss this further below).
125 
 
The other Menander play in which a character exhibits jealousy is Samia.  Uniquely in 
surviving Greek New Comedy, Demeas is a mature man in a loving, exclusive relationship; 
however his relationship is not with a citizen woman (i.e. a marriage), but with a Samian 
ex hetaira (a kept woman), called Chrysis;
126 the third member of the ‘family’ is Moschion, 
Demeas’ adopted son.
127  In the usual complicated way of New Comedy, Demeas comes to 
                                                 
124 As with Orestes, although the language of phthonos is not present, it is clear that the necessary conditions 
and phenomenology are consistent with a phthonos analysis: Polemon has a rival for the possession of a 
desired wife/mistress, she appears to have gone off with the rival, and so he damages her beauty so his rival 
cannot enjoy it. 
125 Polemon’s jealousy is widely recognised by scholars – see e.g. Goldberg (1980) 45, R.L. Hunter (1985) 
67, 150, Zagagi (1994) 18, 30, 49, 150, Lape (2004) 173.  Konstan (2006) 234 5 disagrees, but his argument 
that zêlotypos never means ‘jealous’ in Classical literature becomes strained here.  He writes (235): “Here, 
zêlotypos  seems  to  indicate  not  jealousy  so  much  as  an  unwarranted  or  excessive  reaction  to  perfectly 
legitimate behaviour.”  As Polemon ‘knew’ Glykera had no male family members, her being embraced and 
kissed by another man was certainly not legitimate behaviour; his reaction was therefore neither unwarranted 
nor  (judging  by  other  cases  of  jealousy  already  seen,  and  those  discussed  below)  particularly  excessive.  
Konstan’s  explanation  also  goes  against  the  etymology  of  the  term  –  zêlos  suggesting  an  element  of 
measuring  oneself  against  another.    I  discuss  this,  and  Konstan’s  argument  against  zêlotypia  meaning 
jealousy, further at pp.201 3, esp. n.148 below. 
126 As a mature man in a loving relationship, Demeas is unique not just to Greek, but also to Roman New 
Comedy, per Lape (2004) 139, who also notes that he is the only old man to be living permanently with a 
hetaira, and that a man of his age would have been expected to be married (or remarried).  Chrysis, for her 
part, behaves not like the usual hetaira of New Comedy, but as a respectable Greek wife and mother – Lape 
(2004) 141, Zagagi (1994) 55. 
127  As  a  citizen,  Moschion’s  adoption  renders  him  the  legitimate  son  of  the  oikos  under  Athenian  law, 
notwithstanding his adoption – see Zagagi (1994) 116 7. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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believe that Chrysis has slept with Moschion and had a child by him (the baby is actually 
Moschion’s by a different girl).  We learn from the prologue that Demeas feels erôs for 
Chrysis  (21:  εἰς  ἐ<πι>θυ ίαν;  81: ἐρᾷ),
128  and  is  concerned  about  younger  love rivals 
(26: ὑ[π’] ἀντεραστῶν  ειρακίων).
129  When he ‘discovers’ the supposed affair, he is 
furious (447: τὴν χολήν), but he immediately  exonerates Moschion (his ‘rival’), while 
placing all the blame on Chrysis (326ff.), in both cases on grounds of previous character.  
He heaps imprecations on Chrysis, calling her a whore and a plague (348), and labels her as 
his Helen (336 7 – a woman who ran off with a younger man who was then staying in her 
husband’s house).
130  He tells himself that he must leave behind his yearning and his erôs 
for her (350: ἐπιλαθοῦ τοῦ πόθου, πέπαυσ’ ἐρῶν), and he throws Chrysis (and the baby) 
out of the house, knowing she has nowhere else to go,
131 and spitefully tells her that he will 
find some other girl to love (385: ἀγαπήσει) him.  It should be clear by now that Demeas’ 
reaction at least owes something to jealousy.  We have already seen with jealous women 
that part of the Greek jealousy complex is a concern about status; Demeas too might be 
expected  to  have  such  a  concern:  Moschion  mentions  in  the  prologue  Demeas’  shame 
(23: ᾐσχύνετ’; 27: αἰσχύνεται) at living with Chrysis in a quasi marriage state at an age 
when he should be married, so totally at odds with the values of Athenian society;
132 how 
much more will he have been shamed at continuing the relationship after her (supposed) 
adultery with Moschion? 
 
Two other literary representations of old men cuckolded by their wives survive – one in 
tragedy,  one  in  oratory.    Many  scholars  have  pointed  out  the  similarity  of  the  Samia 
situation to that in Euripides’ Hippolytos.
133  Theseus returns from a long trip away from 
home to find his wife Phaidra dead.  He laments extensively, referring to her as his lekhos 
(858) and alokhos (801).  He soon learns that his wife has left a suicide note, saying his son 
                                                 
128 There seems to be a convergence of epithymia with erôs – see also Lysias 3.5, 3.39, 3.44, discussed below. 
129  Cf.  Deianeira  in  Trachiniae.    We  should  note  that  comedy  presents  a  situation  for  men  that  tragedy 
portrays only for women. 
130 See Goldberg (1980) 97 102 on this scene; also Lape (2004) 159 60.  Note that labelling with the name of 
a famous literary character is an easy way to make the audience tell the story for you (see p.193 and n.120 
above). 
131 R.L. Hunter (1985) 88. 
132 See Lape (2004) 139 40.  Lysias 3, discussed below, also portrays a mature man ashamed of a sexual 
passion inappropriate to his time of life (see n.142 below). 
133  E.g.  Goldberg  (1980)  99;  R.L.  Hunter  (1985)  116;  Zagagi  (1994)  56,  125  (where  he  quotes  other 
references); Lape (2004) 155 6, 159.  Theseus judges Hippolytos on (his view of) his past conduct, as Demeas 
does with Moschion and Chrysis. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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(her  stepson)  Hippolytos  had  made  sexual  advances  to  her,  and  she  killed  herself  in 
consequence.  Theseus immediate denounces and curses Hippolytos with death,
134 and at 
this moment of sharp anguish refers to Phaidra as his eunê (885).  It is hard to determine 
Theseus’ emotional motivation – he does not spend much time saying why he’s doing what 
he’s doing, mostly he just acts – but there are some indications.  Eunê is a more sexualised 
word than lekhos,
135 and it is interesting that he uses it uniquely at this point; later he 
returns to lektra (944) and lekhos (1266).  We should also note that his immediate response 
is to curse Hippolytos with death, implying hatred or jealousy.
136  He calls Hippolytos  ὴ 
φίλος (927), implying he is his ekhthros.  He then comes up with the secondary punishment 
of banishment: he wants Hippolytos either to die (887 90) or to be banished (893 8), but he 
later rejects a quick death for him, so his suffering can be long drawn out (1045 9).  This is 
reminiscent of Medea’s changing of Jason’s punishment: Theseus wants Hippolytos to have 
time to perceive his (Theseus’) revenge.  He also talks twice of Hippolytos dishonouring, 
first Zeus (886), then himself (1040), and also says he attacked Phaidra with violence (886: 
βίαι;  cf.  1073:  ὑβρίζειν)  –  Aristotle  tells  us  that  orgê  is  the  correct  response  both  to 
disrespect  and  to  hybris.
137    Euripides  seems  to  be  portraying  Theseus’  response  to 
Hippolytos’ supposed semi incestuous rape as shocked orgê and misos.
138  The situational 
and  affective  aspects  of  the  scenario  are  consistent  with  a  jealous  response,  and  the 
audience will understand it as implicitly present, but Euripides shies away from developing 
this aspect more fully.  Could it be that jealousy is inappropriate for men (as opposed to 
women) in tragedy,
139 while it can comfortably be presented in comedy? 
 
It is notable that the two jealous men we have seen in comedy are jealous over concubines, 
not citizen wives, and (as we shall see) this is more generally a pattern for jealous men in 
Greek  literature.    But  in  Lysias  1,  On  the  Murder  of  Eratosthenes,  we  might  wonder 
whether the speaker Euphiletos is trying to hide his jealousy at being cuckolded by his wife.  
                                                 
134 W.S. Barrett (1964/2001) 187 notes the speed and violence of his public denunciation of Hippolytos on 
reading Phaidra’s suicide tablet; I prefer to note the speed and violence of the curse. 
135 See n.11 above. 
136 See comments on Medea’s, Hermione’s and Orestes’ desires for their rivals’ deaths earlier in this chapter, 
and why Medea ‘commutes’ Jason’s sentence (see pp.173 4, p.187, p.190). 
137 Arist. Rh. 2.2.1378a30 b25. 
138 The element of shock (without other attendant emotions) is similar to the response of Hippolytos, the 
Nurse, and the Chorus on finding out whom Phaidra’s passion is for. 
139 Except Orestes of course, but Orestes is an extreme and unique figure in (especially Euripidean) tragedy in 
many ways.  It may be relevant that Theseus is the Athenians’ hero par excellence. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
 
198 
As he relates the story, dispassionately, he finds out that his young, demure wife has been 
having an affair with a young man (Eratosthenes) she met at a religious festival, assisted by 
her maid.  He forces the maid to tell him the next time Eratosthenes is in the house with his 
wife; and when she does, he quietly goes out, gathers a group of his friends, returns to 
surprise the couple in flagrante, and kills Eratosthenes.  He is tried for murder, but he 
argues that the ancient laws of Athens permit a husband to kill a moikhos caught in the act – 
indeed, the way he presents the case is that they almost demand it.  However those laws, 
while still on the statute book, were no longer considered comme il faut,
140 and Euphiletos 
faces  an  uphill  struggle  to  give  the  prosecution  no  handle  for  claiming  that  he  was 
motivated by anything other than a dispassionate desire to uphold the law to the fullest – 
should they prove otherwise, then they will be able to argue much more convincingly that 
he  was  guilty  of  entrapment,  while  the  defence  rests  on  everything  happening 
spontaneously.  Euphiletos is on shaky ground, because he has (by his own admission) 
known about the affair for several days before catching his wife and Eratosthenes in the act, 
and many will struggle to believe he went about his life completely as normal, not in any 
disquiet of mind, nor making any effort to stage manage the showdown.  Jealousy is the 
obvious construction for the audience to put on his actions, the ‘elephant in the living 
room’, and Euphiletos needs to avoid any hint that he was motivated by it.  Accordingly, in 
one of Lysias’s best character sketches, Euphiletos presents himself from the beginning as a 
simple, credulous, law abiding man, who does everything because it is the right thing to 
do.
141  He betrays no emotion for his young wife, neither erôs (despite their mutual flirting 
– 1.12 13), nor orgê on hearing the maid’s story or even on finding Eratosthenes in bed 
with his wife.   In his self presentation, he moves from gullible old man to austere defender 
of the law without a bridge, leaving no time for the audience to dwell on his likely true 
response. 
 
Mature men are not only portrayed as jealous (or not) in domestic cases.  In two other 
speeches by Lysias we find them coming to blows over young lovers.  In Lysias 3, Against 
                                                 
140 Carey (1989) 60 1. 
141 See Carey (1989) 61 2 and Todd (2007) 51 2 on Euphiletos’ self characterisation and strategy.  Carey is 
(rightly  in  my  opinion)  unconvinced,  saying  “Euphiletos  seems  a  little  too  innocent  to  be  true”  (63).  
Cf. Edwards and Usher (1985) 220 1, 224, 225, who see flashes of anger at his wife’s adultery peppering 
Euphiletos’ speech; this is, I think rightly, denied by Todd (2000) 16, (2007) 51 2, esp. n. 37.  See also 
Konstan (2006) 234, who in my view takes Euphiletos far too readily at his word. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Simon, the speaker, a man of advanced years,
142 portrays his opponent Simon’s jealousy at 
his lover,
143 a young Plataian boy called Theodotos, with whom they were both enamoured 
(3.5: ἐπεθυ ήσα εν), leaving him for the speaker.
144  Simon is presented as responding 
with violence against both the speaker (and his family) and the boy on two occasions, both 
times while under the influence of alcohol (3.6 8, 12 18).  However, despite the speaker’s 
first assertion that initially Simon was impassioned about the boy too (3.5: ἐπεθυ ήσα εν), 
he later says his behaviour (in waiting four years to prosecute) shows he was not really “in 
love” (3.39: ἐρῶσι, ἐπιθυ οῦσι; 3.44: ἐρᾶν) – presumably he was using the pretence as a 
front  for  his  then  hybris,  and  present  sycophancy  (3.44).    As  for  his  own  role  in  the 
brawling, the speaker attempts to generalise the dispute, labelling it “rivalry over a boy” 
(3.40: περὶ παιδικῶν ἐφιλονικήσα εν ἡ εῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους), and then assimilating it to 
fighting over female hetairai, or through drunken rivalry or games or insults (3.43: ἐκ  έθης 
καὶ φιλονικίας ἢ ἐκ παιδιῶν ἢ ἐκ λοιδορίας ἢ περὶ ἑταίρας  αχό ενοι).
145  While clearly 
trying to downplay the quarrel, he draws on the audience’s underlying assumption that 
sexual desire leads to a range of predictable consequences, irrespective of its object, and of 
the age of the subject. 
 
Two other cases show similar features.  The first is Lysias 4, On a Premeditated Wounding, 
which presents a fairly similar situation to Lysias 3, the differences being that the love 
object  is  a  girl,  the  speaker  is  of  indeterminate  age,  and  the  two  litigants  originally 
contracted to share in her favours (4.1).  The slave girl/prostitute, at least as presented by 
the speaker, clearly relishes the situation, twisting both men round her little finger (4.8, 
                                                 
142 Todd (2007) 278 notes the speaker “appears to be unmarried at an age when this was evidently unusual”.  
He expresses embarrassment at his erotic relationship with a young lad at his advanced age (3.4: ἄλλως δὲ 
ὑ ῖν  φαίνω αι  παρὰ  τὴν  ἡλικίαν  τὴν  ἐ αυτοῦ  ἀνοητότερον  πρὸς  τὸ   ειράκιον  διατιθείς)  –  just  as 
Demeas in Samia was ashamed of a relationship inappropriate to a mature man (see p.196 and n.132 above). 
143 Carey (1997) 82 agrees that the portrayal is of Simon’s “vindictive jealousy”. 
144 It is controversial whether Theodotos was a slave or free – see Carey (1989) 87, 90, Todd (2007) 279 81 
(with copious references to previous scholarship).  Simon apparently presented evidence that he had made a 
contract with Theodotos for the (probably exclusive – implied by the word ἑταιρήσοντα (3.24)) right to have 
sex with him for a period of time, before the end of which he went off with the speaker (3.22 26); and a 
legally binding contract could not be made with a slave.  However, on the speaker’s return from a trip with 
Theodotos, he goes to live in Piraeus while Theodotos lodges with a certain Lysimakhos.  The speaker skates 
over  who  this  individual  is,  but  it  is  possible  that  he  owned  a  brothel  in  which  Theodotos  was  a  slave 
prostitute, and that the contract Simon refers to was made with Lysimakhos, not with Theodotos.  If this were 
the case, the speaker would naturally not want to draw attention to Lysimakhos’/Theodotos’ statuses, as that 
would support the existence of a contract.  Carey (1989) 87 thinks that on balance Theodotos was probably a 
slave, Todd (2000) 43, (2007) 81 that he was not. 
145 See Fisher (1992) 67 on “Drunken brawls … over hetairai and boys”, also 86 n.2 on this case; cf. Cohen 
(1995) 132 3, Carey (1997) 82. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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17),
146 and the opponent is presented as sick with love for her (4.8: δύσερώς ἐστι) and, 
spurred  on  by  this,  liable  to  drunken  violence  (4.8: παρωξυ  ένος  ὀξύχειρ  λίαν  καὶ 
πάροινός ἐστιν) – and indeed a violent brawl results (4.5 7).  Another example is seen in 
Aeschines 1, Against Timarkhos, where the defendant is alleged as a young man to have 
moved in with Misgolas, an older man, to allow the latter to indulge his sexual practices 
(no erôs or epithymia is mentioned, though Misgolas did seek Timarkhos out and persuade 
him  to  leave  another  man  for  him,  so  some  passion  might  be  presumed).    Effectively 
Timarkhos was to be his companion, and exclusively so: Misgolas had allegedly paid in 
advance for the right to have sex with him exclusively (1.41: ἀργύριόν τι προαναλώσας 
– the phrase is one we might expect to see used for relationship with a hetaira).  Aeschines 
mentions an occasion when Timarkhos neglected to turn up to accompany Misgolas at a 
procession: Misgolas was angered (1.43: παρωξυ  ένος) by this and, on searching, by 
finding Timarkhos “lunching” (1.43: συναριστῶντα) with foreigners.  Despite Aeschines’ 
circumlocution, one can read between the lines that more than food was intended to be 
shared  at  this  lunch:  Misgolas  threatens  them  with  prison  for  corrupting  a  free  youth 
(1.43: ὅτι  ειράκιον ἐλεύθερον διέφθειραν) – the phrase must allude to passive anal sex, 
the only inappropriate activity for a citizen, and one which Aeschines has already said 
Timarkhos liked to indulge in (1.41).  Once again, a speaker is relying on his audience’s 
recognition of a scenario, together with its likely affects and outcomes.  What is interesting 
about this case is the stimulus: most cases of male jealousy we have seen are provoked, not 
by imminent loss of status as with women, but by the beloved’s sexual acts with another. 
What these acts are, however, are normally not specified (e.g. Lysias 3, Lysias 4), or are 
unremarkable (a hug and kiss in Perikeiromenê, vaginal intercourse resulting in pregnancy 
in Samia).  The cause of Misgolas’ jealousy – being stood up on a date because his beloved 
is dining with other men – has a nice element of phenomenological precision to it. 
 
Later  in  the  same  speech,  Timarkhos  is  “lodging”  with  Pittalakos,  a  public  slave.  
Hegesandros, a citizen, forms a desire (1.57: ἐπεθύ εσε) for Timarkhos, asks Pittalakos to 
give him up, and when he refuses, personally persuades Timarkhos to move in with him.  
                                                 
146 There is a disparity between the girl’s slave status and the power her sexuality gives her over the two men, 
which turns what was supposed to be a simple sexual arrangement into something else.  Greek literature tends 
to treat sex with slaves as an objective process, even in plays such as Samia where the other partner is in love 
with them.  This speech is more frank about the complexities of ‘real life’. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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Pittalakos  is  then  described  as  feeling  zêlotypia  (1.58:  ἐζηλοτύπει),  a  word  (as  noted 
above) normally translated as ‘jealousy’; however his only action is to make a nuisance of 
himself by hanging around (1.58: ἐφοίτα) Hegesandros’ house.  The scenario is one where 
we  might  expect  jealousy,  and  despite  our  not  being  told  we  might  assume  (as  with 
Misgolas) that Pittalakos felt erôs for Timarkhos, but we have not heard that he is in any 
way angered at Timarkhos’ conduct, nor that he takes any violent or destructive action – on 
the contrary, it is Hegesandros and Timarkhos who end up committing hybris against him.  
It is possible that the financial aspects of the situation provide the clue: Misgolas is said to 
have paid Timarkhos a sum of money in advance,
147 and so would have expected the right 
to have sex with him on an ongoing and exclusive basis (such arrangements can be shared 
by agreement, as in Lysias 4, but are not open more widely); Pittalakos is merely said to 
have  cash  (1.54: εὐπορῶν  ἀργυρίου),  and  to  be  able  to  fund  Timarkhos’  debauched 
lifestyle (1.54: χορηγὸν τῇ βδελυρίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ), an exchange that is exclusive while it 
lasts, but which neither side is obliged to continue.  However, Pittalakos is loathe to lose 
Timarkhos’ favours as a live in lover, hence his hanging around Hegesandros’ house: he is 
trying  to  win  Timarkhos  back.    This  is  in  fact  the  same  behaviour  we  see  Polemon 
practising  in  Perikeiromenê:  having  begrudged  sharing  Glykera’s  favours  with  another 
man, and having cut off her hair and kicked her out in jealous rage, he later repents and 
hangs around Moschion’s house in an attempt to win her back.  His attempts are certainly 
more  violent  than  Pittalakos’  (he  tries  to  storm  Moschion’s  house),  but  that  is  merely 
indicative of his being a soldier rather than a public slave. 
 
Konstan has analysed in detail usage of the word zêlotypia and its cognates.
148  They seem 
to be used in two types of scenario: either when someone possesses something that they do 
not want to share; or when they wish to share in something they currently do not.  The first 
type is evidenced by the first two datable occurrences of the word: in Aristophanes’ Wealth 
(388  BC),  and  Plato’s  Symposium  (380s  BC).    In  Wealth  an  impecunious  gigolo,  who 
sleeps with an old woman in return for her spending money on him, beats her up when 
                                                 
147 We cannot be certain this is true, it is merely an allegation, but I am more concerned with the fact that such 
a scenario can plausibly be put before an audience than with the truth of the allegation. 
148 Konstan (2006) 222 32, who disputes the accepted and usual translation of ζηλοτυπία as ‘jealousy’ (LSJ), 
arguing  for  a  whole  range  of  alternatives  including:  one  of  the  “competitive  emotions”,  “covetous 
resentment”, “invidious contention”, “surliness”, and  “unwarranted insistence on exclusive possession” of a 
person.  See also Fantham (1986), who especially notes the tendency of the zêlotypos to violence. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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another  man  looks  at  her;  the  old  woman  explains,  “That’s  how  zêlotypos  he  was.” 
(1016: οὕτω  σφόδρα  ζηλότυπος  ὁ  νεανίσκος  ἦν).    Similarly,  in  Symposium,  when 
Socrates is describing his (sex free) love affair with Alkibiades, he says, “And from the 
time that I became his lover (213d1: ἠράσθην), I cannot look at or converse with another 
handsome man without him feeling zêlotypia and phthonos (213d2: ζηλοτυπῶν  ε καὶ 
φθονῶν), and he does all kind of strange things and shouts abuse and can scarcely keep his 
hands off me.”  What zêlotypia seems to imply in all four of the above cases (Wealth 1016, 
Symposium 213d2, Aeschines 1.58, Perikeiromenê 987) is possessive, rather than sexual, 
jealousy – though, as Konstan himself notes,
149 there is no intrinsic reason why this cannot 
include sexual jealousy – i.e. possessive jealousy of a sexual object – as indeed I have 
argued (contra Konstan) that it does in Perikeiromenê (see pp.194 5 and n.125 above). 
 
The  other  usage  of  zêlotypia  cognates  is  when  one  is  not  currently  (or  formerly)  in 
possession of some person, object or quality, and feels zêlotypia for those who are.  This 
usage of the word is seen twice in Aeschines 3, Against Ctesiphon: first, Demosthenes is 
said  to  be  motivated  by  zêlotypia  to  match  the  openness  to  bribes  (3.81:  ὑπὲρ  τῆς 
δωροδοκίας ζηλοτυπίας) of one Philokrates; second, his apparently virtuous oration is 
mocked  as  polluted  refuse  feeling  zêlotypia  for  virtue  (3.211: κάθαρ α  ζηλοτυποῦν 
ἀρετήν).  The most vivid usage comes in Isocrates 15, Antidosis, where the author talks 
about those who feel envy towards him, feeling a passion to share his ability in speaking 
(15.244: πάντας τοὺς φιλοτί ως διακει ένους, ἐπιθυ ητικῶς ἔχοντας τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ 
καὶ λέγειν), but who are too lazy to apply themselves.  He talks about their attitude towards 
others who do apply themselves and work hard to gain those same ends, describing them as 
being  malicious  and  feeling  zêlotypia  and  being  agitated  in  their  minds,  and  suffering 
almost  as  if  they  felt  erôs  (15.245:  δυσκόλως  ἔχειν  καὶ  ζηλοτυπεῖν  καὶ  τὰς  ψυχὰς 
τεταραγ ένως  διακεῖσθαι  καὶ  πεπονθέναι  παραπλήσια  τοῖς  ἐρῶσιν).    Isocrates  is 
explicitly giving a sexual simile.  However, this is not the jealous possessiveness of those 
who are already in an exclusive erotic relationship, but the grudging, malicious envy that 
people  who  have  a  passion  for  those  they  will  never  attain,  feel  against  those  more 
successful than themselves – the feeling of the spotty, geeky teenager for the jock who gets 
all the girls.  Zêlotypia, then, in this aspect is a close cousin to Greek jealousy, but not 
                                                 
149 Ibid. 226. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
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identical to it (at least in the Classical period).
150  It is actually not dissimilar to phthonos, 
both in its grudging, malicious nature, and in being  able to be  felt both by those who 
possess and do not want to lose, and those who do not possess but wish to; however the 
sexual nature of zêlotypia, whether sexual in actuality or metaphorically (as in Aeschin. 3), 
moves it rather closer to jealousy than mere phthonos.  Greek has a penchant for coupling 
words with similar meanings, and it is notable that zêlotypia is coupled with phthonos at 
Symposium 213d2.  It also has a flavour of greed about it: a desire to have part of what one 
has none of (or a greater part of what one has a small part of), and retain all of what one has 
to the exclusion of all others. 
 
8.6  Conclusion 
 
We have seen that there is both a degree of convergence and a degree of divergence in 
representations of jealousy in men and women, and across different genres.  In general, a 
jealousy scenario requires three people: two currently or formerly in a sexual relationship, 
and a rival.  The jealous person will feel erôs for the partner, and this erôs, or at least a 
softer affection (philein, stergein, agapan), will normally have once been returned.
151  On 
learning  of  a  rival,  other  affects  are  simultaneously  aroused:  typically  orgê,  misos  and 
phthonos,  with  grief  and  pride  occasionally  part  of  the  mix.    Generally  some  sort  of 
destructive  action follows, in tragedy  (and occasionally  elsewhere) typically murder, in 
other genres some attempt either to make the disputed partner unattractive (e.g. shearing 
Glykera’s hair in Perikeiromenê, beating up the old woman in Wealth – the emotion in such 
situations being sometimes described as zêlotypia), or to harm the rival (e.g. beating each 
other  up  in  Lysias  3  and  4,  Theseus’  curse  in  Hippolytos,  a  threat  of  legal  action  in 
Aeschines 1).  Phenomenologically, if not etymologically, this is all very similar to modern 
English ‘jealousy’. 
 
However the social imbalance in ancient Greek (male female, and free slave) relationships 
creates some notable differences too.  Women, especially wives or concubines in pseudo 
marriage situations (who will generally be older and have lost their looks), lack the ability 
                                                 
150 It also overlaps with English ‘jealousy’, though is by no means coterminous with it. 
151 Off all the cases we have seen, the only one sided attraction was on the part of Hermione; however as a 
wedded wife she at least had the right to expect some affection from her husband, even though it had never 
materialised. Chapter 8:  Sexual Jealousy 
 
204 
to choose partners.  Sex, status and stability therefore go hand in hand.  Wives and long 
term concubines exhibit jealousy when their status or the stability of their relationship is 
threatened, whether that is because they think they are about to be put aside for someone 
else, or because a mistress is being moved into their house; however they do not generally 
exhibit jealousy when their husbands merely have sex with someone else (albeit they may 
not  be  totally  indifferent).    Women  in  Greece,  unlike  men,  do  not  generally  have  the 
freedom to leave their spouse for someone else, and are expected to be sexually faithful – it 
is  therefore  being  cuckolded  that  arouses  husbands’  jealousy.    Outside  of  the  marriage 
bond, whether in homoerotic passion for a youth or desire for a slave woman, men operate 
in a context of unrestricted competition; they are sometimes (though not always) happy 
even  to  share  the  sexual  favours  of  the  beloved,  but  cannot  accept  being  thrown  over 
entirely, and they compete or struggle more overtly for possession. 
 
As well as these striking gender differences, there are also differences between genres.  The 
most obvious is that surviving tragedy contains several, clear, play length portrayals of 
jealous women, while providing only two, brief, ambiguous portrayals of jealous men.  In 
surviving New Comedy, however, we generally find jealousy associated with men, and in 
oratory  even  when we  get the woman’s point  of view it is focalised through the male 
speaker, who can choose motifs to play with or avoid as the circumstances demand.
152  We 
should therefore see the almost complete lack  of jealous men in tragedy  as  a strategic 
omission.    Good  tragedians  (or  indeed  comedians  or  logographers)  edit  situations  and 
reactions: there is a divergence between tragedy and real life, which comedy and oratory 
can approximate much more closely.  Zeitlin has argued that tragedy is mainly preoccupied 
with men, and that women are ‘the Other’ who exist to define men and probe masculine 
values.
153  Perhaps this indicates that jealous women in tragedy reify ‘the Other’ within 
men, the potential vice of destructive jealousy in the hearts of all Greeks, which in the 
‘Othering’ ideology of tragedy can only safely be portrayed in women.
154  New Comedy, 
however, allows the portrayal of jealous men (though at least in surviving plays stops short 
of  portraying  it  within  conventional  marriage),  and  the  two  examples  we  have  portray 
scenarios much more similar to those represented in the oratorical corpus. 
                                                 
152 New Comedy too tends to use male focalisers. 
153 Zeitlin (1990) 68 71. 
154 Possibly for the same reason, Homer does not portray Menelaus as motivated by jealousy in pressing his 
brother to war. Conclusions 
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Conclusions 
 
In the absence of direct access to the emotional experiences of Greeks of the Archaic and 
Classical period in Athens and elsewhere, and given our dependence on written texts, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that so much effort has been devoted to lexical study.  There are, as 
was observed in the Introduction, significant advantages to such an approach, especially 
when we wish to chart the semantic range and the conceptual boundaries between emotions 
as defined by ancient writers.  However, an elusive emotion like envy/phthonos, which is 
bounded by taboos, can properly be explored only in the abstract by such an approach.  I 
hope to have demonstrated that a methodological approach such as that adopted in this 
thesis – which focuses less on specific terminology than on identifying and examining envy 
and jealousy scenarios (or, more properly, phthonos and Greek sexual jealousy scenarios) – 
can be fruitful in illuminating the emotions as experience beyond the possibilities permitted 
by a purely lexical approach.  On a phenomenological level, the modern, multidisciplinary 
research into envy and jealousy and related emotions has helped to illuminate the Greek 
phenomena, allowing me first to explore the socio psychological extent of phthonos itself, 
and  second  to  show  how  phthonos  can  be  paired  with  (or  differentiated  from)  other 
emotions.    The  use  of  constructs  derived  from  modern  social  sciences  as  a  means  of 
exploring  ancient  phenomena  inevitably  raises  questions,  but  the  validity  of  the  use  of 
modern  phenomenological  readings  of  emotion  is  in  this  case  confirmed  by  a  close 
examination of Aristotle’s theorisation of phthonos. 
 
The application of this approach to different Classical Athenian genres produced differing 
results, which shed new light on discrete aspects of those genres, in turn reflecting back on 
aspects of Classical Athenian society.  I have shown that phthonos can be, and indeed 
frequently is, used by speakers in oratory to discredit their opponents; it can also be aroused 
in the audience, either explicitly by name when it applies to (justified) resentment over the 
misuse of money or political power, or more covertly through manipulation of ideology 
when (malicious) envy is the desired emotion.  I have argued that the arousal of phthonos 
against politicians, ostensibly as moral resentment but also as a cover for malicious envy, in 
the audience of Old Comedy ensures that one function of this genre is to allow a non Conclusions 
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destructive outlet for phthonos.  In this case it can be argued plausibly that the appeal to 
phthonos, though it was never (fully) theorised in this way by the Athenians themselves, 
has  a  politically  useful  role  in  helping  to  stabilise  the  democratic  system;  and  I  have 
demonstrated how Aristophanes does this repeatedly in his political comedies of the 420s.  
The  fullest  socio psychological  exploration  of  Greek  phthonos  and  sexual  jealousy 
scenarios qua scenarios came from an exploration of tragedy; and due to the absence of 
phthonos words (or indeed even the existence  of a label for sexual jealousy), this was 
rendered possible only by my theoretical approach. 
 
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to two more general points that have emerged from 
this thesis.  First that phthonos has a somewhat broader purview (including as it does a 
sense of moral resentment), and a much wider prevalence in Classical Athenian genres, 
than is generally appreciated.  Second, that sexual jealousy does exist in Classical Athens 
despite the lack of a prototypical label; it is almost certainly not the only such emotion 
(‘positive’ pride is another that springs to mind), and it is instructive to consider just how 
thoroughly a theoretical approach can illuminate such phenomena when Greek and English 
lexica do not match. 
 
I have suggested at various points in this thesis directions in which this research could be 
taken forward.  Two avenues for potential research were suggested by the limits I set in my 
Introduction.  The first would be to use the model I have created to investigate envy and/or 
jealousy  in  works  or  genres  I  have  not  touched  (e.g.  onstage  phthonos  in  comedy;  or 
phthonos in speeches in Thucydides), or other periods (e.g. phthonos in the speeches of 
Dio of  Prusa;  or  sexual  jealousy  in  the  Greek  novel  –  see  p.16),  or  in  other  societies 
(e.g. phthonos within the courts of Hellenistic kings; or sexual jealousy in a society such as 
Sparta, where women’s lives were less closeted, and a citizen could allow another to have 
sex with his wife to produce children).  The second avenue suggested would be to stay with 
Classical  Athens,  but  change  the  model  to  allow  investigation  of  material  culture,  for 
instance  decrees  (which  would  involve  a  greater  comparative  study  of  political  and 
legislative  theory),  or  curse  tablets  (which  would  require  much  greater  exploration  of 
comparative anthropological scholarship on magic). 
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A third avenue for research, and potentially the most exciting, would be to investigate other 
emotions via similar models: either emotions that have not yet been the subject of much 
research (e.g. hope, regret, positive pride); or ones on which research has been done, but so 
far primarily from a lexical point of view (e.g. anger, pity, grief).  With the amount of 
scholarship that has been, and is being, published on individual emotions across a large 
variety of disciplines, I believe that Classicists should be much more open to using this rich 
trove to inform future research across a wide range of emotions – an intellectual cross 
fertilisation that in due course might become mutual. 
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